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Research into the career of the merchant-smuggler John Nisbet of Gunsgreen 
House, Eyemouth has led to a ‘bottom up’ analysis in this thesis of the North 
Sea smuggling business in the second half of the eighteenth century. Building 
on previous work, but supplemented by a range of new material, this thesis 
challenges some assumptions, notably about direct links between smaller 
Scottish ports and Gothenburg and highlighted the role of the merchant-
smuggler in managing the import of tea from Sweden. It has also highlighted the 
significance of ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ as a brand, extensively advertised in 
newspapers in Scotland and the north of England. 
 
As well as this important addition to our understanding of the northern 
smuggling world, the thesis examines in detail the activities of the small port of 
Eyemouth, developing a knowledge of the methods adopted by smugglers and 
their relationships with each other and with the customs. It will also review the 
North Sea timber trade of the period, challenging earlier preconceptions about 
both the source of much of the timber that came to Scotland and how the 
business was managed.  
 
What it shows is that it is now possible to undertake micro historical research of 
a small port with, apparently, minimal local records, by combining a wider range 
of material, including much now available online, such as family history 
resources and the British Newspaper Archive. In this case, too, evidence is 
provided by Gunsgreen House itself, its physical fabric – the so-called tea 
chute, for example – and its symbolic importance for John Nisbet. 
 
The result is a detailed analysis of northern smuggling, including the importance 
of the role of Scottish merchants in Gothenburg, some of whom were Jacobite 
exiles, and of the business processes involved in smuggling which were 
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For a period of some forty years in the middle of the eighteenth century, the port 
of Eyemouth in the far south-east of Scotland had a small, but steady trade 
across the North Sea, importing timber, iron and tar from Sweden and Danish 
Norway and exporting grain. It had a community of merchants and a small 
number of professionals. It was, in other words, an unremarkable town. A visitor 
to Eyemouth today is immediately aware of Gunsgreen House, a large mid-
eighteenth-century merchant’s house dominating the town and harbour. It is the 
history of this house, and of its builder, John Nisbet, that was the starting point 
of this thesis. What it demonstrates is how small scale, local, or micro-history 
can lead to a complete re-think of how a subject is viewed. In this case, that 
subject is smuggling, in particular, smuggling across the North Sea into 
Scotland. 
 
Figure Intro/1. Gunsgreen House 
 
The initial objective was to examine the business of smuggling in Berwickshire, 
the southernmost county on the east coast of Scotland. It became clear, 
however, that by studying smuggling from the bottom up, it has been possible to 
produce a ground-breaking analysis of North Sea or northern smuggling. An 
area of consideration throughout is the nature of smuggling as a crime. Was it a 
social crime, as key writers in the 1960s and 1970s proposed or was it, less 
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romantically, an economic crime – tax evasion, in fact? Were there different 
styles of smuggling in different parts of the country? Is there evidence of 
popular support for smuggling and/or for the enforcement agencies? Was it a 
violent business as it was often portrayed at the time? 
 
Tea was the main item of contraband in the North Sea and tea smuggling, in 
general terms, has been studied before, but by revisiting some of the sources 
used by the pioneers in this field, combined with an analysis of newspaper 
advertising, and, in particular, a unique group of documents relating to the 
failure of the business of John Nisbet, it has been possible to develop a much 
clearer picture than hitherto of the mechanics of this trade, including the 
development of ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ as a brand. 
 
In addition, the in-depth analysis of the trade of the small port of Eyemouth has 
challenged some existing assumptions about the Scottish timber trade with 
Norway and permitted the development of the proposition that agricultural 
improvement created the environment in which smuggling could flourish. It has 




The focus of the thesis on Eyemouth, situated a few miles north of the border 
with England on the east coast of Scotland (see map in Chapter 2, Fig. 2/1), 
has made it possible to develop an understanding of the way that conventional 
trade and smuggling both operated in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
and how closely they were inter-woven. There is no reason to believe that 
Eyemouth was particularly unusual, so it is permissible to use this work as the 
basis for an examination of smuggling elsewhere in Scotland and Britain. In 
other words, Eyemouth can be seen as a microcosm of small ports of this 
period. 
 
What this thesis has been able to do is to combine a great many sources, both 
primary and secondary, and examine them from the point of view of the 
smugglers of Eyemouth, which has allowed for a new perspective on the 
business of smuggling. Previously, much published work in this area has been 
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either very specific, focusing on individual smugglers, but failing to place them 
in a wider context, or quite general, selecting examples with little regard to the 
influence of locality. It was the detailed examination of the processes involved 
that led to the outcomes presented here. At the heart of this analysis is John 
Nisbet. He was not a particularly significant figure outside of Eyemouth, but 
there is enough evidence surviving of his business affairs and relationships to 




Any examination of the historiography of smuggling is quite challenging. 
Academic historians have been wary of looking at the subject in the depth that 
is pursued in this thesis. They have tended to review its impact on the economy, 
at a high level or at smuggling as an example of social crime. Any detailed 
examination of smuggling at a local level has been left largely to non-
professional or popular historians, writing for a lay audience and usually in a 
purely local context. Contemporary accounts are often sensationalised or 
written for a moral or political purpose.  
 
This thesis is largely developed around primary sources, in particular, the 
documents relating to the process of sequestration (bankruptcy) of John 
Nisbet’s business. The existence of this small, but rich cache of documents, 
alongside the detailed examination of the small merchant community of 
Eyemouth, has allowed a re-examination of material used by other writers and 
the records of the Scottish Board of Customs to produce a far more detailed 
picture of smuggling across the North Sea than has hitherto been possible. 
 
Academic writings on smuggling 
 
The first academic histories of smuggling reflected the late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century concentration on administrative and political history. 
Elizabeth Hoon’s study was, primarily, focused on the governmental body, the 
Customs service, whose role was to prevent smuggling, rather than with the 
practices and experiences of the smugglers themselves. Hoon was the first 
serious researcher to search out and use the scattered records of the customs 
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service throughout England to produce her work The Organisation of the 
English Customs System 1696–1786, first published in 1938, and republished 
with a critical introduction by Rupert Jarvis in 1968. In her original preface Hoon 
set out her purpose: 
 
No detailed account has been made of the nature of customs 
administration in the eighteenth century, at the very time when that 
administration had its greatest significance in the working of the 
mercantile system…This book attempts to describe the elaborate 
organisation which existed for the collection of a revenue that was used 
to meet the national debt and to finance the wars which helped Britain 
win her first Empire.1  
 
This clearly shows understanding of the importance of the customs service to 
the functioning of the fiscal-military state in the eighteenth century and the 
driving force behind its enforcement activities. To this end, it concentrated on 
the state’s response to smuggling, rather than on the process of smuggling 
itself. It was, then, very much a ‘top down’ interpretation of the subject. 
 
In 1959 Neville Williams, an assistant keeper at the Public Records Office, 
published a review of 700 years of smuggling.2 In his bibliography, he referred 
to key texts in understanding the history of the subject, which include Hoon and 
Teignmouth & Harper. He highlights, as ‘the best introduction’, G.D. Ramsay’s 
paper in the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society in 1952.3 This is the 
first article to recognise the role of smuggling in economic history and set the 
agenda for such studies over the succeeding years. Ramsay’s opening 
sentence summarises his argument: ‘Some share – fluctuating and uncertain, 
but assuredly significant – of English foreign trade in modern times is to be 
credited to smugglers…’ He highlighted the fact that ‘There were large-scale 
smuggling interests involved, for instance in the clandestine eastern trade that 
sheltered itself…behind the rights of the companies located, at least in name, at 
Copenhagen, Lisbon, Ostend or Trieste’, and he drew attention to the fact that 
‘other evidence suggests that most of the tea drunk in Great Britain in the 
 
1 Elizabeth E. Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System 1696–1786 (Newton 
Abbott: David and Charles, 1968), p.xxx. 
2 Neville Williams, Contraband Cargoes: Seven Centuries of Smuggling (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co. Ltd., 1959). 
3 G.D. Ramsay, ‘The Smugglers’ Trade: A Neglected Aspect of English Commercial 
Development‘, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series , 2 (1952), 131–157. 
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seventies was smuggled.’4 Ramsay clearly recognised the importance of tea 
smuggling and of the European East India companies in that context, although 
the most significant of these, the Swedish East India Company (Svenska 
Ostindiska Companiet: SOIC) was omitted. 
 
Louis M. Cullen was another relatively early scholar of the subject, who devoted 
attention to smuggling linked to Ireland. His earliest article was published in 
1957 and dealt with a series of letters dating from 1737.5 A subsequent paper in 
1969 addressed the practicalities of the smuggling business in Ireland, which 
was then supplemented in 1994 by a monograph examining the impact of 
smuggling on the economy of Ayrshire.6  
 
The most influential series of papers starting in the 1950s are those by W.A. 
Cole, and Hoh Cheung and Lorna H. Mui. They form a group as the Muis 
challenged aspects of Cole’s work, which he then defended.7 Cole undertook 
statistical analysis to seek to demonstrate the volume of tea smuggled into 
Britain, citing Ramsay to support his contention that official statistics of imports 
and re-exports were ‘virtually useless’.8 The Muis took issue with some of his 
findings, but also looked at the details of the trade in smuggled tea. Their 
starting point was, however, common to many scholars addressing smuggling, 
in that ‘smugglers have a secure place in adventure stories’ and that one of the 
purposes of their work was to ‘bring smuggling down from the heady tales of 
romance to the workaday business it was in fact.’ They also explained that ‘it is 
only recently, however, that we have become fully aware of the importance of 
smuggling in European economic history’.9 
 
 
4 Ramsay, ‘The Smugglers’ Trade’, 135. 
5 Louis M. Cullen, ‘Five Letters Relating to Galway Smuggling‘, Journal of the Galway 
Archaeological and Historical Society, 27 (1957), 10–25. 
6 Louis M. Cullen, ‘The Smuggling Trade in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century’, Proceedings of 
the Royal Irish Academy: Section C, 67 (1969), 149–175; L.M. Cullen, Smuggling and the 
Ayrshire Economic Boom of the 1760s and 1770s, Ayrshire Monographs 14 (Ayr: Ayrshire 
Archaeological and Natural History Society, 1994). 
7 Hoh-Cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784’, The 
American Historical Review, 74.1 (1968), 44–73; W.A. Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth Century 
Smuggling’, The Economic History Review, New Series 10.3 (1958), 395–410; W.A. Cole, ‘The 
Arithmetic of Eighteenth Century Smuggling: Rejoinder’, The Economic History Review, New 
Series 28.1 (1975), 44–49. 
8 Cole, ‘Trends’, 395. 
9 Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling’, 44. 
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H.S.K. Kent’s ground-breaking 1973 work on trade in the North Sea was key to 
understanding the importance of this area to the growth of smuggling.10 It was 
his work that really pointed the way to the existence of a ‘northern smuggling’. 
His understanding of the Scottish timber trade was slightly askew, due to the 
nature of the sources available, but his work was nonetheless significant. 
Lillehammer’s chapter on the Scottish/Norwegian timber trade in the area inland 
from Stavanger of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a study of a very 
particular region and paints a picture of trade that sounds similar to that of the 
later eighteenth century in southern Norway.11 Thomson’s later thesis updated 
our knowledge of the Scottish timber trade, by undertaking a much more 
detailed analysis of the local records.12 
 
What these post-war writers had in common was their placing of smuggling in 
the context of economic history, which experienced a great growth in the 1950s 
and 1960s. They dealt, therefore, with the economic impact of smuggling, rather 
than with the detailed practices of the trade, thereby leaving a significant gap for 
further research, particularly regarding smuggling as a social phenomenon. A 
difficulty in using an economic history approach to the impact of smuggling is 
that no hard statistics exist for the smuggling industry, only a range of historic 
and current estimates, which are referred to in this section and in the main body 
of the thesis. It can be assumed that smuggling did affect legitimate trade and 
business, but how is inevitably unclear. Attempts are made throughout this 
thesis to assess the impact of smuggling on legitimate trade and also on the 
growth of new areas of consumption. 
 
A different view was taken of smuggling by the Marxist historians of the 1970s, 
notably Cal Winslow, writing of the Sussex smugglers in his essay in Albion’s 
Fatal Tree, an important early work that defends it as a ‘social crime’.13 Winslow 
and his fellow practitioners of the ‘new social history’ brought smuggling into the 
 
10 H.S.K. Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1973). 
11 A. Lillehammer, ‘The Scottish Norwegian Timber Trade in the Stavanger Area in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries’ in T.C. Smout, ed. Scotland and Europe 1200 – 1850, (Edinburgh, 
John Donald, 1986), pp. 100 - 106 
12 Alan Thomson, The Scottish Timber Trade 1680–1800 (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of St Andrews, 1991). 
13 Cal Winslow, ‘Sussex Smugglers’, in Douglas Hay and others (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree 
(London: Penguin Group, 1975), pp.119–176 (154). 
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realm of ‘history from below’, with its emphasis on acknowledging the role of 
ordinary people. He accepted the role of the Muis in highlighting the economic 
impact of smuggling, but took issue with them: 
 
What they omit is any mention of the bloody conflict which was at the bottom 
of this aspect of British commercial development. The smugglers both 
resisted and enhanced the development of capitalism; in each case they 
paid dearly for their efforts. 
 
He is wedded to the notion of the plebeian smuggler, albeit sometimes being 
exploited by ‘men of substance’. It was in this context that smuggling could be 
seen as a ‘social crime’, an act that, while undoubtedly illegal was regarded as 
morally defensible by the participants. It was placed in the context of poaching 
and the disputes over forests, written about by E.P. Thompson in his pioneering 
work Whigs and Hunters.14 Winslow also refers to ‘the bloody conflict’, which 
takes the eighteenth-century propaganda propagated by the Duke of Richmond 
at its word.15 
 
John Rule has a chapter in Albion’s Fatal Tree on wrecking and coastal plunder 
and also wrote about smuggling in a similar vein to Winslow. In Crime, Protest 
and Popular Politics in Southern England, 1740–1850, for example, he wrote, 
with specific reference to rural areas in southern England,  
 
…in smuggling and wrecking whole communities seem to have 
supported, openly or tacitly, illegal activities. However, despite varying 
degrees of marginal or occasional involvement by the better off, the basis 
of the reference group in all cases is simply the lower orders, ‘the 
people.16 
 
This reflects Thompson’s theory of ‘Patricians and Plebs’, first expounded in 
1974 and re-presented in 1991, which proposed that society – or rural society, 
rather – was split between ‘the gentry’ and ‘the labouring poor’.17 This has 
subsequently been criticised by Peter King, among others, as being too binary, 
 
14 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pb reprint ed. (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane (Pergrine), 
1975). 
15 Anon (A Gentleman of Sussex), Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex (reprint, Longstone: 
Little, n.d.). 
16 John Rule and Roger Wells (eds), Crime, Protest and Popular Politics in Southern England 
(London: Bloomsbury, 1997), p.158. 
17 E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common (London: The Merlin Press, 1991), pp.16–96. 
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failing to recognise the real complexities of eighteenth-century society.18 Rather 
than being exploited by ‘men of substance’ as Winslow suggested, it is clear 
that smugglers needed – and had access to – reserves of capital or credit.  
 
Looking at the nature of smuggling, Paul Muskett, in his unpublished thesis 
produced in 1996, undertook an extensive survey of violent smuggling and 
made a strong case for its spread in southern England. He sought to draw a 
distinction between violence as a deliberate tactic and as a response to 
particular circumstances. It was in this latter category that he placed the 
murders of Galley and Chater by the Hawkhurst Gang.19 He also suggested that 
excessive violence led to both the loss of community support and a crackdown 
by the authorities. Thus, both King and Muskett provide support for the 
contention that smuggling was not a ‘social crime’. It was, effectively, an 
economic crime implemented, in some parts of the country, with a sufficient 
degree of violence or threats to ensure passive acceptance, rather than 
enthusiastic support. 
 
Rule was one of several writers who have, in more recent years, looked at 
smuggling in Cornwall and have clearly demonstrated its particular character. 
Rule’s last contribution was in the Maritime History of Cornwall, in which he 
investigated smugglers and wreckers. Here he was able to synthesise much 
other work to give a strong sense of a particularly ‘Cornish’ style of smuggling, 
often with the smugglers working with the financial backing of local 
businessmen and other people with disposable income.20  
 
Helen Doe has revealed the Mevagissey businessman, shipbuilder and backer 
of smugglers, James Dunn, who set up his shipyard as a money laundering 
 
18 Peter King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies. The Patrician-
Plebeian Model Re-Examined', Social History, 21.2 (1996), 215–228. 
19 Paul Muskett, English Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Open University, 1996). 
20 John Rule, ‘Smuggling and Wrecking’, in Philip Payton, Alston Kennerley and Helen Doe 
(eds), The Maritime History of Cornwall (Exeter: The Univejrsity of Exeter, 2015). pp.195–208.  
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operation.21 Martin Wilcox has re-examined the Polperro financier Zepheniah 
Job and Charlotte Mackenzie has exposed the double life of the Penzance 
merchants, John and James Dunkin.22 The particular style of Cornish 
smuggling, with the involvement of Guernsey merchants and their agents, which 
has similarities to post-1785 smuggling in Berwickshire, is made clear in 
Jamieson’s own chapter on smuggling in the volume he edited on the maritime 
history of the Channel Islands.23 What this clearly indicates is that, in many 
cases, the picture of the ‘plebeian smuggler’ is simply wrong. The application of 
the social binary is misleading and inadequate as smugglers required links to 
local businessmen and access to capital and, therefore, the business dimension 
of smuggling deserves much greater attention. 
 
The development of the study of consumption, exemplified by the work of John 
Brewer and Roy Porter in 199324 and the more recent initiatives of Maxine Berg 
at the University of Warwick and Helen Berry at the University of Newcastle, 
has gathered pace in recent years.25 Within this field, tea is seen as both an 
important commodity and a social marker. The History of Tea project at Queen 
Mary, University of London is an example of how this has taken effect.26 Writers 
in this field, such as Judith Hanser and Derek Janes, have referred to the 
impact of smuggling on tea consumption and the development of ‘Gottenburgh 
Teas’ as a brand.27 The birth of the journal, History of Retailing and 
Consumption is a further illustration of this.  
 
21 Helen Doe, Small Shipbuilding Businesses During the Napoleonic Wars: James Dunn of 
Mevagissey, 1799 to 1816 (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Exeter, 2003); idem, ‘The 
Smugglers’ Shipbuilder: The Customers, Trades and Vessels of a Mevagissey Shipyard, 1799–
1816’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 92.4 (2006), 427–442; idem, ‘The Business of Shipbuilding: Dunn 
and Henna of Mevagissey, 1799–1806’, International Journal of Maritime History, 18.2 (2006), 
187–217. 
22 Martin Wilcox, ‘Maritime Business in Eighteenth Century Cornwall: Zepheniah Job of 
Polperro’, Troze, 2 (2010), 17 November 2015 <http://nmmc.co.uk/explore/publications/troze/>, 
Charlotte MacKenzie, ‘Merchants and Smugglers in Eighteenth Century Penzance: The 
Brothers John and James Dunkin’, Troze, 7 (2016), December 2016 
<https://nmmc.co.uk/explore/publications/troze/previous-troze-publications/merchants-and-
smugglers-in-eighteenth-century-penzance-the-brothers-john-and-james-dunkin/>. 
23 A.G Jamieson (ed.), A People of the Sea (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1986), 195–219. 
24 J. Brewer and R. Porter (eds), Consumption and the World of Goods (London, 1993). 
25 Helen Berry, ‘Polite Consumption: Shopping in Eighteenth-Century England’, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society, 12 (sixth series) (2002), 375–394. 
26 Tea in Eighteenth Century Britain, Queen Mary, University of London, Available: 
https://qmhistoryoftea.wordpress.com/, accessed 13 May 2017. 
27 Jessica Hanser, ‘Teatime in the North Country: Consumption of Chinese Imports in North 
East England’, Northern History, 49.1 (2012), 51–74; Derek Janes, ‘Fine Gottenburgh Teas: the 
import and distribution of smuggled tea in Scotland and the north of England c.1750–1780’, 




Nick Bunker seeks to explain this obsession, writing that tea ‘had become far 
more than a bland familiar drink…(it) had acquired a more exalted status, as a 
prize to be fought over by powerful and ambitious men.’ A former financial 
journalist and investment banker, Bunker perhaps reveals his origins by 
describing tea as ‘one of a handful of commodities that served the wider 
purposes that crude oil and copper fulfil today’. He reinforces his point by 
quoting Burke, speaking in the House of Commons in April 1774, ‘Tea is 
perhaps the most important object, of any in the mighty circle of our 
commerce.’28 
 
What these studies all focus on is the importance of tea smuggling. Huw 
Bowen, in his article ‘So Alarming an Evil’ describes the pillaging of home-
coming East Indiamen by smugglers, all the way up the Channel and even off 
Ireland.29 He does refer to the effect of tea smuggled in from Europe and to the 
re-importation of exported tea, with consequent drawback of duty. In another 
work, Bowen refers to the work of the East India Company’s Accountant-
General, who had assessed that in the period 1772 to 1780 more tea was 
smuggled into Britain that entered the Company’s warehouses.30 
 
In addition, as British and European history has developed an increasing focus 
on global and comparative studies, the history of smuggling has adapted to 
include the ‘Atlantic World’ in the eighteenth century and has also taken account 
of European perspectives. Benjamin Carp, for example, in his work on the 
Boston Tea Party, has shown the extent of tea smuggling into the American 
Colonies, the role of substantial merchants in that activity and the resentment 
provoked by the attempts to suppress smuggling by the customs service.31 
Simon Harvey has produced a summary of smuggling from the middle ages to 
the present day, attempting to disentangle the political from the ‘romantic and 
 
28 Nick Bunker, An Empire of the Edge: How Britain Came to Fight America (London: Vintage, 
2015), p.32. 
29 H.V. Bowen, ‘So Alarming an Evil’: Smuggling, Pilfering and the English East India Company, 
1750–1810’, International Journal of Maritime History, 14.1 (2002), 1–30. 
30 H.V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–
1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
31 Benjamin L. Carp, Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party & the Making of America 
(New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2010). 
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rebellious’.32 Michael Kwass, in his work on the French ‘Robin Hood’, Louis 
Mandrin, has exposed the life and career of a man who was – and, indeed, still 
is seen as ‘romantic and rebellious’ – someone whose career was followed 
avidly in Britain.33 Peter Andreas has reviewed the place of smuggling in the 
history of the USA, from the tea smuggling of the eighteenth century, through 
Civil War blockade running to the drug and people smuggling of the present 
day.34 
 
The historiography of the smuggling of tea between Scandinavia and Britain is 
comparatively brief and recent and, earlier on, there was little acknowledgement 
of the nature of the trade. Christian Koninckx, for example, produced his 
substantial history of the first 35 years of the Swedish East India Company in 
1980, in which he was not able to persuade himself wholly of the importance of 
smuggling to the success of the Company.35 Other writers simply refer to the re-
export of tea from Sweden.36 It took Leos Müller, in a number of papers, to 
begin the process of explaining this extraordinary phenomenon, although even 
he perhaps underplayed the direct connections between Gothenburg and 
Scotland.37 Steve Murdoch has revealed the extent of the Scottish presence in 
Gothenburg up to 1750, while Goran Behre, in the 1970s, showed the 
relationship between Gothenburg and the Jacobite rising.38 John Ashton’s work 
does not, strictly speaking, fall under the heading of ‘academic writings’, but 
was written from the very particular perspective of the then chairman of the 
 
32 Simon Harvey, Smuggling: Seven Centuries of Contraband (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 
2016). 
33 Michael Kwass, Contraband: Louis Mandrin and the Making of a Global Underground 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
34 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
35 Christian Koninckx, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company 
(1731–1766) (Kortrijk: Van Ghemmert Publishing Cie, 1980), p.282. 
36 Martin Åberg, ‘The Swedish East India Company 1731–66. Business Strategy and foreign 
influence in a perspective of change’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 15: 1–2 (1990) 97–108. 
Sven T. Kjellberg, Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna 1731 – 1813 (Malmö, Allhems Förlag, 
1975)  
37 Leos Mϋller, ‘The Swedish East India Trade and International Markets: Re-Exports of Teas, 
1731–1813’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 51.3 (2003), 28–44; idem, ‘The Swedish 
East India Company: Strategies and Functions of an Interloper’, World Economic History 
Conference (Utrecht: 2009).  
38 Steve Murdoch, ‘The Scots and Early Modern Scandinavia: A 21st Century Review’, Northern 
Studies, 45 (2013), 27–45; idem, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert 
Associations in Northern Europe 1603–1746 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006); Goeran Behre, 
‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, The Scottish Historical Review, 51.152 (1972), 148–171; 
idem, ‘Jacobite Refugees in Gothenburg after Culloden’, The Scottish Historical Review, 
70.189/1 (1991), 58–65. 
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British Factory in Gothenburg.39 The importance of Denmark-Norway as a 
source of smuggled tea has been less worked on, but Ole Feldbaek and Mads 
Kirkebaek’s work on Danish trading companies and the links between Denmark 
and China, together with recent articles on the communities of south Norway by 
Ragnhild Hutchison will surely pave the way for more detailed investigations.40 
Very little of this more recent work has yet been integrated into an 
understanding of smuggling in the British context. Mackillop has recently written 
about the peculiarly distinctive Scottish tea market in the mid-eighteenth 
century, drawing attention to the local taste for Congou and describing this as 
illustrating its place ‘in the Gothenburg tea zone as opposed to the London 
economy.’41 
 
To sum up the current state of our knowledge and understanding of smuggling, 
there have been debates about the economic impact of the trade, about its 
nature – was it a social crime? – and about the impact of tea smuggling, in 
particular. What there has not been, is a ‘bottom up’ analysis of smuggling 
which draws many of the previous threads together and allows for a full 
understanding of the process of smuggling, the way that merchants in a small 
port managed smuggling as a business and developed links with fellow 
merchants in Europe to access contraband. There is a further analysis of the 
merchants’ relationship with the Customs service and with their customers. One 







39 John R. Ashton, Lives and Livelihoods in Little London: The Story of the British in Gothenburg 
1621–2001 (Goteborg: Warne Forlag, 2003). 
40 Ole Feldbaek, ‘The Danish trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuires’, 
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 34:3,(1986) 204 -218; Mads Kirkebaek, ‘The Voyage 
of the Dronningen Af Danmark to China 1742’, in Kjeld Erik Broedsgaard and Mads Kirkebaek 
(eds), China and Denmark: Relations since 1674 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies, 2001), pp.21–47; Ragnhild Hutchison, ‘Bites, Nibbles, Sips and Puffs: New Exotic 
Goods in Norway in the 18th and the First Half of the 19th Century’, Scandinavian Journal of 
History, 36.2 (2011), 156–185; idem, ‘The Norwegian and Baltic Timber Trade to Britain 1700–
1835 and Its Interconnections’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 37.5 (2012), 578–599. 
41 Andrew Mackillop, ‘A North European World of Tea: Scotland and the Tea Trade, c.1690 – 
c.1790, in Berg et al. (eds), Goods from the East, 1600 – 1800 (Basingstoke, Palgrave 





Nearly every coastal region has a popular account of smuggling, usually well 
researched and drawn from a mixture of official records and local traditions. 
What they do is to emphasise the particularity of the smuggling stories told. 
They do not, therefore, help to contribute to a national narrative or make it 
readily possible to use them as the basis for comparative research.  
 
The most well-known publisher in this field is probably Countryside Books of 
Newbury, who have covered Yorkshire, Essex, the Bristol Channel, Hampshire 
and Dorset and Cornwall.42 Their most prolific authors are Geoffrey Morley and 
Graham Smith, who have both also written for other publishers. Frances 
Wilkins, published by Wyre Forest Press, has produced a number of very well 
researched books, including treatments of the east and west coasts of 
Scotland.43 In addition, there are locally produced publications, such as those 
covering the Exmoor Coast, Polperro, North Norfolk, Ayrshire and Montrose.44 
There are also more general works on Scotland and various aspects of the war 
against smuggling.45 I admit to my own contribution to this genre, creating a 
walking trail centred on Gunsgreen House, using the official records to identify a 
number of specific locations where specific smuggling incidents took place on 
the Berwickshire Coast.46 
 
A problem with these texts is the lack of consistency in the standard of 
scholarship, particularly an absence of references, or the citation of ‘local 
knowledge’ or ‘local legend’. It means that it is very difficult to determine the 
accuracy of what is recounted. They are also essentially sold as local books, 
aimed at the visitor and are often seen in the same light as a range of smuggler 
themed attractions and goods, such as ‘Smugglers Brew’ Cornish tea, which – 
on the packet – tells us that ‘Cornwall’s passion for tea harks back to the 18th 
 
42 e.g. Graham Smith, Smuggling in Yorkshire 1700–1815 (Newbury: Countryside Books, 1994). 
43 e.g. Frances Wilkins, The Smuggling Story of Two Firths (Kidderminster: Wyre Forest Press, 
1993). 
44 e.g. Duncan Fraser, The Smugglers (Montrose: Standard Press, 1971). 
45 e.g. Gavin D. Smith, The Scottish Smuggler (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd, 2003). 
46 Derek Janes, The Smugglers Coast (Eyemouth, Gunsgreen House, 2014) 
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Century, when heavy duties and taxes made it an expensive upper class treat 
and therefore a highly-prized cargo for local smugglers.’47 
 
Perhaps the earliest serious approach to smuggling was taken by Lord 
Teignmouth in ‘Smuggling Ways and Smuggling Days’ in 1892, Charles G. 
Harper in ‘The Smugglers’ in 1909 and their joint enterprise The Smugglers in 
1923. Harper took the lead in the 1923 book but acknowledged the importance 
of Teignmouth’s background in the customs, which had given him access to the 
eighteenth-century files of the service, not previously exploited. Although written 
for a popular audience, the book is essentially serious in intent and is the first to 
make full use of official sources. 
 
Harper’s preface draws a distinction between The Smugglers and the material 
published previously, which 
 
…whether in the form of local guide-books or of fugitive articles, has 
been very largely composed of mere gossip and undocumented legend. 
In those pages every cave along the coast was a smugglers’ cave, and 
every sinister old house was full of their hiding holes. All very well in their 
way, no doubt, and none might dispute, just as none could produce 
evidence to prove the truth of these stories. 
 
He then draws a contrast with the present work: 
 
But in all that time when these very vague and hearsay stories were told 
and written, there existed a very great deal of material at hand for the 
use of those who needed but the industry to collect and arrange it, and 
so to produce something which should take these stirring incidents out of 
their obscurity and set the story of the smugglers upon a firm footing of 
history.48  
 
Despite the strong documentary basis for the work, it is still in the tradition of 
telling tales of the villainy of smugglers, picking out some of the more notorious 
incidents, such as the murders of Galley and Chater by the Hawkhurst Gang 
and the activities of other equally violent smuggling gangs and characters, all on 
the south coast of England and Cornwall, with the exception of a brief reference 
 
47 ‘Cornish Tea’, Smugglers Brew (Little Trethew, Cornwall: 2017).  
48 Lord Teignmouth and Charles G. Harper, The Smugglers: Picturesque Chapters in the 
History of Contraband, 2 vols (London: Cecil Palmer, 1923). 
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to the Solway Firth in connection with Walter Scott and Robert Burns. There is 
an introduction dealing with the reasons for smuggling and a reference to Adam 
Smith’s views on the subject, which does add a further serious gloss to the 
work. Its most important contribution was to bring together the best-known 
stories of smuggling and provide reasonably soundly based accounts of them, 
which were then used as a literary quarry by later, more popular writers. 
Teignmouth and Harper are perhaps to be seen as almost ‘cross over’ writers, 





The best known, and most influential, contemporary account of smuggling is a 
History of the Smugglers by a Gentleman of Sussex, first published in 1749 and 
regularly reprinted since.49 This is discussed in more detail below, where it is 
made clear that this publication had a political purpose, as it was encouraged by 
the Duke of Richmond who had ensured the effective pursuit and punishment of 
the smugglers concerned in both the raid on the Poole custom’s warehouse and 
the infamous murders of Galley and Chater.  
 
Captain Harry Carter’s memoir which, although not published in full until 1894, 
was written in 1809 and relates the history of the Carters of Prussia Cove. As 
with the History of the Smugglers this account too was coloured by the 
motivation behind its production – Carter had become a Methodist and wrote it 
as ‘a memorandum of the kind dealings of God to my soul’ and ‘if published to 
the world, may the Lord make it a blessing to every soul that read it and hear it 
for Christ’s sake amen, amen.’50 
 
Both accounts appear vivid and smack of authenticity, but the motivation for 
their publication must cast some shadow over their historical veracity, if not 
entirely over their value to the historian.  
 
 
49 A Gentleman of Sussex, Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex, Facsimile of 1878 reprint ed. 
(Little Longstone, Derbyshire: Country Books, n.d.). 
50 Harry Carter and John B. Cornish, The Autobiography of a Cornish Smuggler, reprint ed. 
(Truro: D. Bradford Barton Ltd, 1894). 
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Newspapers of the period also provide evidence about smuggling and related 
activities. An analysis of this coverage is provided below, along with an 
examination of the influence of the stories of the Hawkhurst Gang on current 
attitudes to smuggling and compares them with the portrayal of the French 
smuggler Louis Mandrin. 
 
Influences on attitudes to smuggling 
 
Much current writing about smuggling is still coloured by attitudes promulgated 
in the eighteenth century. It is necessary, therefore, to seek to understand these 
attitudes and their origins in this Introduction. It is not easy to measure public 
awareness of smuggling and even harder to assess the attitudes of the bulk of 
the population, but a review of the press and other publications can at least 
demonstrate public exposure to tales of smuggling and, in some cases, the 
management of the presentation of smuggling. This substantial section is a 
mixture of examples and statistical analysis. The starting point is a review of the 
two most high-profile smugglers of the mid-eighteenth century, one of whom, 
while still well known in France, is forgotten in Britain, while the others are still 
taken to represent a particularly violent strand of smuggling.  
 
The spread of smuggling stories: the press 
 
The growth of newspapers in the eighteenth century spread news of events 
happening across the country and the world. The creation of the online British 
Newspaper Archive (BNA) in recent years has made it possible to undertake a 
wide range of searches across the British press, something that would have 
been impossible a few years ago. There are serious caveats relating to both the 
local press and the BNA. Victoria Gardner’s recent work on late eighteenth 
century English newspapers highlights some of these issues.51 
 
Gardner’s work is based on her in depth study of local newspapers kept in local 
and other archives. What she has explained is how newspapers were run and 
the way that they collected news. Newspapers often had their origins in local 
 
51 Victoria E.M. Gardner, The Business of News in England, 1760 – 1820 (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
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bookselling businesses and ‘newspaper proprietors can best be described as 
communications brokers’. She further makes clear what becomes apparent 
from examining a range of papers which is that ‘individual proprietors linked 
together to form a national press network’ but that ‘ the construction and 
dissemination of news was unique to the economic and social environment in 
which each individual newspapers was produced.’52 This latter point may 
explain the disparity in coverage of smuggling between newspapers in different 
places. 
 
There was also a degree of randomness about news gathering. ‘Snippets of 
information within newspapers were gathered by proprietors from other means 
of communication: small travelling paragraphs taken from other forms of print 
and newspapers, from correspondence and from conversations.’53  
 
The BNA itself is still developing: ‘The British Library's collection of historical 
newspapers is one of the wonders of the world: it contains newspapers from 
1603 to the present day, from both Britain and further afield. There are over 
600,000 bound volumes of newspapers (occupying 32 kilometres, or 20 miles, 
of shelving) and over 300,000 reels of microfilm (occupying a further 13 
kilometres, or 8 miles, of shelving). Until now, the only way to view these 
newspapers was to visit the British Library, and, of course, it was not possible to 
search them. The British Newspaper Archive is a partnership with the British 
Library to begin digitising this huge collection and make it available on the 
internet so researchers from all over the world can access the treasures within 
it.’54 This demonstrates that it still complete and also that it relies largely on the 
British Library Collection, which, while very substantial, is inevitably incomplete. 
 
Searching the BNA is very straightforward, but only as effective as the 
technology allows. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this section, it is capable of 




52 Gardner, The Business of News, pps 5-6. 
53 Gardner, The Business of News, p.138 
54 BNA website, About the British Newspaper Archive, 
https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/content/a_unique_archive , accessed 29.02.2020 
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Stories and editorial 
 
A search on the word ‘smuggler’ in the British Newspaper Archive for the period 
1740–1790 produces just over 3,000 references. Of these 698, 22.5 per cent 
are in the Derby Mercury and a further 457 (15 per cent) are in the Ipswich 
Journal. The Derby Mercury also covered the Galley and Chater case more 
extensively than any other paper. The other papers with more than 150 stories 
are the Oxford Journal, which also advertised Mandrin’s biography, with 263, 
the Newcastle Courant (203), the Caledonian Mercury (180), the Manchester 
Mercury (180) and the Stamford Mercury (175). Between them these papers 
contained 69 per cent of the recorded stories. The case of the Derby Mercury is 
particularly interesting as it was based in an inland town with only the most 
indirect access to the sea. An examination of a history of the newspaper and its 
proprietor does not reveal someone with a particular axe to grind. It may be that 
readers in the inland towns and cities could enjoy the vicarious thrill of reading 




Gardner explores the financial importance of advertising to the provincial press, 
with newspapers charging per line, while the tax was per advertisement, per 
edition.55 
 
Chapter 6 draws attention to a wide range of advertising for ‘Gottenburgh Teas’, 
which clearly demonstrates that, in the north of England and Scotland at least, 
retailers, newspaper proprietors and customers were clearly aware that this 
brand, for such it was, referred almost exclusively to smuggled tea. The 
collusion of these parties in the sale and purchase of contraband is quite 
extraordinary. It seems quite odd that no measures appear to have been taken 
to ban the advertising of contraband goods, for the adverts appeared over a 










Louis Mandrin was a notorious gentleman smuggler who led a well organised 
gang in France for a relatively short period in 1754–1755. He was eventually 
captured and executed by being broken on the wheel.56 He became immensely 
popular in the British papers, due in no small part to dispatches describing his 
activities sent regularly from Paris. Between November 1754 and August 1756 
stories about Mandrin and his successors featured on 31 occasions in the 
Caledonian Mercury, 26 times in the Leeds Intelligencer, 24 times in the Derby 
Mercury and 20 times in the Oxford Journal, as well as regular appearances in 
other papers. His popularity was such that in 1756 there was a Liverpool 
Privateer called the Mandrin, while a Cornish gentleman smuggler in 1755 was 
called, in the press at least, the ‘Cornish Mandrin’ and was described as 
heading ‘the Banditti near Port Isaac’.57 
 
 
Figure Intro/2. ‘The Cornish Mandrin’  
Leeds Intelligencer, 29 July 1755 
 
This illustration (Fig. Intro/3) from a current Petites Histoires film about the life of 
Mandrin, shows his linkage to the legend of Robin Hood (known as Robin des 
Bois in France). There was also a contemporary song La Complainte de 
Mandrin, recorded in various versions, including by Yves Montand and Monique 
Morelli which is still learnt by school children in the Rhône-Alpes region of 
 
56 Michael Kwass, Contraband: Louis Mandrin and the Making of a Global Underground 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
57 Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque with an Account of 
the Liverpool Slave Trade (London: William Heineman, 1897), pp.87, 96, 97. 
20 
 




Figure Intro/3. Poster for French educational film issued by Les Petites Histoires 
 
The treatment of Mandrin, both in his own time and subsequently, shows the 
power of the press in creating the image of a smuggler as romantic hero, as 
opposed to the treatment of the Hawhurst Gang dealt with below. 
 
Violence and smuggling: a moral panic? 
 
Tales of violence are a feature of localised smuggling histories and certainly 
some fatalities occurred – two in the case of the incidents described by Holmes 
at Hunstanton, although these occurred in what seems to have been an 
ambush partly fuelled by drink.59 Even the most notorious action of the 
Hawkhurst Gang resulted in just two deaths. Less known, if at all, is the death of 
two ‘smugglers’, one described as a hosier, the other as a merchant, at the 
hands of the customs men in Aberdeen in 1744.60 The nature of smuggling 
made a degree of violence inevitable. The real question is how serious and 
widespread was it? Muskett has collected details of incidents of violence from 
all round the country, but as virtually all cases of violence would be ‘discovered’, 
they were disproportionately reported.61 The review of the Hawkhurst Gang and 
the murders of Galley and Chater sets them within a particular local context, 
which was not necessarily replicated elsewhere. It is because their story and its 
presentation have been so influential in forming the popular image of 
 
58 https://www.mandrin.org/paroles-la-complainte-de-mandrin.html, accessed 19.November 
2019 
59 Holmes, The Lawless Coast. p.43. 
60 ‘We Learn from Aberdeen...’, Caledonian Mercury (3 July 1744). 
61 Muskett, English Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century. 
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smuggling, that it merits further discussion. It shows clearly how careful we 
need to be when making use of such material. 
 
It is worth noting that the Hawkhurst Gang’s most famous exploit was the raid 
on the Poole Custom House, yet, as we shall see later, there were at least two 
such raids on the Custom House in Eyemouth and similar activities took place 
in Montrose and Penzance at the very least. These are enough to suggest that 
such break-ins were not exceptional. One of their key features was that the 
smugglers were usually seeking to reclaim what they regarded as their own 
goods, which had been seized. Customs Houses also tended to be rented on a 
temporary basis and were not always particularly secure. 
 
The Hawkhurst Gang and ‘the Inhuman and Unparalleled Murders of Mr 
William Galley and Mr Daniel Chater’ 
 
The southern counties of England, whose smuggling history colours the popular 
view of smuggling everywhere, seem to have been a special case with the 
attitudes of both the landowners and poorer people heavily influenced by twenty 
years of often violent disturbances around the enclosed deer parks in the area 
and the consequent repression of the so-called Black Acts as well as the 
presence of Jacobites and their supporters in the area.62  
 
Figure Intro/4. Logo of the Hawkhurst Gang Smugglers Trail 
 
The Hawkhurst Gang, from the village of that name in Kent, on the border with 
Sussex, is perhaps the most notorious of the eighteenth-century smuggling 
gangs and is now commemorated in its home district with a tourist trail. This 
section sets out to unpick the story of the Gang and place it within its particular 
context. 
 




Along with the incidents linked to the murder of Galley and Chater, the attack on 
the village of Goudhurst is the other well publicised set piece in the story of the 
Hawkhurst Gang. Goudhurst is supposed to have resisted the Gang’s reign of 
terror by forming a local militia and fighting them off when the village was 
attacked. A search of the newspapers in the British Newspaper Archive for the 
period 1744 to 1750 reveals no reference to Goudhurst at all. Nicholls, after 
providing a detailed and graphic account of the siege then says that ‘one might 
expect that this affair would have made a great stir in the district, but such was 
the state of Kent and Sussex at this time that little written record remains.’63 The 
report of the trial of Thomas Kingsmill, for the Poole Custom House break-in, 
makes no mention of the events at Goudhurst, at which Nicholls said he was 
the ring leader of the Hawkhurst Gang. He draws attention to a short account in 
the Gentleman’s Magazine, but this was not published until 1785, when a 
correspondent describes the event as ‘a very gallant action not recorded in 
history’, apparently recounted by the hero of the hour, who was still alive in 
1785 and was described as having ‘a soldier-like regard to the strong beer of 
Old England’.64  
 
There must be a suspicion that the account of this apparently extraordinary 
battle was, at the very least, heavily embroidered. There are numerous stories 
of individual incidents involving the Hawkhurst Gang, some described at the 
trials of certain members. The transcripts of two Old Bailey cases give a 
detailed account of the raid on the warehouse at Poole and of a landing of 
contraband in Kent.65 Given that virtually every violent incident was reported – 
such as that at Aberdeen, noted above – it seems surprising that the battle of 
Goudhurst escaped attention – it seems distinctly possible, in fact, that it never 
happened and is an example of how constant repetition makes a story ‘true’. 
 
 
63 F.F. Nicholls, Honest Thieves: The Violent Heyday of English Smuggling (London: The 
History Book Club, 1973), p.84. 
64 ‘Rare Species of Oak at Goudhurst; Its Church, Church-Yard, &C‘. The Gentleman’s 
Magazine, July–December 1785, p.679. 
65 'Trial of Thomas Kingsmill, Alias Staymaker, William Fairall, Alias Shepherd, Richard Perin, 
Alias Pain, Alias Carpenter, Thomas Lillewhite, Richard Glover, 5th April', 
www.oldbaileyonline.org; ‘Trial of Arthur Gray, 20th April', www.oldbaileyonline.org. 
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It seems to be the case that, because of the local circumstances, including a 
long history of smuggling in places such as the Romney Marshes, the Kent and 
Sussex smugglers must be exceptional, in terms of organisation and violence. 
They appear to have operated as named ‘gangs’ – the ‘Mayfield Gang’ of the 
years before 1720, the ‘Groombridge Gang’, the ‘Hooe Company’ and the 
‘Outlaws’ or ‘Transports’ of Hastings in the 1730s and 1740s.66 In addition, their 
pursuit by the Duke of Richmond has added to their notoriety. McLynn is of the 
opinion that Richmond, the local magnate and leading Whig, pursued the 
Hawkhurst Gang in particular because of their links to the Jacobites. He also 
says that the French Colonel Lally boasted of organising the raid on the Poole 
Custom House. McLynn quotes Horace Walpole as explaining that the end of 
Newcastle’s war on the smugglers in Sussex, came about because he had 
succeeded in ‘turning’ them against the Jacobites.67 
  
The incident which colours many views of smuggling – the events that followed 
the raid on the Customs Warehouse in Poole by the Hawkhurst Gang supported 
by local smugglers, in October 1747, involving the brutal murders of an 
informer, Daniel Chater and William Galley, a customs officer – seems to have 
attracted far less attention in the contemporary press than the adventures of 
Louis Mandrin. In a range of searches of the British Newspapers Archive, the 
phrase Hawkhurst Gang and word Hawkhurst produced no results. More 
success was achieved using the names of the victims, Galley and Chater, in a 
number of combinations. Even so only 28 references were found in three 
newspapers and a magazine. The Derby Mercury which later placed 24 stories 
about Mandrin was the most enthusiastic follower of the case, with ten stories 
between January 1748 and August 1749. The Ipswich Journal had eight stories, 
the Newcastle Courant just three, while the Scots Magazine, which covered 
Mandrin in virtually every issue, during his active months, only mentioned 
Galley and/or Chater seven times. 
 
One feature in common with Mandrin was the publication of a book, from which  
the title of this section is taken, which included ‘Seven Plates, Descriptive of the  
 
66 Philip Payton, A History of Sussex (Lancaster: Carnegie, 2017), chapter 6. 
67 Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England, OUP Paperback ed. 
(London: Routledge, 1989), p.188. 
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Barbarous Cruelties’.68 It is, perhaps, the existence of these plates, that has so  
influenced subsequent opinion about the existence of gangs of violent  
smugglers. This book, by an anonymous ‘Gentleman of Chichester’ was 
 reprinted in about 1878 for, it should be noted, a moral purpose. Mandrin has  
come to be regarded as ‘Le Robin des bois Français’, whereas, 
in this case,  
 
…parents, guardians, and others who have the tuition of youth (we mean 
here the youth of the poor and the illiterate in general) should now and then 
take occasion to read, or cause to be read to their servants, etc. divers 
passages of this true history; at the same time make such remarks and 
draw such inferences from them, as their own natural good sense and 
experience might point out; and more especially they should put them in 
mind that God, by the mouth of His servant Moses, expressly declares, ‘He 
who sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.’69 
 
There was one aspect of this case, which appears different from most 
smuggling events, in that Galley and Chater appear to have been treated badly 
and murdered deliberately, rather than in the heat of the moment during a 
conflict. Indeed, the words of the King’s Counsel at the trial of the murderers 
expressed the fear of the implications of this crime: 
 
What avails the laws of society, where no man dares to carry them into 
execution? Where is the protection of liberty and life, if criminals assume 
to themselves a power of restraining the one and destroying the other?70 
 
 
68 Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex. 
69 Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex, p.5. 





Figure Intro/5. The image of Louis Mandrin (L) as a romantic hero contrasts with 
the portrayal of the Hawkhurst Gang as ‘Bloody Villains’ 
 
The fact that the men who had robbed the Customs House, but not taken part in 
the murders, were also hanged, bears out the belief of both Samuel Johnson 
and Oliver Goldsmith that the increase in capital offences would lead to people 
committing greater crimes, particularly murdering witnesses. Ian Gilmour, 
seeking to establish the truth of this said that ‘few robbers killed their victims’ 
perhaps setting them morally apart from other incidents of more spontaneous 
violence.71  
 
The murders of Galley and Chater appear to support the views of Johnson and 
Goldsmith. Galley, a tidewaiter, was escorting Chater to deliver a letter to Major 
Battine JP, naming a man called Dimer, whom he had recognised passing by 
with the gang of smugglers. They made a mistake by asking the way and then 
stopping in a public house, where they were identified, and the smugglers 
summoned. The published text of the trial of the murderers suggests that their 
objective was to prevent Chater giving evidence against Dimer. They debated 
 
71 Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution: Governance and Violence in Eighteenth Century 
England, paperback ed. (London: Pimlico, 1992), p.159. 
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what to do – thinking they could either send the men to France, or place them in 
hiding, with each of the smugglers contributing 3d per week for the costs – or 
murder them. They eventually set out with the men tied to the back of horses 
and regularly beaten. Galley fell from his horse and died. The smugglers then 
presumably felt they had no choice but to dispose of Chater as well.72 In other 
words, the murders of Galley and Chater were the result of incompetence and 
mismanagement. What may have provoked the King’s Counsel’s ire was the 
fact that the decision to kill Chater was voted on by a gathering of local 
smugglers, assembled for that purpose, seen as a mock jury threatening the 
integrity of the justice system.  
 
In many ways, the story of the murder of Galley and Chater exposes much of 
the nature of criminality at that time, particularly the use of quite shocking 
violence – usually short of murder. Is it too much to speculate that it was the 
tone of the contemporary account of the unusual murders of Galley and Chater, 
and other subsequent dramatic re-telling, that have influenced current views of 
eighteenth- century smuggling as violent and cruel, rather than tax evasion on 
an industrial scale? 
 
The concept of the network applied to eighteenth-century trade 
 
The analysis of the trading community in Eyemouth in Chapter 3 draws on 
works on the concept of the network. In 1927 in the English Historical Review, 
Lewis Namier, one of the twentieth century’s most distinguished Whig 
historians, published an article ‘Bryce Fisher MP: a mid-eighteenth-century 
merchant and his connexions’.73 This is a relatively early examination of what 
we would now refer to as a mercantile network, that mix of family connections, 
friendships, business and social relationships and links of obligation. It is only 
relatively recently that the concept of the network has been applied to them.74  
 
 
72 Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex, pp.91–97. 
73 Lewis B Namier, ‘Brice Fisher MP: A Mid-Eighteenth Century Merchant and His Connexions', 
English Historical Review, 92 (1927), 514–532. 
74 David Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks: Managing the Scots Early-Modern Madeira 
Trade ‘ The Business History Review, 79.3 (2005), 467–491 (472). 
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Another relatively early, and important, if apparently little known, reference to 
such networks is in McAloon’s paper on the early eighteenth-century Edinburgh 
merchant, Edward Burd. The following passage is worth quoting at length as it 
describes how a range of connections becomes a network: 
 
Burd epitomises how well suited this social framework was to the 
contemporary economic situation in Scotland. It had important attributes 
which served him and his associates well. In the first instance it made 
him the centre of a network of acquaintances who supplied him with 
valuable mercantile information, interspersed with small talk which 
showed their close connections. However, the latter feature was the 
shadow rather than the substance of their relationship, which was solidly 
grounded in the objectives of commercial life. In this sphere, he and his 
friends can be observed trading with France in the traditional way, aided 
by a factor who was a boyhood acquaintance, and who was himself part 
of a firm based in Edinburgh, run by his father and two brothers. Trade 
with the West Indies was maintained by two of Burd’s immigrant friends 
who handled transatlantic cargoes and offered him information on what 
to export. There were many dealings with Edinburgh associates in 
London, mostly on the subject of finance and its supply; we can also see 
him acting as factor for a group of Glasgow merchants to export 
agricultural products for the North Atlantic trade, the connection in this 
case being his cousin, Robert Stirling, who was one of the group.75 
 
A detailed analytical approach to metropolitan business networks has been 
taken recently by the Haggertys.76 This examined the overlapping memberships 
of the Town Council, the African Committee and two drinking clubs in Liverpool 
and, using visual analytics, allowed the authors to analyse 210,000 
relationships involving some 1,700 participants. They were able to demonstrate 
how institutional networks changed over time.  
 
A review of the development of the modern understanding of mercantile 
networks was undertaken by David Hancock in an article published in 2005.77 
His initial summary of the position, as he saw it, was that academics from a 
range of backgrounds – business theorists, business and economic historians, 
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, social historians, 
 
75 Thomas McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant in General Trade: The Case of Edward Burd, 
1728–39’, page 20 in John Butt and J.T. Ward (eds), Scottish Themes: Essays in Honour of 
Professor S.G.E. Lythe (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976). 
76 John Haggerty and Sheryllyne Haggerty, ‘The Life Cycle of a Metropolitan Business Network: 
Liverpool 1750–1810’, Explorations in Economic History, 48 (2011), 189–206. 
77 Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks’. 
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archaeologists, geographers and mathematicians had all been working to clarify 
the concept of the network, while, in his view, making it increasingly vague. 
 
The thrust of Hancock’s article was that networks often created trouble for their 
members. He opined that many writers about networks tend to celebrate them: 
that our view is coloured by the fact that it is successful enterprises that leave 
most data, both in written records and in the memories of the descendants of 
the adventurers. He then quotes Julian Hoppit as a counter balance 
‘…alongside such heroes stood mortal businessmen’.78 This is particularly 
apposite in the case of John Nisbet of Eyemouth, who was sequestrated and 
forgotten for two hundred years, and his nemesis Robert Robertson, who was 
the central figure in a family pedigree published in the 1930s.79 
 
Hancock then discussed the origins of the term network, taking it back to its 
literal sense, as a fabric or even a spider web. He finds early uses approaching 
the modern understanding in the 1940s, but in the sense of a relational network, 
he looks as late as around 1970 for its widespread use. He refers to the 
eighteenth century, and the application of terms such as connections, which 
Namier used when writing of the period, and correspondents. Hancock, 
however, clearly advocates the use of the term network with reference to 
eighteenth-century merchants, and is worth quoting his justification for this: 
 
Both correspondent and connection focussed on the nodes of what 
would later be conceived explicitly as a network, rather than on the 
structure per se. They usually referred to specific people, rather than sets 
of people with complex relationships among them … Some might argue 
that we should not refer to business networks in the eighteenth century, 
but only to correspondents and connections ... The reason for using 
‘network’ is more than stylistic, however; one of the points I make is that, 
to a large degree, eighteenth century transatlantic traders managed their 
sets of supplier-customer-agent-friend connections as a group, a 
network. Second, ‘network’ focusses attention on the fact that a trader’s 
correspondents and connections were also each others’ correspondents 
and connections ... Using ‘network’ shifts the point of view from the 
individual trader to the type of social relationship.80 
 
 
78 Julian Hoppitt, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p.1. 
79 S. Eustace, The Family of Robert Robertson of Brownsbank and Prenderguest and Margaret 
Home, his Wife (London, 1931). 
80 Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks’, 472. 
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Stobart expressed the view that what we call networks were, effectively, the 
only way of conducting business in the eighteenth century. He says that  
 
The cultural, political, social and economic networking of merchants 
created a common moral system, a set of ‘shared attitudes, goals and 
aspirations, either through a shared background or the creation of a 
business culture’.  
 
and that this culture was held together by bonds of trust and regard. To be 
included in such a network, you had to be able to demonstrate your 
trustworthiness, which meant that reputation became a critical factor in 




Few records of smuggling businesses survive. Most of those that do have 
already been published and are referred to elsewhere in this introduction. The 
core of this thesis is the rich collection of documents relating to the 
sequestration of the merchant-smuggler, John Nisbet of Eyemouth. Nisbet was 
sequestrated for a relatively small amount of money, but there were a series of 
disputes surrounding the eligibility of certain debts to be paid from the estate. 
Two of these debts were challenged on the basis that they related to 
contraband, while others were queried for procedural reasons. The documents 
describe Nisbet’s career and include transcripts of some of his correspondence 
and an account of his business failure in his own words. Their discovery was 
made possible by the identification of John Nisbet’s will, in the National Archives 
at Kew where it was mistakenly transcribed as belonging to ‘John Nisbet, 
Merchant in Edinburgh’.82 The length and intemperate wording of the will 
opened the door to the identification of a series of other documents. 
 
These contain extensive arguments regarding Nisbet’s links to his creditors and 
describe in detail the history of their relationships. Perhaps the most significant 
group relate to Nisbet’s dealings with Greig and Sibbald of Gothenburg, who 
 
81 Jon Stobart, ‘Personal and Commercial Networks in an English Port: Chester in the Early 
Eighteenth Century’ Journal of Historical Geography, 30 (2004), 277–293 (278). 
82 NA, PROB 11/1276/239, Will of John Nisbet, Merchant in Eymouth, 1796  
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supplied him with tea.83 These paved the way for the examination in detail of 
this important relationship. There are comparable documents covering dealings 
with the Rotterdam merchant, Richard Pillans, which contain detailed accounts 
of Pillans’ support of Nisbet’s smuggling business, and the Edinburgh wine 
merchants Bell and Rannie, both of which indicate relatively long-term 
relationships.84  
 
These documents on their own give a detailed picture of Nisbet’s career, but 
indicated the potential for further work in the National Records of Scotland, 
which uncovered additional details of his business, such as the record of 
Nisbet’s transactions with his carriers over a five year period.85 The fondness of 
merchants for litigation reveals Nisbet and his brother’s links to Newcastle and 
Leeds, and a number of other disputes which have thrown light upon the trade 
of the port of Eyemouth. One further source of information was Gunsgreen 
House itself, with its hiding place for tea, constructed from re-cycled Cantonese 
tea chests, and other places of concealment. There were even a few scraps of 
documents relating to the Eyemouth merchant Robert Robertson, torn up and 
used to pack round a door frame during building works in the House around 
1804/1805. 
 
In the absence of his own books, these records cast a vivid light on Nisbet’s 
career. The fact that he carried on his business as if he were a regular 
merchant is the key to this, with all the disputes and associated litigation that 
the activities of eighteenth-century merchants generated. The only time it 
becomes clear that Nisbet was a smuggler was when the lawyer acting for the 
creditors challenged the right of Greig and Pillans to claim against the 
sequestrated estate as their activities were against the law. 
 
Aside from this specific group of documents, the main areas of documentation 
were the records of the Customs service in Scotland – the Minutes of the Board 
 
83 Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/N1/60, George Johnston, Replies to the Answers for John Sibbald 
Esq. Of Abden and Henry Greig Merchant in Gothenburg, 1790; Edinburgh, NRS, 
CS229/Y/1/17, Gavin Young v Nisbet, 1784. 
84 Edinburgh, NLS, ESTC T213586, George Johnston, Answers to the Petition of Messers Bell 
and Rannie, Edinburgh, 1789; Edinburgh, NLS, BCL D2680(85), George Johnston, Petition 
Unto the Rt Hon the Lords of Council and Session, Edinburgh, 1792. 
85 Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/N/1/41, John and David Nisbets v Hairs, 1771. 
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of Customs, the Dunbar Customs Letter Books and the Collector’s Quarterly 
Accounts from Dunbar.86 Smuggling activities in south-east Scotland featured 
regularly in the Minutes of the Board and in the Dunbar letter books. An 
important caveat to note is that these records only refer to smuggling 
enterprises that were discovered. It is impossible to assess how many 
smuggles were successful, and, therefore, largely unrecorded. Cole attempted 
to establish the proportion of tea that was smuggled – perhaps as much as 
three quarters of that consumed and, although his figures were challenged by 
the Muis, he still considered them to be broadly accurate.87  
 
There are no separate official records relating to Eyemouth, as it was a creek 
(subsidiary customs port) of Dunbar. It proved possible, however, using the 
Quarterly Accounts, together with other data regarding the town and its 
merchants, to re-construct the shipping records for Eyemouth from the mid-
1720s until the 1790s. The first fifteen or so years of data were derived from a 
transcript of the now lost official records copied to provide evidence in a 
financial dispute.88 The existence of these shipping records, never before 
capable of being accessed in this way, allowed the detailed analysis of 
Eyemouth’s overseas trade and the relationships between the various local 
merchants. 
 
Other significant sources which threw light on the local merchant community 
included the Kirk Session records of Ayton, Dunbar and Eyemouth, the 
important early minutes of Eyemouth Masonic Lodge89 and family history 
records obtained through the Scotland’s People service of the National Records 
of Scotland. These demonstrate the role of the key players in the local 
community and their relationships, both familial and social. The testamentary 
records also give snapshots of the business dealings of the protagonists, their 
creditors and debtors. There were papers from the feudal superiors (landlords), 
the Homes of Billie, Eyemouth Harbour Trust and other sources, including title 
 
86 Edinburgh, NRS, CE56/2/1-5, Dunbar Customs Letter Books, Edinburgh, 1754–1790; 
E504/10/1-6, Collector of Customs, Dunbar, Collector’s Quarterly Accounts, 1742–1790; 
CE1/1–20, Board of Customs, Edinburgh Minutes, 1740–1790. 
87 Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth Century Smuggling‘. Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea 
Trade’; Cole, ‘The Arithmetic of Eighteenth Century Smuggling: Rejoinder‘. 
88 NRS, CS228/K/1/66, John Keith v Home, 1739. 
89 Eyemouth, Lodge St Ebbe No. 70, Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe No. 70, 1757–1787. 
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deeds, sasines, tax records etc. Of great interest was the report prepared for 
Henry Dundas in 1784 describing the process of tea smuggling – this had been 
used by the Muis but was susceptible to deeper quarrying.90 
 
The Sound Toll records, available on line, confirmed a number of voyages of 
Eyemouth ships from the Baltic, while the Swedish East India Company sale 
catalogues, also available online, threw light on buyers of tea.91 The British 
Newspaper Archive was an invaluable resource, not available to earlier 
researchers, which permitted detailed searches of all the newspapers so far 
included. This gave more evidence of shipping movements, the sale of 





My own background was as a social historian in local museums in England 
between 1969 and 1984, focusing on very specific local history. My 
‘publications’ took the form of ephemeral exhibitions and displays looking at 
communities of place and interest in specific areas. These included the story of 
a small council estate, semi-professional dance bands, their members and 
audiences, in Coventry and small breweries in Bury. This thesis has grown out 
of a similar approach to smuggling in Eyemouth, provoked by the history of 
Gunsgreen House and John Nisbet, its builder. 
 
Writing in History News Network in 2006, Sigurdur Gylfi Magnusson summed up 
the debate at that time.92 Two of his points have particular resonance in this 
case: ‘they (microhistorians) scrutinise those individuals who did not follow the 
paths of their average fellow countryman, thus making them their focal point.’ 
And ‘Nearly all cases which microhistorians deal with have one thing in 
common: they all caught the attention of the authorities, thus establishing their 
 
90 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2, Charles Paton and John Aitchison, Letters Concerning the Tea Trade 
Forwarded to Henry Dundas by I.C., 1785. 
91 Sound Toll Registers, 1740–1790, University of Groningen/Tresoar in Leeuwarden, 
www.soundtoll.nl ; Europe’s Asian Centuries: Trading Eurasia, 1600–1830, Sale Catalogues of 
the Swedish East India Company, University of Warwick Digital Collections, 
https://wdc.contentdm.oclc.org/collection/swedish  
92 Sigurdur Gylfi Magnusson, What is Microhistory? , History News Network,  
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/23720 , accessed 22.2.2020 
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archival existence.’ Classic early works of microhistory are Carlo Ginzburg’s 
The Cheese and the Worms (…an incisive study of popular culture in the 
sixteenth century as seen through the eyes of one man, the miller known as 
Menocchio, who was accused of heresy during the Inquisition and sentenced to 
death. Carlo Ginzburg uses the trial records to illustrate the religious and social 
conflicts of the society Menocchio lived in.93). Carlo Ginzburg was a pioneer of 
the development of the concept of microhistory, which – in the beginning at 
least – was a European proposal.  
 
An early American example is The Unredeemed Captive by John Demos, 
published in 1994. It exemplifies another key element of microhistory – the 
narrative. Demos does not identify is as microhistory, rather as a narrative – the 
first line of the preface is ‘Most of all, I wanted to write a story’.94 Douglas 
Winiarski, quoted in History News Network said ‘Classic microhistories, such as 
John Demos’s Unredeemed Captive or Paul Johnson and Sean 
Wilentz’s Kingdom of Matthias, often read like gripping historical novels. They 
share much in terms of approach with popular nonfiction books, such as Erik 




Every study of smuggling has a different approach. The current study is based 
on the proposal that smuggling was an extension of ‘business as usual’, which it 
pursues by tracing the supply and distribution chains of contraband in south-
east Scotland. It is also, effectively, a micro-history of the trade of the port of 
Eyemouth over a fifty-year period. The combination of these approaches has 
allowed the development of a number of new propositions, most importantly, 
that there was a particular ‘North Sea’ smuggling, which supported the success 
of the Swedish East India Company and allowed the marketing of ‘Gottenburgh 
Teas’ in Scotland and the north of England. It additionally identifies the role of 
the non-plebeian merchant-smuggler, exemplified by John Nisbet with his fine 
 
93 https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/cheese-and-worms (synopsis on John Hopkins University 
Press website, accessed 29.02.2020) 
94 John Demos, The Unredeemed Captive, (London, Papermac, 1996), p.xi 
95 Interview with Douglas Winiarski, History News Network, 
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/172590 , accessed 29.02.2020 
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John Adam merchant’s house with its smuggler’s hiding places. The change of 
the nature of smuggling in south-east Scotland, noted by contemporary 
observers, is here made explicit.  
 
By following the Scandinavian trade of Eyemouth, it leads to questioning of 
some assertions made by Kent regarding the Scottish timber import business 
and it demonstrates the opportunities for exporting contraband to Norway as 
well as importing ‘Danish’ tea. In terms of the distribution chain within Scotland 
and the north of England, it draws attention to the previously largely overlooked 
importance of road transport, with evidenced connections to Edinburgh, 
Newcastle and Leeds. Examination of the customs records reinforces the view 
that the customs and the local merchant-smugglers seem to have developed a 
modus vivendi, whereby a reasonable amount of income accrued to the state, 
with minimal risk to the officers of the customs service and little interference 
with the smuggling business.  
 
There are, inevitably, unanswered questions. How typical was Eyemouth? Its 
geographical advantages are highlighted, but these apply to other ports. It does 
seem that the port was redeveloped by the ‘County’ to provide an outlet for 
grain from the improved farms of the Merse, the rich agricultural district of 
Berwickshire. Can it be said that agricultural improvement paved the way for 
Eyemouth to become a centre for smuggling? What is going on with respectable 
merchants in Newcastle and Leeds dealing with at least one smuggler in south-
east Scotland? How important was the Jacobite connection between Scotland 
and Gothenburg?  
 
These and other questions will be raised in the appropriate chapters and 
addressed again in the Conclusion, but they may not all be answered here, and 




The thesis is structured to provide the evidence which supports the key 
contentions about the nature of smuggling in south-east Scotland and the 




Chapter one explores the development of economic activity on both sides of the 
border, in the years around the Union of 1707, and the background to the Union 
itself. The key changes that affected Eyemouth were the improvement in 
relations with the north-east of England and the development of agriculture 
there and in Berwickshire. 
 
Chapter two concentrates on the port of Eyemouth, its physical setting and its 
slow early growth. It demonstrates how agricultural improvement provided the 
launch pad for the development of the port in the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the growth of its community of merchants and of its overseas trade. It 
includes an analysis of the growth of smuggling and identifies those merchants 
who were most involved.  
 
Chapter three forms an in-depth analysis of the merchant community in 
Eyemouth – the first time that this has been possible, due to the nature and 
range of sources identified. In the context of current thinking on mercantile 
networks, it identifies the key institutions in Eyemouth and the personal 
relationships involved. It then focusses on two families – the Nisbets, 
particularly John, the builder of Gunsgreen House, and his brother David, and 
the Robertsons, the key figures in the town, with local business roots back into 
the early seventeenth century. The connections of the Nisbets demonstrate the 
importance of smuggling to their business, and the northern nature of that 
smuggling, across the North Sea and into northern England. 
 
The following chapter (four) analyses the smuggling business in south-east 
Scotland, exploring in detail how it functioned as, essentially, an adjunct to, or 
even a core part of the normal business of trade. This is developed in the first 
part of the chapter and is then followed by a consideration of the reaction of the 
authorities in Scotland to smuggling – the ineffective resolutions of the 
Convention of Royal Burghs and the Church of Scotland and the activities of the 
Customs and Excise services. It seems apparent from the latter that there 





Smuggling would be not worthwhile without an efficient distribution network. 
This is the theme of chapter five, following, as far as possible, the route of 
contraband from its landing places near Eyemouth to middlemen and end 
consumers from Edinburgh to Newcastle, Leeds and even London. This is 
where the importance of road transport, even before the development of 
turnpikes, is highlighted.  
 
Chapter six examines the smuggling of tea in the North Sea with an in-depth 
consideration of the impact of the Swedish East India Company on the tea 
market in Britain, with a strong focus on Scotland and the north of England. The 
records of John Nisbet’s business have provided the route into this study, which 
highlights the role of Scottish merchants in Sweden and the development of 
Gottenburgh Teas as, in modern terms, a brand, illustrated by a range of 
newspaper advertisements for smuggled tea. 
 
The thesis concludes with a valedictory chapter on the decline of merchant-
smugglers in Eyemouth and their replacement by ‘professionals’ from 
Folkestone and the Netherlands. It is organised as a series of case studies of 
local merchant-smugglers, with most attention inevitably paid to John Nisbet. 
The end of locally based smuggling coincided with, and was probably brought 
about by, the slashing of duty on imported tea in the 1784 Consolidation Act – 
although, as often with John Nisbet, this is not entirely clear, as he was also in 

















The economic background of the cross-border region before and after the 




This chapter will address national and local economic and political 
developments, particularly those surrounding the Union of 1707. It will look in 
some detail at those changes as they affected the wider cross-border region, 
covering south-east Scotland and north Northumberland, with a comparative 
review of the western Borders.  
 
In the years after the Union, there were still cross border rivalries, notably in the 
salt trades of the Forth and Tyne, while the Northumberland/Borders region 
along the River Tweed steadily developed as supplier of agricultural goods to 
London, through the port of Berwick-upon-Tweed, while the farming 
improvements in Berwickshire supported the development of the port of 
Eyemouth. The growth of Glasgow as a centre of tobacco imports fed an active 
smuggling trade on the east coast, as well as the west. 
 
1.2  The Union of 1707 
 
In 1707 England and Scotland agreed a Treaty of Union to create the new entity 
known as Great Britain. Since 1603, when James VI of Scotland inherited the 
English throne, the two countries had shared a monarch, but continued to exist 
as separate entities, aside from a period during the Commonwealth when 
Scotland had been fully incorporated with England. There has been a long-
standing debate about the influence of economic factors on the Union and, vice 
versa, about the impact of the Union on the economy of Scotland.1 The effect of 
the Union on the economy of the cross-border region of north Northumberland 
and Berwickshire, and, for comparative purposes, of Cumberland and south-
 
1 T.C. Smout, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707. I. The Economic Background‘, The Economic 
History Review, New Series 16.3 (1964), 455–467; C.A. Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The 
Scots and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 
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west Scotland will be examined here. There has, perhaps inevitably, been less 
consideration from the English side of the economic impact of the Union, but 
there has been work on the growth of Northumberland’s economy in the 
eighteenth century and on the history of Berwick-upon-Tweed, the principal 
town of the cross-border region.2 
 
During the seventeenth century, Scotland’s economy was developing, notably 
through the activity of merchants trading with northern Europe. Examples of 
successful enterprises were the export of coal to Rotterdam, Bremen and 
Hamburg, salt to Bremen and fish to Bremen and Hamburg.3 The 1690s, 
however dealt a series of hammer blows to Scotland. Whatley argues that these 
were inter-related, while some writers have posited that they were effectively 
coincidental. Some, such as the effects of climate change, were not exclusive to 
Scotland, but Whatley has proposed that the impact in Scotland was similar to 
that of the famine of the 1840s in Ireland and a population loss of around 13 per 
cent has been suggested.4 The attempt to create a Scottish Empire based on 
the isthmus of Darien in central America in the late 1690s proved to be a further 
setback for Scotland’s morale and self-identity.  
 
Traditionally, the driver for Union on the Scottish side has been regarded as the 
economy. Recent work by Whatley has suggested that there was, in fact, a 
considerable political and principled support for Union: 
 
... it has become apparent that for many of Scotland’s politicians of the 
period, ideas and political ideology were more important in shaping their 
attitudes than has generally been recognised by most modern historians, 
including this one. The long-held and popular notion that the Scots were 
bought and sold for English gold seems not to stand up to close scrutiny. 
On its own, neither does the argument that the Scots bargained away 
their parliament for free trade and access to England’s colonies. There 




2 Tony Barrow, ‘Corn,Carriers and Coastal Shipping; the Shipping Trade of Berwick and the 
Borders, 1730–1830’, Transport History, 21.1 (2000), 6–27. 
3 Kathrin Zickermann, Across the German Sea: Early Modern Scottish Connections with the 
Wider Elbe Weser Region (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp.83–114.  
4 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, p.143. 
5 C.A. Whatley, ‘Economic Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A Survey’, The 
Scottish Historical Review, 68.186/2 (1989), 150–181. 
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Aida Ramos has proposed that the Union needs to be viewed in the context of 
contemporary English mercantilism.6 She defines one purpose of mercantilism 
as ‘the purposeful crafting of policy in order to limit the actions of countries that 
one perceives a real or potential threat to the dominance of the nation-state’.7 
She then proceeds to argue that the English ministers had their eyes on the 
long term ‘gains in power in parliamentary representation, the location of the 
capital, debt service, increased tax revenue and access to increased financial 
and physical capital’ while the Scots focused on free trade with the colonies as 
their major gain.’8 
 
Karin Bowie, writing of the public debate surrounding the Union, suggests that 
the weight of opposition, extending as far as an attempt to organise a joint 
Jacobite/Covenanter armed uprising, was dealt with in what was then the 
appropriate way, by a mixture of repression and concession, notably ‘the 
promise of the Hanoverian succession, security for the Presbyterian Church, a 
communication of trade and the reimbursement of the African Company 
shareholders’ She particularly noted the support among Glasgow merchants for 
the Union, as the potential for free trade in the colonies offered them ‘vast 
wealth by trading in the West Indies’9 
 
1.3 The Impact of the Union on the cross-border region 
 
Over a long period of time the area each side of the eastern border had been 
subject to unrest, varying from outright warfare to criminal violence. Although 
the Union of the Crowns led to a decline in this violence, there was still a level 
of insecurity, felt particularly strongly in Northumberland. This was reinforced by 
the experience of the Civil War when, in 1640, a Scottish Army briefly seized 
the Tyne Coalfields and sought to hold the King to ransom in support of their 
allies in parliament. The coal fields were seized again from 1644 to 1647 during 
which time Newcastle coal was still exported to Hamburg, to the benefit of the 
 
6 Aida Ramos, Shifting Capital: Mercantilism and the Economics of the Act of Union of 1707 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 
7 Ramos, Shifting Capital, p. 9 
8 Ramos, Shifting Capital, p. 14 
9 Karin Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union, 1699 – 1707 (Woodbridge, 
Boydell Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2007), pp 164-5, p.143 
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Scots.10 During the 1640s, the attitudes of people in Northumberland and North 
Yorkshire towards the Scots fluctuated, but by end of the decade the 
predominant feeling was one of distrust and dislike.11 
 
Despite the full Union between England and Scotland under the 
Commonwealth, which was revoked at the Restoration, as late as 1703–1704 
there was still nervousness in Northumberland of a potential Scottish invasion 
provoked by the political activity which led up to the treaty of Union. The 
memory of the 1640s – and the centuries before – played a large part in this. 
The insecurity felt by people in Northumberland delayed economic 
improvements.  
 
Equally, the coming of the Union had reduced the importance of Berwick-upon-
Tweed as a frontier town. Berwick was – and, indeed, still is – in a peculiar 
position. When it was Scottish, which it was on and off until 1482, it was a Royal 
Burgh and one of the chief ports of the country, serving the wealthy agricultural 
area of Berwickshire. When it was English, however, it was a remote frontier 
town, fortified by Queen Elizabeth as a response to the loss of Calais by her 
sister. The Jacobite risings had helped to maintain Berwick’s status until the 
1740s – politically it remained associated with the government interest and a 
place where patronage related to places in the army remained important.12 
 
Steve Murdoch has written about the confusion of identities, particularly in the 
early seventeenth century, with people referring to themselves as Scoto-
Britannus or Anglo-Britannus.13 In Berwick, according to the diary of the English 
Royalist Officer John Aston, there were two ministers – one an Englishman who 
was a pro-covenant Presbyterian and a Scottish pro-Canterbury Anglican. The 
implication was that there was tolerance between English and Scots south of 
 
10 Zickermann, Across the German Sea, p.112. 
11 S. Barber, ‘The People of Northern England and attitudes towards the Scots, 1639–1651: 
‘The Lamb and the Dragon cannot be reconciled’, Northern History, 35 (1999), 93–118. 
12 Edward Hughes, North Country Life in the Eighteenth Century: The North East 1700–1750. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952), p.273.  
13 Steve Murdoch, ‘Anglo-Scottish Culture Clash? Scottish identities and Britishness, c.1520 – 
1750, CYNCOS, 25.2 (2008), p.254 
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the Border, even during the Civil War.14 This seems to go against Barber’s 
findings, but even he notes that feelings fluctuated.15 
 
It is clear from the study by Hughes that the period from 1700 to 1750 was one 
of great change in Northumberland.16 Many of the ‘old’ families – mainly, but not 
exclusively, Catholic – had been ruined by the disruption of the Scottish 
occupation in the 1640s, followed by the penalties imposed on Royalist families 
during the Commonwealth.  
 
... the period between the Restoration and 1750 witnessed the liquidation 
of scores of ancient families both great and small, and the rise out of the 
ashes of new men who gradually acquired vast agglomerations of 
estates and whose descendants have, for the most part, remained in 
possession until our own day (1950s) 
 
Analysis of the condition of Jacobite estates forfeit in 1715 gives a picture of 
huge indebtedness. Hughes even suggests that support for the Jacobite rising 
of 1715, which was strong in Northumberland, may have been driven as much 
by economic desperation as by religious or political principles. Oates, in 
describing Northumberland’s vulnerability to Jacobite invasion in 1715, 
reinforced the impression given by Hughes of a county with a strong Catholic 
community, whose northern border abutted on to Scotland and with a coastline 
which was attractive to potential invasion. He also refers to ‘the urgent threat of 
open rebellion’ in the county.17 
 
The rise of the ‘new’ gentry, characteristic of the south of England in the 
sixteenth century, was delayed in Northumberland until the eighteenth century. 
The border region was constantly unsettled and insecure, even after the Union 
of the Crowns in 1603. It was not until after 1707 that the situation really settled 
down. This, as referred to above, was too late for many of the traditional 
families and they were effectively displaced by these new men who had made 
their fortunes in the coalfields around Newcastle.  
 
 
14 Murdoch, ‘Anglo-Scottish Culture Clash?’, p 257. 
15 Barber, ‘The People of Northern England’ 
16 Hughes, North Country Life, pp.1–38. 
17 Jonathan D. Oates ‘Responses in the North of England to the Jacobite Rebellion of 1715’, 
Northern History, 43:1 (2006), 77–95. 
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What we have in the north at this time is ... a sudden blossoming of 
civilization with the melting away of political and social disorder under the 
warming influence of economic prosperity.18 
 
While relatively little work has been undertaken on the economic impact of the 
Union on Northumberland, more has been done with relation to Cumberland. 
Part of the reason for this is the nature of trade on the west coast, and the 
wealth of records that exist for Whitehaven in particular. Robinson makes it 
clear that the main impact of the Union on Cumberland was that it effectively 
normalised existing trade. In the late seventeenth-century Whitehaven, for 
example, attracted Scottish merchants, who used it effectively as an outstation 
of Glasgow to trade with the American colonies, thus circumventing the post 
Commonwealth Navigation Acts. Tobacco was imported legally to Whitehaven, 
then exported, with drawback, to the Isle of Man and smuggled into Scotland or 
Ireland.19 Whitehaven benefited from this – the port was newly developed by Sir 
John Lowther and he was very happy to attract Scottish merchants ‘As any 
Scotch merchants come there, ingage them to bring some of their countrymen 
to settle with us’.20 His Steward, William Gilpin, was dutiful, but not so 
enthusiastic: 
 
Wee have … Several Scotch (some of them are become tenants) who 
are (generally) very industrious and are of use to the town, but maligned 
under the foolish notion as if they came to eat other people’s bread. I 
have as little respect for that nation as anybody, but always think it is our 
interest to encourage as many of them (as are industrious) to settle with 
us.21 
 
The Union provided opportunities for a creative approach to trade on both sides 
of the Solway Firth, where there remained differential tax rates on the opposite 
sides of the border. This was greatly assisted by the absence of any controls on 
the land frontier.22  
 
 
18 Hughes, North County Life, p.30. 
19 Allan L. Macinnes, ‘Scottish Circumvention of the English Navigation Acts in the American 
Colonies 1660 – 1707, in G.Lottes et al (eds) Making, using and resisting the law in European 
History, (Pisa, Pisa University Press, 2008), 109 – 130, (118)  
20 M.J. Robinson, ‘Cumbrian Attitudes to Union with Scotland: Patriotism or Profit?’, Northern 
History, 39 (2003): 227–244 (228). 
21 Robinson, ‘Cumbrian Attitudes’, 228. 
22 Robinson, ‘Cumbrian Attitudes’, 235.  
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Over the early years of the eighteenth century, the ports in the north-west of 
England, Liverpool and Whitehaven, together with Glasgow, came to dominate 
the tobacco trade. This was largely for logistical reasons, in that the passage 
from the Colonies round the north of Ireland was quicker and safer than that to 
London. Glasgow, however, building on its long experience before the Union, 
had developed its own way of managing the trade. Glasgow merchants had a 
deep understanding of the European markets for tobacco and they had also set 
up agents and warehouses in the colonies, allowing them to buy up tobacco in 
advance and thus turn around their ships in two or three weeks, instead of 
waiting in Chesapeake Bay for months on end building up cargoes as ships 
from the English ports tended to do.23 
 
The initial response of English competitors was that the Glasgow merchants 
were rogues, working in collusion with corrupt customs officers in Glasgow. This 
led to the merger of Scottish and English customs administration in 1723, which 
caused ill feeling in Scotland, but only had a temporary effect on the Glasgow 
trade. Another panic in the south led to the Tobacco Act in 1751, seeking to 
further control the trade. There was certainly a considerable smuggling trade in 
south-west Scotland throughout the eighteenth century, much of it built around 
false re-exports, for which the duty was refunded, but this was not unique to 
Glasgow – indeed, John Nisbet of Gunsgreen House was known by the 
Customs in London to be a leading exponent of this practice.24 
 
It was, however, the efficiency of the Glasgow merchants, combined with 
particular advantages in terms of availability of credit and trade goods, which 
led to that city dominating the trade, so that by 1758 it overtook London as the 
leading tobacco port. In this case, then, despite Glasgow being a centre of 
opposition to the Union in the years leading up to 1707, its merchants were very 
successful in exploiting its advantages. As with the Tyneside salt masters 
described below, however, the Scottish merchants were suspected of taking 
unfair advantage of the special arrangements put in place by the Treaty of 
Union. As Price puts it ‘these included the excessive susceptibility of the North 
 
23 J. M. Price, ‘The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707–1775’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 11.2 (1954), 179–199 (189). 
24 Edinburgh, NRS, CE1/9, 25 June 1755. 
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British officers to corruption, the ignorance and sloth of the same officers, which 
made fraud easy … and the unfamiliarity of even the best officers with the 
correct English customs procedure…’ 25 
 
1.4     Coal and Salt 
 
In terms of industries represented on both sides of the Border, the inter-related 
coal and salt trades make a useful case study, particularly as the fates of the 
English and Scottish industries in the eighteenth century differed so markedly 
and this difference was, at least in art, due to the effect of the Union Treaty. 
What they had in common was that they were both sited on major estuaries with 
easy access to cheap coal. The difference between Scotland and England was 
that, effectively, in Scotland coal was subsidiary to salt, whereas on the Tyne, 
coal was the major industry, with salt pans being useful consumers of otherwise 
unsaleable ‘small coal’.26  
 
The Scottish Government in the seventeenth century had adopted a 
protectionist stance towards its nascent industrial sector. In 1665, for example, 
a tax of £12 Scots (the equivalent of one-pound sterling) per boll of foreign salt, 
except that which was used for preserving fish or meat for export, was imposed. 
This effectively closed the domestic market to imports. As many of the 
proprietors of the coal and salt industries were Privy Councillors and 
parliamentarians, this climate of protectionism inevitably influenced the Treaty 
of Union. It is clear, however, that the motivation of the proprietors was to 
protect the domestic market, rather than to seek to exploit any new markets 
created by the Union. The debate on the VIIIth Article of Union lasted several 
days and aroused concern among the proprietors. The Earl of Mar, for example, 
wrote ‘I told you always this was the artickle I was most afraid of.’27 The 
outcome of the debate was that Scottish salt used in Scotland was to remain 
free of any duties for seven years and there was a perpetual exemption from 
 
25 Price, ‘The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade’, 185. 
26This section draws on two articles: C.A. Whatley, ‘Salt, Coal and the Union of 1707: a revision 
article’, The Scottish Historical Review, 66.181/1 (1987), 26–45 and Ellis, ‘The Decline and Fall 
of the Tyneside Salt Industry, 1660–1790: a Re-examination’, The Economic History Review, 
New Series, 33.1 (1980), 45–58. 
27 Whatley, ‘Salt, Coal and the Union’, 31. 
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the additional English duty of 2s 4d per bushel on Scottish ‘home-salt’. Whatley 
tells us that: 
 
The manufacturers of Scottish salt were, like the proprietors of many 
other Scottish industrial enterprises, aware of their shortcomings and 
opposed to unhampered competition from the English. The post-Union 
disappearance of many of them demonstrates how well founded were 
their fears.28 
 
Enjoying this protection, however, a Scottish salt industry did survive until well 
into the nineteenth century. 
 
Scottish coal was similarly protected in the XIIth Article of Union. This 
safeguarded all Scottish ‘coal, culm and cinders’ used within Scotland from 
English duties until 1710. The protective nature of this was reinforced by the 
ongoing arrangements that came into force in 1710, following proposals from 
the Forth coal masters. Under this variation, the exemption continued to apply 
to all Scottish coal used between St Abb’s Head and Red Head, near Arbroath. 
This protected the natural local market for Forth coal while opening the rest of 
the east coast to English imports. The fragmentary records of imports into 
Eyemouth – the only port in Scotland south of St Abb’s Head – seem to 
illustrate the impact of these special arrangements. Between April 1726 and 
January 1739, 87 ships entered Eyemouth carrying coal or salt. Of these 52 had 
Scots salt, 12 Scots coal, 22 English coal and 1 Foreign salt.29 Whatley further 
discusses accusations by English economic historians that duty-free Scots salt 
undercut and effectively destroyed the Tyne salt industry. His view is that there 
is no evidence to support this allegation. We shall see later why the Tyne 
industry failed. Whatley does allow, however, that there was ‘a localised illegal 
trade in the eastern border towns.’ It is not wholly fanciful to suggest the figures 
for imports into Eyemouth support this view.  
 
The salt industry on the Tyne, which was essentially like that on the Forth, 
faded out in the course of the eighteenth century. Why this difference? It was 
very straightforward – the Tyne industry simply did not enjoy the protection 
afforded to that in Scotland, so was wiped out by competition. The process of 
 
28 Whatley, ‘Salt, Coal and the Union’, 38. 
29 NRS, CS228/K/1/66. 
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extracting salt from sea water by boiling in large iron pans was inefficient – it 
took around six tons of coal to produce one ton of salt – and the product was 
poor. Tyne salt was bitter and dirty – especially as it was often transported in 
colliers and was known as ‘grey salt’.30 It was not suitable for either long term 
preserving or as table salt but was adequate for kitchen purposes. The golden 
years of the Tyne salt industry were the second and third decades of the 
eighteenth century, with the peak year being 1713/1714 when over 20,000 tons 
was sold.31 More than half of this was represented by exports to Europe, but 
these were never going to be long term, as new sources of salt were always 
being developed. By the 1740s, production had declined to about 9,000 tons 
per year, with as few as one quarter of the Shields salt pans operating.32 The 
fatal blow to the industry, however, was the improvement to local transport links 
to the Cheshire rock salt mines. This was exacerbated by the growth of other 
industries in the Tyne area, such as iron working, which used small coal, 
thereby increasing demand for and prices of this hitherto cheap fuel. By the 
1780s there were only 20 pans left operating – down from a peak of about 170 
sixty years earlier. By 1796 the industry was so far gone that the government 
inspectors no longer visited the area.33 
 
The situation was that there were two similar industries operating only one 
hundred miles or so apart, both producing a poor-quality product, although Ellis 
says that Forth Salt was regarded as being made with rather more care, using 
the local coal industry for low cost fuel. The Scottish industry, protected since 
the 1660s, survived into the nineteenth century, while the Tyne industry, despite 
a more sophisticated approach to management, failed in the face of competition 
from a product that was superior and – eventually – price competitive. Although 
the accusations of unfair competition from the Forth salt pans was largely 
unfounded, there must have been resentment at seeing this fundamentally 
similar industry surviving for another couple of generations thanks to the 
protection assured by the Treaty of Union, reinforced by the long term anti-
Scottish feeling in the English border counties. 
 
 
30 Ellis, ‘Decline and Fall of the Tyneside Salt Industry’, 46. 
31 Ellis, ‘Decline and Fall of the Tyneside Salt Industry’, 50. 
32 Ellis, ‘Decline and Fall of the Tyneside Salt Industry’, 53. 
33 Ellis, ‘Decline and Fall of the Tyneside Salt Industry’, 53. 
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1.5    Agriculture 
 
Traditional Scottish agricultural practices – notably the shared use of 
unenclosed fields – hindered individual experimentation or improvement, but in 
the seventeenth century, Sir Alexander Cockburn introduced systems of limited 
rotation at his estates in Berwickshire at Simprim and Langton. It was possible 
to adopt this within the traditional holding patterns and by the later seventeenth 
century the Scottish lowlands were able to produce enough food to mitigate the 
worst effects of crop failure.34  
 
The Scottish Parliament had begun the process of land reform, with a few Acts 
in the later seventeenth century, but it was the effect of Union, with Scots 
landowners travelling more frequently in England, that encouraged greater 
changes. Scotland had no need for legislation to permit enclosures as, to quote 
Sir John Sinclair ‘in no country in Europe are the rights of proprietors so well 
defined and so carefully protected (as in Scotland).’35 Pioneering landowners in 
East Lothian, the Borders and Aberdeenshire – for arable – and Galloway, for 
pasture, set about improvement and enclosures. In 1733, for example, the 
estate of Cockburn in Ormistoun in East Lothian, let to the Tenants for three 
lives was described as ‘now all enclosed and most of the Fences sufficient; and 
the Farmers are becoming wealthy, far beyond the common Condition of 
Persons of their Rank.’36 
 
East Lothian, one of the wealthiest agricultural districts, had the advantage of 
three local Royal Burghs with ports, North Berwick, Haddington (at Aberlady) 
and Dunbar – which was also the customs headport, of which Eyemouth was a 
‘creek’. Berwickshire had, of course, lost its only Royal Burgh with a port with 
the final seizure of Berwick-upon-Tweed by the English in 1482, leaving 
Eyemouth as its only accessible harbour. Aside from East Lothian, Berwickshire 
was perhaps the richest agricultural area in Scotland during this period. John 
Home writing in 1797, for example, offered a synopsis of the development of 
 
34 John Dent and Rory McDonald, Farm and Factory: Revolution in the Borders (Scottish 
Borders Council, Newtown St Boswells, 2001). 
35 Hamilton, An Economic History, p.57. 
36 Hamilton, An Economic History, p.61.  
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farming in the county, which provides the background for the growth of the port 
of Eyemouth: 
 
Previous to the year 1730, no such thing was known as a proprietor of 
land pursuing systematically the profession of farmer… Between the year 
1730 and 1745, several landed proprietors of the county of whom the 
celebrated Henry Home, Lord Kames and the late George Carr, Lord 
Nisbet, Judges of the Court of Session, Mr Home of Beeles, together 
with the father of the present Lord Swinton, and Mr Home of Ninewells, 
the elder brother of David Hume, the Philosopher and Historian, 
commenced the practice of husbandry upon their own lands, on a 
studied and intelligent plan, with a laudable zeal, and considering that 
they were the first improvers in an unknown art, with a tolerable degree 
of success.37  
 
South of the Border, too, agriculture blossomed in the eighteenth century. 
Barrow describes how, at the end of the eighteenth century, the agricultural 
economy of the cross-border region (Glendale, Tweeddale and the Lower 
Merse) enjoyed a period of great prosperity. Enduring peace and stability in the 
Borders, agricultural innovation and extensive investment in land improvement 
and turnpiking, he explains, facilitated the emergence of coherent regional 
networks of transport and exchange … based on the ports and market towns of 
the region.38  
 
The major landowners of Northumberland, such as Lancelot Allgood, Walter 
Blackett, the Culleys, Swinburnes, Ridleys, Greys and Delavals made major 
contributions to the development of the transport network. George Culley had a 
national reputation as an innovative farmer, increasing his wheat yields in 
Glendale almost seven-fold between 1767 and 1802. He claimed to have 
introduced spring sown wheat into the county, paving the way for wheat to 
replace barley as the number two cereal crop. The work of such men as Culley 
went hand in hand with the development of commercial networks for the 
purchase and transport of crops. Corn merchants from Alnwick, for example, 
built six granaries at the port of Alnmouth between 1760 and 1820. Coutts of 
Edinburgh and London – more usually known as bankers – had an agent based 
at Fenwick in North Northumberland, buying up grain for transport to London.39 
 
37 J. Home, Rectified report of Berwickshire agriculture (Home, Berwick, 1797) 
38 Barrow, ‘Corn, Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, 9. 
39 Barrow, ‘Corn, Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, 14. 
49 
 
As a result of the agricultural developments both sides of the Border, the port of 
Berwick was revitalised. In 1764 the Old Company was founded, a shipping line 
operating Berwick smacks. These were sloops with a single tall mainmast, 
capable of carrying a good spread of sail. Early ones were built at Whitby, but 
most were built in Berwick itself. By about 1800, the typical smack was about 70 
feet long and could carry a cargo of between 100 and 120 tons. There were two 
incentives to develop a specialist fast sailing vessel. One was security – the 
North Sea was a dangerous place, frequented by French privateers, Dunkirk 
pirates etc. A well-handled smack could out sail or out fight most of these.40  
 
In addition, one of the key goods carried was salmon 
 
…shipped to London in ice as fresh fish. Ice had first been used at 
Berwick about 1787, and the subsequent construction of five substantial 
ice houses in the town after 1790 bear witness to its increased 
importance. Merchants engaged in the salmon trade entered into 
agreements with local farmers to collect ice from the surface of ponds 
during the winter. In 1806 (it was) calculated between 10,000 and 12,000 
boxes of salmon worth £66,000 were shipped annually by the smacks.41 
 
The development of the network of turnpike and other maintained roads linking 
Berwick to a substantial cross-border hinterland, from Duns, Kelso and Hawick 
(in Scotland) to Wooler and Glendale (in England), referred to above, was 
critical to the economic generation of the cross-border region. It facilitated the 
gathering of agricultural products, notably eggs, oats and wheat which were 
exported to London. Berwick, despite its remoteness, managed to develop 
close links with London. This trade ensured a distribution of cash income 




It is clearly the case that the Union was economically beneficial to Scotland and 
to the Border region. By the end of the seventeenth century, Scotland was in a 
relatively poor state, though improving economically and while the country 
would have continued to improve without the Union, that improvement would 
 
40 Barrow, ‘Corn, Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, 14. 
41 Barrow, ‘Corn Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, 19. 
42 Barrow, ‘Corn, Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, 19. 
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surely have been slower. The history of protectionism demonstrated the lack of 
confidence in the ability of Scotland’s industries to compete on a level playing 
field. Indeed, coarse linen weaving faded quickly, as did the embryonic woollen 
industry. 
 
Of the areas examined here, coal and salt were industries where the Scottish 
sections were protected by the Treaty of Union and, effectively, stayed as they 
were from 1665 until the last of the special protection was removed in 1823. 
There was no serious attempt made to expand either industry or to build up an 
export trade. Their weaknesses were recognised and protected. The Tyne salt 
and coal industries equally were unaffected by the Union, although the failing of 
the salt pans was partly – if wrongly – ascribed to unfair Scottish competition. 
 
The tobacco trade of Glasgow benefited enormously from the Union, with 
unfettered access to the American Colonies. Glasgow exploited its geographical 
advantages and cost-effective business practices to corner the British market in 
tobacco. Most of what was imported was re-exported and the merchants of 
Glasgow were not above exploiting the drawback of duty on exports to sustain a 
smuggling trade, especially while the Isle of Man enjoyed its special status prior 
to 1765. As with salt, the English rivals to Glasgow blamed the Union – in this 
case the retention of a separate Scottish Customs Administration. The abolition 
of this in 1723 made no long-term difference – and it was reinstated after a few 
years. The Tobacco Act of 1751 was another attempt by the English merchants 
to control Glasgow’s ascendancy, with equal lack of success. 
 
Agriculture is an interesting case. Scottish farming was not strong in the late 
seventeenth century, but the improvers who so radically changed methods were 
Scotsmen, who may well have undertaken the same improvements irrespective 
of the Union. What was different was the eventual emergence of Berwick-upon-
Tweed as a specialist agricultural export centre serving both sides of the 
Border. This was aided by the great improvements to farming in north 
Northumberland which were assisted by the confidence engendered by the 
Union. The integrated network of roads serving the ports would have been 
unthinkable without the Union. Thus, the areas of Glendale, in Northumberland, 
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the Tweed valley, spanning the border and the Merse, in Berwickshire became 
a single agricultural region. 
 
It is clear that the Union – despite the disruptions of the Jacobite uprisings – 
finally brought peace to the Border counties and facilitated the development of a 
single agricultural region. Given that agriculture was the most important industry 
on both sides of the eastern borders, this can be seen as a clear beneficial 
outcome. Eyemouth, as will be shown, benefitted for some years from borough 
restrictions laid on the port of Berwick-upon-Tweed, but the removal of these 
charges and the subsequent expansion of the trade of the port of Berwick, tied 
to the local transport links, was a further benefit to the region. The bigger picture 
was also positive, with Scotland – and the Scots – working to take advantage of 
the Union, with its access to greater markets and personal opportunities.  
 
These factors created the context for the development of the port of Eyemouth 
and its trading community with associated shipping and land transport. The 
increasing wealth of its hinterland, together with links to Edinburgh and 
Newcastle, provided ideal circumstances for the growth of the smuggling 
business with connections across the North Sea and a local customer base. 
 
Chapter 2 will demonstrate how Eyemouth developed into a town with a 
growing middle class, around its developing trade, both coastal and overseas, 
and how the development of agriculture in the hinterland supported that growth. 












Chapter one outlined the economic consequences of the Union of 1707, which 
provided the context for the growth of the port of Eyemouth. This chapter will 
build on that to offer a detailed analysis of the development of the port from its 
beginnings to the end of the eighteenth century. There are a number of issues 
that need to be addressed, including the nature of the trade of the port and how 
it changed over time; various influences on the success – or failure – of the port, 
such as the activity of the nearby port of Berwick-upon-Tweed; factors 
influencing its popularity as a centre for smuggling; the nature and importance 
of local merchants and their inter-relationships and, a related issue, the 
circumstances which led to the creation of the Harbour Trust in the 1790s.  
 
Analysis in the detail used here and in subsequent chapters has not been 
possible until recently, due to the lack of easily accessible local records. An 
increasing familiarity with Eyemouth merchants and the identification of a range 
of sources – from the Kirk Session to Customs papers and the Masonic Lodge – 
has allowed a detailed picture of Eyemouth, its trade and traders, to emerge, 
 
2.2 Early development of the port of Eyemouth 
 
‘The smaller the merchant or port, the less we know of its history or importance’ 
Gordon Jackson wrote.1 He provided a guide to how to proceed: 
 
…the study of a port (is) validated by examining the interplay of facts and 
comparisons between ports and people; in short by measuring anything 




1 Gordon Jackson, ‘The Significance of Unimportant Ports‘. International Journal of Maritime 
History, 13.2 (2001), 1–17 (3). 




Figure 2/1. South-east Scotland (1920s), Bartholomew ½” series 
 
Fig. 2/1 shows a map of the coast from Edinburgh to Berwick-upon-Tweed, 
together with the counties of East Lothian and Berwickshire. It illustrates the 
ridge of the Lammermuir Hills separating Berwickshire from East Lothian and 
the natural advantages enjoyed by the port of Berwick-upon-Tweed, serving 
Berwickshire to the north and west and Northumberland to the south. Its loss to 
England in 1482 and the subsequent rigid application of its borough rights and 
restrictions until 1776 made the growth of Eyemouth essential to the successful 
development of the Merse, the main agricultural district of Berwickshire.3  
 
East Lothian was served by three Royal Burghs – Haddington, whose port was 
Aberlady, North Berwick and Dunbar and was also closer to Edinburgh than 
Eyemouth. Dunbar was the customs headport for Eyemouth and this map also 
shows both the inconvenience this posed to Eyemouth merchants and the 
advantage for smugglers, in terms of the distance between the two ports. 
 
 












Figure 2/2. ‘A Correct Chart of the German Ocean’, Paul Rapin de Thoyras, London, 
1745 
 
This map (Fig. 2/2) shows how well-placed Eyemouth was to trade across the 
North Sea to the timber ports of Norway and the Baltic and the contraband ports 
of Gothenburg and Rotterdam. It was conveniently placed for transport 
connections with Newcastle, by land or sea, and less far from the main 
population centres than Montrose, one of the busiest of the east coast ports. 
Eyemouth was both relatively remote and convenient for Edinburgh and the 
prosperous interior of Berwickshire. It was pressure from the improving 
landlords of Berwickshire that led to the steady improvement of the port in the 
eighteenth century which, in turn, encouraged the growth of a merchant 
community equipped with ships capable of trading with Europe.4  
 
 









The other advantage possessed by Eyemouth was the fact that it was north 
facing. As will be seen later this was regularly used as an argument for the 
significance of Eyemouth as a safe port when seeking funding. 
 
The bay at Eyemouth, with its prominent headland, had been recognised as a 
place of strategic importance at least as early as the English invasion of 
Scotland in 1547, in an attempt to force the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots 
to King Edward VI of England. Part of the English strategy was to build a chain 
of forts to protect their supply lines and the headland at Eyemouth was chosen 
for the site of one of these. Marcus Merriman described its strategic 
advantages:  
 
A garrison stationed there would guard the approach to England and at 
the same time establish a foothold within Scotland at the mouth of the 
east coast shelf which constituted the main route north to Edinburgh. 
Moreover the harbour… would make supply and provisioning easy.5 
  
Following the Treaty of Boulogne in 1550, the Fort in Eyemouth was 
demilitarised, but was re-fortified in 1557 by the French in response to England 
taking Spain’s side in the dynastic struggles of the time.  
 
...it was thought necessary to build a fort at Aiimouth, which might both 
stop these incursions of the English and be a strength to keep cannon 
and munition in that pairt of the cuntrie.6 
 
 
5 Marcus H. Merriman, ‘The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?’, The Scottish Historical 
Review, 67.184/2 (1988), 142–175 (146). 





Figure 2/3. A Plan of Aymouth, or Eyemouth, [Berwickshire] taken in 1557,  
in which year it was fortified by Henri Clutin, Sieur d'Oysell et de Ville Parisis 
 
The movement of building materials, supplies etc. from Edinburgh to Eyemouth 
was undertaken by sea, indicating that the natural harbour was an attraction to 
the French.7 
 
Ritchie quoted English sources as confirming that: 
 
Cannon, demi-cannon and other great pieces of ordnance intended for 
the assault against Wark and Norham were being stored at Eyemouth.8 
 
It was once again demilitarised following the end of the Franco-Spanish war and 
the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Merriman suggests that that the strategic 
importance of the harbour, allowing for the regular re-supply of this out-station, 
posed such a threat to Berwick-upon-Tweed that it provoked the creation of its 
massive Tudor fortifications.9  
 
In 1597, Eyemouth was created a Burgh of Barony. In Scotland only Royal 
Burghs were originally permitted to take part in foreign trade and had a regional 
monopoly of goods on which the ‘Great Custom’ was levied, and which, 
therefore, benefited the King. In the late sixteenth century, the position of the 
Royal Burghs was threatened by the growth of new Burghs of Barony – created 
by local landlords – with market rights. The Royal Burghs had their rights 
 
7 Ritchie, Mary of Guise, p.182 
8 Ritchie Mary of Guise, citing Talbot MSS, 3195, fol.99, p.182. 
9 Merriman, ‘The Forts of Eyemouth’, 153. 
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confirmed by Act of Parliament in 1633, but by the end of the seventeenth 
century the Burghs of Barony had persuaded the Scottish Parliament to grant 
them extensive rights in the field of foreign trade, in return for a contribution to 
burghal taxation.10 This concession meant that when Eyemouth needed 
assistance with the repair of its harbour in the 1790s, the townspeople were 
able to appeal to the Convention of Royal Burghs. 
 
That the Town of Eyemouth in the County of Berwick is a Burgh of 
Barony and as such has always joined and regularly paid that proportion 
of Stent for participating in foreign trade and therefore tho not a Royal 
Burgh is next in kin and justly intitled to every encouragement and favour 
which can be bestowed by the Royal Burghs...11 
 
The feature of a Burgh of Barony, however, was that it had a Feudal Superior. 
By the mid-eighteenth century this was the family of Home of Billie, as they 
were known. Much of the information about Eyemouth is contained in their 
estate records housed in the National Records of Scotland.  
 
Robert Kerr describes the state of Eyemouth Harbour in the years before it was 
improved: 
 
The harbour of Eyemouth is the private property of a country gentleman, 
to whom some ancient small customary dues are payable from trade and 
shipping, but without any reciprocal obligation to improve the port, or to 
keep its necessary accommodations in repair, for which, indeed, the 
dues are utterly inadequate. It consequently long remained a mere open 
tide creek, at the influx of the Eye into a bay of some extent, and entirely 
exposed to the sea in several directions. In this state nothing but boats 
and barks, or sloops of the smallest size could enter…12 
 
Despite this assessment, Alan Thomson has identified a record of an Eyemouth 
merchant, Philip Hood, buying a timber cargo from Michael Knudsen of 
Stavanger in 1691 and asking the master of the vessel to ‘freight another two 
Norwegian vessels for him’.13 It is also clear from family wills that the most 
 
10 Bruce Lenman, From Esk to Tweed (Glasgow, London: Blackie, 1975), p.30. 
11 Eyemouth, Harbour Trust Archives (uncatalogued), The Petition of the Inhabitants of the 
Town of Eymouth to the Convention of Royal Burghs, 1792. 
12 Kerr, General View of the Agriculture of the County of Berwick, p.8. 
13 Thomson, The Scottish Timber Trade, p.8. 
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important merchant family in the eighteenth century, the Robertsons, were 
active – and prospering – in Eyemouth from as early as the 1620s.14 
 
The Dunbar Collector’s Quarterly Accounts, which survive from 1742 onwards, 
offer a detailed picture of the trade of the Customs Port of Dunbar, which 
included the port of Eyemouth.15 Eyemouth is not identified separately, but it 
has proved possible to deduce which ships used the port, from a developing 
knowledge of the merchants and comparison with other sources. For the earlier 
period it is fortunate that a longstanding dispute between local merchant John 
Keith and the then Feudal Superior, John Home of Manderston, led to a 
certified transcript being made of the shipping records from 1726 to 1738, which 
do not otherwise survive.16 The information provided is the name of the ship, the 
date, merchant, master, cargo and home port. There is no indication as to the 
size of the ships, but it is safe to assume that they would mostly be in the 30/40 
ton (500 bolls) category – certainly the earliest formal records of the Harbour 
Trust in 1797 indicate that this was the most common size. The records also 
only refer to incoming cargoes. The overwhelming majority of ships coming into 
Eyemouth in this twelve-year period were simply sailing from the Firth of Forth 
with salt or coal. The main exception was that John Keith himself brought in 
coal from Newcastle on a regular basis. The volume of salt imported seems 
excessive, considering the fact that Scots salt was not generally regarded as 
suitable for preserving food stuffs.17 There was widespread belief in England 
that Scots salt was smuggled across the border and that this undermined the 
Tyne salt industry.18 Is this flow of salt into Eyemouth a hint, if nothing else, that 
there was indeed a degree of illegitimate cross-border traffic, taking advantage 
of the lower duties charged on Scottish salt? This is discussed in more detail in 
section 1.3 above. 
 
John Keith’s coal from Newcastle may simply have been taking advantage of 
the provision of the Treaty of Union, whereby English coal could be imported 
without penalty into ports south of St Abb’s Head and north of Red Head, near 
 
14 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/8, Testament Dative and 
Inventar of William Robertson, 1720. 
15 NRS, E/504/10/1–6. 
16 NRS, CS228/K/1/66. 
17 Whatley, ‘Salt, Coal and the Union’, 27. 
18  Ellis, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Tyneside Salt Industry’, 51. 
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Arbroath. Greenhall confirms the existence of this trade this from the evidence 
of the Newcastle Port Books, which shows coal exports to Montrose, Aberdeen, 
Inverness and Dunbar. It is likely that Dunbar refers to Eyemouth, which was a 
creek of Dunbar, but south of St Abb’s Head, while Dunbar itself is to the north. 
Greenhall also has no references to coal coming to Eyemouth, during a period 
when there is clear evidence from the Eyemouth end.19 Keith’s business in 
Newcastle evidently addressed itself to more than just coal. The Newcastle 
Customs Books, quoted by Greenhall, give a tantalising glimpse of these wider 
interests – in July 1733 it was reported: 
 
 Honourable Sirs, 
Pursuant to your Honours directions of the 10th May 1732 on the 12 June 
last Mr Keith paid the whole French duties for Fifteen dozen French wine 
stopt at this port for being brought by Land Carriage and without a 
dispatch....20 
 
Apart from Scots salt, coal and cinders, very little was imported into Eyemouth. 
1727 saw one ship load of oatmeal and bear (barley) and in 1728 there was a 
consignment of foreign salt – presumably for preserving fish. James Fall, 
Provost of Dunbar for whom John Nisbet, the future merchant-smuggler and 
builder of Gunsgreen House, almost certainly worked, imported some malt and 
meal from Dunbar to Eyemouth in 1734, while three more cargoes of grain 
arrived in 1738/1739. Imports from abroad were rare – onions in 1727, 
chestnuts and walnuts in 1730, two cargoes of linseed in March 1731, two more 
consignments in January and April 1733, one in April 1735 two in March 1736 
and three in January and February 1737. There were more walnuts in 1735 and 
chestnuts in 1737. All are described as coming from ‘foreign parts’.21 There are 
no records of exports at this period. Information does occur in the papers 
concerning harbour improvements, which clearly indicate that the main exports 
were grain, as would be expected from the nature of the hinterland.22 
 
 
19 M.R. Greenhall, The Evolution of the British Economy: Anglo-Scottish Trade and Political 
Union, an Inter-Regional Perspective, 1580–1750 (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Durham, 2011) p.288. 
20 NA, CUST 84/3, 20 July 1733. 
21 NRS, CS228/K/I/66. 
22 NRS, GD267/27/162/2050. 
60 
 
The records for the period after 1742 suggest that, even before the Harbour 
was improved, Eyemouth was importing goods from across the North Sea, in 
locally owned ships. Other sources reveal that John Keith owned the ship Mary 
and William Robertson, brother of Robert, owned the Francis and a half share in 
another ship, probably the Jane.23 ‘The said Defunct had the time foresaid of his 
Decease the particular Goods... Item half of a ship Thomas Kelly Master one 
hundred pounds.’24 Kelly had been Master of the Francis in the 1720s and was 
Master of the Jane in the early 1740s, when she was working largely for Robert 
Robertson. 
 
The picture of the unimproved harbour suggests about ten or a dozen ships a 
year bringing in imports. They are mostly travelling around the coast from the 
Forth or from the Tyne, with very rare arrivals from ‘foreign parts’. It is certain 
that exports were more significant. It is clear, for example, that Eyemouth had a 
small, but reasonably prosperous merchant community before 1750. It was 
these men, together with the county agricultural interest that campaigned for 
harbour improvements in the 1740s. 
 
As early as 1733 a group of Eyemouth merchants had petitioned the Dowager 
Duchess of Marlborough for her support towards the improvement of the 
harbour – she was approached as the first title awarded to her late husband, 
John, Duke of Marlborough, was Lord Churchill of Eyemouth.  
 
The text of the petition was 
 
That it is the only Port betwixt Berwick & Leith where ships might put in 
easily, and ly safe att any time, if the Harbour were repaired, and the 
necessary Peirs built up. 
 
That the Entry to this Harbour is for the most part choak’d up with sand 
and small stones, by the frequent storms from the North and East, to that 
degree, that a small Vessell of twenty tons can neither enter, nor get out. 
 
That Your Grace’s humble Petitioners propose to clear this Harbour of 
the sand and stones, and to build two Peirs, one on the east and another 
 
23 Caledonian Mercury, Sale advertisement, 18 October 1731; Edinburgh, NRS, CS232/N/31 
William Nisbet v. John Keith, 1747. 
24 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/9, Testament Dative and 
Inventar of William Robertson, 1738. 
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on the west side; which would make it sufficient for ships of two or three 
hundred tons, and prevent it from ever being stop’d up again: but that we 
are now reduced so low, by the long decay of our trade, as not to be able 
to raise a sufficient fund for this end, the Charge being estimated att the 
sum of L2,000.25 
 
This wording supports Robert Kerr’s description of the pre-improvement harbour 
and rehearses some of the arguments used later in the century. It was signed 
by the Minister, two baillies, the town clerk and twelve merchants, indicating that 
the port was reasonably active and was believed to have the potential to grow. 
The baillies and the town clerk were representatives of the towns feudal 
superior. Nothing came of this appeal – the Duchess was famously both 
wealthy and mean. As is detailed below, the first phase of harbour improvement 
only began fifteen years later, in 1748. 
 
2.3 The growth of agriculture and harbour improvements 1748–1797 
 
The motivation for the improvement of the harbour was the agricultural 
improvement of the Merse, the rich farming area inland from Eyemouth, alluded 
to in the previous chapter. These extracts from the 1766 Memoriall Anent the 
Harbour of Eymouth illustrate this clearly. 
 
The dangerous Navigation and the scarcity of good Harbours upon this 
part of the Coast makes it highly necessary for the Country in generall to 
have a Safe and Commodious Harbour here which with the many 
advantages that will Accrue thereby & particularly to the Countys of 
Merse & Tiviotdale renders it an Object of the greatest utility & worthy of 
the Attention and Encouragement from all ranks of people especially 
from Gentlemen of property and their Tenants & those Concern’d in trade 
and manufactures. 
 
In addition, its strategic location was emphasised: 
 
The naturall Situation of the place for trade & the obvious practicability of 
making a safe & commodious Harbour preferable to and of much easier 
access than any Harbour between Flamborrow Head & Leith…26 
 
25 Hawick, Heritage Hub, Duns Library Watson Collection, DL/WC/9/35, Petition to Her Grace 
the Duchess Dowager of Marlborough Soliciting Her Help in Repairing the Harbour of Eymouth, 
1733. 
26  NRS, GD267/27/162/2050. 
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The history of the harbour from 1748 to 1797 was summarised in a record of a 
meeting in 1796 of the Committee established to work towards the creation of 
the Harbour Trust the following year. John Renton, a lawyer and leading citizen 
for over fifty years gave his recollections of the events of that period.27 These 
are supported by two further documents from 1766 and the technical report by 
Smeaton in 1767. The detail provided in these makes them worth quoting at 
some length. John Renton established his credibility: 
 
...he himself was present at laying the first Foundation Stone of the old 
Pier in 1748 which was planned by Mr Crow and under his direction the 
building was carried on till the time of his Death which happened in the 
year 1750 and the remaining part of it was carried on under the direction 
of John Wilson the chief mason in this part of Ye country at that time & 
finished in 1752 to the Satisfaction of the Committee28 
 
William Crow’s pier was the first major development of the Eyemouth Harbour, 
providing the beginnings of a modern small port. It began the process of 
creating a safe entrance and sheltered harbour, usable at all states of the tide, a 
process which was not truly completed until the 1990s. It was designed to solve 
one problem: 
 
The Peir hath been attended with all the good Effects expected, The 
fresh floods have carried off all the gravel & Sand that formerly 
obstructed the Entrance. The bed of the river is now in a level or rather 
below the foundation of the Peir and since building thereof no Barr hath 
appear’d to prevent the greatest Vessels employ’d in the trade of 
Scotland from coming in or going out.29 
  
The merchant John Nisbet, whose later records provide much source material 
for the local smuggling trade, moved back to his home town of Eyemouth from 
Dunbar, where he had been based for some years, coincident with, and 
perhaps prompted by, the construction of the pier, as his John Adam designed 
Gunsgreen House was built in the early 1750s, with the mason John Wilson, 
perhaps having at least some part in the construction work, as his will indicates 
he was owed a sum of money by Nisbet.30 At the same time, John Renton built 
 
27 Eyemouth Harbour Trust Archives (uncatalogued) John Renton, Report to the Committee 
Appointed for Conducting the Repairing and Improving of the Harbour of Eyemouth, 1796. 
28 Renton, Report to the Committee. 
29 NRS GD267/27/162/2050. 
30 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC 15/5/10, Testament Dative 
and Inventar, John Wilson, 1752.       
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himself a new house in the town – Chester House–the second finest house of 
its period.  
 
In 1748, there had been a considerable debate as to whether it would be better 
to build the Pier or the Breakwater – funding was inadequate for both. In the 
end, the pier went ahead and was evidently successful in its own terms, but the 
lack of the breakwater was strongly felt. This was acknowledged by the county 
gentry and magistrates, who, in 1766, commissioned John Smeaton to 
undertake a report on the provision of a breakwater (Fig. 2/4). In his report in 
1767 Smeaton wrote: 
 
...but as the mouth of the river or harbour lies open to the northerly 
winds, ships cannot lie in safety therein without going up beyond the 
elbow of the present quay, where the water being shallower by several 
feet, and the breadth much contracted, the harbour is not only defective 





Figure 2/4. Smeaton’s Plan for his breakwater (l)  
showing the 1748–1752 pier with the elbow (r) 
 
Following the building of the breakwater, the harbour was made safer but 




31 Quoted in George Tod, ‘Parish of Eyemouth’, in Sir John Sinclair (ed.), The Statistical 
Account of Scotland (1791–1799), pp.112–117. 
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That it appears from Robert Cramond’s Report of the 24th Septr. 1773 
(following a land flood in 1772) that he was employed to inspect the 
breaches and estimate ye expence necessary for Repairing the 150 feet 
of the old pier ... nothing was done in consequence of that report and the 
harbour seemed to be allowed to go into Ruin which was hastened by 
the greatest flood that ever happened in the River in the memory of the 
Oldest man living in November 1794 whereby the bottom of the water 
was rendered still deeper and the foundations of the East side of the 
Turret or outer head was then Sapp’d, undermined and reduced to the 
ruinous state in which it now appears.32 
 
 
Figure 2/5. As late as 1948 land floods were still violently destructive, despite 
nineteenth-century changes to the layout of the Harbour. 
www.facebook.com/groups/eyemouthpast, accessed 13 March 2016 
 
It was this decay that led eventually to the creation of the Harbour Trust in 1797, 
following a petition to the Convention of Royal Burghs and a subsequent Act of 
Parliament.33 
 
The story of Eyemouth Harbour in the second half of the eighteenth century is a 
mixture of hubris and ineptitude, largely due to the inadequate management of 
the facility, which was privately owned, with any major works funded on a 
subscription basis by the county administration. It took the creation of the 
Harbour Trust to put in place anything approaching rational management. The 
sense of hubris is neatly summarised in the following point, the ninth, from the 
1766 Memoriall Anent the Harbour of Eymouth, which paints a glowing picture 
of Eyemouth’s future were the harbour only to be improved: 
 
 
32 Renton, Report to the Committee.   





As it appears morally certain that trade may (upon the Harbour being made 
safe & commodious) be carried on here upon easier terms that at any of the 
neighbouring ports and that both Exports and Imports will Increase, one or 
more Considerable branches will be productive of others, ships may be built 
and repair’d here as well as at Berwick or any other port, Roperies, 
Breweries, Tannaries & many other sorts of Manufactories may gradually 
arise, Greenland ships may be as well laid up & fitted out here as at Dunbar, 
hence a circulation must happen the value of lands in the neighbourhood will 
Advance in proportion to the trade and Manufactories, a consequence which 
hath ever prevail’d where trade and Manufactories flourish.34 
 
Thus, Eyemouth was well located, both in terms of its position in a north facing 
bay and as the outlet for one of the wealthiest farming districts in Scotland at 
the time. Its weakness was that, as a port at the mouth of river, it was open to 
the effects of silting and flooding (Fig. 2/5), just as described by Jackson.35 
 
The only alternative outlet for agricultural produce from the Merse was the port 
of Berwick-upon-Tweed, but, as was argued at the time in this presentation in 
the Memoriall, Berwick was more expensive to use: 
 
For 40,000 Bolls Corn sold at Berwick Scotland 
 
£83 6s 8d 
The Turnpike at ½ for each horse amounts to £116 13s 4d 
The Toll or Towns dues at 1d per Boll  
The shore dues if shipp’d by a stranger is 2d per 2b & if 
by a 
Burgess 1d per 2b suppose it to be shipp’d by a stranger 
at 1d per 2b 
 
£125 0s 0d 
Anchorage at 2/4 for each ship and supposing each Ship 
To carry 500 Bolls 
  £9 6s 8d 
Totall  £384 6s 8d 
 
For 40,000 Bolls sold at Eymouth 
 
 
The Town Custom is 20d for each 100 bolls £33 6s 8d 
 
The Anchorage is 10d for each ship & 
supposing each ship to carry 5000(sic) bolls  
£3 6s 8d 
 £36 13s 4d 
  Gain’d by selling at Eymouth £341 13s 4d 
         
NB  Neither Turnpikes nor Shore Dues are payable at Eymouth and 
Pilotages are by reason of the easy access to & from the Harbour 
equally reasonable. The above saving upon the sale of Corn must in a 
course of years turn out to a considerable sum. The other Articles of 
 
34 NRS, GD267/27/162/2050. 




Expence attending Trade at Berwick & Eyemouth will appear from the 
severall schedules or tables herewith produc’d.36 
 
According to Robert Kerr 
 
Before 1776 this place (Eyemouth) possessed a considerable trade in 
grain and oatmeal, exported coastways, chiefly because the Guild, or 
Corporation of Berwick, till then refused the freedom of trade to those 
who were not burgesses. 
… a considerable quantity of grain and oatmeal was carried through 
Berwick from Northumberland and North Durham, to be shipped at 
Eyemouth.37 
 
This explains the strength of the arguments made in 1766 regarding the 
respective costs of using Eyemouth and Berwick and appears to justify the 
optimism of the authors of the Memorial. In 1776, however, Berwick-upon-
Tweed recognised the potential value of the trade that it was losing and opened 
its trade to non-freemen on moderate terms and its shipping greatly increased. 
Kerr explained that the ‘corn trade from an extensive circuit, on both sides of the 
borders, now principally centres there’ at the expense of Eyemouth, although 
‘one respectable corn merchant still carries on a considerable trade, the 
hereditary representative of one of the oldest commercial houses in the 
kingdom’.38 This was William Robertson, who continued the family grain 
business well into the nineteenth century. 
 
One of the difficulties facing farmers in the Merse was that of getting their 
produce to Eyemouth or, indeed, to Berwick-upon-Tweed. The Scots Magazine 
in December 1789 reported a meeting of the ‘Noblemen and Gentlemen of the 
County of Roxburgh… in order to take under consideration the proposed canal 
between Berwick, Kelso and Ancrum-bridge.’ This prompted the following 
commentary, by ‘a correspondent’: 
 
… about fifty years ago there was a plan for bringing Whitewater (the 
river Whiteadder) into the water Eye, which discharges itself into the sea 
at Eyemouth, for the benefit of the salmon fishing and the trade to 
London from Eyemouth. At that time, a company of engineers from 
Holland offered to cut a navigable canal betwixt Eyemouth and the Bery 
 
36 NRS, GD267/27/162/2050. 
37 Kerr, General View of the Agriculture, pp.6–7. 
38 Kerr, General View of the Agriculture, p.6.  
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Mas (Berrymoss – site of Kelso racecourse), for ten years duty arising 
from it. The track of it was to have been from Eyemouth, the Bely Mire 
(Billie Mire), Edrom, Manderston, Wedderburn and Cheeklaw to Kelso. 
The towns of Eyemouth, Dunse &c. would now subscribe to such a plan, 
and the advantage of it running through so large a track of country, would 
be greater than the canal from Berwick to Kelso alone.39 
 
The writer is referring to the original proposal of ‘fifty years ago’ and advocating 
that route as preferable to the current proposal. Neither came to pass. What is 
relevant to the development of the port of Eyemouth is that the merchants 
petitioned the Duchess of Marlborough in 1733, referred to above, and finally 
started improvement works in 1748, funded by the local gentry and the parishes 
of the Merse and Teviotdale.40 This reinforces the sense that there was a real 
drive to develop Eyemouth in the 1730s and 1740s, which reached fruition in 
1748. The fact that the writer was still advocating this route for a canal in 1789 
indicated that there was still optimism about the future of Eyemouth as a port. 
 
2.4 The overseas trade of Eyemouth 1750–1790 
 
There are no separate official records of the trade of the port of Eyemouth 
between 1750 and 1790. A developing understanding of the merchant 
community of Eyemouth has permitted a re-construction of the port’s overseas 
trade in this period extracted from the Collector’s Quarterly Accounts (CQA) for 
the customs headport of Dunbar.41 When it has been possible to cross 
reference these records they have proved to be accurate. The CQA survives 
from 1742, but earlier records were transcribed for a legal dispute between the 
Eyemouth merchant John Keith and the town’s feudal superior, John Home of 
Manderston. These cover an additional 13 years, from 1726 to 1739 when 119 
voyages into Eyemouth were recorded, of which just 14 were described as 
being from ‘foreign parts’ as they were then described.42 It is not possible to 
make comparisons with the later period as the records of coastal voyages after 
1744 are absent, although newspaper reports of shipping movements in and out 
of Leith do provide some, presumably incomplete, information of coastal 
 
39 Anon, ‘News from Scotland’, Scots Magazine, 51,1 December 1789, 614. 
40  NRS, GD267/27/162/2050. 
41 NRS, E504/10/1–6. 
42 NRS, CS228/K/1/66. 
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shipping. It is clear, however, that the earlier average of one ship per annum 
coming from abroad was considerably exceeded. 
 
The later records show that in 1744, the first year with a worthwhile number of 
voyages recorded, there were two ‘goods outward’ voyages and six ‘goods 
inward’. Intriguingly Bergen was the source of four of these with, in every case, 
the imports consisting largely of Mediterranean/Iberian produce (raisins, wine 
and brandy in the main).43 It is likely that this is evidence of neutral shipping 
being used to trade with enemy countries during the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740–1748).44 The only ‘normal’ inward voyage during this war 
was from Gothenburg with a cargo of deals and iron.45  
 
Ten years later, in 1754, there were eight ‘goods inward’ voyages and one 
‘outward’. Five of the ‘goods inwards’ were from the south Norway timber ports, 
two from Bergen, and one each from Copenhagen and Gothenburg, all 
ostensibly carrying the expected cargoes from those sources. 1764 was a quiet 
year, with just four ships ‘inward’ recorded, one of which is only recorded as a 
seizure of contraband from Guernsey. Of the other three, one is from Easteryce 
(Risor) in south Norway, the other two from Gothenburg, all with the regular 
cargoes. 1774 was another quiet year, with just four ships inward – two from 
Risor, and one each from St Petersburg and Gothenburg. Two of these 
attracted the attention of the Customs – one unloaded part of its timber cargo in 
the bay, outside the port – this implies that smuggling was suspected, rather 
than merely lightening the ship to allow it to enter the harbour..46 There were 
five ships in 1784 – two from Memel and one each from Christiana, Gothenburg 
and Risor.47  
 
The three busiest years were 1750, 1770 and 1777: in 1750 there were eight 
ships recorded ‘outward’ and seven ‘inward’. The ships ‘outward’ were all 
carrying grain, three to Hamburg, three to Bergen and one each to Gothenburg 
and Rotterdam. Six of the ‘inward’ ships came from south Norway with timber 
 
43 NRS, E504/10/1–6. 
44 Thomson, The Scottish Timber Trade, p.40. 
45 NRS E504/10/1, 4 November 1742. 
46 H.S.K. Kent, ‘The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the Eighteenth Century‘. The Economic 
History Review, New Series 8.1 (1955), 62–74 (66). 
47 Edinburgh, NRS, E504/10/1–6. 
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and one from Bilbao with Spanish wine. 1770 saw 17 movements, four 
‘outward’, three to Londonderry and one to Riga, all with grain. Four of the 
‘inward’ ships came from Rotterdam, two from Christiansand, two from Risor 
and one each from Gothenburg, Riga, Memel and St Petersburg. There was 
one unusual arrival that year – the Boulogne Packet bringing the furniture and 
personal effects of Sir Edward Marjoribanks, moving from Boulogne to his home 
at Coldstream. The records for 1777 are incomplete – the Christmas Quarter is 
lost – but there were thirteen ships in the three quarters for which records 
survive. There were six ‘outward’ – all to Hamburg with grain and seven 
‘inward’, two from Risor and one each from St Petersburg, Dronton 
(Trondheim), Memel, Gothenburg and Campveere.  
 
In a number of cases, it has been possible to cross reference voyages of ships 
to or from Eyemouth with the Sound Toll Records and it would certainly be 
possible to do the same with records from Gothenburg.48 A number of what 
appear to be legitimate voyages were revealed as nothing of the sort from the 
Dunbar Customs Letter Books. These will be examined in more detail in a 
subsequent chapter.  
 
What is clear is that for a period of some forty to fifty years there was a trade 
across the German Ocean, with regular imports of timber, iron, canvas, hemp, 




One of the challenges with a project of this kind is to establish whether the 
object of study is atypical. Having looked in such detail at Eyemouth, it is now 
appropriate to compare it with other ports. Such a comparative exercise needs 
to identify ports that have some similarities to Eyemouth, in terms of location 
and scale, and that have been studied. To this end, it has been possible to 
identify Alnmouth, a port of comparable scale in Northumberland, and 
Montrose, a larger port on the east coast of Scotland. Alnmouth was the port of 
 
48 Sound Toll Register. 
49 National Library of Scotland, Ordnance Survey 25 inch map, Eyemouth (1857), 
https://maps.nls.uk/os/25inch/berwickshire.html (accessed 30 December 2012). 
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Alnwick, a ducal town in north Northumberland and Montrose was a Scottish 
Royal Burgh in the county of Angus.50  
 
Alnmouth expanded during the eighteenth century as one of the principal outlets  
for the expanding grain trade of north Northumberland. This was symbolised by 
the construction of the so-called ‘Grain Road’ linking Hexham, Rothbury and 
Alnwick to Alnmouth. Barrow has pulled together data about the grain exports of 
Alnmouth, which shows clearly how the destination of shipments changed from 
London (70 per cent in 1733) to Leith (57 per cent in 1771). His work also 
shows how the preponderance of oats went to London and wheat to Leith, 
much for onward export. Barrow also identifies John Coutts of London and 
Edinburgh as one of the leading merchants with a local agent, based at 
Fenwick, along with Ralph Carr of Newcastle, another man with substantial 
business interests, of which the grain trade from Alnmouth was but a small part. 
It is also evident that Alnwick merchants built granaries in Alnmouth while the 
Lord Crewe Trustees, the local landlords, built granaries and lime kilns at North 
Sunderland. In the eighteenth century, therefore, although Alnmouth had a 
rather more substantial grain trade – between 2,500 and 7,000 tons per annum, 
as opposed to a known figure of around 2,400 tons in one year from Eyemouth, 
it appears to have been a port operated on behalf of a network of merchants 
from elsewhere, as opposed to Eyemouth which was effectively a miniature 
version of a major port. This may seem to reinforce the view that a proportion of 
the Eyemouth merchants relied on more than the visible trade, and that the 
nature of smuggling in the area did influence the character of the port and 
town.51 
 
Montrose had been made a Royal Burgh some time during the reign of David I, 
around 1140 as part of his Normanisation of Scotland. Duncan points out: 
 
Harbours by themselves did not attract market and town, but when 
combined with land routes, such as the crossing of the Tweed at Berwick 
or the ferry over the mouth of Montrose Basin, then exchange flourished 
and exchange implied market and town.52 
 
 
50 S.G.E. Lythe and Gordon Jackson (eds), The Port of Montrose (Tayport: Hutton Press, 1993). 
51 Barrow, ‘Corn,Carriers and Coastal Shipping’. 




It had, therefore, a long history of trade, especially across the North Sea. By the 
eighteenth century, Montrose was well set to take advantage of the new 
opportunities offered by the opening up of the colonial markets following the 
Union. There is evidence that Montrose ships took part in the slave trade and 
they certainly traded regularly with the Americas until the mid-1750s, after which 
the transatlantic trade faded away. Like Dunbar, Montrose also operated ships 
in the whaling trade to Greenland. In 1790 a total of 55 ships entered Montrose 
from overseas, although only 12 cleared outwards. Montrose had a substantial 
community of merchants, whose houses lined the High Street, and who seem to 
have been busy enough with fair trade to explain away their wealth.53 Fraser’s 
account clearly shows that Montrose was an active centre of smuggling, with 
the merchants heavily involved.54 
 
2.6 Eyemouth merchants 
 
Moving from the port to its merchants, it has been possible to develop a 
reasonably detailed picture of the men (and they were all men, as far as can be 
seen) involved, their relationships and their working arrangements. At this 
stage, only so-called fair trade is being considered, although, even here, 
nothing is simple, as Defoe asserted in ‘A Plan of English Commerce’, quoted 
by Jackson: ‘the Merchant is no more to be followed in his Adventures than a 
Maze or Labyrinth is to be traced without a Clue.’55 
 
Although Eyemouth was a relatively small port, it had quite a sizable merchant 
community, with a group of around 30 or so merchants active during the 
eighteenth century. Very little survives in terms of actual business papers, so it 
is quite difficult to assess the financial success, or otherwise, of their ventures. 
The records of the Kirk and the Masonic Lodge give an idea of the involvement 
of some of these men in civic life. A surprisingly helpful amount of information is 
available in several places, however, such as testaments, inventories, court 
cases and the customs records. Between them they throw considerable light on 
this group of men, the scale and nature of their businesses, their inter-
 
53 Jackson and Lythe, Montrose, p.141. 
54 Duncan Fraser, The Smugglers (Montrose: Standard Press, 1971). 
55 Gordon Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Economic and Social History 
(London: Oxford University Press for The University of Hull, 1972) p.97. 
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relationships and where they lived. A synopsis of their businesses, their 
involvement in public life and their relationships appears in Appendix 1. 
 
It is unlikely that the business practices of merchants in Eyemouth differed 
significantly from those elsewhere in Scotland. A review of general working 
methods is useful in order to provide a context for the understanding of 
merchants in Eyemouth. McAloon’s essay on Edward Burd provides an 
excellent analysis of one particular merchant of the second quarter of the 
century while Jackson’s work on Hull is also helpful in looking at how merchants 
managed their affairs.56 The description of Burd’s antecedents provides a 
picture of a family more akin to the Robertsons of Eyemouth – with at least two 
earlier generations in the shipping trade and a series of good marriages. What 
comes through very strongly is the role of personal relationships in effective 
trading. Burd, for example, had a circulating capital of as little as £5 4s 4¼d, but 
he had status in the community and the prospects of a landed inheritance – 
thanks to his grandfather’s purchase of an estate in 1679.57 Jackson reinforces 
this view: 
 
The merchant didn’t need heavy fixed capital. His assets were his 
business contacts… and although he needed to have capital behind him, 
the system of credit was such that he need never show it over the 
counter.58 
 
What was significant, and particularly so for John Nisbet, was the role of credit, 
particularly of Bills, which, according to McAloon, had, by the late 1720s, 
become ‘the main lubricant of ... commercial activities’.59 This was particularly 
significant in Scotland, where there was a shortage of actual cash with which to 
operate. McAloon writes further that  
 
Domestic bills had become an auxiliary currency... and had acquired a 
flexibility, a degree of negotiability among business associates. Thus 




56 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant’; Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century. 
57 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant’, 19. 
58 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p.110. 
59 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant’, 21. 
60 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant’, 22. 
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He further comments: ‘This was a new feature and suggested a vitality and 
sophistication in the economy that would not be apparent from a study of specie 
and its circulation.’61 
 
Working in such a way depended on the ability to trust one’s associates. 
Indeed, there is evidence, in a letter from Richard Pillans of Rotterdam to 
Alexander Robertson that John Nisbet was given a reference when he engaged 
with Pillans: ‘Thomas Anderson of Perth, recommended to us Mr John Nisbet of 
your place, with whom, since the dissolution of our partnership, I have done 
business…62 
 
Much knowledge of business comes from court cases, with their indications that 
the system had broken down, but McAloon suggests that such recourse to law 
was quite frequent, although usually a last resort, after ‘a great deal of 
preliminary pressure and haggling for payment’. This is rather borne out by the 
time that elapsed between the incident that supposedly led to the effective 
failure of John Nisbet’s business, in 1775, and his sequestration in 1787. 
 
Jackson describes eighteenth-century Hull as having a small number of big 
houses, with others aspiring to join them.63 Eyemouth seems to have had one 
big, long established house – that of the Robertsons – and a number of smaller 
ones who had relationships, both good and bad, with each other. This will be 
explored in detail in chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Eyemouth as a centre of smuggling 
 
Eyemouth had several attributes which made it a potentially attractive centre for 
the smuggling trade. These included an improved harbour and local merchant 
fleet, accustomed to trading across the North Sea, a surrounding rocky 
coastline, with ample coves, caves and cliffs to facilitate the landing of 
contraband and an inland transport infrastructure required to ferry cargoes of 
grain and other agricultural goods to the harbour and, therefore, available to 
 
61 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant’, 23. 
62 Robert Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session November 1790 to July 1792 (Edinburgh: 
Dickson, Hill, Watson, 1794), p.350. 
63 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, pp.96–129. 
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move deliveries inland. The existence of a wealthy community in Berwickshire 
offered both potential customers and investors. In addition, following the 
reinstatement of the separate Scottish Customs administration in 1742, 
Eyemouth’s position just north of the English border, meant that there was a 
degree of confusion about the rights and responsibilities of local customs 
officers, until cross-border working was allowed. Eyemouth is also located just 
south of the mouth of the Firth of Forth and its ships were accustomed to 
trading up to Leith, Carron, Alloa and other ports in the Forth, which meant that 
local masters knew their way around and had the ability to drop goods off near 
to Edinburgh. Ships from those ports also traded into Eyemouth on a regular 
basis. 
 
The relationships within the local merchant community will be explored in 
Chapter 3, and the nature of smuggling locally in Chapter 4. Both these 
elements allowed for the exploitation of the opportunities that smuggling offered. 
This package of attributes may not have made Eyemouth unique, but it did 
make it a peculiarly attractive centre for dealing in contraband. 
 
One of the challenges of writing about smuggling is the lack of availability of 
reliable data. As Kenneth Morgan wrote in 2011, of research by his colleagues 
into the careers of eighteenth-century Scottish merchants: 
 
… all three historians have grappled with incomplete primary material… 
These potential limitations however are overcome… all three authors 
show that attention to contextual evidence can provide an analysis firmly 
based on patient probing of the surviving material.64 
  
There are accounts in varying degrees of detail of incidents in the records of the 
Scottish Board of Customs – the Minutes of the Board and the Dunbar Letter 
Book (only that containing copies of letters from Edinburgh to Dunbar has 
survived). In addition, there is light thrown on John Nisbet’s business in court 
documents prepared following his sequestration. Except for the latter, of course, 
the references are almost entirely to unsuccessful ventures – ones that were 
detected. It is not safe to draw conclusions from these records regarding the 
overall volume of smuggling, but it is probably reasonable to assume that the 
 
64 Morgan, Haggerty, Hamilton and Hamilton, ‘Mercantile Networks’, 264. 
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smuggles detected, form a reasonably representative picture of the trade, in 
terms of the nature of smuggling and the identities of those involved. In addition, 
the Collector’s Quarterly Accounts for the Customs headport of Dunbar provide 
details of legitimate cargoes brought into Eyemouth. In the spirit of Morgan’s 
comment above, these records have had to be analysed and interpreted to 
establish which ships came to Eyemouth, as all are shown as Dunbar. This 
process will be described in more detail in the chapter dealing with Eyemouth 
merchants. From these various sources, it has been possible to identify 115 
smuggles, accounts of which vary from detailed descriptions of the seizure of 
goods, to passing references to ships seen at sea.  
 
The movers and shakers of the smuggling business in this area were a cadre of 
merchants at home and abroad. Of the group of some 30 merchants identified 
as working in or from Eyemouth in the period 1740–1790, it is hard to be sure 
that any of them were not involved in smuggling. Certainly at least 20 were 
named in reports of detected smuggles. In addition, several the overseas 
merchants who supplied the smugglers have also been identified and some at 
least of these were regarded as respectable citizens in their home ports. 
 
All 1776 and 
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Table 2/2. Smuggles identified as conducted by John Nisbet and associates, compared 
to the two other busiest smugglers 
 
*Nisbet and Associates are: 
 
John and David Nisbet/Nisbet & Knox 17 
Thomas Hair (carrier) 2 
Wm. Nisbet (brother) 1 
James Gray (Clerk) 2 
James Renton/Henderson & Renton (associate) 4 
 
This database is derived principally from the Dunbar Customs Letter Books (CE56/2/1-
5) and the Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs (CE1/1–20) both held in the 
National Records of Scotland.  
 
The data reveals that the two Nisbet brothers (John and David alone) were 
significant smugglers, being involved in around 32 per cent of smuggles which 
were detected and where the merchants were identified (17 out of the 54 in 
column 2). This certainly reinforces the impression given by what was written 
about them at the time and the evidence of Gunsgreen House, their home and 
business headquarters with its unique group of hiding places.65 David Pae’s 
description of the activities of Mr Jessop who lived in what is clearly a 
fictionalised version of Gunsgreen House, is surely based on local memories 
and stories of John Nisbet retold to Pae in the 1830s.66 
 
One question which is hard to answer, in the absence of more detailed business 
records, is how far did smuggling contribute to the economic wellbeing of the 
merchants of Eyemouth? The known trade of the port was relatively small and 
yet it supported a large group of merchants, some of whom were apparently 
reasonably prosperous.  
 
65NRS, CS229/N/1/60.  




2.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter establishes the context in which smuggling operated along the 
Berwickshire coast. It will be demonstrated in future chapters how smuggling 
and business were inextricably interwoven, with the same merchants, masters 
and ships involved in both activities. Despite the relatively small scale of the 
port of Eyemouth and its trade, it was able to support a group of merchants, 
some of whom were quite wealthy and had networks of contacts in Edinburgh 
and overseas. The Robertsons followed the classic path of multi-generational 
merchants, summed up by Jackson as progressing ‘from staith to estate’ while 
the Nisbets followed another classic pattern – that of over-reaching themselves 
and failing. It seems reasonable to propose that Eyemouth was only able to 
support this cadre of respectable, middle class merchants on the back of the 
smuggling business – given the relatively small scale of regular trade evidenced 
by contemporary records and observers. Work done by other researchers on 
Ayr indicates how the economy of that port recovered in the mid-eighteenth 
century on the back of a smuggling boom.67 There are hints of links between the 
two areas, but these may have been through Edinburgh, the centre of society, 
rather than direct business connections.  
 
One tangible piece of evidence in Eyemouth is Gunsgreen House itself, a 
building of outstanding quality, designed by Scotland’s leading architect of the 
period. The thinking behind its construction is not known, but it is possible that it 
was created to provide John Nisbet with an instant reputation, an essential 
possession for an eighteenth-century merchant reliant on credit. The timing of 
its construction – just as the port of Eyemouth was being improved – is surely 
not a coincidence.  
 
Building on the analysis in this chapter, chapter three explores the mercantile 
community of Eyemouth – who the people were – and seeks to identify their 
relationships, concentrating in particular on the networks of John Nisbet, the 
leading figure in the smuggling trade, and Robert Robertson, the principal 
merchant in the town.
 









The scene having been set in chapters one and two, this chapter begins to 
analyse the merchant community of Eyemouth to establish their relationships 
with each other and with other stakeholders in the smuggling and legitimate 
branches of trade. At this period such relationships, based on trust, were critical 
to the success of a mercantile business. These relationships will be examined in 
the context of recent work on networks, which has been reviewed in the 
Introduction. This will assist in understanding some of the reasons for the 
success or failure of particular businesses in Eyemouth. It will also lay out a full 
picture of the merchant community of this small port.  
 
3.2 The concept of the network applied to eighteenth-century trade 
 
In 2001, Pearson and Richardson commented that there have been few 
examinations of the business community of a specific place, with a systematic 
analysis of those relationships that forge a network. They particularly indicate 
that researchers have tended to focus on the elite families, rather than moving 
on to the less prominent members of those networks.1 
 
Shani D’Cruze, writing about mid-eighteenth-century Colchester, set out the 
nature of networks in a smaller town, and the role of individuals within them. 
 
Within what remained very much a face-to-face community, local social 
relations were important in associating middling individuals through 
networks of family, neighbourhood, religion, trade and politics…social 
networks tended to centre on a significant minority of active middling 
individuals who had a heightened public role and were in contact with 
multiple groups of people. These ‘community brokers’ can be supposed 
to have held power within the networks they linked.2  
 
1 Robin Pearson and David Richardson, ‘Business Networking in the Industrial Revolution’, The 
Economic History Review, New Series 54.4 (2001), 657–679 (659). 
2 Shani D’Cruze, ‘The Middling Sort in Eighteenth Century Colchester: Independence, Social 




This analysis supports the significance of John Nisbet’s apparent exclusion from 
the core business community of Eyemouth and of Robert Robertson’s centrality 
to that community – effectively as one of D’Cruze’s ‘community brokers’.  
 
Paul Monod, writing in 2003 about Rye in Sussex, identified the number of 
social events that took place – feasts, dinners and other celebrations – and their 
importance in cementing relationships. He noted that the outsider about whom 
he wrote, was only identified on one occasion as being involved in such an 
event.3 There is no evidence for comparable activities in Eyemouth, save the 
frequent meetings and public events of the masonic lodge from which John 
Nisbet was excluded, as a non-member. 
 
Two more recent works, by Murdoch and Zickermann, which bear on this 
subject look at Scottish networks in northern Europe, in Gothenburg in the years 
before 1750 and Hamburg and neighbouring ports in north-east Germany. In 
these cases, the nationality of the merchants, their locality ‘at home’ and family 
connections were all found to be significant factors.4 
 
3.3 The merchant communities in Dunbar and Eyemouth 
 
Before we analyse the networks of John Nisbet and the Robertsons, it is 
necessary to understand the context in which they operated.  
 
Dunbar, the customs headport, was made a Royal Burgh, the top level of 
municipal organisation in Scotland, at some point in the fourteenth or fifteenth 
century – the records are unclear.5 It certainly enjoyed this status by 1445 at the 
latest. This meant that Dunbar had a degree of political and administrative 
organisation with opportunities for leading citizens to hold positions of influence. 
 
Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England 1550–1800 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1994), p.182. 
3 Paul K. Monod, The Murder of Mr Grebell: Madness and Civility in an English Town (New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003), p.198. 
4 Murdoch, Network North, pp.49–83; Kathrin Zickermann, Across the German Sea: Early 
Modern Scottish Connections with the Wider Elbe – Weser Region (Leiden: Brill, 2013) pp.114–
126. 




Crucially, it also meant that Dunbar could trade abroad. By the early eighteenth 
century, Dunbar was dominated by the Fall family, who claimed descent from 
the Faas of Kirk Yetholm, the traditional Kings of the Gypsies.6 Whether this 
was true or not, it was part of their mythology about themselves and they 
pronounced their name Faa. The Falls had a virtual monopoly of the post of 
Provost (mayor) from the 1690s into the 1780s and Captain James was elected 
MP for Haddington in 1734. In the late 1730s he built Dunbar House, which still, 
in expanded form, dominates the High Street, as can be seen in Fig. 3/1, 
below.7 It seems probable that John Nisbet, having lived and worked here, took 




Figure 3/1. Dunbar High Street showing the former Dunbar House across  
the end of the street 
 
Dunbar had a relatively small harbour, but traded widely, including regular 
voyages to and from the American Colonies and it became the home base of 
the Greenland Ships of the East Lothian and Merse Whale Fishing Company.8 
The dominance of the Falls was such that, while there were a good number of 




6 A. Francis Steuart, ‘The Falls of Dunbar and Their Descent from the Gypsies’, The Scottish 
Antiquary, or Northern Notes and Queries, 16.63 (1902), 127–132. 
7 John Martine, Reminiscences and Notices of the Parishes of the County of Haddington, reprint 
ed. (Haddington: East Lothian Council, 1999), p.55. 
8 Archibald Higgins, The Contract of Co-Partnery of the East-Lothian and Merse Whale-Fishing 
Company, 1751, Eighteenth-Century Collections Online (Gale ECCO); NRS, E504/10/1–6.  
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Eyemouth was a smaller port, in customs terms a creek or out-port of Dunbar, 
but by the mid-eighteenth century it, too, had a thriving merchant community. 
The nearest equivalent of the Falls were the Robertsons. They had been 
leading merchants in Eyemouth from at least the 1620s; indeed Robert Kerr, 
writing in 1807, called them ‘one of the oldest commercial houses in the 
kingdom’.9 The key figure in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, and 
near contemporary of John Nisbet, was Robert Robertson.  
  
In addition to the Robertsons, Eyemouth had other merchants operating on a 
reasonable scale: James Martin, Thomas French, the Turnbulls, John Keith, 
Patrick Grieve, John Davidson, William, John and James Henderson, James 
Renton, Alexander Ker (who moved to Bordeaux and died in Montpellier) and, 
of course, the three Nisbet Brothers, William, David and John. In addition, 
several Dunbar merchants used Eyemouth on occasions, notably John Nisbet’s 
sometime business partner, Harry Knox, Thomas Meik and the Falls, who were 
tenants of Nisbet’s granary at the time of his sequestration in 1787.10 
 
3.4 Networking opportunities in Eyemouth 
 
Although Eyemouth was a small town, it had a significant population of people 
of the middling sort – merchants, ship masters, a lawyer, a minister – enough to 
justify the founding of a Masonic Lodge as early as 1757. Smout describes how 
 
…almost all groups in the middle class shared … the dizzy sense of 
opportunity which pervaded the towns from 1760 onwards. Lawyers 
prospered when farmers and landowners flourished, mainly because a 
high proportion of their profits came from conveyancing and from 
disputes about land.11 
 
As a Burgh of Barony, Eyemouth, unlike the Royal Burgh of Dunbar, did not 
have a Town Council. It was run by the Agent of the Feudal Superiors, who 
were, by the 1750s, the Homes of Billie, supported by a small number of 
Baillies, who tended to be respectable tradesmen. There was, therefore, no 
 
9 Kerr, General View, p.7. 
10 NRS, EH504/10/1–6; George Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor Adjourning the Sale of 
John Nisbet’s Estate,1788, Eighteenth-Century Collections Online (Gale ECCO). 




opportunity for the local merchants to seek public office as provost, chamberlain 
or dean of guild. It did, however, have two organisations, membership of which 
was a sign of community approval – the Kirk Session and the Lodge. In 
addition, the East Lothian and Merse Whale Fishing Company, based in 
Dunbar, had a relatively restricted shareholder base consisting largely of 
Dunbar merchants and Berwickshire landowners. Ownership of their £50 shares 
was another indicator of status. Although not part of any formal network, the 
Window Tax records do indicate levels of prosperity. Window Tax was only 
payable on houses with seven or more windows. These records, therefore, be a 
further indicator of membership of the ‘middling sort’. Appendix 1 is a summary 
of these relationships and status indicators. 
 
Whatley describes the Kirk Session as  
 
parish church courts, through which the impact of the Church of Scotland 
was mainly felt within the local communities. Membership of the Session 
comprised the Minister, the Session Clerk and the elders, lay members of 
the congregation appointed by their fellows.  
 
Eyemouth was an unusually small parish, consisting of little more than the town 
itself, so the elders would ‘typically be merchants, craftsmen and 
professionals.’12 A picture of the role of the Kirk Session in managing private 
morals is shown when considering John Nisbet’s connections in Dunbar. Suffice 
to say that the Kirk Elders were significant figures in the town. This was 
reinforced by the style of their appointment. This extract from the Eyemouth Kirk 
Session in June 1750 illustrates this: 
 
 17th June 1750 
This day Wm. Home of Sclatehouse Mr Wm. Nisbet Mr Robert 
Robertson Mr Andrew Edgar Mr Jas. Turnbull Mr James Colvill James 
Morison and Robt. Purvis having been set apart by Prayer in the 
presence of the Congregation to the Office and Duty of Elders in this 
Parish were accordingly enrolled as members of this Session.13 
 
Of this group appointed in 1750, William Home was a landowner and Nisbet, 
Robertson, Edgar and Turnbull were merchants. 
 
12 Whatley, Scottish Society 1707–1830, p.147 . 
13 Edinburgh, NRS, Minutes of Eyemouth Kirk Session (note: the pre-1826 minutes are not 




Lodge St Ebbe was founded in 1757 as a meeting place for the town’s incipient 
middle class and tradesmen. Burt has written about the importance of the role 
of Masons and other societies in Cornwall, especially in small communities. He 
also highlights the international nature of their interconnections, a feature of 
great value to a merchant community.14 The minutes of Lodge St Ebbe survive 
from the beginning and have been summarised in book form.15 
 
Masters of the Lodge included the merchants William Henderson, William 
Graeme/Grahame, John Davidson, Robert Robertson, Richard Turnbull, 
Thomas French, Patrick Grieve, William Knox, Alexander Robertson (son of 
Robert) as well as John Renton, the lawyer, John Johnston, the Riding 
Surveyor, Thomas Tait, the Minister, William Wightman, the doctor and John 
Stuart, the wealthy tenant of Gunsgreen House from 1782 to 1787 who was 
master from 1783 to 1786. Neither of the Nisbet brothers who were members of 
the lodge ever became Master. 
 
A detailed analysis of the membership, abstracted from the Minutes, for the 
period 1757–1787, shows that of 366 recorded members, 27 were Eyemouth 
Merchants.16 Both David and William Nisbet were members of the Lodge, but 
John was not. Looking at the Collector’s Quarterly Accounts and making 
comparisons with the masonic records it is apparent that the only significant 
Eyemouth merchant who was not a member of Lodge St Ebbe at this period 
was John Nisbet. Burt makes the point that membership was by invitation and 
that ‘members could exchange information, seek credit, arrange capital 
movements, organise contracts, find employment, exercise influence and 
ensure benevolent support against the unexpected.’17 This shows what Nisbet 
was missing by not being a member. 
  
 
14 Roger Burt, ‘Freemasonry and Business Networking during the Victorian Period’, The 
Economic History Review, New Series, 56/4 (November 2003), 657–688 (658). 
15 A.J.S. Willox PM, The History of an Ancient Scottish Lodge: Lodge St Ebbe No. 70 
(Eyemouth: Lodge St Ebbe No. 70, 2007).  
16 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.  
17 Burt, ‘Freemasonry and Business Networking’, 659–660. 
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Freemasonry was an international movement, although in its modern form it 
originated in Scotland.18 It was, therefore, a very useful medium for making 
contacts with likeminded men in strange towns and cities, particularly for 
smaller merchants like most of those in Eyemouth. Interestingly, on 12 February 
1761, George Carnegie, described as a member of the ‘Lodge St John in 
Gottenburg’, visited Lodge St Ebbe as a guest. Carnegie, a Jacobite refugee in 
Gothenburg, had become a successful merchant there and a regular buyer of 
tea at the auctions held by the Swedish East India Company, before returning to 
Scotland in 1769 to reclaim his estate near Montrose.19 He was the only 
recorded visitor to the Lodge from Gothenburg, but Eyemouth did attract visitors 
and members from a wide area, from the West Indies to Norway. Of 32 British 
shipmasters who were members, only six were from Eyemouth. The other 26 
were from elsewhere on the east coast, from York to Stonehaven.20  
 
The Whale Fishing Company was founded as a co-partnery in 1751: ‘For 
carrying on the Whale-fishing from the Harbour of Dunbar’ and was to have 120 
shares at £50 each, a total potential capital of £6,000. The subscribers were 
intended to be merchants from Dunbar and landed gentry from East Lothian 
and Berwickshire. The Company had five managers, drawn from the partners 
resident in Dunbar and holding a minimum of two shares.21 A co-partnery is a 
Scots Law concept, described as ‘a contract by which the several partners 
agree concerning the communication of loss or gain, arising from the subject of 
the contract.’22  
 
The local tax records for the period from 1748 to 1792 were analysed. The 
focus was on Eyemouth, but a small number of taxpayers from the neighbouring 
parishes of Ayton and Coldingham were included when they were known to be 
active in Eyemouth. Altogether there were 89 House Taxpayers identified, of 
whom 11 were women. Of these, 42 men and eight women also paid Window 
Tax. Six men paid tax at the top rate, for 20+ windows: John Renton, the lawyer 
 
18 David Stevenson, The Origins of Freemasonry, Paperback ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988; reprint, 13th printing 2012). 
19University of Warwick Digital Collections, Sale Catalogues of the Swedish East India 
Company, 1733–1759; Jonas Berg and Bo Lagercrantz, ‘Scots in Sweden: Eighteenth Century‘. 
https://www.electricscotland.com/history/sweden/18.htm  
20 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe. 
21 Higgins, ‘Contract of Co-Partnery’. 
22 https://thelawdictionary.org/copartnery/, accessed 19 September 2018. 
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who lived at Chester House, Robert Robertson, whose house was on the quay 
side, William Nisbet, and John Nisbet, across the harbour at Gunsgreen House 
in Ayton parish, as well as John Stewart, Nisbet’s tenant at Gunsgreen in the 
early 1780s and Alexander Robertson, who acquired Gunsgreen in 1789. John 
and William Nisbet, Robert Robertson and John Renton only paid for 20+ in one 
year, subsequently cutting down to 19, thereby falling into a lower payment 
scale – 19 at 9d each as opposed to 20 at 1s, a saving of 5s 9d. 42 of the 78 
male house tax payers were members of the masonic lodge (54 per cent) and 
25 of the 42 male window tax payers (60 per cent). Of those 21 men who paid 
for 10 or more windows, 15 were masons (70 per cent). Of the six who were not 
masons, there are queries about the precise identity of one, another was only 
an occasional resident – a West Indies plantation owner – and John Nisbet was 
a third.23 
  
3.5 The Nisbets, the Robertsons and their relationships 
 
The two leading merchant families in Eyemouth were the Nisbets and the 
Robertsons. The Nisbets dominated the smuggling business, while the 
Robertsons were the leading figures in legitimate trade. The purpose of this 
section is to seek to identify their respective connections, debate how far these 
can be classed as networks and identify what influence they had on the success 
or failure of their enterprises. There is more data regarding the Nisbets’ 
business activities, as they came so often to the attention of the authorities. Of 
the Robertson’s family connections, however, much more is known. The depth 
and breadth of knowledge and understanding is, therefore, unbalanced. The 
arrangement of both their networks under broad categories – family, social 
institutional and commercial – will make them easier to follow and analyse. 
 
In addition to relationships formed through the organisations referred to above, 
all merchants had a range of social and commercial connections. What they 








One had to trust, understand and support one’s correspondents. Trust 
was the basis of eighteenth-century trade and was most easily 
established between those who shared common standards and similar 
backgrounds.24 
 
Nisbet’s local connections were drawn from his family, his early career in 
Dunbar and then from his business contacts and employees. It is not clear how 
he made his contacts in Gothenburg, but there is evidence for how he identified 
a trading partner in Rotterdam. Nisbet’s contacts changed over time, but it is 
important to bear in mind that throughout the period, he was an active 
smuggler. Robertson had a similar range of contacts, although in his case, he 
had a wider family-based circle, from having been married three times, but he 
lacked the entrée into Dunbar that Nisbet enjoyed. It was significant that 
Robertson came from several generations of merchants who would already 
have developed a range of contacts throughout the trading world. 
 
The key difference between the Robertsons and John Nisbet, was that the 
Robertsons had been active in Eyemouth since at least the 1620s, were styled 
‘Robertson of Prenderguest and Brownsbank’ and were married into 
respectable local families. Robert’s father had lent money widely, including to 
gentry and they operated at least two maltings and owned several ships.25 They 
were the only Eyemouth merchants to have an extensive export trade, sending 
grain around the coast and overseas. The Nisbets, on the other hand, seem to 
have arrived in Eyemouth in the early eighteenth century, when David senior 
appeared. He was a small scale merchant and it seems likely that he was 
followed into the business by his son William – who did have one of the biggest 
houses, judging by the window tax paid, in Eyemouth.26 John seems to have 
behaved in a way that would today be described as arriviste, returning from a 
period of employment in Dunbar to build Gunsgreen House, which dominated, 
and still dominates, the harbour and town of Eyemouth (Fig. intro/1). Although it 
is hard to interpret behaviour with confidence, it seems likely that this was at 
least one factor which provoked the Robertsons into pursuing John Nisbet. 
 
24 Bill Purdue, ‘Ralph Carr: a Newcastle merchant and the Baltic trade in the mid-eighteenth 
century’, in  Patrick Salmon and Tony Barrow (eds), Britain and the Baltic (Sunderland: 
University of Sunderland Press, 2003), p.162. 
25 Edinburgh, NRS Scotland’s People, CC15/5/8, Testament Dative and Inventar of William 
Robertson, 1720. 
26 Edinburgh, NRS Scotland’s People, CC15.5/10, Testament Dative and Inventar of David 
Nisbet, 1746; NRS E326/1/19–23. 
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The origins of the Nisbet family before 1710 are hard to trace. John was the 
youngest of three brothers – William was probably the oldest, although his date 
of birth is unrecorded. David was born in 1710 and John in 1712. Their father 
David was a merchant, but we know little of his business, save that he was one 
of the signatories to the petition to the Duchess of Marlborough in 1733, 
imported a ship load of salt in July 1727, died in 1746 and that his inventory 
describes a five roomed house containing the expected paraphernalia of a 
merchant/shopkeeper/farmer.27  
 
In his will William and John were named as Executors, but not David. William 
was described as ‘Merchant in Eyemouth’ and John as ‘Merchant in Dunbar’. 
William was the only one of the three brothers who married – Elizabeth Ramsey 
– and had children. He had two daughters who survived to adulthood – Alison 
and Margaret. Alison married William Henderson, originally a land surveyor 
from Alloa, later a merchant, and had two children – John and Jean. Margaret 
married William Graeme, almost certainly the son of Robert Robertson’s sister 
Isobel and William Graeme of Jordanstown in Ireland. Isobel and William 
Graeme senior’s other children were Andrew, Isobel and Margaret.28 
 
William Graeme junior was a merchant in Eyemouth and he and Margaret 
Nisbet lived at Chesterbank, near Eyemouth. They had five children: Andrew 
(baptised at Chesterbank 13 August 1763), William (baptised at Chesterbank by 
James Allan of Eyemouth), John, Isobel and Margaret. The names of these 
children surely confirm the relationship with Isobel Robertson and William 
Graeme senior. A William Graeme lived at Brownsbank, a Robertson property, 
from around 1760 to 1780. As this overlapped with the time that William junior 
was at Chesterbank, this is likely to be William senior. 
 
Neither John nor David married, which reduced their access to wider networks 
and contributed to their relative isolation in Eyemouth, an apparent weakness 
later exploited by the better connected Robertsons. They did, however, maintain 
 
27Hawick, Heritage Hub, DL/WC/9/35; Edinburgh, NRS, CS228/K/1/66; Edinburgh, NRS, 
Scotland’s People, CC15/5/10, Testament Dative and Inventar of David Nisbet, 1746. 
28 Eustace, The Family of Robert Robertson, p.16. 
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contact with William’s descendants and both made allowance for them in their 
wills.29 
 
William was an active merchant in Eyemouth from the beginning of the customs 
records in 1742, until around 1770. There are only records of imports, with just 
nine voyages recorded in which William had an interest. Of these, John also 
had an interest in three and David in two.30 In terms of smuggling, only one 
incident involving William is recorded, when James Grey, John’s clerk, was also 
named.31 There is also evidence from an advertisement shown in the 
Caledonian Mercury on 19 September 1754 of William acting as an agent for an 
emigrant ship. Thus William, who appears to have been the most respectable of 
the Nisbet brothers, still worked with his other brothers from time to time. 
 
Born, as mentioned above, in 1710 there is no record of David between then 
and 1750, when he managed the legal import of a cargo of Spanish wine from 
Bilbao.32 It is possible that he had spent time abroad developing contacts for his 
brother or for other Scottish merchants. There is no evidence to support this 
proposition, other than his complete absence from the record and his omission 
from his father’s will. Whatever David was doing, he was able to lend John 
£1,500 in 1758, enough to pay for the building of Gunsgreen House, judging by 
the cost of building the similar and contemporary, John Adam designed, Banff 
Castle.33 
 
Once David had returned to Eyemouth in 1750, the brothers appear to have 
worked closely together and it is safe to assume that David lived in Gunsgreen 
House with John. David does not appear in any of the tax records, for example. 
From this time onwards, David was involved in nine apparently legitimate 
voyages on his own account, John four and they undertook four together, all in 
the period 1769 to 1770 as J. & D. Nisbet. In terms of smuggling, John was 
involved in six known episodes, David four and they were involved in six 
 
29 NA, PROB 11/1276/239 Will of John Nisbet Merchant in Eymouth, 1796; Edinburgh, NRS, 
Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/12, Second Eik to the Testament Dative of 
Umquat. David Nisbet Merchant in Eymouth, 1790. 
30 NRS, EH504/10/1–6. 
31 NRS, CE 1/10, 9 September 1761. 
32 NRS, E504/10/1–6. 
33 Edinburgh, NRS, Berwick Register of Sasines, 17/143, Sasine: Heritable Bond over 
Gunsgreen House, 1777; oral communication, Alistair Rowan, 2011. 
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together (Table 2/2). Figures for smuggling, of course, reflect only those 
instances where the smuggle was detected or reported. 
 
The Robertsons, on the other hand, were long established – ‘one of the oldest 
commercial houses in the kingdom’ – and well connected, to the extent that, in 
the 1930s, the family commissioned the preparation and publication of a 
pedigree centred on Robert Robertson, which indicated that a William 
Robertson first bought property in Eyemouth in 1624.34 Through the wife of the 
William who died in 1719 they claimed descent from the sister of King Robert 
the Bruce. Robert Robertson married Margaret, the daughter of the Reverend 
George Home of Chirnside, who himself was the son of Alexander Home of 
Kennetsideheads, an active Covenanter. There are many Homes in 
Berwickshire, all – to a degree – related. George Home of Chirnside, for 
example, was married to the aunt of the Enlightenment philosopher, David 
Hume (who altered the spelling of the family name when he moved to London, 
to reflect its pronunciation) and they were closely linked to the Homes of Billie. 
 
It was through his three marriages and the marriages of his children that 
Robertson developed a web of family-based relationships. Robert’s children all 
came from his marriage with Margaret Home. His son Alexander married the 
daughter of the Vicar of Norham and went into business with his father – it was 
Robert Robertson and Son who sequestrated Nisbet in 1787. Jean Robertson 
married Thomas Potts, a lawyer from Kelso, in a wedding conducted by her 
cousin, George Home, at Ayton. Thomas Potts subsequently acted as the 
creditors’ factor in the early stages of Nisbet’s sequestration. Robert’s son 
William (the second one – the name was, as usual in the family, given to the 
first born son, but he had died young) also joined his father and brother in the 
business and eventually took it on fully as Alexander seems to have retired, to 
live the life of an invalid gentleman in Gunsgreen House and Edinburgh.35 In 
1801, after the period covered by this thesis, William married a member of the 
Jameson family of Alloa, pioneering grain whisky distillers and founders of the 
distillery in Dublin which still bears their name. This relationship was surely 
 
34 Kerr, General View, p.7; Eustace, The Family of Robert Robertson. 
35 Hinton Charterhouse, Bath, Private Collection, Petition, Whyt’s Trustees against Innerhouse 
Interlocutor, 11 December 1820; Thomas Aitchison, The Edinburgh Directory from July 1797 to 
July 1798 (Edinburgh, 1797). 
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linked to the coastal grain trade which seems to have been the core of the 
business in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Robert’s 
daughter Margaret married her first cousin, George Home, who acquired 
Gunsgreen House from his nephew around 1830, and whose descendants 
retained ownership of the house until 1881. George Home’s sister, also 
Margaret, married James Renton, son of the Eyemouth Writer (lawyer) John 
and a future business associate of both Robert Robertson and John Nisbet.36 
 
When Robert’s wife died in 1767, he quickly married Ann, sister of James 
Jamieson Martin another significant Eyemouth merchant. James Martin’s other 
sister, Betty, was married to Thomas French also an Eyemouth merchant. 
When Ann died in turn, Robert married again to Elizabeth Home of Fairneyside, 
a cousin through George Home of Chirnside. As with William’s subsequent 
career, the fate of Alexander’s children is outwith the scope of this work, but the 
six boys who survived to adulthood all entered the professions – three doctors, 
two ministers and a lawyer. Thus, while the Nisbets effectively died out, 
William’s descendants were all through his daughters, the Robertsons thrived 
and spread out to populate the professions in nineteenth-century Scotland. 
Even the name of Gunsgreen House was spread by Robertsons – houses built 
by descendants in Wimbledon in the 1880s and Surrey in the 1920s were both 
called Gunsgreen.37 
 
John Nisbet developed a useful group of social connections in Dunbar. We 
have little direct evidence of his early career, but there is strong circumstantial 
evidence, initially drawn from hearings of the Dunbar Kirk Session and 
associated baptismal records. In July 1739 Nisbet, together with Harry Knox 
and John Melvill was accused of being the father of the child which Janet 
Penman, servant to Provost Fall was carrying. He denied it, although he 
admitted going into her room at night to get a light. Eventually Knox admitted 
paternity and the child was baptised, with Melvill and Nisbet as witnesses.38 
In 1741 Nisbet was again involved with Melvill and with Thomas Meik, another 
Dunbar merchant, when a woman called Janet Duncan fell pregnant. The affair 
 
36 Eustace, The Family of Robert Robertson. 
37 Eustace., The Family of Robert Robertson. 
38 Edinburgh, NRS, CH2/647, Minutes of Dunbar Kirk Session, 1738–1740; Edinburgh, NRS, 
Scotland’s People, Baptism records, 706/20 174, Baptism of ?Mary Knox, 1739. 
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was less amicable than that of 1739 – Melvill effectively accusing Nisbet of 
being responsible on this occasion, part of the accusation being that Meik had 
arranged for the girl to go to Edinburgh because Nisbet had no acquaintances 
there. In this case, Thomas Meik ended up offering to pay four guineas to the 
poor fund, although he refused to accept paternity. This meant that, unlike the 
earlier case, the child remained unbaptised.39.The fact that Nisbet had gone into 
Janet Penman’s room at night to get a light, strongly suggests that he was living 
in the same house – that of Captain James Fall, member of parliament for 
Haddington Burghs and Provost of Dunbar, the leading merchant in the town 
and member of a large and influential family. This is prima facie evidence that 
Nisbet had a position in the Fall business empire – perhaps having been 
apprenticed to James Fall, then continuing as his Clerk or in some similar 
position. He is referred to as a Merchant in the 1741 Kirk Session investigation.  
 
The Dunbar Collector’s Quarterly Accounts start in September 1742 and show 
John Nisbet acting more often as an agent rather than as a merchant in his own 
right. In the period from 1742 until 1750, when Nisbet returned to Eyemouth, he 
was involved in ten cargoes as an agent (three for the Falls), six as a merchant, 
two as both and one with Harry Knox as Knox and Nisbet.40 Nisbet’s links with 
the Falls lasted until his sequestration in 1787, when one of his assets, a 
warehouse in Eyemouth, was described as being let to Messrs Fall of Dunbar. 
Further, when Nisbet’s former clerk Alexander Dow died in Bengal in 1779 and 
a sum of money was to be transferred to the Nisbets, the agent in this 
transaction was Philip Delisle of Calcutta, whose father had married a Fall 
widow in the 1740s. Delisle used Robert Fall to arrange the last stage of the 
transaction.41 At the time of Nisbet’s sequestration he had two £50 shares in the 
Whale Fishing Company – one in his own name, the other inherited from David. 
Possession of these shares indicates a certain status in the Dunbar merchant 
community, perhaps as a result of John’s longstanding links to the Fall family. 
 
Harry Knox and John Nisbet had a co-partnery from 1754 to 1757 and had also 
worked together in the 1740s. Their relationship was soured in 1755 when Knox 
 
39 NRS, CH2/647. 
40 NRS, EH504/10/1–6, 1742–1750. 
41 NRS CC15/5/12. 
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took David Nisbet to court for seeking to ‘help’ John by taking some wine from 
Newcastle to London – wine which was then seized by the Customs.42 This 
episode casts light on other connections in Newcastle and Leeds, which are 
addressed below. 
 
John Melvill became Collector of Customs at Dunbar, but there is no actual 
evidence that Nisbet’s relationship with John Melvill was beneficial to either 
party. Neither is there anything in the investigation that led to Melvill’s ultimate 
dismissal that suggests this. The summary of the findings was: 
 
… it appearing that the general Conduct of Mr Melvill as an Officer of the 
Customs, has been extremely negligent, loose and irregular, and that by 
the Influence of such Example, all the Officers at the Port have been 
remiss in the Execution of their Duty; and it also appearing that Mr Melvill 
has been repeatedly Fined and Reprimanded for neglects, omissions, 
Irregularities, and misrepresentations...43 
 
There is (currently) little or no evidence of the social relationships of the 
Robertsons. It seems likely that they overlapped with family and business. 
 
There is no evidence at all of John Nisbet playing any role in society in 
Eyemouth. In fact, as indicated in section 3.4 above, John was not welcomed 
into the Masonic Lodge. William and David were both Masons and William a 
member of the Kirk Session. In Ayton, however, the parish in which Gunsgreen 
House was situated, John Nisbet was a heritor (‘a proprietor of land or houses 
liable to payments of public burdens connected with the parish, including 
administration of the poor, schools and upkeep of church property’)44 and 
fulfilled his duties as such, including chairing meetings on a rota basis – 
sometimes when Robert Robertson, who had his main house, Prenderguest, in 
Ayton parish, was present.45 
 
Robert Robertson clearly occupied a prominent position in local society. Also 
having a house – his business headquarters – in Eyemouth, he was eligible to 
 
42 Edinburgh, NRS, CS271/38288, Harry Knox v David Nisbet, 1763. 
43 NRS, CE/1/12, 23 July 1770. 
44 Mairi Robinson (ed.), The Concise Scots Dictionary (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press,1985). 
45 Hawick, Heritage Hub, Records of Church of Scotland synods, presbyteries and kirk sessions, 
CH2/26/1, Ayton Kirk Session Minutes and Accounts, 1758–1778.  
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be a member of the Eyemouth Kirk Session, as he was from at least 1750 into 
the 1780s. He was regularly nominated as the member of the Session 
delegated to represent Eyemouth at meetings of the Presbytery (district 
committee) and Synod (higher level committee). In 1781 he was nominated as 
Praeses (chair) of a meeting of local householders called to discuss the need 
for a new church building.46 In a number of local wills, Robertson was named as 
the Cautioner (‘one who stands surety’).47 Robert, Alexander and William 
Robertson were all members of the Masonic Lodge and all were elected Grand 
Master, Robert once, Alexander twice and William on six occasions.48 
 
Associates 
This section covers perhaps the most important range of connections. The term 
‘associates’ is used here to define people with whom merchants had a 
relationship that was either explicitly or implicitly connected with business. 
These were the people that were trusted and with whom one was prepared to 
share risks, and who were, therefore, most crucial to the success of a business 
enterprise in this period. It is apparent that Nisbet’s connections were less well 
founded than those of the Robertsons. Of the people in this category, Alexander 
Dow and James Grey were, initially at least, Nisbet’s employees. James 
Renton, although related by marriage to Robertson, nevertheless appears to 
have become closer to Nisbet in later life perhaps when he was in financial 
difficulties and turned to smuggling .49 Patrick Home, the feudal superior, had a 
relationship with Nisbet, and the Hairs, Bell and Rannie and Stewart of 
Allanbank all had financial relationships with Nisbet. Nisbet’s sequestration 
provided much useful evidence about his business career. 
 
It has been harder to find out so much about Robertson, beyond the various 
customs records. One unusual find at Gunsgreen House does, however, cast 
some light on his business connections. When the House was being restored in 
2006/7 it was discovered that workmen in the early 1800s had packed paper 
round a door frame to stop plaster going behind it. They used a number of 
 
46 NRS, Minutes of Eyemouth Kirk Session, 22 April 1753, 20 November 1781. 
47 Robinson (ed.), The Concise Scots Dictionary. 
48 Willox The History of an Ancient Scottish Lodge. 
49 National Archives, PROB 11/1276/239; Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/G/6/21 (1–3), Claim for Mr 
Paterson on the Estate of Mr Nisbet of Gunsgreen, 1790.  
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scraps of Robert Robertson’s business papers from the 1760s, which provide at 
least some names and business contacts, which are referred to in the 
appropriate place below.50 Even in these random scraps some names crop up 
which also appear in Robertson’s father’s will in 1720, as debtors.51 
 
An indication of closeness and trust is the extent to which merchants were 
prepared to share risks, such as the joint owning of ships. The formation of a 
close – or regular – relationship with a ship’s master would also have indicated 
trust, or, at the very least, acceptance of the man’s competence and honesty. 
While it is not straightforward to ascribe the ownership of ships, it has been 
possible to identify vessels that were almost certainly owned by the Nisbet 
Brothers (Table 3/1) and the Robertson family. From this, it has further been 
possible to establish a pattern of relationships with the masters of ships. With 
the Nisbets it has been possible to identify 30 voyages by their own ships, with 
10 masters involved. What is very clear is the close relationship between the 
owners and the masters. In terms of all the identified voyages of the two groups 
of ships masters, those undertaken for the Robertsons and Nisbets accounted 
for around 90 per cent of their recorded career totals. This worked both ways, in 
that the owners had a loyal cadre of masters working for them and the masters 
had a close link with the owners. In only one case so far identified did one 
master work for both. Even here, there is an element of uncertainty as the name 
is spelled differently, but the dates fit so it is probably the same man. This topic 
is of such complexity, that the Nisbets and Robertsons are dealt with in detail in 
separate sub-sections.  
 
Ship ownership 
This section begins with an analysis of ships apparently owned/operated by the 
Nisbet brothers and of the ship masters they employed on regular basis, with a 
breakdown of their known involvement in smuggling. 
 
50 Eyemouth, Gunsgreen House (uncatalogued) Business Papers of Robert Robertson 
(Fragmentary), 1765–1775. 













Link with Simpson; 
worked exclusively for 









Simpson and Nisbet; 
worked exclusively for 




Friendship 1752 John 
Simpson 
Almost certainly the 
ship ‘building at Hull’ 
in Thomas Home 
indenture 
Simpson was 
moved from the 
Expedition 





Board of Customs – 
informers on board 
 
Hope 1761–1764 Thomas 
Hogg 
Board of Customs – 
ship seized and JN 









when auctioned by 
Customs .2.68 
 
Experiment 1766 James Lyall Only carried cargo for 
Nisbets 
 






















Pillans case; landed 























James Browett 1 0 0 
John Simpson 5 0 0 
James Pollock 1 0 0 
George Hay 5 0 4 
Thomas Hogg 5 0 3 
Peter Dalgleish 6 1 3 
James Lyall 2 0 0 
George Grame 3 1 2 
George Malcome 1 0 1 
James Balfour 1 1 1 
Totals 30 (90.90%) 3 14 (46.66%) 
 
Table 3/2. Masters who worked regularly for the Nisbets 
 
Sources are the Collector’s Quarterly Accounts, the Dunbar Customs Letter Books and 
the Minutes of the Board of Customs. 
 
Fourteen detected smuggles were carried out by this small group, with three 
masters – George Hay, Peter Dalgleish and Thomas Hogg alone responsible 
for ten of them. It can be no coincidence that Dalgleish and Hogg had no 
compunction about firing their ships’ cannon at representatives of the authorities 
when necessary. The Lord Advocate agreed that Dalgleish should be tried by 
the Court of Admiralty and he certainly disappeared from the shipping records 
after this decision was arrived at in October 1770.52 
 
In terms of fellow merchants, aside from his co-partneries with Harry Knox in 
the 1740s and 1750s, Nisbet had no regular trading partners outwith the family. 
There are 27 voyages recorded featuring the Nisbet family, in ten of which John 
was involved, David in another ten, William in six, Harry Knox in four (one as 
Harry Knox only, the others as Knox & Nisbet). In the early part of his career in 
Dunbar, John Nisbet also acted as an agent on eleven voyages, again with no 
outstanding client. The only person using him more than once was Charles Fall, 
with three – which would be expected, accepting the validity of the assumption 
about Nisbet’s relationship with the Fall family. 
 
In respect of the ownership of vessels, there is little evidence of multi-party 
ownership in Eyemouth. Both the Nisbets and the Robertsons appear to have 
owned ships outright, or to have owned them within the family group. Robert 
 
52 NRS, CE1/12, 22 October 1770. 
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Robertson’s older brother, William, who died in 1735 did leave a half share in a 
ship ‘Thomas Kellie, master’.53 Kellie was master on thirteen occasions for the 
Robertsons, between 1726 and 1744. It is possible, of course, that his brother 
Robert had the other half. The will of Job Buck, which reveals Robertson’s 
connection with Dunkirk, shows Buck leaving a half-share in a ship, but the 
owner of the other half is not revealed.54 The 1781 will of Walter Sherrilaw, 
shoemaker in Eyemouth – and fellow freemason – reveals that he had ‘Half a 
boat with Mr David Nisbet Merchant in Eyemouth Anchors, ropes, sails etc. 
which Mr Nisbet will not allow to be valued.’55  
 
From the informer on Nisbet’s ship Molly, we know that James Grey was 
Nisbet’s clerk, as he was described being aboard ship and overseeing the 
unloading of the contraband.56 He appears as the agent for David Nisbet on the 
Peggy in 1759, a voyage probably involving smuggling, as was that of the Syren 
of Stromness in 1761, when Grey acted for the Grieves, William and David 
Nisbet. Subsequently he acted for Patrick Grieve again and for Richard Turnbull 
in 1767 and then again for John and David Nisbet for the voyage of the Peggy 
in 1769, involving contraband. On shore Grey was involved in a violent 
confrontation with the Customs in 1761, alongside William Nisbet and Patrick 
Grieve, when he was described as a merchant.57 He seems to fall into the 
category of a loyal and valued employee, trusted with the most sensitive of 
transactions. He was also a founder member of the Eyemouth Masonic Lodge. 
 
James Renton, son of the Eyemouth lawyer John, was born in 1749 and 
appears to have been involved in trading from the age of eighteen, the first 
reference being to a cargo brought in on the ship Dunbar of Dunbar in March 
1767, consisting of linseed, flax, clover seed, old iron, goose quills and 
childrens’ toys. Some of it was on his own account and part on behalf of James 
Veitch,58 The remainder of the cargo was managed by James Grey, who was 
John Nisbet’s clerk in 1760. Renton joined the Lodge St Ebbe in December 
 
53 Edinburgh, NRS, CC/15/5/9. 
54 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/10, Testament Dative 
and Inventary of Job Buck, 1753. 
55 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/11,Testament Dative and 
Inventary of Walter Sherrilaw, 1781. 
56 NRS, CE1/10, 17 August 1761. 
57 NRS, CE1/10, 9 September 1761. 
58 NRS E504/10, 30 March 1767. 
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1768. He was also the cousin of John Gibson of Fairneyside – Gibson was later 
described as ‘the most treacherous of all the Contraband Tribe’.59 Renton was 
in partnership with James Henderson from 1769 to 1775. Henderson had 
worked on his own account from 1764 to 1768, importing timber from Norway.60 
 
Renton was married to Margaret Home, Robert Robertson’s first wife’s niece, 
and his relationship with Robertson is described below. There is little evidence 
of Renton being involved in smuggling early in his career, though he did use 
one of Nisbet’s more active smuggling masters, Peter Dalgleish, in 1770 and a 
ship that had been involved – the Anne & Peggie, under George Grame in 
1769. He was involved in a well-known move in 1774 when the Magdalene 
unloaded part of her cargo of timber in the bay, thereby avoiding some of the 
duty.61 There is also a possibility that the importation of timber from southern 
Norway was effectively a ‘cover’ for the smuggling of contraband from the 
Asiatisk Kompagni of Copenhagen. Kent quotes several sources which 
encourage this belief.62 This is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6, below. 
 
By the end of his career, Renton was seemingly close to John Nisbet. In 1786, 
for example, Nisbet and Sir John Stuart of Allanbank, tenant of Gunsgreen 
House, stood surety for Renton when he borrowed £500 from David Paterson, 
an Edinburgh insurance broker.63 A dispute between the men’s trustees reveals 
further information of their business association.64 It seems likely that, if he was 
not involved earlier, Renton turned to smuggling when his business began to 
fail, as he, like Nisbet, ended up bankrupt. The key evidence for this is in the 
shipping records.65 Having used a wide variety of ships from different places, 
suddenly Renton used the Elizabeth (also known as the Betsy and Peggie) of 
Berwick-upon-Tweed under her master John Lyon, to bring in timber and iron 
from Gothenburg four times between 1782 and 1784. Lyon was a smuggler, 
 
59 Paxton, Berwickshire, Paxton House, David Home, Letter to Patrick Home of Wedderburn, 
1799. 
60 NRS, GD267/27/81. Note of Timber Imported by Henderson & Renton. 
61 NRS, CE56/2/1–5. 
62 Kent, War and Trade in the Northern Seas.  
63 NRS, CS229/G/6/21 (1–3). 
64 Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/R/4/27. Answers for the Assignees of James Renton Late Merchant 
in Berwick Now Deceased to the Objections Stated to Their Interest in the Sequestration of the 
Estate of John Nisbet by David Hume, 1796. 
65 NRS, E504/10, 1781–1784. 
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Having considered your Report of the 2nd Instant on the petition of James 
Renton Merchant at Berwick, praying the delivery of two kegs of oil under 
stop out of the Betsey and Peggie John Lyon Master from Oporto for not 
being reported by the Master. We direct you to return the same as a 
Seizure for Condemnation.67 
 
What is also apparent from this is that Renton had moved to Berwick-upon-
Tweed – his last recorded shipping activity in Eyemouth was in August 1784. 
Following his bankruptcy there was a newspaper advertisement for the sale of 
his warehouse in Berwick, shown in chapter seven, where this latter phase of 
Renton’s career is dealt with in more detail. 
 
The Hair Brothers were carriers and business associates of the Nisbets. There 
is a surviving document which makes clear this relationship. It is a statement of 
account covering the years from 1763 to1768 which demonstrates that the 
Hairs acted as the Nisbets’ distributors of contraband.68 It details around £500 
of business, and there is nothing listed, apart from one load of hay, other than 
tea, brandy or gin. Some years earlier, in 1756, there was an information sent to 
the Board of Customs, regarding sundry frauds committed at Eyemouth and 
naming Thomas Hair.69 In June of that year, he made a complaint against a 
customs officer, Alexander Mair, regarding the taking of four ankers of gin and 
brandy. The spirits were subsequently condemned by Justices of the Peace. In 
late December 1757 Thomas Hair was involved in a violent assault on 
Alexander Mair, causing some damage to his eyes.70 
 
Dow’s links with the Nisbets were not directly related to the smuggling business, 
but the relationship was important to them. Dow was born in Perthshire in 1736 
and was Nisbet’s Apprentice/Clerk until 1756.71 His uncle was Daniel Dow, Tide 
 
66 NRS, CE 56/2/1–5. 
67 NRS, CE56/2/ 1–5.  
68 NRS, CS229/N/1/41 
69 NRS, CE56/2/ 1–5, 10 February 1756.  
70 NRS, CE56/2/ 1–5, 3 June 1756.  
71 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
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Surveyor in Eyemouth from 1754 to 1769. When holding forth to Alexander 
‘Jupiter’ Carlyle in 1769, Dow said that his father had been ‘of the customs’ at 
Dunbar.72 There is no evidence of his father being active locally, only his uncle. 
It is interesting to trace Dow’s links to Eyemouth in the first place. It is difficult to 
be certain, but the most obvious link is that Dow’s near neighbour in Perthshire, 
Thomas Drummond of Drummondearnoch was both ‘of the customs’ and 
married to Jean Renton of Eyemouth, the sister of John the Writer and aunt of 
James.73 Thomas Drummond also owed David Nisbet senior the best part of 
£20, debts incurred in 1726 and 1727, indicating a long association.74 
 
Alexander Dow left Eyemouth in 1756 and joined the Privateer King of Prussia, 
after whose cruise from Falmouth in 1757, he made a will at Dartmouth in which 
he left everything to ‘my beloved friend’ David Nisbet.75 Dow was just 21 with 
little in the way of wealth, but he then made his way to India, where he rose 
through the ranks in the East India Company to become a Colonel. There, he 
learned Persian, produced the first authoritative English-language history of 
India, wrote two plays that were put on by Garrick in London76 and had his 
portrait painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds, which is currently on display at 
Petworth House in Sussex. 
 
When he died in 1779, Dow was worth around £18,000, around £2m in current 
terms. The family organised a search for a will, but only found ‘a paper 
purporting to be a will’ – the one referred to above in which all was left to David 
Nisbet. This provoked a reference to Chancery, for, although the Nisbets 
agreed to settle for half, the relatives fell out among themselves. When John 
was sequestrated in 1787, Dow’s inheritance would have been sufficient to save 
him, but it was unavailable – indeed it only saw the light of day in 1796, a month 
after John’s death.77 
 
 
72 John Hill Burton (ed.), The Autobiography of Dr Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk 1722–1805 
(London Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910), pp. 529–533. 
73 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC8/8/111, Testament Dative 
and Inventary of Thomas Drummond, 1747. 
74 NRS, CC/15/5/10. 
75 London, National Archives, PROB 11/1091, Will of Alexander Dow, 1757. 
76 Alexander Dow: History of Hindostan (London 1768/1772); Zingis (London, 1768); Sethona. A 
Tragedy (London, 1774). 
77 London, National Archives, C.12/658/19 Bill of Complaint concerning the Will of the late 
Colonel Alexander Dow, 1793. 
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How did this relationship help Nisbet? Dow lent Nisbet £1,500 in 1772, secured 
by a heritable bond.78 It was this debt, which, as heritable property, had been 
automatically transferred to his next of kin, his cousin and namesake in 
Hertford, that the Robertsons used to bring about Nisbet’s sequestration. It 
seems, in fact, that Dow was more use to his family than to his old benefactors, 
for such we must assume the Nisbets to have been, in that his namesake’s son 
William became a clerk in the East India Company in London and his cousin, 
Alexander, son of Daniel the Eyemouth tide surveyor, became a Colonel in the 
Bombay Regiments of the East India Company (EIC). In addition, John left 
Dow’s natural son Daniel £500 in his will and a Mrs Touffner, who, as Isabella 
Mountfort had cohabited with Dow, probably in India, was left an annuity 
payable out of Nisbet’s estate.79 
 
One unresolved relationship is that between John Nisbet and the Feudal 
Superiors, the Homes of Billie. The Homes had a chequered career in the 
eighteenth century. They were active Jacobites in 1715 and, as such, lost their 
estates of Billie, Paxton and Wedderburn. The Reverend Ninian Home then 
married the daughter of the dispossessed Sir George Home and eventually was 
able to take possession of the family properties again.80 Ninian’s youngest son 
was Thomas and on 19 September 1751, it was 
 
Contracted and Agreed Betwixt John Nisbet Mercht. In Eymouth on the 
one part and Thomas Home youngest lawfull Son of the Deceast Mr 
Ninian Home of Billie on the other part ... (that) the said Thomas Home 
Hath become by these presents, with advice of his Cautioner (Sponsor: 
Thomas Cockburn, Writer in Edinburgh) aftermentioned Become Bound 
Apprentice to the said John Nisbet as Sailor aboard the Vessel presently 
building at Hull whereof John Simpson Shipmaster in Dunbar is to be 
Commander…81 
 
The term of the apprenticeship was three years and the Apprentice Fee was 
£25, both within the ranges referred to by Ralph Davis. Davis adds that such 
 
78 NRS 17/143. 
79 London, National Archives, Prob 11/1091, will of Alexander Dow of Hertford; Edinburgh, NRS, 
CS177–867, Act Appointing William Molle WS Curator Bonis on the Sequestrated Estate of 
John Nisbet, 1812; National Archives, PROB 11/276. 
80 Alistair Rowan and Jackie Miller, Paxton House (Norwich: Jarrold Publishing, 2003). 
81 Paxton, Berwickshire, Paxton House, John Nisbet and Thomas Home, Indenture, 1751. 
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apprenticeships ‘attracted a small but continuous flow of youths from much 
higher levels of society’.82 
 
Patrick Home commissioned John Adam to design his new house at Paxton in 
1755, the year that John Nisbet’s house at Gunsgreen, also designed by John 
Adam, was completed. Paxton was built by the stonemason James Nisbet.83 
There is no record of who built Gunsgreen or of any relationship between 
James and John Nisbet, but this is another tantalising coincidence. When 
Nisbet was on the verge of losing his house in 1788, Patrick, then an MP, was 
written to by his cousin George Home of Branxton about Nisbet, referring to him 
as ‘John Nisbet, poor man’.84 This suggests some form of ongoing relationship. 
The fact that the papers of Nisbet’s housekeeper, Janet Ferguson, who died in 
1817, have survived in the Home of Billie archive in the National Records of 
Scotland seems to confirm this connection.85 
 
Aside from individuals who were either in or closely associated with Eyemouth, 
Nisbet had connections in other places.  
 
Bell and Rannie were a significant firm of Edinburgh wine merchants. In 1745 
they supplied the wine for Charles Edward Stuart during his stay at the Palace 
of Holyroodhouse, for example.86 They pursued Nisbet over a debt run up by 
Duncan Carmichael, a shop owner in Edinburgh and relative of Alexander Dow. 
George Johnston, acting for Nisbet’s other creditors challenged the authenticity 
of this debt. The fact of his relationship with Bell and Rannie is indicated in a 
rehearsal of the case before the Court of Session explaining how ‘Mr Nisbet, in 
the 1770, 1771 and 1772 was a man in a considerable trade and had many 




82 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, second Impression ed. (Newton 
Abbot: David & Charles, 1962), p.117. 
83 Kitty Croft, John Dunbar, and Richard Fawcett, Borders, The Buildings of Scotland 
(Newhaven, London: Yale University Press, 2006) p. 607. 
84 Edinburgh, NRS, GD 267, Papers of the Homes of Billie, George Home, Letter to Patrick 
Home MP, February 1788. 
85 Edinburgh, NRS, GD267/20/22. Janet Ferguson, Household Accounts etc., 1788–1817. 
86 The Rannie Monument http://www.leithhistory.co.uk/2004/07/08/the-rannie-monument/. 
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It was wrong in the petitioners to make any private application to a 
bankrupt to aid their plea; and it was equally wrong in Mr Nisbet, when 
divested of his property, and unable to pay his onerous creditors, to say 
anything that could infer a wish upon his part to favour the petitioners, 
who had long been his correspondents and intimate friends … 87  
 
The inference to be drawn from this affair is that Bell and Rannie were helping 
to look after Nisbet in return for his favouring them in the sequestration process. 
 
Sir John Stewart of Allanbank, the third baronet, was Sheriff Depute of 
Berwickshire, the chief law officer of the county. He was also an Edinburgh wine 
merchant. His son, Sir John junior married Frances Coutts, daughter of the 
banker, in 1778 and rented Gunsgreen House from John Nisbet from 1782 to 
1787 at £35 per annum.88 John McDonald, who was also Alexander Dow’s 
servant in 1768/1769, describes a visit to the wine country of Portugal, Spain 
and France with young Sir John in the mid-1770s.89 Sir John was not just 
Nisbet’s tenant: as mentioned earlier, he jointly guaranteed a bond for £500 for 
James Renton. As with the relationship with Bell and Rannie, there was 
something here, more than a landlord-tenant relationship. It is surely not a 
coincidence that the Robertsons’ attempts to sequestrate (bankrupt) Nisbet 
started within three months of the end of Stewart’s tenancy of Gunsgreen 
House. 
 
In the Nisbets’ dealings with Scott and Fraser of Gothenburg, John Brown, 
Merchant in Edinburgh, drew a Bill for £372 12s 6d, on their behalf to be paid by 
John Nisbet.90 
 
In 1755 Nisbet and Knox consigned a parcel of wines for sale to Robert Carrick 
of Newcastle. This was then transhipped to London by a Richard Markham at 
the initiative of David Nisbet, when it was seized by the Customs. In his 
defence, David Nisbet explained that 
 
87 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, ESTC T213586, George Johnston WS, Answers to 
the Petition of Messers Bell and Rannie, 1789.  
88 Edna Healey, Coutts and Co 1692–1992 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992) p.107; 
Edinburgh, NLS, BCL.D 2650 (85), George Johnston, Petition Unto the Rt Hon the Lords of 
Council and Session, 1792. 
89 John Macdonald, Memoirs of an Eighteenth Century Footman, The Century Lives and Letters 
(London: Century Publishing, 1985) p.184. 
90 Edinburgh, NRS, Register of Sasines, RS 19/17/140–1, Discharge and Renounciation: John 




… he was often in use to dispose of Goods for the behoof of the 
Company particularly in ordering goods from Newcastle and Leeds and it 
happening at one and the same time that Knox and Nisbet had eight and 
the Respondent six Hogsheads of Claret wine in the hands of one Mr 
Thomas Wallis of Newcastle for sale and which on his death was handed 
over to the care of Mr Robt. Carrick, the Respondent finding the Mercate 
at Newcastle was not favourable he desired Mr Carrick to send off his six 
Hogsheads to Leeds to one Mr Richard Markham who was to forward 
them by wagon to London…91  
 
A newspaper advertisement illustrating the sale of this claret is illustrated at Fig. 
5/3. A year earlier, David Nisbet had sought to transport 1,120 lbs of tobacco to 
Leeds.92 It was surely also intended for Markham. R.G. Wilson refers to the 
Elam brothers, Leeds merchants in the 1740s, who imported tobacco from 
America, before moving over to the wool trade, using their contacts in America 
to assist them. He makes no reference to potentially illegitimate trade, however. 
Some merchants accepted wine for their own use as part payment for exports 
and some went into the wine trade on a larger scale. Markham had a fine house 
in central Leeds and an estate at Chapel Allerton.93 
 
Carrick was a significant figure in Newcastle merchant circles with an office in 
Sand Hill and a house near Hanover Square. He married Miss Maddeson of 
Birtley, a wealthy heiress who inherited an ‘opulant fortune’ on the death of her 
father.94 
 
In 1773 James Home, merchant in Newcastle, was pursuing John and David 
Nisbet through Alexander Christie Jr. of Duns for £33 11s Sterling.95 These 
connections are only known because business transactions went wrong. As 
with so much to do with smuggling, there is no evidence when everything went 
well. The implication is, however, that Nisbet and Knox at least, if not the Nisbet 
Brothers themselves, dealt with at least one merchant in Newcastle, using him 
as an outlet for their wines. In addition, it seems that David Nisbet had regular 
 
91 NRS, CS271/38288. 
92 NRS CE56/2/1, 1 October 1754. 
93 R. G. Wilson, Gentleman Merchants: The Merchant Community in Leeds 1700–1830 
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94 Newcastle Courant, 24 February 1750. 
95 Edinburgh, NRS, CS 271/8237/8, Bond of Cautionry: William Nisbet for Messrs John & David 
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dealings with a leading merchant in Leeds, acting as a supplier for, presumably, 
duty-free tobacco and making use of his contacts to move wine to London.  
 
Aside from David’s dealings with Richard Markham, there is some evidence of 
Nisbet’s contacts in London, particularly in relation to banking facilities, which 
are outlined in the court case dealing with the Pillans claim against his estate.96 
In the details of the cash transfers, there are listed the names of the bankers 
that Nisbet used. These were Herries and Co., Simon Fraser and Bertram, 
Baillie and Company. Of these Herries and Co. are the best known, being a 
breakaway from Coutts. The reason for the break was that 
 
Herries was an unscrupulous adventurer, capable of bribery, opening the 
letters of his competitors and of speculating on his own account on the 
probable rise in the price of tobacco during the American War of 
Independence.97 
 
Herries did however recognise the difficulties of transferring money to the 
continent and pioneered ways of doing this effectively. Herries also acted for 
Greig and Sibbald of Gothenburg. The Nisbets were invited to settle their 
accounts with Greig and Sibbald through London or Edinburgh.98 
 
George Baillie and Co. had an important position in London in the 1780s; in 
contrast, Bertram, Gardner and Co. failed during the banking crisis of the 
1790s. Given the way partnerships came and went at this period it is not 
reckless to assume that these were the Baillie and Bertram of Bertram and 
Baillie.99 The paperwork in the 1784/1785 documentation relating to Nisbet’s 
financial dealings with Henry Greig reveals that Nisbet had a further banker in 
London, Kinloch and Hog.100 
 
The one other connection in London was Peter Ferguson, a shipwright, referred 
to in John Nisbet’s will as the brother of his housekeeper, Janet Ferguson and 
father of Alison, to whom Nisbet left £250. This is a puzzling reference and 
there must be some suspicion regarding the relationship between John Nisbet 
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and Janet Ferguson. Alison was Nisbet’s mother’s name. It is possible that 
Nisbet had a business relationship with Ferguson, but there is no clarity at all 
about any of this.101 
 
The nature of Nisbet’s links with merchants in Gothenburg, who supplied him 
with contraband tea, is explored in depth in Chapter 7. They seem to have 
lasted from at least the late 1750s through to the end of his career in the mid-
1780s. 
 
The Nisbets brought in cargoes from Rotterdam and Campveere, the former  
Scottish Staple in the Netherlands, then still used by Scottish 
merchants, on eight occasions between 1746 until 1770. Six of these  
enterprises were identified as involving smuggling, perhaps implying that there  
may well have been more. There is, yet, no evidence as to the Nisbets’  
contacts in the Netherlands before the episode with Richard Pillans in  
1774/1775 that went badly wrong and was described in some detail after John  
Nisbet’s sequestration (see chapter seven). How Nisbet came to be connected  
with Pillans is described in a letter from Pillans to Robertson, quoted in court: 
 
 Thomas Anderson of Perth, recommended to us Mr John Nisbet of your 
place, with whom since the dissolution of our partnership I have done 
business, I believe to his satisfaction as far as respected the 
management here.102 
 
The suggestion here is that Nisbet had a relationship with Thomas Anderson of 
Perth, who – in turn – had a relationship with Pillans. Anderson felt confident 
enough of Nisbet’s viability to recommend him to Pillans. 
 
A detailed analysis of Robert Robertson’s trading indicates that he had no 
exclusive, or even close business relationship with any other merchant in 
Eyemouth. Of 87 trading enterprises he undertook eighteen as a sole trader, or 
with his son, Alexander. For twelve other voyages, William Grahame, his 
brother-in-law, acted as his agent and for another 22 William Weir, his clerk, 
 
101 NA, PROB 11/1276/239 
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fulfilled this role. Otherwise, apart from James Renton, no one person shared 
more than three or four ships and – ironically – John Nisbet and Harry Knox 
both fell into this category. When identifying ships belonging to the Robertsons, 
going back into the 1720s, there is a trend of loyal attachment to ship masters, 
with eleven men used, devoting 88.5 per cent of their careers, as far as records 
show, to the Robertsons. The most used were Thomas Kellie with thirteen 
voyages between the late 1720s and early 1740s, John Aitken, with seven in 
the early 1750s (three of which were smuggles) and John Peart with six in the 
early 1780s. This is a very similar pattern to that of the ships belonging to John 
Nisbet.103 From this it seems that Robertson’s strongest local business links 
were with people whom he employed – his two agents and eleven ship masters. 
Unlike Nisbet, there is no evidence of his entering into a co-partnery or other 
long-term business relationship with anyone, other than his sons, Alexander 
and William. 
 
Renton, as mentioned above, was married to Robertson’s wife’s niece Margaret 
Home. James was involved in 70 recorded voyages, all but one of them 
imports. For much of his career James was in partnership with John/James 
Henderson, about whom little is known. He may have been related to William 
Henderson of Alloa, Smeaton’s surveyor for the 1760s harbour improvements, 
who married William Nisbet’s daughter Alison, and had a son called John – but 
it seems far too late for it to be the same person. At this date there were, 
however, many Hendersons in and around Alloa and that town, a centre of 
brewing and distilling, would have been an important outlet for grain from 
Eyemouth, particularly from Robert Robertson’s maltings. For example,there is 
a reference in the Eyemouth Kirk Session to a John Paxton ‘sometime maltman 
to Mr Robertson.’104 It was this involvement in the grain trade that made the 
difference between Robertson and other merchants, in that he had a far better 
balance between exports and imports. 
 
Of the 70 voyages mentioned above, only eleven were shared with other 
merchants and ten of these were exclusively with Robert Robertson. Given that 
both Robertson and Renton so rarely shared cargoes with other merchants, 
 
103 NRS, CE/56/2; NRS E504/10. 
104 NRS, Minutes of Eyemouth Kirk Session, 6 April 1755. 
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there is perhaps something to be read into this close relationship. 37 of 
Renton’s voyages came from the timber ports of southern Norway, but those 
shared with Robertson all came in from elsewhere – seven from Gothenburg 
and three from St Petersburg. This, perhaps, suggests that Robertson took the 
lead in these enterprises. There are no detailed records of the failure of 
Renton’s business, but it seems possible that Nisbet gave Renton assistance by 
introducing him to smuggling to help to save his business. The close 
relationship they had at the end of both of their careers would tend to support 
this hypothesis. 
 
William Weir is referred to above as managing the cargo for 22 of Robertson’s 
voyages. Weir and William Whitehead both witnessed Robert Robertson’s 
Disposition Settlement in 1771 when they were described as ‘clerks to me and 
my son’.105 
 
Robertson had an Edinburgh lawyer – Robert Jamieson. One of the 
fragmentary letters found in Gunsgreen House is from him to Robertson, dated 
9 July 1768.106 It seems likely that Jamieson also acted for Robertson when he 
sought to have Nisbet sequestrated in 1787. By chance, the copy of the 
Edinburgh Evening Courant in the City of Edinburgh Libraries with the 
advertisement for the first meeting of Nisbet’s creditors seems to have been 
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Figure 3/2. Edinburgh Evening Courant, October 1787: copy in Central Library, 
Edinburgh 
 
Thomas Potts, the lawyer whose name was at the foot of the advertisement was 
Robertson’s son-in-law. Robertson also had dealings with Hugh Mossman in 
1768, another lawyer in Edinburgh, who was famously killed in the collapse of a 
tenement in 1774.107 Other names in Robertson’s accounts include Sir James 
Livingston, David Inglis, Frazer and M., Lord ?Baryarg and Lord Marchmont. Of 
these, only Lord Marchmont is easy to trace. He was a politician, one of the 
Scottish peers in the House of Lords who had been one of Robertson’s father’s 
debtors in 1720.108 Perhaps more significantly he managed the Berwickshire 
county constituency and oversaw patronage in the county for many years in the 
eighteenth century. 
 
Robertson had an interest in 22 ships coming into Eyemouth from Gothenburg 
from the mid-1760s onwards and there is a fragmentary entry from an account 
book  
 
Decbr, 10 To Cask from Messr. Hall in -----  
 
which seems likely to refer to the Halls of Gothenburg.109  
 
107 Robert Robertson papers, Gunsgreen House. 
108 NRS, CC/15/5/8. 




Figure 3/3. Bill on behalf of Robert Robertson for William Douglas in Gothenburg 
 
This bill110 relates to a voyage by the ship Elizabeth, master John Peart, 
reported as arriving in Eyemouth on 13 December 1780 from Gothenburg, with 
a cargo of timber and iron for Robert Robertson and Son and Renton and 
Home.111 
 
It is clear from the correspondence regarding Nisbet’s dealings with Richard 
Pillans (see chapter seven) that the Robertsons had once had a partnership 
with Pillans, since there is a reference to its dissolution. There are, however, 
very few ships recorded as coming in from Rotterdam or Campveere with goods 
for the Robertsons. It was only after the supposed dissolution of the partnership 
that they had serious trade with northern Europe – seven ship loads of grain 
were sent to Hamburg in 1776/1777, for example.112 It does seem to be 
apparent, however, that Robertson’s relationship with Pillans was stronger than 
Nisbet’s, even though it was indicated that they were no longer in business 
together. This is not wholly borne out by the records, which only reveal five 
voyages to or from the key Dutch ports by the Robertsons. There is an 
implication that there may well have been other voyages that were undetected 
smuggles. 
 
Dunkirk was a notorious centre of smuggling and piracy in northern France.113 
The will of Job Buck, ship master in Eyemouth, provides evidence of Robert 
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Robertson being active in that port. In the Inventory of Buck’s will is the 
following: 
 
Item The said Defunct had at the time forsaid of his Decease the Debts 
and Sums of money underwritten adebted resting and owing to him by 
the persons after named viz. By Robert Robertson merchant in Eymouth 
Eighty pound Sterling Contained in a bill dated at Dunkirk in France the 
twenty seventh Day of August last (1752) and drawn by the defunct upon 
the said Robert Robertson payable four months after date114 
 
Buck was also the owner of half of the ship Helen of Eyemouth, which was 
advertised for sale in the Caledonian Mercury on 23 April 1753. 
 
The only reference to the Helen of Eyemouth in the Collector’s Quarterly 
Accounts is of her arriving in Eyemouth from Malaga with Raisins and Spanish 
Wine under the command of Thomas Davidson for James Martin, acting as 
agent for Davidson, Grieve & Co. on 12 March 1753, a date which would fit with 
the death of Buck in January and the advert for the sale in late April.115 
There is no sign of any Eyemouth ships in or near Dunkirk in August 1752, the 
date of the bill. Robertson did, however, act as the Cautioner on Buck’s will.116 
It is highly likely that tea imported into Copenhagen was also being smuggled 
into Eyemouth from Danish Norway. Kent says that Bergen acted as an 
entrepôt for goods from the Asiatisk Kompagnie and it seems likely that some of 
the 120 odd ships bringing timber from the south of Norway into Eyemouth 
would have carried tea and other contraband in amongst their legitimate 
cargo.117  
 
It seems clear that the Robertsons had networks, in that they had connections 
who related to each other and whom they could use in a variety of ways. Pillans 
of Rotterdam, for example, was not a simple trading partner. He was either a 
party to, or certainly co-operated with, the campaign to sequestrate John 
Nisbet. Robertson’s relations were also useful. Thomas Potts the lawyer acted 
for Robertson, his father-in-law, in the instance of Nisbet’s sequestration and 
the Gunsgreen fragments reveal business with other members of the Potts 
 
114 NRS CC15/5/10. 
115 E504/10, 12 March 1753. 
116 NRS CC15/5/10. 
117 Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas, p.109. 
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family as well as Robert Robertson’s second brother-in-law, James Jamieson 
Martin.118 Martin and Martin’s other brother-in-law, Thomas French were both 
Freemasons and merchants. Robertson was also, of course, in business with 
his sons Alexander and William jnr., and it was Alexander who eventually 
bought Gunsgreen House from Nisbet’s sequestrated estate. 
 
Nisbet’s connections, on the other hand, seem to have been simpler, for mainly 
business purposes. The most complex relationship was with Alexander Dow, 
but he was outside Nisbet’s other circles. His precise links with the Homes of 
Billie are unclear, as were those with Stewart of Allanbank. He was in business 
with his brother, David and had some links with his other brother, William, but 
both predeceased him. The one exception may be his relationship with Henry 
Greig in Gothenburg, where there is a coincidence of dates in May 1771 which 
suggests that Greig may have had some sort of debt of gratitude to Nisbet. This 
is dealt with in more detail in chapter 6. 
 
The simple fact that the Robertsons were able to bring about Nisbet’s 
sequestration suggests that they had a stronger group of connections than 
Nisbet did. To start with their families, Nisbet was a bachelor and his brothers 
died in 1774 and 1784. Robertson, on the other hand, had children and was in 
partnership with two of his sons and used his son–in-law’s legal position to start 
the process of sequestration. 
 
Alexander Dow, too, had died in 1779 and his interest in his loan to Nisbet of 
£1,500 passed to his cousin, Alexander of Hertford. It was this debt that the 
Robertsons used to bring Nisbet down. One of Nisbet’s more longstanding 
customers, Bell and Rannie of Edinburgh were among his more eager pursuers, 
although there is a suggestion that Nisbet did favour them in his evidence.119 
Pillans, in Rotterdam, was clearly an associate of the Robertsons and used 
them as his representatives in Britain and sold Nisbet’s debt to them ‘at an 
undervalue’, as Nisbet put it in his will.120 Stewart of Allanbank seems to have 
been close to Nisbet, but had left Gunsgreen House at the end of May 1787 and 
 
118 Gunsgreen House, Business Papers of Robert Robertson 
119 NLS, ESTC T213586 
120 Kew, National Archives, PROB 11/276 
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the Homes, while sympathising with Nisbet’s plight – ‘John Nisbet…poor man’ – 
played no part in safeguarding his future – although there is a hint of something 
in that Nisbet’s housekeeper’s papers did end up in the Home’s archive.121 
James Renton, a man with a foot in both camps, himself went bankrupt, as did 
Harry Knox and Robert Fall, Nisbet’s acquaintances from Dunbar. 
 
In terms of the local community, there is no evidence that Nisbet had any 
connections, whereas the impression of Robertson is that he was a leading 
figure, surely one of D’Cruze’s ‘community brokers’.122 He was an active Mason 
and member of the Kirk Session, who was so respected that he was invited to 
chair the committee established to build a new parish church.123  
 
When Nisbet was in difficulties in 1787, his two brothers and his 
friend/benefactor, Dow, were dead. His potentially influential tenant, Stewart of 
Allanbank, had moved out, and three of his business connections were 
bankrupt themselves. George and Patrick Home were sympathetic but played 




The Robertsons’ connections proved to be more sustainable than those of the 
Nisbet brothers, as the Nisbets were mainly involved in criminal enterprises, 
while the Robertsons had a substantial legitimate import and export trade, as 
well as extensive family and social connections. John Nisbet was also 
unfortunate in that his main financial backer, Alexander Dow, died young, in 
1779, leaving a tangled estate. The simple inheritance of Dow’s wealth would 
have ensured Nisbet’s financial survival. 
 
What needs to be considered is whether either family’s relationships were so 
interwoven as to be worthy of being described as networks, in the sense 
defined by Hancock as being the management of a set of ‘supplier-customer-
agent-friend connections as a group’.124 Although less is known of the details of 
 
121 Paxton, Letter to Patrick Home; NRS GD267/20/22. 
122 D’Cruze, ‘The Middling Sort in Eighteenth-Century Colchester‘. 
123 NRS, Minutes of Eyemouth Kirk Session, 20 November 1781. 
124 Hancock, The Trouble with Networks, p.473. 
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the Robertsons’ commercial relationships, their connections do have more the 
appearance of a network in Hancock’s sense. Robert Robertson, as the nearest 
thing that Eyemouth had to a leading citizen, or ‘community broker’, enjoyed a 
strong position in the town and its merchant community.125 He also had the 
benefit of a long family history in trade in Eyemouth, and the inherited 
connections that that brought with it. In terms of business, he was the only 
Eyemouth merchant who was recorded as having a substantial export trade, 
which would have meant that he had connections throughout northern Europe, 
customers as well as suppliers. Conversely, he also had connections with the 
farmers and landlords who used him to process and export their grain. 
Unfortunately, only an early version of Robert Robertson’s will can be found so 
it is not possible to assess if he had inherited any of his father’s and brother’s 
debtors, which would have further strengthened his position.126 It is certainly the 
case, however, that the Robertsons had a complex web of relationships which 
can be categorised as a network. 
 
Nisbet’s connections, on the other hand, were much more limited. He lacked 
Robertson’s social position in Eyemouth, not being a member of either the 
Lodge or the Kirk Session. His family was of marginal benefit to him, apart from 
David, his brother. Even his connection to Alexander Dow, a minor celebrity in 
the decade up to his early death, failed to benefit him. In terms of his trade, 
Nisbet only had suppliers in Europe and customers in Britain, so relied heavily 
on credit and goodwill. At the time of his sequestration, his only debtors were 
the Hair Brothers, his distributors in the 1760s.127 He had some form of 
relationship with Patrick Home of Billie and with Sir John Stuart of Allanbank, 
but the nature of these relationships is unclear. They were certainly not part of a 
network. Nisbet’s connections, even those from his days in Dunbar, were a 
series of one to one relationships with individuals. At the end of his life, there is 
no evidence that any of his relationships were of assistance to him. After his 
death, John effectively disappeared from history – his link with Gunsgreen 
House was only re-discovered in 1998.  
 
 
125 D’Cruze, The Middling Sort in Eighteenth Century Colchester, 
126 Hinton Charterhouse, Robertson, Disposition Settlement. 
127 NRS, CS229/N/1/41. 
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The Robertsons, on the other hand, flourished. Alexander bought Gunsgreen 
House and also had a house in Edinburgh. His sons all entered the professions 
and thrived. His younger brother, William, took over the family business and 
continued with coastal grain exports into the nineteenth century. Both William, 
and Alexander’s daughter Mary married into Alloa based grain whisky families, 
the Jamesons and the Haigs (Field Marshall Douglas Haig was Alexander’s 
great grandson). Two of Alexander’s sons married into West India Plantation 
families and the family flourished through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.128  
 
Chapter seven will examine in detail the failure of John Nisbet’s business in 
1787 and how the Robertsons used their connections to bring about his 
sequestration, choosing a time when Nisbet was at his weakest – he was 75 
years old, his brothers and his patron, Alexander Dow, were all dead and his 
influential tenant, John Stewart of Allanbank, had just given up his lease of 
Gunsgreen House. Robertson, on the other hand, made use of his contacts with 
Pillans in Rotterdam, his lawyer son-in-law and his Edinburgh Writer to bring 
about maximum pressure. Nisbet, with few good connections and no actual 
networks had flourished for thirty years. The Robertsons had already been in 
business for at least 150 years and their descendants continue to thrive today. 
For all his ambition and chutzpah, Nisbet was unable to stand up to the local 
establishment, who struck decisively when he was fatally weakened. 
 
The next chapter builds on this examination of the mercantile community of 
Eyemouth to seek to explore how the business practices of those merchants 
were applied to the smuggling trade, to the extent that it is appropriate to us 
the term merchant-smuggler for the key players in that field. 
 
128 Eustace, The Family of Robert Robertson of Prenderguest and Brownsbank and Margaret 





Smuggling in south-east Scotland 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Having previously considered how business in the eighteenth century worked, 
particularly in Eyemouth, this chapter, in sections 4.2 and 4.3, reviews the 
conduct of business and seeks to draw out the way that smuggling fitted into 
those normal processes. The second part, sections 4.4 to 4.5, looks at what can 
again be seen as normal features of business – supply and demand. The 
relationship between smugglers and merchants – or, rather the fact that they 
were frequently the same people – has been alluded to in works about 
smuggling but has been largely ignored in studies of ports.1 Jackson, in his 
major work on Hull, for example, has just one reference to smuggling, while a 
work about Montrose, edited by Lythe and Jackson, has just four passing 
references.2 
 
Section 4.6 reviews the relationship between the local merchant-smugglers and 
the customs and excise services and 4.7 looks at the attempts by the 
Convention of Royal Burghs and the Church of Scotland to discourage 
smuggling in Scotland. 4.8 then considers the nature of smuggling in three 
areas – Cornwall, south-west Scotland and Montrose – which had some 
similarities to Eyemouth and its hinterland. 
 
It is one of the main contentions of this thesis that it is inappropriate to ghettoise 
smuggling. Smuggling was an important aspect of the nation’s trade in the 
eighteenth century. As early as 1898 Gustav Schmoller, quoted by Salvemini 
and Zaugg, wrote  
 
In the eighteenth century, an artificial system emerged just about 
everywhere that was characterised by the exponential growth of 
deception and abuse, bribery and corruption, smuggling and fraud, 
 
1 Cullen, Smuggling and the Ayrshire Economic Boom; Ramsay, ‘The Smugglers’ Trade:  
2 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century,p.16; Lythe and Jackson (eds), The Port of Montrose, 
pp.101, 129, 131, 230. 
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scams and forgery. One could almost say that the actual history of 
trade in the eighteenth century is the history of smuggling. (my 
emphasis).3 
 
Kent recognised that smuggling should be seen as part of the overall picture of 
trade in his work on the North Sea.4 Following Nisbet’s sequestration, his 
lawyer, who was also the lawyer for his creditors, said of him ‘Mr Nisbet himself 
was a professed smuggler and altho’ designed Merchant in Eyemouth it is well 
known that he dealt in no other than this traffic which he carried on to a very 
great extent.’5 Critically Johnston, the lawyer, described Nisbet as both a 
merchant and a smuggler. 
 
The following chapter (five) will reinforce the argument about the ‘normalness’ 
of smuggling by examining the relationship between the merchant-smugglers of 
Eyemouth and their customers. It is this ability to understand that relationship 
and, indeed, the whole of the smuggling business that makes this study of the 
port of Eyemouth so important. 
 
4.2 The conduct of business in the eighteenth century 
 
It is helpful to reiterate some of the key points made in chapter 3, to assist with 
an understanding of the relationship between smuggling and legitimate 
business. As with all dealers over the years, a merchant in the eighteenth 
century required a supply of goods and a demand for them. He, for it was 
almost always ‘he’, also required transport, distribution and finance. According 
to Jackson, however, ‘the merchant didn’t need heavy fixed capital. His assets 
were his business contacts… and although he needed to have capital behind 
him, the system of credit was such that he need never show it over the 
counter.’6 This is reinforced by McAloon’s account of the Edinburgh merchant 
Edward Burd. McAloon describes the scale of Burd’s business, indicating that it 
gave the impression that he was a ‘major entrepreneur’, when, in fact 
 
 
3 Biagio Salvemini and Roberto Zaugg, ‘Frodi Marittime Tra Norme E Istitutizione (Secc xvii–
xix): Premessa’, Quaderni Storici 143/Fascicolo 2 (2013), 311–332 (311). 
4 Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas.  
5 NRS, CS229/N/1/60. 
6 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p.110. 
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Burd was a very minor trader, indeed – as his account books show – he 
had few tangible resources. What he had was his status in the 
community, and the prospect of a landed inheritance in the future. It was 
clearly on the basis of the last two assets that he was able start a 
business and maintain it in the commercial capital of Scotland with a 
circulating capital of £5 4s 4¼d.7  
 
This could as well describe John Nisbet. It appears from the progress of his 
career that he never had any actual capital, merely the impression of status 
given by Gunsgreen House, itself almost certainly paid for by a loan from his 
brother. The importance of networks, or connections as they were called at the 
time, to the eighteenth-century merchant and merchant-smuggler is analysed in 
Chapter 3. Suffice to say, these relationships were crucial to the success of a 
merchant, especially one trading overseas, or, even more so, dealing in 
contraband.  
 
4.3 The operation of a smuggling business 
 
Having briefly reviewed how a merchant operated in the eighteenth century, the 
next step is to consider how a merchant-smuggler worked. The bulk of this 
material is drawn from the careers of John and David Nisbet, which are 
comparatively well documented, and their fellow Eyemouth merchant-
smugglers. They were, however, not unique. Recent work on Cornwall by 
Charlotte MacKenzie, Martin Wilcox and Helen Doe has drawn attention to the 
essential ‘normalness’ of smuggling. Wilcox, writing of Zephaniah Job, explains 
that 
… it can seem surprising that a successful man of business such as Job 
should have been so heavily involved in smuggling. However, aside from 
its illegality, smuggling was much like any other branch of trade, and it 
demanded the same skills, in terms of organisation, book-keeping and 
commercial judgement.8  
 
MacKenzie analyses the careers of the Penzance merchants, John and James 
Dunkin. They were clearly merchants but were described in the press as ‘the 
most notorious smugglers.’ They collaborated, for example, with the Carters of 
Prussia Cove, perhaps the best known of the large-scale Cornish smuggling 
 
7 McAloon, A Minor Scottish Merchant, p.20.  
8 Martin Wilcox, ‘Maritime Business in Eighteenth Century Cornwall: Zephaniah Job of Polperro’ 
Troze 2 (2010), 17 November 2015 <http://nmmc.co.uk/explore/publications/troze/>. 
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families.9 Doe’s work on the shipbuilder James Dunn of Mevagissey again 
shows us a businessman, actively involved in smuggling.10 
 
As suggested in chapter three, it is highly likely that John Nisbet started as an 
apprentice, then clerk to James Fall, a substantial merchant in, and provost of 
Dunbar.11 He subsequently acted as an agent for several merchants in Dunbar, 
co-ordinating the cargoes of a number of ships.12 He had a co-partnery with 
Harry Knox in the 1740s and was described as a merchant in Dunbar in his 
father’s will in 1746.13 By 1751 he was in a position to commission a ship to be 
built at Hull and to take the youngest member of the Home family as an 
apprentice.14 Nisbet was back in Eyemouth, where he built Gunsgreen House in 
the period 1752 to 1755 to the design of John Adam, although nothing is known 
of Nisbet’s contractual relationship with Adam. The house was built as his 
‘corporate headquarters’, with a suite of quayside storage cellars and at some 
point, a number of hiding places were created within the building, for the 
concealment of contraband. 
 
He operated his business perfectly normally. In the early 1750s he had an 
apprentice and clerk called Alexander Dow,15 the nephew of the tide surveyor in 
Eyemouth and had a second co-partnery with Knox, which ended in acrimony.16 
For the rest of his business career he was effectively in partnership with his 
brother David, who died in 1784. He was said to have ceased actual 
involvement in smuggling at some point in the late 1770s, although there does 
seem to have been an active relationship with Henry Greig into the 1780s.17 
There are references to other members of staff, a clerk, James Grey, three or 
 
9 Charlotte MacKenzie, ‘Merchants and Smugglers in Eighteenth Century Penzance: The 




10 Helen Doe, ‘The Smugglers’ Shipbuilder: The Customers, Trades and Vessels of a 
Mevagissey Shipyard, 1799–1816’ The Mariner’s Mirror, 92.4 (2006), 427–442; idem, ‘The 
Business of Shipbuilding: Dunn and Henna of Mevagissey, 1799–1806’, International Journal of 
Maritime History, 18.2 (2006), 187–217. 
11 NRS, CH2/647. 
12 NRS, E504/10/1. 
13 Edinburgh, NRS, The Admiralty Court Decrees in Absence, AC8/912, Knox and Nisbet 
v.Michael Leon (1756); NRS, CC15/5/10. 
14 Paxton, Nisbet and Home Indenture. 
15 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
16 NRS, CS271/38288.  
17 NRS CS229/Y/1/17; Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
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four ‘servants’, presumably porters  and/or labourers, and a housekeeper, Janet 
Ferguson, whom he seems to have relied upon to run his household affairs.18 
 
Risk was a feature of all business at this period, as it still is. Maritime trade, 
particularly in the North Sea, was riskier than many other branches of 
commerce. Adam Smith characterised smuggling as peculiarly risky: 
‘Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous trades. The most 
hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler, though when the adventure 
succeeds it is likewise the most profitable, is the infallible road to bankruptcy.’ It 
is interesting here that Smith treats smuggling as merely one of a few 
hazardous trades. He then explains why he feels smuggling to be so vulnerable: 
‘The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as upon all other 
occasions, and to entice so many adventurers into those hazardous trades, that 
their competition reduces their profit below what is sufficient to compensate the 
risk.’ He then explains that in hazardous trades, profits should be sufficient to 
cover the risk of any losses: ‘To compensate it completely, the common returns 
ought, over and above the ordinary profits of stock, not only to make up for all 
occasional losses, but to afford a surplus profit to the adventurers of the same 
nature with the profit of insurers. But if the common returns were enough for all 
this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent in these than in other trades.’19 
 
A keyway to minimise risk is to work with people who are trusted. That Nisbet 
sought to do this is made clear below. The fact that he was ultimately 
sequestrated appears to have been, in large part, due to the personal 
antagonism of Eyemouth’s main merchant family, the Robertsons, and is 
addressed in more detail in Chapter seven. 
 
There is no clear evidence in Eyemouth for the practice of sharing risk by 
splitting ship ownership into small fractions, as described by Davis.20 There is a 
similar lack of evidence for outside investors in cargoes. As McAloon and 
Jackson both noted (see 4.2 above), the key to managing a trading business 
was access to credit, rather than capital. The origins of Nisbet’s business are 
 
18 NRS CE1/7 17 August 1761; NA, PROB 11/276. 
19 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, reprint ed. 2 vols, vol. 1 (Books 1–3) (London, Penguin 
Classics, 1999), p.213. 
20 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, p.82. 
121 
 
unclear. After a relatively low-key start in Dunbar, he seems to have arrived in 
Eyemouth around 1750 able to build Gunsgreen House and commission a ship 
to be built at Hull.21 He borrowed £1,500 from his brother David in 1758, another 
£1,500 from Alexander Dow in 1772, and ran credit lines with his suppliers. In 
1763 he was able to make a considerable financial offer – around £250 – for the 
release of a seized ship and cargo and successfully bid £555 for three 
consignments of red French wine auctioned by the Customs in 1768.22 He also 
used three banking houses to make payments to Richard Pillans in 
Rotterdam.23 As late as 1783/1784 he was still able to make regular payments 
on a bill relating to an account with Henry Greig.24 
 
Tim Newton, quoting Muldrew, referred to the qualities required to promote trust 
in the sort of credit networks in which Nisbet was involved: ‘the ethic considered 
to be of the greatest importance was honesty, followed by upright and fair 
dealing in market transactions.’ Newton reinforces this, quoting Brewer, 
suggesting that credit relations favoured virtues of reliability, candour, affability, 
plain dealing and fairness: ‘One needed to be or, at least needed to appear to 
be, a man with such characteristics in order to carry on trade: to ‘keep up your 
reputation’, ‘preserve your integrity’, ‘maintain your credit’.25 In relation to the 
Nisbets, the use of the qualifying phrase ‘or, at least needed to appear to be…’ 
in the quote above was almost certainly true and, as mentioned elsewhere, may 
even help to explain the significance of Gunsgreen House to Nisbet as a symbol 
of respectability.  
 
Counterintuitively, it was a recognised characteristic of smugglers that they had 
a reputation for straight dealing. The break-in at the Eyemouth customs 
warehouse in 1780 for example, covered in more detail on pages 146/7 below, 
was carried out by a group of smugglers to retrieve their own goods, seized 
earlier. The much quoted anecdote regarding smugglers boarding an East 
Indiaman in the Channel to buy contraband from the crew, has the captain 
saying, in response to being questioned by a passenger about the wisdom of 
 
21 Paxton, Nisbet and Home, Indenture. 
22 NRS, CE1/11, 8 February 1763; NRS, CE56/2/3, 29 February 1768. 
23 NLS, BCL.D2650(85).  
24 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
25 Tim Newton, ‘Credit and Civilization’ (2003), <https://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/documents/papers/management/2003/0315.pdf>, accessed 15 April 2017. 
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accepting a cheque from the leader of the smugglers, ‘These people always 
deal with the strictest honour: if they did not their business would cease.’26 It is 
tempting to regard this as evidence of honesty. Perhaps, however, they relied 
on honour and directness as they could not normally seek legal remedies. 
 
A business based on credit, and particularly one which involved unlawful 
activities, required a high degree of trust between the participants. Those 
advancing credit had to have trust in the borrower. It has already been shown 
above that the two people from whom we know Nisbet borrowed money were 
his brother and his former clerk. We also know that he was introduced to Pillans 
of Rotterdam by an apparent associate, Thomas Anderson, a merchant in 
Perth, and appears to have developed his link to Greig and Sibbald in 
Gothenburg by assisting, or offering to assist, Henry Greig to avoid the risk of 
arrest. Harry Knox, with whom he had a co-partnery on two occasions, was a 
friend of his youth in Dunbar.27 Late on, he had a business relationship with 
James Renton who, towards the end of his career, appears to have moved into 
smuggling.28 His other regular business partner was his brother, David.  
 
The merchant-smugglers themselves also had to trust other men, notably their 
shipmasters. They had to be reliable and loyal. It was they, after all, who would 
be in the front line if challenged by the customs. No smuggling enterprise was 
possible without access to a ship and reliable master. Chapter three has looked 
in detail at ship ownership in Eyemouth in connection with networks. It is clear, 
however, that certain ships and masters had an involvement in smuggling. This 
consistent participation indicated a strong degree of trust in the masters 
concerned. This analysis reinforces the notion of smuggling being normal 
business, as these ships and masters were also regularly recorded in the 
Collector’s Quarterly Accounts arriving in Eyemouth with legitimate cargoes.  
The involvement of specific ships, masters and merchants in identified 
smuggling enterprises makes it tempting to reconsider whether all the voyages 
in the Quarterly Accounts were legitimate – or apparently legitimate. How many 
of these represent successful smuggling voyages? Chapter three has also 
 
26 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, p 99. 
27 NRS, CH2/647. 
28 NRS, CS229/R/4/27. 
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considered this effectively unanswerable question. To avoid long lists, this 
section will discuss the two ships identified most often and a case highlighting 
the apparent abuse of the procedure for auctioning seized goods. 
 
In terms of known smuggles, there are 28 incidents involving named Eyemouth 
ships in the records. Of these the Peggy and Molly were each named in five, 
about 18 per cent. The Molly was owned by the Nisbets and her career is 
outlined in Chapter 5. The Peggy was used by Robert Robertson more than 
anyone else. It is possible that she was named after his daughter Margaret, 
known as Peggy, who had been born in 1747. There is enough evidence to 
suggest that she was originally the Providence of Kinghorn. Her first 
appearance in the Board of Customs Minutes is in May 1753, when she was 
referred to as Peggy of Kinghorn, John Aiken, Master, and was found hovering 
on the coast and brought into Leith.29 Peggy of Eyemouth arrived in Eyemouth 
on 7 July 1753 from Guernsey under the command of John Aitkin. A year 
earlier, in June 1752, Aitkin is again recorded as master of the Peggy of 
Eyemouth, but in May 1752 he was master of the Providence of Kinghorn 
coming in from Oporto. This illustrates the difficulties inherent in tracking ships 
in the eighteenth century, when there was only a limited range of names 
employed. In total, the Quarterly Accounts record ten arrivals in Eyemouth by 
the Peggy, plus the one by the Providence, two of which can be associated with 
detected smuggles.30  
 
On 19 September 1754 Peggy, under John Aitken, was found at anchor off 
Coldingham and brought into Eyemouth. The voyage was reported to be 
Bergen – Eyemouth – Campveere, the former Scottish staple in the 
Netherlands. Brandy, rum and fourteen casks of herrings were found aboard 
and removed to the King’s Warehouse. The herrings were later released.31 On 
23 September, Peggy was recorded as arriving from Bergen with a cargo of tar 
and timber for Robert Robertson.32 On 24 February 1756 Peggy’s arrival is 
again recorded – from Guernsey, with French wine and ‘vinegar, not French’. 
The Master was James Gourlay and the cargo intended for Robert Robertson 
 
29 NRS, CE1/8, 1 May 1753. 
30 NRS, E504/10, various dates. 
31 NRS, CE56/2/1, 19 September 1754. 
32 NRS, E504/10, 23 September 1754. 
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and his brother-in-law James Martin.33 In a letter from the Board, dated 19 
January, there is reference to a precognition (witness statement) regarding 
goods run out of the Peggy of Eyemouth, James Gourlay, Master. On 4 March 
1756, a further letter instructed the release of 2 casks of vinegar as not being 
French.34 
 
The five voyages highlighted in the table below all seem to have been those 
recorded as intercepted by the Customs. Those on 7 July 1753 and 20 June 
1759 were probably voyages that were intercepted – the dates vary, but only 
slightly – while the other three certainly were. In terms of the voyages not 
highlighted, the four incoming ones are all candidates for smuggling ventures, 
particularly that on 14 June 1756, when the bulk of the merchants involved in 
receiving the cargo have records for smuggling and the ship came in from 
Guernsey, a main centre for the supply of contraband. There is no proof of this 
as the smuggles, if that is what they were, went undetected. Even the two 
export voyages, to Hamburg, must attract an element of suspicion, as Hamburg 




33 NRS, E504/10, 24 February 1756. 
34 NRS, CE56/2/1, 19 January, 4 March 1756. 
35 Claudia Schnurmann, ‘His Father’s Favored Son: David Parish 1778–1826’, Immigrant 
Entrepreneurship: German/American Business Biographies, German Historical Institute, 
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Table 4/1: Recorded movements of Peggy/Providence of Kinghorn 




Thomas Hogg, who was master of the Nisbets’ ship Molly in 1760, was in 
charge of the Hope of Eyemouth in January 1763 when she was seized by His 
Majesty’s sloop Ranger and again on 7 May 1764, when she – initially 
successfully – deforced the King’s Boat from North Berwick and one of the 
boats from the Prince William sloop.36  
 
The other instance appropriate to refer to here was the Nymph/Pretty Nymph, 
Peter Dalgleish master, almost certainly associated with the Nisbets. In a letter 
from the Board on 30 November 1765, she was suspected of running on the 
coast about Eyemouth. She had arrived at Ely, in Fife in ballast – with no cargo 
remaining on board –and was detained pending investigation. In May 1767 she 
was intercepted ‘about two Leagues without the Isle of May by Captain Fairfax 
of the Greyhound Cutter’ and brought into Eyemouth. Peter Dalgleish was again 
the master and she was carrying 38 hogsheads and three Tierces of claret wine 
from Boulogne ‘pretending to be bound for Bergen in Norway’. By mid-June she 
had been moved to Dunbar and the Claret stored in the King’s Warehouse. It 
was auctioned in February 1768 in three lots, each of which was purchased by 
John Nisbet at one shilling above the appraised value – a total payment of £555 
10s 11d. £32 was then given to Peter Dalgleish to cover the expense of bringing 
the wine from France.37 The outcome of the auction was similar to that 
described by Hoon referring to English practice in the years before new 
legislation to seek to address the problem was introduced in1763: 
 
… genuine buyers had been discouraged from attending the sales and 
had left them to certain persons who for some years combined together 
to keep down the prices by agreeing not to bid against each other, or to 
let anyone else bid unless they were properly paid. As a result, the sales 
had been sadly unproductive, goods realizing little more than the 
appraised value.38 
 
This evidence of Nisbet’s participation in such a fixed auction is strongly 
suggestive of the fact that he enjoyed a certain status among the merchant-
smuggler community, sufficient to be trusted to play a full part in such 
collaborative activities. 
 
36 NRS, CE1/11, 8 February 1763; CE56/2/3, 10 May 1764. 
37 NRS, CE56/2/3. 
38 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs, p.279. 
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4.4 Supply and demand 
 
Vital to the success of any enterprise were the suppliers. Nisbet clearly had 
trading relationships with British merchants based overseas. The nature of 
these relationships is revealed in some of the court cases that followed John 
Nisbet’s sequestration in 1787. Greig and Sibbald of Gothenburg had supplied 
tea to Nisbet from 1771. They sought to claim against Nisbet’s sequestrated 
estate for a small balance which they were owed from a transaction as late as 
1784. Their right to do so was challenged by George Johnston, acting for the 
other creditors. The transcript of Johnston’s ‘replies’ from the Court of Session 
provides evidence of direct connections with these merchants in Gothenburg, 
the home port of the Swedish East India Company (SOIC). Johnston argued 
strongly against Greig and Sibbald’s right to claim as the debt related to the 
supply of contraband, and he set out to establish this.39 Much of the evidence 
was derived from Nisbet’s (now lost) business records. The underlining is 
original. 
 
Now, the fact that the commerce carried on between Mr Nisbet and the 
claimants was an assured smuggling traffic which was illegal for all 
parties they being all natives of this country and owing allegiance to the 
laws. 
 
Mr Nisbet himself was a professed smuggler… The House of Messers 
Sibbald and Co was one of the houses established on the Continent the 
principal and most lucrative part of whose trade consists in running 
goods upon the coast or shipping them by virtue of Commissions sent 
from this country by Natives for the very purpose of smuggling them onto 
this country in defiance of the Law. 
 
Johnston appeared to have felt that the clincher, drawn from ‘Mr Nisbet’s 
Books’, was a letter from Henry Greig to the Nisbets which Johnston asserted 
proved that they had solicited the Nisbets’ custom. Johnston described the 
letter: 
 
Their first letter, dated 25 May 1771 written or at least originally signed 
by Henry Greig enclosed a list of goods brought home by a Swedish East 
 
39 NRS, CS229/N/1/60. 
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India Ship with [HOLE IN THE PAPER] process annexed. The list is 
printed for the more easy distribution among their customers.40  
 
The letter itself does appear to be a solicitation, until one disentangles the 
relationship between the Nisbets and Greig, drawn out in more detail in 
chapters three and seven and hinted at in the closing sentence: 
 
We shall be well pleased on every occasion to hear from you and beg to 
offer our best thanks for your kindness and offer of friendship to our HG  
 
At first this looks like classic eighteenth-century politeness, but from other 
sources it is clear that Greig was in Scotland earlier in 1771 and was being 
sought by the authorities.41 Knowing this, the letter can perhaps be read as a 
quid pro quo for assistance given, or offered, by the Nisbets to Greig when he 
needed to return to Sweden urgently. This is, in fact, alluded to by George 
Johnston in his presentation to the Court of Session, when he mentioned that 
other evidence indicated that Greig himself had been a smuggler, with the 
implication that he would, therefore, have been aware that the importation of tea 
from Sweden into Scotland was unlawful. 
 
These extracts clearly demonstrate the relationship between the Nisbets and 
Greig and Sibbald, confirming that it was in many ways no different from that 
between any other merchants and their suppliers. It looks as if there was a high 
degree of trust and obligation between the two parties. The fact of Greig and 
Sibbald being Scottish was also not at all unusual. Nisbet’s other apparent 
suppliers in Gothenburg, Scott and Fraser, were also Scottish.42 The complex 
relationship between various local smugglers in the 1780s, including Nisbet and 
Greig is further explored in chapter seven, including an analysis of the later 
dealings between Nisbet and Greig from 1783/1784. The reference to the 
nature of Sibbald and Co’s business, as described by Johnston above, 
indicating that they were typical of a style of operation established by British 
merchants on the continent to supply contraband perhaps supports the view 
 
40 The Swedish East India Company produced annual sales catalogues. It is assumed that it 
was the current one of these that was attached. 
41 NRS, CE1/12, 13 May 1771. 
42 NRS, RS19/17/140–1. 
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that David Nisbet may have fulfilled this role earlier in his career, hence being in 
a position to lend John £1,500. 
 
Gothenburg has full shipping records from the seventeenth century onwards.43 
A targeted inspection has identified some Eyemouth ships, particularly the sloop 
Lively, George Young Master. There is a record of her arrival and departure in 
1771 and of her cargo of timber provided by John Sibbald and Co and iron by 
John Hall and Co. John Hall was perhaps the most successful of the merchants 
of British origin in Gothenburg and builder of a large country house at Gunnebo 
Slott, a few miles south of the City.44 The Gothenburg record can be paired with 
data from the Collector’s Quarterly Accounts, which show the Lively, George 
Young master, arriving from Gothenburg on 20 May 1771, with a cargo of 
timber and five tons of Swedish iron.45 Hall is recorded as having been involved 
in the iron trade, as well as with East India goods.46 While these records appear 
to relate to ‘normal’ trade, it is not unreasonable to suspect that there would be 
little difference in the way merchants dealt with outgoing tea at the Swedish 
end. The Halls were regular tea buyers at the Swedish East India Company 
sales, which reinforces this view.47 It is unlikely that Hall was seeking to supply 
the domestic market in Sweden. A detailed account of the merchant community 
in Gothenburg and the reliance of the SOIC on smuggling follows in chapter six. 
 
In Rotterdam, Nisbet is known to have dealt with Richard Pillans. Pillans was 
the son of an English merchant who had settled in Rotterdam earlier in the 
eighteenth century. He gave every sign of being wholly respectable, but he 
supplied contraband to Nisbet and helped him to prepare ships for running it. 
This is made clear in the Petition against Pillans’ (by this time actually 
Robertson’s) claim on Nisbet’s Estate following his sequestration.48 Indeed, the 
finding of the Court was to allow that part of the debt that related to ship repair 
and preparation, but not for the supply of contraband.  
 
 
43 Gӧteborgs tolagsräkkenskäper. 
44 www.gunneboslott.se. 
45 NRS, E504/10. 
46 Ashton, Lives and Livelihoods in Little London, pp.75–77. 
47 Warwick Digital Collections. 
48 NLS, BCL.D 2650 (85).  
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The wording of the Petition included a clear exposition of the business dealings 
between Nisbet and Pillans, describing how they had been ‘for a course of 
years engaged in an illicit trade of smuggling spirits, teas and other prohibited 
goods’, describing how ‘Pillans was aiding and assisting to the utmost in these 
illicit dealings, by furnishing the goods, knowing them to be prohibited from 
being imported into this country; by furnishing fictitious invoices, by providing 
and preparing the vessels employed in transporting the goods, by advancing 
the wages to the seamen engaged in this perilous business’.49 This forms a 
detailed description of the processes involved in supplying contraband and the 
whole hearted participation by Pillans in the process. As with Greig and Sibbald, 
of course, what Pillans was doing was wholly lawful in the Netherlands. It was 
also not just the simple supply of contraband to a smuggler: it was a proper 
business relationship. The only caveat that could be made is that Johnston’s 
petition on behalf of the other creditors may have been exaggerated to 
maximise its chance of success. The published account of the case suggests 
an earlier relationship between Pillans and Robert and Alexander Robertson 
who had bought the debt from Pillans and were pursuing Nisbet’s estate. It also 
indicates that Nisbet was introduced to Pillans by Thomas Anderson of Perth 
and that Pillans had previously been in partnership with the Robertsons.50 Given 
Pillans’ enthusiastic participation in the smuggling trade, the Robertsons may 
have been more deeply involved than concrete evidence suggests. The Petition 
also reveals that Nisbet was using at least two London bankers to transfer funds 
to Rotterdam. 
 
Timber ships from Norway also brought tea to Britain. Kent has a number of 
references to discoveries by Customs in England.51 Locally, on 31 October 
1765 Alexander Wallace of Bergen was named as the claimer of the Ship 
George of Sunderland, and her cargo of gin, brandy and coffee.52 Wallace is 
identified by Kent as ‘the (British) consul appointed (in Bergen), a prominent 
Norwegian born merchant of Scottish parentage and education.’ He further 
remarks that in February 1765 Wallace had ‘reported on smuggling from 
Norway – he had intimate and painful knowledge of it as one of his own ships 
 
49 NLS, BCL.D 2650 (85). 
50 Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session, pp.349–355. 
51 Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas, pp.112–129. 
52 NRS, CE1/11, 31 October 1765. 
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had been seized in England…’. Kent further notes that in 1757 Wallace had 
written of ‘shipments of East India goods from Copenhagen to Norway, from 
where they were smuggled to England’.53 Wallace, incidentally, came to a 
composition over the George, which the Board of Customs agreed to as there 
was ‘difficulty as to proving the Vessel to have been within the Limits of a 
Port’.54 Kent possibly refers to an incident in 1757 when Wallace prayed that 
‘His Majesty's share of captured brandy and tea which has been condemned in 
the Court of Exchequer may be relinquished in his favour.’55 
 
Given that, during the period covered by this thesis, over 120 timber ships came 
into Eyemouth from the ports in southern Norway, it is highly likely that some of 
them would have had contraband concealed.56 Contraband from Norway, at that 
time ruled by Denmark, was imported into Europe by the Asiatisk Kompagni, the 
Danish East India Company, based in Copenhagen. An intelligence report from 
November 1783, for example, a copy of which was sent to Dunbar describes 
that a 500-ton ship 
 
… commanded by Smith and Dickens, two Adventurers said to be from 
Leith… is now taking in Cargo and among other things will have Eighteen 
thousand pounds worth of Tea from the House of Mr Ryberg … there is a 
probability some of His Majesty’s cruisers might intercept her before she 
has reached Scotland… 57  
 
Kent described Nils Ryberg as a ‘Danish House with English connections’ and 
refers to Ryberg obtaining the right to bond tea on the Faeroes for re-export.58 A 
further intelligence report from earlier that November, also from Copenhagen, 
refers to ‘a Great Quantity of Tea and other Goods lately imported at 
Copenhagen from India’ and then details: 
 
 
53 Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas, p.119. 
54 NRS, CE1/11, 31 October 1765. 
55 London, NA, TI/372/92–93, Commissioners of Customs, Report on the Petition of Alexander 
Wallace, Consul at Bergen, Praying That His Majesty’s Share of Captured Brandy and Tea 
Which Has Been Condemned in the Court of Exchequer May Be Relinquished in His Favour, 
1757. 
56 E504/10. 
57 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 20 November 1783. 
58 Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas, p.119, n.4. 
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A large ship going to Ostend, where the Captain’s brother (one Gibson) 
is preparing all the vessels calculated for the Smuggling trade to receive 
the Cargo which will probably be landed on the Coast of Scotland.59 
 
It is possible that this refers to the Gibson brothers, Ralph and John, of 
Burnmouth. John was the master of the ship George which arrived from Memel 
at Eyemouth in August 1784, working for his cousin, James Renton, an 
associate of the Nisbet brothers. Ralph was master of Robert Robertson’s ship 
Philadelphia in the 1770s.60 According to a family history document they 
married into the Dangerfields, a significant smuggling family from Folkestone 
and represented the new, more professional approach to smuggling to be 
discussed in chapter seven.61 
  
One other overseas merchant clearly identified is John Christian junior of 
Dunkirk, who claimed the cargo of a ship described as being from Elgin, 
wrecked at Thortonloch in December 1787.62  
 
Demand for goods that were smuggled was created by two simultaneous 
developments – the almost continuous warfare between Britain and France in 
the eighteenth century, which both restricted the import of continental goods 
and necessitated a continual increase in duties – and the growth of an 
increasingly prosperous middling sort who had a growing appetite for these 
expensive goods. One of the key methods for financing the wars was through 
increasing taxation on what were felt to be luxury goods, such as tea, tobacco 
and spirits in order to support the ever growing national debt.63 Increasing 
prosperity, however, created a growing demand for these goods and, it has 
been argued, made them necessities rather than luxuries.64 What should have 
produced an increasing flow of income to the government in fact prompted a 
boom in the smuggling business. By 1733, when Parliament held its first enquiry 
 
59 NRS CE56/2/5C, 3 November 1783. 
60 NRS, E54/10/1, 21 June 1777. 
61 Jim Tibbett, The Dangerfield Family of Folkestone (Victoria, Australia & 
Norfolk, England: 2010), p.11.  
62 NRS RH4/76, 24 January 1788; March 1788. 
63 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783, 
paperback ed. (London: Unwin, Hyman Ltd., 1989), p.119. 
64 Jamieson (ed.), A People of the Sea, p.202. 
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into smuggling, ‘(it) was endemic in almost all the maritime counties of the 
kingdom.’65 
 
Adam Smith, later a member of the Board of Customs in Scotland, in Wealth of 
Nations, writing of taxes on luxuries, said that they ‘always take out or keep out 
of the pockets of the people more than almost any other taxes.’ 
 
… the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling gives frequent occasion 
to forfeitures and other penalties which entirely ruin the smuggler; a 
person who, though no doubt highly blamable for violating the laws of his 
country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and 
would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws 
of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so.66 
 
When Smith was appointed to the Board, he shortly afterwards wrote to his 
friend William Eden: 
 
About a week after I was made a Commissioner of the Customs, upon 
looking over the list of prohibited goods, and upon examining my own 
wearing apparel, I found, to my great astonishment, that I had scarce a 
stock, a cravat, a pair of ruffles, or a pocket handkerchief, which was not 
prohibited to be worn or used in Great Britain. I wished to set an example 
and burnt them all.67 
 
This illustrates the range of goods encompassed, even if Smith’s letter is 
regarded by Conlin as a little tongue in cheek. 
 
Of the key goods involved, most were smuggled simply to avoid paying duty. 
Tea, on the other hand, fell into the category of ‘prohibited goods’, the 
importation of which was the monopoly of the East India Company (EIC). Tea 
was only allowed to be imported from the ‘country of its native growth’ and the 
EIC had the monopoly of all trade east of the Cape of Good Hope.68 Thus the 
price of tea was driven up by both taxation and the effect of this monopoly. It 
was also greatly in demand, with a whole range of tea related goods being 
manufactured and sold. Jessica Hanser has produced an analysis of the 
consumption of tea and China goods in the north-east of England in the 
 
65 Jamieson (ed.), A People of the Sea, p.202. 
66 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, p.495. 
67 Jonathan Conlin, ‘The Prophet of Profit’, History Today, 66.8 (August 2016). 
68 NRS, CS229/N1/60. 
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eighteenth century.69 This charts the growth of the habit of tea drinking and its 
spread through the classes. Bunker reinforces the idea of the significance of tea 
as ‘one of a handful of commodities that served the wider purposes that crude 
oil and copper fulfil today’. He supports his point by quoting Burke, speaking in 
the House of Commons in April 1774, ‘Tea is perhaps the most important 
object, of any in the mighty circle of our commerce.’70 Inevitably this demand 
encouraged the north European East India Companies to enter the field, 
supplying the British market via smugglers. The effect of this was, of course, to 
drive down prices in Britain and thereby further increase demand.  
 
4.5 The key players 
 
These are virtually indistinguishable from the participants in normal trading 
activities. Indeed, they are usually the same people. One indicator of the level of 
involvement of local people in the business is the style of smuggling. Using the 
data in Table 2/1, in the earlier period, from when the records begin in 1745 
until the end of 1776, when the impact of the American War had begun to take 
effect, 42 smuggles, out of 83 recorded, 50.6 per cent, were carried out in what 
appear to be regular merchantmen, in conjunction with regular trade. After 
1776, up to around 1790, only six out of 32, 18.75 per cent, fell into this 
category. In the earlier period there are four recorded smuggles by specialist 
vessels – described variously as Folkestone Cutters, Flushing Cutters or 
Luggers, five per cent of the total, and none of these was before 1768. In the 
second period the comparative figure was seven out of 32: 21.875 per cent.  
 
4.6 The customs and excise services 
 
The section will look at the relationship between the merchant-smugglers and 
the customs service in Berwickshire, a relationship apparently based on a 
degree of mutual consideration, recognising the challenges that both sides 
faced. It will then consider the attitudes to smuggling of the two other national 
authorities in Scotland – the Church of Scotland and the Convention of Royal 
 
69 Jessica Hanser, ‘Teatime in the North Country: Consumption of Chinese Imports in North 
East England’, Northern History, 49.1 (2012), 51–74. 
70 Nick Bunker, An Empire of the Edge: How Britian Came to Fight America (London: Vintage, 
2015), p 32. 
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Burghs – and see how they reacted to smuggling, what steps were taken and 
how much support there was for their attempts to clamp down. 
 
Before seeking to understand the relationship between the customs and excise 
services and the merchant-smugglers in Berwickshire, it is necessary to 
understand these two branches of the state, which are frequently confused and 
conflated. They represented two of the three key income sources for the 
government in the eighteenth century – the other being the Land Tax. They 
were crucial to funding the wars throughout that period, by allowing the 
government to service the ever-growing National Debt.71 Put simply, excise 
duties were levied on goods produced at home, while customs were levied on 
imports. Some imported goods, however, were also subject to excise – these 
included tea, coffee, brandy and other liquors.72  
 
The two groups of commissioners collaborated and so, in theory, did the men 
on the ground. In fact, as Hoon describes, and evidence from Eyemouth 
confirms, the officers ‘hated each other as only men can hate who see fortunes 
carried off before their very eyes’.73 The two boards reached an agreement in 
1754 whereby the officers who were first aboard a ship had the right to 
rummage without interference, but this did not always work. Hoon quotes a 
direction from the Customs Board to a collector to ‘enjoyn & recommend it to all 
the officers of your Port to behave decently & to live in unity & harmony with the 
Officers of the Excise’.74 This could as well have referred to an incident at 
Eyemouth on 5 December 1761, which was described in the minutes of the 
Board of Customs: 
 
The Commissioners of Excise have communicated to the Board a 
Complaint of Mr William Perceval Officer of the Excise, that on the 5th of 
last Month he was obstructed in going on board of the Ship Syrene in the 
execution of his Duty, the said Ship then lying in the Harbour at Eymouth, 
by Robert Hastie and Alexander Ingram Boatmen in the Boat stationed at 
Eymouth; the Board sent Directions to the Collector and Comptroller of 
Dunbar to Reprimand the said Boatmen in the severest manner, and to 
recommend to them to live in Harmony with Officers of the Excise upon 
 
71 Brewer, The Sinews of Power. 
72 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.86.  
73 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.87. 
74 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.87. 
136 
 
all Occasions that the Service of the Revenue may not suffer by Quarrels 
and Misunderstandings.’75 
 
John Home, an officer of Excise based at Coldingham, on at least two 
occasions complained that a customs officer had behaved corruptly. One of 
these incidents, in 1759, is described below. The other was in 1787 when his 
complaint against tidewaiter John Swanston for collusive conduct resulted in 
Swanston’s dismissal. Officers of the Excise could be deputed to make 
seizures. An example of this is shown below, where two excise officers were 
assaulted by a merchant seeking to retain his goods. 
 
The overall responsibility for the Customs lay with the Treasury based in 
London. Below that stood two Boards of Customs Commissioners, one for 
England and one for Scotland. This system was established in 1707, amended 
in 1723 when the two Boards were merged, then re-established in 1742. The 
Board in Edinburgh sat virtually every week day, with the exception of holidays, 
and considered all matters to do with the management of the service.76 The 
duties, the collection of which it oversaw, were largely Britain-wide, with the 
exception of those affected by the Act of Union, designed to protect some 
Scottish industries. The meetings considered what look to us like tiny details: 
every member of staff from every head port in Scotland had to have leave of 
absence approved by the board, for example. Routine correspondence was 
dealt with under a broad heading in the minutes, but there is a great deal of 
information about smuggling throughout Scotland, including Eyemouth, as well 
as investigations into real and alleged corruption of officials. Read in association 
with the Customs Letter Books for Dunbar and the Collector’s Quarterly 
Accounts they provide a vivid picture of the inter-relationship between 
smuggling and fair trade. 
 
Below the Board was a network of Custom Houses based in the most important 
ports, the head ports, from Dunbar in the south-east to Kirkwall and Lerwick in 
the far north, then back down the west coast via Stornoway and Glasgow to 
Dumfries in the south-west. Each of these ports had a Collector and Comptroller 
and a cadre of other officers depending on the size and vulnerability of the 
 
75 NRS, CE1/10, 20 January 1762. 
76 NRS, CE1/7–18. 
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district. There were also some officers based in Edinburgh who acted as 
inspectors. Edinburgh had a solicitor, access to a wine taster and a team of 
head office staff. The bulk of the staff was appointed not on merit, but as a 
result of patronage. In Berwickshire, for example, the third Earl of Marchmont 
Hugh Hume-Campbell (1708–1794), who managed the parliamentary seat, 
oversaw such patronage for many years. Brewer explains the political 
vulnerability of customs officers, whose ‘appointments were under the 
patronage of the Treasury who attended as much, if not more, to local political 
considerations as to the running of the revenue itself.’77 
 
There is a revealing set of letters from Robert Cossar of Coldingham to his 
Member of Parliament, Hugh Scott, not, for once, a Marchmont placeman, 
seeking employment in the Customs, which came with a guaranteed salary and 
access to the superannuation scheme. Cossar, by the way, is likely to have 
been the same Robert Cossar of Coldingham, who was a merchant who had 
been involved in the smuggling trade some twenty years earlier, referred to 
below:  
 
my Necessity requires to make further Application to you to Pry if there is 
a Possibility to procure me some small office in the Customs ...If any 
thing can be done for me there is no matter where I am to be Stationed, 
as Interest may be made with the Commissioners here afterwards to 
Remove me to this place or Eymouth at a Convenient time, but indeed it 
would be greatly to my advantage to be fixed at this very place for 
Sundry Reasons best known to my good friend Capt. Brydon78  
 
 As Hoon says: ‘Much of the inefficiency and corruption in the eighteenth-
century customs system can be explained by abuses in the appointment of 
officers.’79 
 
Doe describes the importance of patronage in local elections in Fowey, 
Cornwall both to the direct recipients of patronage, but also to local merchants 
 
77 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.101. 
78 Edinburgh, NRS, GD157/2952, Robert Cossar, Letters to Hugh Scott MP, 1781–1783. 
79 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.195. 
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who would benefit from a changeover of the local customs staffing 
establishment.80  
 
Patronage mattered because it diminished the efficiency and effectiveness in 
the service. The best men were not necessarily recruited; and it was hard to 
discipline or dismiss them, apart from in cases of obvious corruption, as with 
Robert Manderson, below, and John Nisbet’s associate John Melvill, sacked as 
Collector from Dunbar only after the collection of a long list of misdemeanours 
over many years.81 Daniel Dow, a tidewaiter in Eyemouth, and uncle of John 
Nisbet’s clerk, Alexander Dow, had tea discovered in his garret in March 1754, 
but was merely re-located to Queensferry, before being returned to Eyemouth in 
the promoted position of tide surveyor in 1756.82 There are records of men from 
the Dunbar area seeking leave to retire at the ages of 75 and 81 and another 
whose eyesight had failed. The Annual List of Officers and their Capacities for 
Dunbar dated 22 September 1775 listed two men who were ‘not so active in the 
Execution of their Duty as they ought to be’ and two others who were ‘addicted 
to Drinking’. They were all admonished and warned as to their future conduct. 
One, who was based at Eyemouth, was swapped with another from Dunglass, a 
quieter location, who was deemed ‘an active and Sober Man’ – more suitable 
for Eymouth. Ironically this man, together with the two drinkers, was dead within 
a year.83  
 
Eyemouth, like all such smaller ports, was classed as a ‘creek’. The staffing of 
the sector, shown on the map at Fig. 4/1, the coastal strip of the historic county 
of Berwickshire, from Dunglass in the north to the English border, varied, but 
typically had tidewaiters at Dunglass, Cockburnspath, Old Cambus and 
Coldingham, with a tide surveyor, who was also commander of the King’s Boat, 
and four boatmen at Eyemouth itself, where there was also a King’s Warehouse 
with associated weighing equipment.84 In addition there was a Riding Surveyor, 
covering the inland area. From time to time there were additional tidewaiters at 
Eyemouth and riding officers inland. It is hard to assess how relatively busy 
 
80 Helen Doe, ‘Positions, Patronage and Preference: Political Influence in Fowey before 1832’ 
Cornish Studies, 12 (2004), p.4.  
81 NRS, CE1/12, 23 July 1770. 
82 NRS, CE56/2/1, 27 and 30 May 1754; 3 August 1756.  
83 NRS, CE1/14, 25 September 1775. 
84 NRS, CE56/2/1, 20 January 1756. 
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Berwickshire was, although on 11 March 1747, the Board of Customs 
considered a letter from the Collector and Comptroller at Dunbar to the effect 
that: ‘the Officers had twice been deforced last Week, and that it is impossible 
for them to do their Duty at Eymouth, Coldingham, Old Cambus and Cockburns 
Path without the Soldiers.’85 There is no evidence that soldiers were deployed, 
but it does suggest a certain degree of alarm at Dunbar. As will be shown, there 
were several instances of Customs officials being deforced over the years, but 
no record of any further request for soldiers, save on one occasion to guard the 
King’s Warehouse at Dunbar. 
 
On a practical level, the Customs service in south-east Scotland worked along 
the lines described by John Brewer: 
 
The detection and prosecution of smugglers was necessary for the 
system to operate effectively, but it was of secondary importance. 
Revenue commissioners had a remarkably level-headed attitude to 
smuggling, recognizing it as the inevitable consequence of high tariffs. 
And, as Tom Paine complained, when subordinate officers devoted their 
time to chasing smugglers rather than the mundane tasks of measuring 
and assessing, they were quickly ordered to return to the tedious tasks 
that the commissioners recognized as the most fiscally lucrative.86 
 
This approach explains the number of compositions (negotiated payments) 
agreed and the lack of serious violence. 
 
85 NRS, CE/7, 11 March 1747. 





Figure 4/1. Key locations in Berwickshire; John Thomson, Berwickshire, published by 
Baldwin and Cradock, 1821 
 
The three main approaches of the smugglers in Berwickshire were, first of all, to 
avoid any contact at all with the customs men, secondly to offer inducements to 
keep them onside and thirdly to threaten, or even assault, them, but only to the 
extent necessary for them to be able to yield with a degree of honour. The last 
resort of the owner of a seized cargo was to come to a composition – a formal 
agreement with the authorities. Examples of these follow. 
 
Avoidance is the category for which there is necessarily least evidence. What 
there is, often, is intelligence that did not result in the goods being intercepted. 
In 1759/1760 there were reports from informers of the Nisbets’ ship Molly 
running goods on five occasions, but the reports were all after the event. In 
1765 the ship Nymph, of Eyemouth, arrived in ballast at Ely in Fife, where she 
was detained, ‘suspected of running on the coast about Eymouth’. In 1767 
Alexander McDouall, an innkeeper from Birgham, slipped two ankers of spirits 
off his horse and fled when approached by Charles Watters, a Riding Officer.87 
 
87 NRS, CE1/10, 26 June 1760; 17 August 1761; 26 August 1761; NRS, CE56/2/3, 30 
















As with avoidance, it was only when people were caught that the authorities 
became aware of the practice of the offering and accepting of inducements. 
Examples of corruption appear in the records – as with smuggling, only those 
that were discovered. One example will suffice, as it covers a few issues. On 10 
April 1759 Mr West, the Inspector General, reported the results of an enquiry to 
the Board of Customs. His findings were: 
 
That Robert Manderson and David Denholm, Tidewaiters at Coldingham 
declined to communicate to the Tidesurveyor Information they received 
of Ships Smugling on the Coast alledging that he never satisfied them for 
such Intelligence, or even paid their Expences. 
 
That Robert Manderson received a Bribe from the Smuglers not to Seize 
a Parcel of Tobacco and Brandy at Coldingham upon the 2nd of 
December 1756. 
 
That the said Robert Manderson gave back to the Smuglers thirty six 
ankers, part of a greater Quantity of Spirits and Wine Seized upon the 
Information of David Denholm in a Cave at St Abbs Head on 29th of 
October last, and that John Home, Officer of the Excise at Coldingham 
getting an account thereof threatened to discover it unless he was 
satisfied with regard to some Pretention he had to the Seizure, and that 
he procured a Bill for Five pounds on that Account. 
 
And it appearing by the Examination of several Persons on oath, and by 
the confession of Robert Manderson that he did leave in the Cave at St 
Abbs Head forty Ankers, part of the Goods Seized there…to be carried 
off by the Smuglers. The said Robert Manderson was dismissed… 
 
The matter in the first paragraph was absolutely denied and John Home’s case 
was referred to his employers, the Board of Excise. This illustrates a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the local management, and the vulnerability of relatively 
isolated officials to bribery. John Home was apparently determined not to miss 
out, so appears to have resorted to blackmail.88 It supports the contention in 
paragraph 4.6.2 that relations between the local officers of the customs and 
excise services were poor. 
 
Ten years later two officers were caught and dismissed: 
 
 
88 NRS, CE1/9, 10 April 1759. 
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Andw. Stevenson Tidesman and Robert Hastie Boatman when stationed 
on board the ship Ann & Peggy of Eymouth from foreign parts in the 
Month of July last, allowed a hhd of wine, and the greatest part of a hhd 
of Brandy specially and particularly committed to their care, to be Run off 
or Embezzled.89 
 
Stevenson and Hastie were both dismissed the service and George Henderson, 
the tide surveyor, their manager, was admonished to be more vigilant in future. 
Two years later George Henderson was again in trouble, as he had ‘left some 
Stone bottles of Spirits to the Master of the Peggy of Dysart, upon Rummaging 
that Vessel.’ His punishment on this occasion was ‘to be severely Reprimanded 
in the Publick Customhouse before the Boatmen’ and threatened with dismissal 
should he repeat his action.90 
 
The last straw as far as Henderson was concerned came in January 1773 when 
he was swapped with the tide surveyor at Cromarty, following a complaint from 
the Commissioners of Excise 
 
…respecting his Conduct as a Witness on a Trial had in the Court of 
Exchequer, And in a matter of such delicacy, the Board being extremely 
tender, at the same time thinking his Conduct not clear of suspicion, and 
that possibly it may have proceeded from too intimate a connection with 
certain Persons on the East coast concerned with Fraudulent practices… 
 
In other words, the Board of Customs, in this case, recognised the risks 
attached to being in one place for too long and the possibility of getting too 
close to the merchant-smugglers in a small, isolated community. Excise officers, 
however, were periodically transferred to new stations as a matter of course, 
which meant, according to Brewer that not only were they ‘less likely than 
customs men to be complicit with local traders and smugglers but they avoided 
local political entanglements,’ He also pointed out that excisemen were subject 
to much closer scrutiny than their colleagues in the Customs and quoted 
Walpole, speaking to the House of Commons in 1733 ‘in the Customs the 
officers … had no cheques upon one another; whereas in the excise they 
chequed one another, which made them not liable to be bribed.’91 
 
 
89 NRS, CE1/12, 21 November 1769. 
90 NRS, CE1/12, 17 July 1771. 
91 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p.102. 
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In August and September 1779, two Extraordinary Tidesmen – James Crawford 
and John Swanston accused each other of wrongdoing. Initially Crawford was 
believed, and Swanston suspended. 
 
…the Collector and Comptroller have always found Crawford diligent and 
zealous for the Service of the Revenue, and they are of the Opinion that 
the Seizure of Twenty one Boxes of Tea made on the 15th May last was 
much owing to his activity and experience of the Smugglers method of 
concealing their Goods… 
 
After further enquiries the Board then reversed their decision, reinstating 
Swanston and suspending Crawford.92 Twelve months later a James Crawford 
of Coldingham was one of the key players in the raid on the Custom’s 
warehouse in Eyemouth, led by Charles Swanston, who had a brother, John.93 
 
There was a further outbreak of corruption in 1786/7. Firstly John Swanston, 
along with John Home of the Excise, who had threatened Robert Manderson in 
1759, ‘made a seizure of a Cart and two old horses with 7 Ankers of Spirits, but 
had in their Power on that occasion to have seized another Cart and four 
valuable Horses.’94 Then two members of the crew of the Dunbar King’s Boat 
were dismissed for ‘having a connection with the Smugglers and giving them 
Intelligence of the Motions of the Officers, whereby sundry attempts to fall in 
with Smuggled Goods have been rendered fruitless’.95 Finally John Home gave 
evidence to the Comptroller that led to the dismissal of John Swanston for 
‘Collusive Practices’.96 
 
The publicity given to the Hawkhurst Gang, dealt with in the Introduction, has 
given rise to the view that violence was the main means of dealing with 
Customs officers, whereas it was likely to have been the least effective. After 
all, an assault would have been reported and added to the seriousness of the 
crime involved. As mentioned earlier, there was a situation in 1747, which 
caused the local Customs to express the view that they needed the support of 
 
92 NRS, CE1/16/1–3, 30 August 1779; 23 September 1779.  
93 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 31 August 1780. 
94 NRS, CE56/2/5D, 11 December 1786.  
95 NRS, CE56/2/5D, 26 March 1787. 
96 NRS, CE56/2/5D, 7 April 1787. 
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soldiers. Despite this fear, there were no further instances of violence reported 
in Berwickshire until January 1753 when 
 
George Gray Tidesman was on the 18th of October last Deforced by 
Several Fishermen in Northfield of Twenty Four Matts of Tobacco Stalks, 
Seized by him and Robert Manderston Tidesmen near St Ebbs Head…97 
 
Alexander Mair, a Tidesman, was assaulted in 1755 and again in 1757, when 
he was described as having been subject to a violent assault when he and a 
colleague were attempting to seize casks of snuff. In 1755 it was reported that 
he had been deforced.98 Deforce is defined as ‘to impede or prevent by force 
(an officer of the law or body of officials) from the discharge of duty’ – by 
implication a lower level of violence that an actual assault.99  
 
There is evidence of the presence of soldiers in Eyemouth in 1757, during the 
Seven Years War, but no evidence of their being used against smugglers, 
rather they appear from the content of the press coverage below 
to have been defending the port:  
 
 
Figure 4/2. Evidence of soldiers in Eyemouth; Manchester Mercury, 3 May 1757 
 
Two accounts of what seems to be the same incident which took place in 
January 1761, although not described until August and September that year, 
suggest deforcement with a degree of violence. The Letter Book refers to the 
seizure of two hogsheads containing ‘as they say’ wine and that the officers 
were forcibly deforced by Thomas Meik.100 The report received by the Board 
provided a rather stronger account 
 
 
97 NRS, CE1/8, 3 January 1753. 
98 NRS, CE56/2/1, 14 August 1755. 
99 Robinson (ed.), The Concise Scots Dictionary.  
100 NRS, CE56/2/2, 26 August 1761. 
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…an Information of Alexander Martin Officer of the Excise at Dunbar 
deputed to Seize Uncustomed and Prohibited Goods setting forth that 
upon the 18th of January last he with Robert Williamson Officer of the 
Excise his Assistant Seized two Hogsheads of Wine which had been Run 
of the Shore, and that the same were violently Rescued from them by Mr 
Thomas Meek Merchant in Dunbar, the Proprietor thereof…101 
 
On 24 June 1761 there was another incident, which can be followed through to 
its end. As reported to the Board on 9 September, Charles Watters and 
Alexander Mair of the Customs had seized two hogsheads of wine and one of 
rum which they were taking to Dunbar when they were ‘opposed and 
obstructed’ by William Nisbet, malt-man in Eyemouth and William Darling, 
servant to William Nisbet, also in Eyemouth. This William Nisbet was John 
Nisbet’s brother. Darling and Nisbet, according to the report ‘had been 
employed in Running the Goods or in conveying them after they had been Run’. 
The same day Alexander Mair was ‘attacked and Deforced of two hogsheads of 
Claret’ by James Gray, William Darling, Patrick Grieve and George Aitchison. 
Gray and Grieve were both Eyemouth merchants. Aitchison was a carpenter in 
Eyemouth. On 29 November it was reported to the Board that 
 
Mr Alexander Taylor Attorney for Patrick Grieve, James Gray and William 
Nisbet Defendants in an Action brought against them in pursuance of the 
Board’s Minute of 9th September 1761 for treble the Value of the Goods 
by them Run, having by petition of the 23rd instant proposed to pay the 
sum of Fifty pounds by way of Composition, and likewise the costs of 
Suit incurred by the Crown, And the Solicitor having upon the 24th 
instant, in the forenoon reported that by some accident Alexander Mair 
Tidesman who was intrusted with the Care of serving the Witnesses with 
Subpoenas was not then come to Town, And that if he did not come 
before Five in the afternoon there would not be time to consult the 
Advocate and prepare for Trial on the 25th instant; the Board gave 
conditional Directions to the Solicitor to agree to the Defendants proposal 
in case Alexander Mair did not come to Town in due Time, and that 
therefore the Solicitor did notify to Mr Taylor Attorney for the Defendants 
the Acceptance of their Offer…102 
 
This case draws attention to several points. As with the instance of Thomas 
Meik earlier, merchants were personally involved in deforcing the officials and 
seeking to rescue their own goods. The proposed trial was in connection with 
the running of goods, not the assault on the officials. The failure of Alexander 
 
101 NRS, CE1/10, 3 September 1761. 
102 NRS, CE1/10, 29 November 1762. 
146 
 
Mair to appear, which resulted in the collapse of the legal proceedings is 
interesting. This is not the only instance of witnesses disappearing, resulting in 
the Board accepting the offer of a composition made by the owner of seized 
goods. 
 
The instances detailed above are fairly typical of what went on over the whole 
period concerned. The most spectacular event was the attack on the King’s 
Warehouse in Eyemouth in 1780. Although investigated in detail by the 
Customs, this was not the first break-in. There had been another such incident 
in 1759, when the names of the miscreants were known, but they disappeared. 
One of them was a servant to Robert Robertson and another to James Martin – 
both significant figures in Eyemouth and in a position to ‘look after’ their people. 
The 1780 venture – superficially like the attack on the warehouse at Poole by 
the Hawkhurst Gang– involved only the threat of violence.103  
 
 
Figure 4/3. Account of the raid on the Customs Warehouse, Norfolk Chronicle, 12 
August 1780 
 
The story in the press, above, is very similar to the report made to the Board in 
Edinburgh: 
 
…between 11 and 12 o’clock of the night thirty armed smugglers, after 
landing out of a boat, broke open the King’s Warehouse, and carried off 
23 whole and 34 half ankers of spirits and 6 Bags of Tea which had been 
seized the 24th and 28th of last month by the Tidesmen at Eymouth and 
Coldingham; 
 
Some witnesses described what they saw: ‘…the Witnesses declare the party 
was disguised: that Peter Nairne however declared that by his Size, Voice & 
 
103 Anon (A Gentleman of Sussex), Smuggling and Smugglers in Sussex. 
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Shape, he knew James Crawford to be one of the Rioters tho his face was 
blacked.’ 
 
The Customs further reported that: 
 
…most of the Goods lodged in the Warehouse had belonged to or been 
landed by Charles Swanston son of James Swanston at Northfield, and 
that many of the Witnesses declare that Charles Swanston, his Brother 
Robert & James Crauford at Coldinghame went aboard the Smuggling 
Cutter the 28th July Last, and were not seen to come on Shore that 
Day.104 
 
Even the related incident at Greystonelees, described in more detail at 7.5, 
when the smugglers discharged muskets at the Customs Officers, seems to 
have been calculated merely to chase them away. There is one other incident 
recorded which shares the element of disguise with the 1780 events. In was 
reported in March 1763 that Alexander Geddes and David Denham, Tidesmen, 
were deforced in the middle of the day when attempting to seize four 
hogsheads of brandy by several people who ‘tho men were disguised in 
women’s apparel.’105 
 
In addition, these two cases are examples of what may be popular support for 
smugglers. This was certainly exemplified by an incident reported in October 
1776, which seems to have been a genuinely spontaneous response to the 
activities of the Customs men: 
 
…having suspicion of a quantity of Prohibited Goods being concealed on 
board the George and Betty of Kincardine from Memel lately arrived at 
your port, he (Abernethie, the Tidesurveyor) stationed two Boatmen and 
two Tidesmen onboard her, that on the evening of the same day they 
seized twenty five ankers of spirits out of the said Ship, but while making 
the Seizure they were insulted by a Mob from the shore, by throwing 
stones upon the Boatmen particularly David Moncur one of the Boatmen 
and William Farrow got a stroke with a handspoke upon his back, which 
almost disabled him from doing duty…106 
 
 
104 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 31 August 1780. 
105 NRS, CE56/2/2, 10 March 1763. 
106 NRS, CE56/2/5, 22 October 1776. 
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In addition to deforcement or violence on shore, there were also instances of 
violence at sea – mostly firing of light cannon, but in September 1763 it was 
reported that David Denham and John Swanston were deforced on board the 
Margaret of Arbroath, from Gothenburg, and that goods were run out of the 
vessel. This ship, listed as the Happy Margaret was recorded at Eyemouth on 9 
September, with a cargo from Gothenburg for David Nisbet, John’s brother and 
business partner.107  
 
Hoon defines ‘composition’ as an instance where ‘a sum mutually agreed upon 
by the customs and the defendant (and) paid by the latter to effect a discharge 
of his seizure or debt… An application for such a composition was referred by 
the Board to the solicitor for his opinion as to whether or not the case was 
deserving.’108 The example given in full, here, demonstrates that compositions 
were often seen by the Customs as means of maximising income while 
minimising risk. In February 1763, the Board of Customs in Edinburgh 
considered the following; 
 
Application having been made to the Board by Mr John Nisbet 
Merchant in Eymouth Claimer of the Ship Hope of Eymouth and her 
Cargo undermentioned Vizt. 
 
  1105 Gallons of Brandy Appraized at 6sh 4d per Gallon
           L349.18.4 
    832 Gallons of Red French Wine at L19 per hhd 
           L266 
 
Proposing to withdraw the Claim entered to the Brandy and to pay the 
Appraized Value for the quantity which shall be delivered to him, and 
also to pay the French Duty for the Wine, provided the Board will 
agree to deliver up the Ship Appraized at L250; consent to the 
vacating the Recognizance; and not insist upon the Costs incurred by 
the Crown; and the Solicitor having Reported that he had upon the 
15th of last Month written to Captain Dowthwaite Commander of His 
Majesty’s Sloop the Ranger, by whom the Ship and Goods were 
Secured, in order to furnish the Proof necessary for Condemning the 
Wine and the Ship, and that he has received no Answer; And it 
likewise appearing by a Letter from Mr Adam Hendry Seizure Maker 
on Record, from the Information of Lieutenant Welsh late of the 
Ranger that the Persons by whom the Proof was to be made have 
absconded; For these Reasons the Board are of Opinion with the 
 
107 NRS, CE56/2/2, 20 September 1763; E504/10, 9 September 1763. 
108 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.95. 
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Solicitor that it is expedient to accept of the Terms offered, and he is to 
proceed accordingly, taking care that the Time for paying the Duties of 
the Wine and the Appraized Value of the Spirits to be properly 
vouched.109 
 
In other words, there were no witnesses to support the Board, so it was 
expedient to accept Nisbet’s offer. 
 
Other compositions were accepted for similar reasons. On the 4 July 1751, the 
Board accepted an offer of £40 from a group of Eyemouth merchants after the 
solicitor had reported that the evidence for the crown was doubtful. In 
September 1752 the Board agreed to prosecute Richard Turnbull, then settled 
the following May when his lawyer paid £100. John Nisbet’s brother William 
offered £50 in 1761, in a case discussed above. One final example, from the 
meeting on 1 October 1765, involved Alexander Wallace of Bergen. Wallace 
made quite a low offer, which the Board accepted, on the basis that ‘there is a 
difficulty as to proving the Vessel to have been within the Limits of a Port’.110  
 
In all these cases, there was some weakness in the evidence, so the Board 
decided to accept a financial offer rather than risk a prosecution which might 
fail. 
 
4.7  The reaction of other authorities 
 
Following the Union of 1707, the two major national institutions in Scotland were 
the Convention of Royal Burghs and the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland. Both bodies took an interest in smuggling in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. 
 
The origins of the Convention of Royal Burghs can be traced back to the 
thirteenth-century Court of the Four Burghs, which was part of the governance 
of Scotland. It was formalised in the sixteenth century and survived until local 
government reorganisation in 1975, when it was replaced by the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities. It represented the interests of Burgh merchants to 
 
109 NRS, CE1/11, 8 February 1763. 
110 NRS, CE1/11, dates as recorded in text. 
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the King and parliament and was a significant and influential body. Reference is 
made to it in chapter 2 in relation to the state of Eyemouth harbour in the 1790s. 
 
The Convention moved against smuggling in 1736 and again in 1748, passing 
acts to encourage member bodies to take action locally to pass similar 
resolutions. A review of the Caledonian Mercury indicates that Inverness, 
Kincardineshire, Aberdeen, Linlithgowshire, Midlothian, Aberdeenshire, Elgin, 
Tain, Cullen, Beith, Berwickshire, Haddingtonshire and Fife all moved such 
resolutions. That for the Shire of Berwick is shown, at Fig. 4/4, below.  
 
 
Figure 4/4. Advertisement placed by the Justices of the Peace of the Shire of Berwick, 
Caledonian Mercury, 8 August 1748 
 
The Preses (chair) of the meeting of the Berwickshire Justices of the Peace was 
the key magnate in the county, the Earl of Marchmont. The notice, placed in the 





Do give this publick Warning and Advertisement, that all may know, that 
so far as our Interest and Assistance reaches, every Person guilty, or Art 
and Part of promoting this infamous Practice of Smuggling, shall be 
prosecuted with the outmost Rigour of Law 
 
A similar notice placed by ‘The Justices of the Peace and other Heritors of the 
Shire of Haddington’ in May 1744 included a diatribe against tea drinking: 
 
…for the drinking of Tea, and especially among the People of the lower 
Rank, has arrived to such an extravagant Excess particularly of Tea 
belonging to foreign Companies, and run and smuggled into this country, 
to the great Hurt of the British East India Company and of the Revenue, 
and the yet greater Hurt of private Families, by Loss of their Time, 
Increase of their Expence, and Negligence of Diet more suitable to their 
Health and Station... 
 
Those agreeing the resolution promised not to drink any French wines or spirits 
in public houses or at home. They also agreed to  
 
Make it an Article in all our Leases which we may hereafter grant of our 
respective Lands to our Tenants, That their aiding any way the 
clandestine importing or smuggling French Wines, or Spirits, or Tea, 
shall be ipso facto a Breach or Forfeiture of the Leases… 
 
They encouraged the brewing of strong ale and the distilling of spirits made 
from local malt or other grain and promised to refuse to countenance public 
houses which did not sell such strong ales and spirits.111 
 
There is no evidence regarding the effectiveness of such resolutions. It is 
difficult to imagine the whole of the local gentry abstaining from French wines 
and tea. This incident in Fife was claimed as a victory for that County’s 
resolution. As with other press stories, however, it is hard to tell if this does 
indeed represent popular feeling against smugglers, or whether the story was 
embellished for propaganda purposes. 
 
 
111 ‘The Justices of the Peace and Other Heritors of the Shire of Haddington...’, Caledonian 




Figure 4/5. The claimed effect of a county resolution against smuggling 
Caledonian Mercury, 23 July 1744 
 
The nearest institution Scotland had to a parliament until the reinstatement of 
the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland still meets annually and is attended by the Ministers and lay 
representatives of its parishes. The bulk of its business concerns the Church 
itself, but it has always taken an interest in wider affairs and in the first half of 
the eighteenth century it considered smuggling, obviously seen as a widespread 
and invidious problem. It first debated the issue at the General Assembly on 22 
May 1719, when it passed an ‘Act showing the Sin and Evil of Running 
Unentered Goods and of the Perjuries at the Custom-Houses in Matters of 
Trade.’112 It called upon people to abstain from 
 
such crying sins and deadly courses, that cannot but justly provoke a 
holy God to deny them success in their enterprises and undertakings, to 
lessen their means, and to send heavy judgements upon them…that 
have so plain a tendency to ruin their souls, and to draw down the wrath 
of God upon them and theirs…And the General Assembly ordains this 
Act to be once read in all the churches in Scotland, and as often in 
particular parishes as the prudence of ministers shall direct. 
 
It is an interesting religious take on smuggling and was certainly intended to put 
a stop to the practice. Unfortunately it failed in its desired effect and had to be 
followed up in 1736, when the General Assembly ‘taking into their serious 
consideration the crying multiplied abominations of perjury in many of the 
customhouses of Scotland, especially in the French wine trade, to the great 
 
112 The Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 1638–1842 (Edinburgh: The 
Church Law Society,The Edinburgh Printing and Publishing Company, 1843), p.530. 
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reproach of religion, the offence of all sober and good men, a wasting of 
conscience, and diffusing of most pernicious example…’ acknowledged that the 
1719 Act had not had ‘the effect that might have justly expected from it’ 
reinforced their drive against smuggling by ordering, in the name of the Church, 
‘all the judicatories thereof …to use their best endeavours to put a stop to it, by 
the conscientious and impartial use of all the means appointed by the Lord 
Jesus Christ against scandals of such an heinous nature.’113 
 
Only eight years later, the General Assembly made what appears to have been 
a final attempt to stem the flow, in 1744 when it passed an ‘Act and 
Recommendation against the sinful Practice of Smuggling of Goods’. This 
called on ‘all the ministers of the Church, &c., to discourage, so far as in them 
lies, by their discourse and examples, the sinful practice of smuggling; and do 
appoint that the 9th Act of Assembly 1719 and the 15th Act of 1736, be reprinted, 
and forthwith transmitted to Presbyteries and ministers: and ordain that the 
same be read from the pulpits of all the parish churches within Scotland…’114  
 
Given that, when the Masonic Lodge in Eyemouth was founded in 1757, the 
Minister was one of the earliest members, alongside the town’s merchants, 
many of whom were involved in the smuggling business, it is hard to see that 
such encouragement to put a stop to the trade would have had any effect at 
all.115 The evidence from the will of the smuggler Charles Swanston, mentioned 
in Chapter 5, that in 1780 the Minister of Duns was one of his debtors further 
casts doubt on the effectiveness of these measures.116 
 
4.8 Smuggling elsewhere in Britain 
 
One of the points made in the Introduction is that it is unlikely that Eyemouth is 
exceptional in terms of smuggling. This section seeks to summarise the nature 
of smuggling elsewhere in the country to support this point. 
 
 
113 The Acts of the General Assembly, p.641. 
114 The Acts of the General Assembly, p.675. 
115 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.  
116 NRS CC15/5/11 Testament Dative and Inventary of Charles Swanston, 1782. 
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Of all the smuggling districts it is perhaps Cornwall that has gained the most 
romantic reputation, through popular fiction and TV adaptations, notably 
‘Jamaica Inn’ and ‘Poldark’, as well as several visitor centres, such as those at 
Jamaica Inn itself, Mevagissey and Polperro. The reference in the Introduction 
to ‘the Cornish Mandrin’ offers a picture of smuggling in Cornwall that suggests 
that it had popular support, either voluntary or otherwise. Recent studies of men 
involved in smuggling in Penzance,117 Mevagissey118 and Polperro119 do 
emphasise the business-like nature of smuggling in Cornwall. Even the more 
colourful accounts, such as that of Harry Carter – written after he became a 
Methodist – indicate that he had support from all levels of society.120 He also 
describes a break in at Penzance Custom House, to reclaim his goods, earlier 
seized by the customs, which he justified by explaining that the did not wish to 
keep his customers waiting. This further shows the vulnerability of local customs 
houses and the unremarkable fact of their being broken into. 
 
It is clear that smuggling in Cornwall was a well organised business with 
merchants in Guernsey playing a significant role. The nature of this business, 
and the customers, can be deduced from one instance described by Jamieson, 
when, in 1807, William Tinney, the chief customer in Newquay of the merchants 
Carteret Priaulx, said that he was not able to pay what he owed due to failed 
venture in a tin mine. He was, therefore, clearly a man of some substance and 
ambition. Carteret Priaulx had agents in Cornwall who both collected orders and 
pursued customers for payment and once a year a partner of the firm came 
over to check the agents’ books and press unforthcoming debtors. Although the 
details of the trade differ from south-east Scotland, it was clearly a business 
conducted in a business-like way by businessmen.121  
 
The south-west of Scotland – the Ayrshire coast on the east side of the Firth of 
Clyde – had an interesting smuggling community. The scale of operations was 
quite substantial – via the Isle of Man before 1765, then linking with Ireland and 
Europe after that, but it was also the west coast where the great trade boom in 
 
117 MacKenzie, ‘Merchants and Smugglers’.  
118 Doe, ‘The Smugglers’ Shipbuilder’. 
119 Wilcox, ‘Maritime Business in eighteenth-century Cornwall’. 
120 Carter and Cornish, The Autobiography of a Cornish Smuggler  
121 Jamieson (ed.), A People of the Sea, pp.214–217.  . 
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Scotland was concentrated, in Glasgow and its associated ports. A spin-off from 
Glasgow’s role as the main importer of tobacco in Britain was tobacco 
smuggling. When tobacco was imported, duty was paid, then reclaimed (draw 
back) when it was re-exported. Ships re-exporting tobacco from Glasgow would 
stop off the Ayrshire coast and land tobacco, which could then be sold duty 
free.122 What the south-west had in common with the south-east of Scotland 
was the domination of the trade by a cadre of merchant-smugglers, several of 
whom were closely associated with the Ayr Bank, which – when it failed in 1772 
– was characterised by the banking establishment as representing an amalgam 
of ‘obscure lawyers and smugglers.’ Indeed, the cashier of the bank was John 
Christian, originally from the Isle of Man and certainly active in the smuggling 
business, as was Robert Arthur of Ayr, also involved in the Bank.123 Robert 
Arthur acted as the correspondent of Dunlop & Co, a group of a dozen or so 
smugglers operating in the Loans area near Troon.124 What there was, then, 
was a group of lower level smugglers, operating wherries onto the coast 
between Ayr and Irvine, bringing in cargoes for the merchant-smugglers. They 
were occasionally disrupted by the Customs, but as required the smugglers 
were able to summon enough support to be able to discourage intervention. It 
was in this way that they most resembled the Sussex smugglers, but – as with 
Montrose and Eyemouth – such intimidation was more in the nature of a 
deterrent than a desire to carry out wilful violence. 
 
Montrose was one of the busiest of the east coast ports in Scotland and the 
town has many fine surviving merchant’s houses.125 It was a great centre of 
smuggling, with a particular interest in tobacco. Some was imported direct from 
the Americas and simply dropped off on the way in to port, but as Glasgow grew 
to dominate the trade, so more and more tobacco came to Montrose from 
Glasgow via the port of Bo’ness on the Forth, which acted as Glasgow’s outlet 
to the east.126 
 
 
122 Wilkins, The Loans Smugglers, p.13. 
123  Cullen, Smuggling and the Ayrshire Economic Boom, p.21. 
124 Wilkins, The Loans Smugglers, p.11. 
125 Lythe and Jackson (eds), The Port of Montrose.  
126 Fraser, The Smugglers, p.127. 
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Fraser describes three incidents, all in the early 1740s, when ships sailed from 
Montrose with what would have been contraband in Britain, bound for Norway, 
and returned with a day or so – having miraculously sailed to Norway and back. 
The excuse was that they had met another ship bound for Norway and had 
transhipped their cargo and then returned to Montrose. Undoubtedly the goods 
had been run. The Custom House was broken into in 1743 and a small amount 
of seized contraband liberated. Ten men were suspected, but no proof was 
forthcoming. The Collector was concerned about the security of the warehouse 
and relocated it. He said of Montrose that ‘this place is so full of idle beggarly 
people that the King’s warehouse is not safe one night’. After the shock of the 
seizure of the town by the Jacobites in 1745/1746, business resumed as usual, 
but – as with Eyemouth – tobacco smuggling dropped off during the 1750s and 
was replaced by tea and spirits. What is particularly similar to the Eyemouth 
area is the nature of the violence used. Fraser describes how ‘often tidesmen 
would arrive home black and blue, and quite a few times terror stricken…No 
one was killed and in forty years only one received lasting injury.’127  
  
4.9 Conclusion  
 
What this chapter clearly demonstrates is that smuggling, as conducted by a 
cadre of merchant-smugglers in south-east Scotland, was virtually 
indistinguishable in its methodology from regular trade. The men were, after all, 
merchants, who conducted legitimate trade, often in the same ships that they 
used for contraband. They needed lines of credit, suppliers and reliable, loyal 
shipmasters. The next chapter will reinforce this impression of normality by 
illustrating their distribution and sales networks. Their suppliers were men who 
were legitimate merchants in their home ports, men who – as chapter 6 will 
show – often had substantial reputations. They bought the goods openly at 
public sales and undertook perfectly legal exports. 
 
The main difference from regular trade was that, as the goods involved were 
contraband, this caused issues with their sale and distribution and, therefore, 
with the generation of income to settle accounts with their suppliers. The 
evidence from Nisbet’s sequestration is that he owed money to two important 
 
127 Fraser, The Smugglers, p.28. 
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suppliers and to one of his main outlets. He also relied on loans to keep his 
cash flow moving and was, in turn, owed money by one of his distributors. In 
many respects, this differs little from the career of a regular merchant. Nisbet’s 
business failed, not because he was a smuggler, but because he was old, alone 
and vulnerable to the machinations of his rivals. The fact that he can be 
associated with as many as seventeen smuggles, indicates that he was well 
known to the customs, but – other than financial losses associated with having 
goods seized – he did not suffer from this. He carried on working right up to the 
end, perhaps even acting as an adviser to James Renton. 
 
It could even be argued that the relationship with the Customs and Excise 
services was effectively negotiated – the enforcement services sought to 
maximise income in a challenging context, while the smugglers were prepared 
to manage that relationship by accepting the need to pay some duties, notably 
be negotiating compositions when goods were seized. It appears that 
smuggling elsewhere in Britain was equally run in a business-like manner with 
minimal intervention from the authorities. 
 
Having considered the nature of the smuggling business in this chapter – 
indeed having made the point of its similarity to regular business, the next 
chapter will look in more detail as the specifics of the distribution of contraband, 
in particular, how the goods were transported overland and to both retail outlets 










Chapter four examined the business of smuggling, together with supply and 
demand. This chapter will look in detail at the import and distribution networks 
for contraband. The purpose will be to assess further the mechanics of the 
distribution system and the specific demand for contraband. As with all 
considerations of smuggling, the lack of evidence is a constraint. One of the 
features of the detailed study of John Nisbet of Eyemouth is that it has been 
possible to develop an understanding of his personal connections and, through 
them, to draw some inferences about his customers. Initially, however, there will 
be an examination of the process of distribution of contraband from when it 
came ashore until it reached the retailer, or customer. This is an area where 
some of the most colourful accounts of smuggling in the south of England would 
lead us to expect a degree of violence and the involvement of what we might 
think of today as ‘organised crime’.1 There will be an attempt to identify key 
players and how they avoided unnecessary contact with the customs officers 
and, indeed, how little actual violence was perpetrated. 
 
In addition, through an examination of two key products – claret and tea – some 
understanding will be sought of the motivation of the customer. What drove 




Much smuggling around the coasts of Britain was organised in the way 
described by Jamieson, writing of Guernsey and Cornwall. The goods were 
supplied and delivered by a specialist firm in one of the continental or Channel 
Island smuggling ports and received by smugglers on the coast of Britain.2 
Using the records of Carteret and Priaulx of Guernsey, Jamieson describes the 
 
1 Nicholls, Honest Thieves. 
2 Jamieson, A People of the Sea, pp.195–219. 
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network of agents they provided and the way that smugglers in Cornwall, in 
particular, placed very specific orders with them. The goods were then received 
and distributed by the local smugglers, with the agents also being responsible 
for ensuring payment of the charges due. 
 
There is some evidence of this type of activity – the delivery of contraband by 
outsiders, to be collected by local men – around Eyemouth, evidenced by this 
note in the Dunbar Customs Letter Book in March 1780: 
 
… John Lilly, Mason in Dunse, from whom two ankers of spirits and a 
horse were seized… having frequently of late headed a Desperate Gang 
of Smugglers when the Flushing Cutter were upon the Coast…3 
 
As will be highlighted later, in chapter seven, this style of smuggling became 
more common in south-east Scotland towards the end of the century, displacing 
the activity of Eyemouth based merchant-smugglers. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century there were approximately 30 merchants recorded as 
operating out of Eyemouth. Of these at least 15 were involved in smuggling. 
There are 54 smuggles for which the merchant and/or claimer is recorded. Of 
these 49 are ascribed to Eyemouth merchants – 91 per cent: and of these 17 
are identifiable as being tied exclusively to John and/or David Nisbet – 35 per 
cent of the Eyemouth total. The Nisbets had a connection with a further seven. 
 
The other merchants with multiple involvements were Davidson, Grieve & Co, 
and Patrick Grieve alone, with six, the Robertsons with five and Henderson and 
Renton, and James Renton alone, who also had five. Thus, these four groups 
accounted for over two thirds of the identified Eyemouth based merchant-
smugglers. The smuggling business was dominated by these men for a period 
of between thirty and forty years, from the mid-1740s until around 1780. They 
were not simply shore-based distributors, rather they were shipowners and 
merchants who ran smuggling as they ran the rest of their businesses. They 
operated two styles of smuggling – paperwork fraud, which related mainly to 
tobacco, and the direct import of goods that would then be either run, landed on 
the coastline, or simply concealed on board and brought into Eyemouth.  
 
3 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 24 March 1780. 
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Tobacco smuggling seems to have dominated the market in the 1750s. The 
way tobacco documentation was handled by the authorities made it especially 
vulnerable to forgery or other abuses.4 It was in connection with tobacco fraud 
that John Nisbet of Gunsgreen House first came to the attention of the Board of 
Customs.5 After receiving a warning from London, the Scottish authorities 
rummaged places in and around Eyemouth in search of tobacco and snuff. Two 
and a half tons of tobacco were seized from the Nisbet brothers, but 
 
…as it does not appear from the circumstances you relate that the 
Quantity of 5,548 lwt (pounds) of Leaf Tobacco secured in the House of 
Messrs John and David Nisbet can be made a legal seizure, you may 
take your hands off the same.6   
 
As a result of frequent frauds of this nature, new regulations and instructions 
were issued, which included having a member of staff escort the tobacco for 
which a certificate had been granted and setting a time and distance limit for 
such certificates.  
 
‘Running’ was the term for what can be regarded as ‘traditional’ smuggling – the 
secret unloading of contraband goods, generally offshore, into small boats 
which then brought it ashore. An account of ‘running’ is given by paid informers 
on board the Nisbet Brothers’ ship Molly of Eyemouth. Molly appears in three 
different sources in the late 1750s and early 1760s.7 In the Collector’s Quarterly 
Accounts, Molly is recorded arriving in the Dunbar area, probably at Eyemouth, 
on 1 August 1758, with George Hay as Master, delivering a cargo of 29 matts 
(29 cwt) of undressed flax for John Nisbet from Campveere, the former Scottish 
Staple in the Netherlands. In the Dunbar Customs Letter Books, there is a 
record of an alert sent to the Collector at Dunbar on 26 June 1760 to the effect 
that Molly of Eyemouth had put in at Great Yarmouth loaded with spirits and 
other goods pretended to be bound for Bergen. ‘Pretended Voyages’ were a 
classic technique. A ship would have a cargo of contraband, with the papers 
stating that she was bound for Bergen. She would sail closely up the east coast, 
hovering offshore, seeking opportunities to run her cargo. If caught by the 
 
4 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.261. 
5 NRS, CE1/9, 30 March 1755. 
6 NRS, CE/56/2/1, 24 March 1755 
7 NRS, CE1/9; CE56/2; E504/10. 
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Customs, the master would claim that he needed to take in water or make 
repairs and hope to go on his way. In July 1759, for example, Daniel Dow, 
commanding the King’s Boat at Eyemouth, came across the sloop Charles and 
Mary of Carron Water at anchor in Lumsdean Bay (just north of Eyemouth) 
carrying 29 hogsheads of spirits, 2 hogsheads of claret and 3 half hogsheads of 
rum ‘pretended designed to be carried to Bergen’.8  
 
 The minute of the Board of Customs makes the warning about the Molly 
clearer. A letter had been received from Mr Wood, of the Customs 
Commissioners in London as a result of which the Board had sent a circular 
letter to the ports in the Firth of Forth and along the coast to Inverness, and to 
the commanders of the sloops to put all officers on their guard to prevent any 
part of the cargo being run in Scotland. In August 1761 the first of the informers 
came forward – John Page. The Commissioners of the Customs in London told 
the Board in Edinburgh and Page was interviewed under oath by the Edinburgh 
Solicitor. He declared that he had joined Molly in Yarmouth in July 1760 as a 
sailor. Molly was captained by Thomas Hogg and had come from Rotterdam. 
She sailed to the coast of Scotland  
 
near Eyemouth, where upon the 19th July and 2nd, 4th and 5th of August 
sundry Tubs and hogsheads containing (the informer believed) French 
Wine and Foreign Spirits and also four Chests containing Three hundred 
and thirty-six pounds weight of Tea were unshipped into Boats by the 
Direction of James Gray, who called himself Clerk to James (sic) Nisbet 
Merchant in Eymouth.9  
 
At their meeting a week or so later, the Board referred to a letter they had 
received from Mr Wood in London in July 1760, forwarding ‘an Information’ 
given on oath by Charles Coombs. Coombs said that in July 1759 he had bound 
himself apprentice to David Nisbet, Merchant in Eyemouth to serve on board 
any of his ships or vessels. A few days after this Coombs joined the Molly of 
Eyemouth, George Hay, master and made  
 
successive Voyages to Gothenburgh, Hamburg, Campvear and 
Rotterdam and each Voyage returned to the Coast of Scotland, where 
there were run out of the said Ship sundry Quantities of Brandy, Geneva, 
 
8 NRS, CE56/2/2, 13 July 1759. 
9 NRS, CE1/9, 17 August, 1761. 
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Tea, Wine Tobacco, Vinegar and eleven pieces of Indian Silk 
Handkerchieffs.10 
 
The records do tell us more about how smugglers were apprehended, 
particularly those that were running. There are twenty-five recorded instances of 
smugglers being intercepted at sea – mostly successfully. This represents 22 
per cent of the recorded total of smuggles. Of these 15 (60 per cent) involved 
the King’s Boat, seven (28 per cent) naval ships or revenue cutters and further 
three were reported as hovering, but not apprehended at that time. 
 
Although violence was not frequent or extreme in Berwickshire, there are 
records of 24 incidents in which smugglers used violence against the 
authorities, generally on shore, but with a small number of incidents at sea, 
such as  
 
... an account of his (George Henderson) boarding and seizing out of the 
Brigantine Ann & Peggy of Eymouth, from Rotterdam, one hundred and 
sixteen ankers of spirits and representing that after a chace of two hours 
he came up with the said Vessel, when they began firing upon him with 
Swivels (small cannons) and Blunderbusses, and that one of the shot 




This term should be taken to include the work of the people who fetched goods 
away from the shore, as well as those who undertook more conventional 
distribution. Again, the sources are primarily from the Customs records, but they 
do include the will of one leading figure in the smuggling trade and a detailed 
breakdown of the Nisbet Brothers’ business with one distributor over a five-year 
period, preserved as evidence in the records of a court case. 
 
 
10 NRS, CE1/9, 26 August, 1761 




Figure 5/1. The Scottish Borders and East Lothian, from Bartholomew’s 1887 
Gazetteer of the British Isles 
 
The information about these figures varies in detail from that regarding the 
people present at Dowlaw in late April 1783, who were described merely as 
bystanders, albeit quite threatening ones: 
 
… the Goods seized by Mr McNab and his Boats crew at Dowlaw Shore, 
and representing that the seizure makers are apprehensive, that, as 
there are no military quartered at Dunbar at present, the smugglers may 
attempt to carry away the Goods out of the Kings Warehouse by Force, 
and that such threats were expressed by some bystanders at the time of 
seizure…12 
 
to actual lists of those involved, such as this account from January 1765: 
 
… having reported that James Weatherley Farmer in Northfield, James 
Weatherley Junior, Thomas Hopper Feuer in Coldingham Hill, Martin 
Folton Farmer at Coldingham Sands, and Alexander Craig Messenger in 
Coldingham are to be prosecuted for treble the Value of the Goods 
Run… as owners of the Goods, or aiding and assisting in conveying 
them from the Shore… and that Mr Robert Corser (probably Cossar) at 
Coldingham may in like manner be prosecuted for a certain part of the 
Goods received by him;13 
 
 
12 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 30 April 1783. 
13 NRS, CE1/11, 21 January 1765. 
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What is interesting here is that three of the people involved were farmers 
controlling land on or adjacent to the shore. This is a pattern that Wilkins has 
noted in Ayrshire and was clearly prevalent all along the coast of 
Berwickshire.14 Northfield, near Coldingham, now just a farm, but was then a 
village that housed fishermen, and was an important centre of support for 
smugglers. In October 1752, for example, the Tidesman George Grey was 
 
… deforced by Several Fishermen in Northfield of Twenty Four Matts of 
Tobacco Stalks, Seized by him and Robert Manderston Tidesman, near 
St Ebbs Head (a warrant was requested) for apprehending and 
Committing Thomas Turnbull and James Johnston Skippers in Northfield, 
the two most notorious Offenders… 15  
 
It was from Northfield that one of the most audacious coups was launched – the 
raid on the King’s Warehouse in Eyemouth on 28 July 1780, led by Charles 
Swanston – whose father James then farmed Northfield. Evidence assembled 
by the Customs indicated that 
 
Most of the Goods lodged in the Warehouse had belonged to or been 
landed by Charles Swanston son of James Swanston at Northfield, and 
that many of the Witnesses declare that Charles Swanston, his brother 
Robert & James Crawford at Coldinghame went aboard the Smuggling 
Cutter the 28th July last and were not seen to come on Shore that Day 
along with the other Persons who had gone on board along with them. 
That the Warehouse was broke open the night of 28th that Month by a 
Party said to be landed from the Cutter, so that there is a presumption 
that the Swanstons and Crawfords were of the Party; But the Witnesses 
in general seem unwilling to speak out and declare the party was 
disguised; that Peter Nairne however declared that by his Size, Voice 
and Shape, he knew James Crawford as one of the Rioters tho’ his face 
was blacked…16 
 
Swanston did not live long to enjoy his triumph, as he died in June 1782, 
leaving a will detailing his debtors. This is one record we have of customers. 
One of them, however, was more than just a customer. John Lillie of Duns owed 
Swanston £2 2s 6d and £3 2s in two separate Bills. Lillie was referred to in an 
 
14 Frances Wilkins, The Loans Smugglers, Ayrshire Monographs, vol. 34 (Ayr: Ayrshire 
Archaeological and Natural History Society, 2008). 
15 NRS, CE1/8, 3 January 1753. 
16 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 31 August 1780.  
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earlier correspondence, cited in 5.2 above, when he was described as the 
leader of ‘a Desperate Gang of Smugglers’.17  
 
The first stage of distribution, once goods had been ‘run’ ashore, was to get 
them away from the immediate landing areas and the eyes and ears of local 
customs officers. The customs records from south-east Scotland appear to 
indicate that this was carried out discreetly and, largely, non-violently. The 
difference between this and the descriptions of armies of men, armed with 
muskets, cutlasses and cudgels, escorting convoys of tea in the south of 
England is marked.18 What is curious is that such large-scale threatening 
behaviour and violence was also largely unknown in Cornwall – an area subject 
to recent serious research. Even David Pae’s novel Eustace the Outcast, has 
the smugglers of Berwickshire defeating the customs men by cunning rather 
than force.19 The relationship between the customs service and merchant-
smugglers in the area is analysed in more detail in chapter 4. Following on from 
this, it is surely necessary to re-consider the accounts of violent smugglers in 
the south of England to assess their reliability. They obviously make a good 
story and, perhaps more to the point, would have helped in creating a climate of 
‘moral panic’ at the time, with the intention, perhaps, of discouraging public 
support. This was also considered in chapter 4, along with an assessment of 
public attitudes to smuggling. Cathryn Pearce draws attention to the similar 
dramatic treatment of wrecking in Cornwall, particularly the confusion between 
the almost mythical figures of ‘wreckers’ who tempt ships ashore with lanterns 
and then brutally murder the crew and steal the cargo and the more technical 
definition of wreckers as salvors of cargo. Obviously the myth is far more 
attractive than the reality.20  
 
Having successfully got the goods ashore and away from the attentions of the 
customs officials, they then had to be got into the market. They were 
transported locally by horse and cart or on horseback. The men involved appear 
to have had close links to the merchants or, indeed, the merchants themselves 
 
17 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 24 March 1780.  
18 Nicholls, Honest Thieves.  
19 Pae, Eustace the Outcast. 
20 Cathryn Pearce, Cornish Wrecking: 1700–1860, Reality and Popular Myth, (Woodbridge, The 
Boydell Press, 2010) pp.9–16. 
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participated. In the records relating to John and David Nisbet, there is enough 
detail about the movement of goods to use their business as a representative 
illustration. In addition, the evidence gathered for Henry Dundas provides 
details of the supply of tea to retailers in Edinburgh and Glasgow.21 A side effect 
of Eyemouth being a port from which grain was exported, was that there would 
have been a fairly constant stream of carts and wagons moving in and out, 
providing a degree of cover. 
 
One of the more valuable records relating to the Nisbets’ business is a 
statement of account of the transactions conducted between John and David 
Nisbet and Thomas and Alexander Hair ‘Carriers and Indwellers in Eymouth’.22 
Covering the period from February 1763 to June 1769, this has survived as 
evidence in a case, in which the Nisbet Brothers pursued the Hair Brothers for 
the settlement of an outstanding debt, initially of £46 14s 11d. On one side is 
listed the goods supplied which, aside from one consignment of hay, are spirits 
and tea. The tea, inevitably, is contraband but there are some references to 
apparently paying duty on spirits at Dunbar Customs House. The Hairs account 
for income received, due to the Nisbets for the goods, plus their own outgoings 
which were offset. 
  
What does this tell us? It illustrates that the movement of goods by means of 
carriers was at least part of how the Nisbets distributed their contraband. It also 
shows that at least some wine was delivered overland to Leith. Leith was where 
the wine merchants Bell and Rannie were based, with whom Nisbet had a 
longstanding business relationship.23 The Hairs, however, were not merely 
innocent tradesmen. In February 1756 Thomas Hair was named in an 
‘information’ concerning sundry frauds committed at Eyemouth24 and in June 
1756, Thomas Hair made a complaint about Alexander Mair, Tidesman, seizing 
four ankers of gin and brandy. The Dunbar Customs office was instructed to 
 
21 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2: Charles Paton and John Aitchison, Letters Concerning the Tea Trade 
forwarded to Henry Dundas by I.C., 1785. 
22  NRS, CS229/N/1/41. 
23 NLS, ESTC T213586. 
24 NRS, CE56/2/1, 10 February 1756. 
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contest this case and to pay for Alexander Mair’s medical treatment. The spirits 
were later condemned by a Justice of the Peace.25 
 
In October 1759, the Board of Customs reported receiving a letter from a Mr 
West, at Berwick-upon-Tweed which enclosed a petition from William Brown, an 
Eyemouth carrier, who was a prisoner in Berwick gaol ‘by virtue of a Writ issued 
out of the Exchequer in England for Conveying Brandy knowing the same to 
have been smuggled’.26 In addition, one of the creditors of Charles Swanston, 
the joint ring-leader of the raid on the Customs Warehouse in Eyemouth in 
1780, was James Carse, a carter in Duns, who owed Swanston £75.27 These 
three instances suggest that the merchant-smugglers used the normal 
distribution mechanisms for contraband, a further indicator of the normality of 
the smuggling business. This is further reinforced by the experience of David 
Nisbet in moving goods as far as London via Leeds, which is explored in more 
detail below. He had the assistance of Richard Markham who was said to have 
arranged to convey wine to London by wagon – surely the regular Leeds to 
London service, such as that described by Eric Pawson, who made use of the 
account book of Robert Dawson, a Leeds to London carrier in the early 1750s – 
now apparently lost – which shows that he made trips to London every three or 
four weeks, carrying ‘packs of cloth’ and ‘bailes of wool’, along with between 10 




Figure 5/2. Advertisement for the sale of Robert Dawson’s wagons and horses,  
Leeds Intelligencer, 1 January1765 
 
 
25 NRS, CE56/2/1, 3 and 23 June, 7 September 1756.  
26 NRS, CE1/10, 8 October 1759. 
27 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC15/5/11, Testament Dative 
and Inventary, Charles Swanston, 1782. 
28 Eric Pawson, Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(London: Academic Press Ltd, 1977), p.54. 
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The dispute relating to a debt incurred by Duncan Carmichael, a relative of 
Alexander Dow, with the Edinburgh wine merchants Bell and Rannie 
demonstrated clearly that John Nisbet supplied them with wine, apparently over 
a period of years.29 Before looking at this relationship in more detail, it is to be 
noted that the will of Thomas Rannie suggests that Bell and Rannie had regular 
dealings with other likely suppliers of contraband. One of his more significant 
debtors was Alexander Wallace of Bergen – the British Consul and known 
smuggler, two other Bergen merchants, John Sibbald of Gothenburg, one of 
Nisbet’s suppliers, John Smith also from Gothenburg and Will. Wood of 
Copenhagen.30 A key piece of evidence for Nisbet’s dealings with Bell and 
Rannie is a transcribed letter – the italics are as reproduced in the document: 
 
Edinburgh, 14th July 1768 
Gentlemen, 
This will be delivered you per Duncan Carmichael, a shopkeeper in town, 
and a relation of Captain Dow’s. Mr Carmichael now want a butt of red 
port, which you will please let him have one of our butts of port at your 
selling price; you will also let him have some of your white wine, and any 
other thing he may want in your way, which I shall see made good, 
 
And am, Gentlemen, your most obedient servant, 
 
(Signed) John Nisbet 
 
Subsequently, in the course of George Johnston’s argument, he sought to 
establish that Nisbet would have replied to letters, by explaining that ‘Mr Nisbet, 
in the 1770, 1771, and 1772, was a man in a considerable trade, and in 
particular, had many transactions with the petitioners’. Nisbet was also criticised 
for intervening in the sequestration process by admitting that he was liable to 
pay Bell and Rannie’s claim, who, according to Johnston, ‘had long been his 
correspondents and intimate friends’.31 
 
The clear conclusion to be drawn is that Nisbet was a regular supplier of Bell 
and Rannie, indeed, perhaps the delivery to Leith in January 1764 (see above) 
was to them. The reference to supplying butts of Port to Carmichael raises a 
question – was it really Port? According to Ludington, Port was beginning to 
 
29 NLS, ESTC T213586. 
30 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, CC8/8/123, Testament of 
Thomas Rannie, 1774. 
31 NLS, ESTC T213586. 
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displace Claret by the 1760s, so maybe it was, or is it an example of suppliers 
of contraband being discreet at all stages of the business?32 
 
This relationship between smugglers, or merchant-smugglers and dealers in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow is reinforced by the evidence gathered for Dundas in 
1785.33 This formed an assessment of the state of the tea trade prior to the 
Commutation Act of 1784 which greatly reduced the duty on tea. It helps to 
explain the success enjoyed by smugglers with retailers, not just customers. 
 
… if a Dealer in Scotland employed a Broker in London to buy Congos 
for him at the India Sales, he paid from 7/ to 7/6 per pound for it on the 
spot, besides Freight and Insurance in bringing it to Scotland… but if he 
bought from the smuggler (he) delivered it to him almost free of risk, at a 
much lower sale, and of as good a quality as the best he could get at the 
India House… 
 
… All the south and west parts of Scotland were supplied by the 
smugglers on the west coast, all the east and north by the smugglers on 
the east and north coasts… and a great deal was also privately 
conveyed into the nearest parts of England from these channels. 
 
Aside from convenience and price, John Aitchison, an Edinburgh tea dealer, in 
the same document, draws attention to a further advantage of dealing with 
smugglers 
 
The smuggler, from the credit he has abroad, and otherwise, gives credit 
to the retailer of 2, 3, and 4 months which same inducement will make 
the retailer purchase from the smuggler rather than at the public sale 
where he has money to pay ere he can receive his goods.  
 
Before 1784, therefore, for dealers in Scotland, remote from the London 
markets, smugglers offered an attractive proposition. The tea they supplied was 
cheaper, of at least as good – if not better – quality, it was delivered to the door 
(in Edinburgh – in Glasgow tea was delivered to within two miles of the city) and 
good credit terms were offered. No wonder, as the Muis explained, ‘Perhaps the 
more moderate estimate that four fifths of the total supply was illicit may be 
closer to the actual situation.’34  
 
32 Charles Ludington, The Politics of Wine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
33 Edinburgh, NRS, Melville Muniments, GD51/3/194/1–2, Charles Paton and John Aitchison, 
Letters Concerning the Tea Trade Forwarded to Henry Dundas by I.C. 




An early reference to a smuggling connection between Eyemouth and 
Newcastle comes from the Newcastle Port Books, referring to the Eyemouth 
merchant John Keith, mentioned in chapter two above: 
 
Persuant to your Honours directions of the 10th May 1732 one the 12 
June last Mr Keith paid the whole French duties for Fifteen dozen French 
wine stopt at this port for being brought by Land Carriage and without a 
dispatch…35 
 
In 1744 John Nisbet and Harry Knox, then in a co-partnery, had apparently 
purchased a consignment of liquorice juice and soap for £128 0s 0d from a sale 
of seized goods in Scotland. They were transporting this overland when they 
were stopped at Corbridge by two customs officers from Newcastle and the 
goods seized. They were subsequently condemned. Nisbet and Knox petitioned 
for a composition, due to the difficulty of travelling to London for the appeal.36 
 
In October 1754, David Nisbet was stopped by the Riding Officer when he was 
transporting tobacco to Belford in north Northumberland with an out of date 
certificate. He explained that the certificate that he had been granted was for 
removing 1120 lbs of tobacco to Leeds within ten days, but that as part of the 
time had elapsed and he had not been able to identify a carrier, he decided to 
send it to Belford. He was permitted to amend the certificate on swearing an 
appropriate oath.37 Six months later, the Commissioners at London sent a letter 
to Edinburgh warning of frauds being committed in Scotland. The Board wrote 
to Dunbar, alerting them to the warning that such frauds were being committed 
‘particularly about Eymouth and the Neighbourhood thereof by Smuggling 
Tobacco and conveying the same into England by the artfull management of 
certificates…’38 The record of the letter in the minutes of the Board was more 
specific, ‘particularly instancing that Messers Nesbit and Company… do carry 
on this Fraudulent Practice…’39 
 
 
35 Greenhall, The Evolution of the British Economy, p.288. 
36 London, NA, T1/321; C46 4961, Humble Petition by Harry Knox and John Nisbet to the Right 
Honourable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury, 1745. 
37 NRS, CE56/2/1, 1 October 1754. 
38 NRS, CE56/2/1, 4 March 1755. 
39 NRS, CE1/8, 30 March 1755. 
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This is clear evidence that the Nisbets were known to be regularly transporting 
contraband tobacco and other goods overland from Eyemouth into the north of 
England. This impression is reinforced by the evidence given in a dispute 
between David Nisbet and John’s partner, Harry Knox.40 Nisbet and Knox, as 
mentioned above, had been together in the 1740s and had formed another co-
partnery on 8 June 1754 for ‘carrying on a joint Trade’, which was dissolved by 
mutual consent on 15 December 1757. Each partner was ‘entitled to half of the 
effects and the debts’. This was the nub of the case. According to Knox, Knox 
and Nisbet had a consignment of wine with Robert Carrick, a merchant in 
Newcastle, which was not selling, so David Nisbet had taken it upon himself to 
send five hogsheads overland to London and, as there were no credits for the 
same in the Custom House books, the wine was seized and condemned. Knox 
was seeking £40 as the value of his half share. 
 
David Nisbet’s evidence provides details of his connections in Newcastle and 
Leeds and the way he conducted his business. 
 
… he was often in use to dispose of Goods for the behoof of the 
Company, particularly in ordering goods from Newcastle and Leeds and 
it happening at one and the same time that Knox and Nisbet had eight 
and the Respondent six Hogsheads of Claret wine in the hands of one 
Mr Thomas Wallis of Newcastle for sale and which on his death was 
handed over to the care of Mr Robt Carrick, the Respondent finding the 
mercate at Newcastle was not favourable he desired Mr Carrick to send 
off his six Hogsheads to Leeds to one Mr Richard Markham who was to 
forward them by wagon to London. Mr Knox’s partner John Nisbet 
understanding that the six hogsheads belonging to his brother the 
Respondt. was transported safe to London has desired him to write to Mr 
Carrick to forward their stock of wine in the same manner…41 
 
 
40 Edinburgh, NRS, CS271/38288. 




Figure 5/3. Advertisement for the disposal of Thomas Wallis’ stock by Robert Carrick, 
including fourteen hogsheads of Claret, presumably those belonging to Knox and 
Nisbet and David Nisbet from the Newcastle Courant, 28 June 1755 
 
This confirms that the Nisbets had regular contacts in Newcastle and that David 
at least was accustomed to dealing with Leeds and certainly knew that Richard 
Markham was someone with whom he could do business. There is also a 
reference to the claret being taken from Leeds to London by wagon. The 
missing link in this instance is the fate of wine successfully transported to 
London. It is not known if David Nisbet had his own contacts there, or whether 
he relied on Markham’s connections. 
 
 
Figure 5/4. Advertisement for a wagon service between Newcastle and Leeds,  
Newcastle Courant, 1 July 1758  
 
This emphasises the existence of regular cross-country wagon services before 
the development of turnpikes. Even between Edinburgh and Newcastle there 





Figure 5/5. Announcement of a new wagon service between Edinburgh and Newcastle, 
Caledonian Mercury, 4 June 1745 
 
What there is, therefore, is an established transport network for moving goods 
overland, enabling the Nisbets to use Newcastle and Leeds as transhipment 
points. Travelling overland would have avoided ports, with their active customs 
service, although that did not prevent the Nisbets’ wine being stopped at the 
edge of London, or Keith’s near Newcastle. Hoon describes land carriage in the 
same section of her book as ‘the coastwise trade’. Describing the movement of 
tobacco, she wrote 
 
If the merchant wished to send his tobacco by land-carriage, as was 
frequently the case in times of war… he usually secured (from the 
Customs) a certificate or ‘let-pass’ which was a kind of safe-passage or 
direction to any customs officer not to stop the carriage.42  
 
This describes the procedure followed by David Nisbet in 1754, above, when he 
was stopped by the Riding Officer, who was not satisfied with the validity of his 
certificate. Presumably the wine moving from Leeds to London was similarly 
inspected by a Riding Officer and seized due to inadequate paperwork. 
 
As part of his analysis of the tea market around the time of the Commutation 
Act, Pitt commissioned the Excise to undertake a survey of certain collections 
(administrative areas) to seek to assess the amount of legal tea on hand, by 
extrapolating from these results. The Excise were all too aware of the actual  
position with legal/illegal tea in Britain so 
 




… no collection north of the Trent was included in the survey. This was 
an area inundated with illicit tea. Large quantities were smuggled on the 
east coast via Yorkshire… The north English counties were also supplied 
with illicit tea from Scotland.43  
 
This further supports the impression that there were formal arrangements in 
place for the cross-border transport of contraband goods. 
 
5.4 Sale to the consumer 
 
The ultimate key to the success of any business involving the sale of goods was 
the final stage – the sale to the consumer. The previous section indicates how 
some retailers obtained goods, while this section follows that to the next stage. 
Not all contraband was sold via retailers – much was sold direct to the final 
consumer. The detailed evidence for both is inevitably somewhat lacking. It is 
possible, however, to draw some conclusions. 
 
There must be a suspicion that local inns were regular customers of the 
smugglers and there is some evidence that this was the case. On 5 March 
1767, for example, there was a report of Alexander McDouall, an innkeeper 
from Birgham ‘slipping two ankers of spirits off his horse when approached by 
Charles Watters, Riding Officer’.44 The will of Charles Swanston, the Northfield 
smuggler and ringleader of the raid on the Eyemouth customs warehouse in 
1780 includes bills drawn by Adam Barra, innkeeper in Duns, James Crawford, 
innkeeper at Cairncross and William Shiel, innkeeper in Duns.45 Crawford was 
also named by the customs as Swanston’s associate in the raid.46 
 
Alongside the growth of a market for new consumer goods, there developed a 
polite ‘shopping culture’, whereby ‘the rituals of shopping could… in themselves 
become a pleasurable pursuit, associated with sociability, display and the 
exercise of discerning taste.’47 In chapter six, the evidence of newspaper 
 
43 Hoh-Cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping in eighteenth-century England 
(Kingston, Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), p.162. 
44 NRS, CE56/2/3, 5 March 1767.  
45 NRS, CC15/5/11. 
46 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 31 August 1780. 
47 Helen Berry, ‘Polite Consumption’, 377. 
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advertisements is used to demonstrate the existence of what is being called 
‘northern smuggling’. It also clearly shows the importance of shops in the sale of 
contraband goods. Of interest is the Edinburgh Tea Company in Newcastle. 
 
 
Figure 5/6. Advertisment for the Edinburgh Tea Company 
Newcastle Courant, 25 July 1778 
 
The use of the term ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ clearly indicates that the tea on offer 
was almost certainly smuggled, despite the – surely implausible – claim of John 
Aitchison to have supplied his business in the north of England with ‘Teas 
purchased at our Custom House and Excise sales in this country.’48 The 
Edinburgh Tea Company boasted of its ‘very fine Gottenburgh Teas’ and 
emphasised that they sold them ‘greatly below the London wholesale prices’. 
The Warehouse – the fashionable term for a shop, adopted from the 1760s 
onwards–also sold Brandy, Rum, Geneva and Sugar – of which Brandy and Gin 
were regular contraband goods. In addition, the advertisement is phrased in the 
language of eighteenth-century politeness: 
 
The Edinburgh Tea Company most gratefully acknowledge their favours 
hitherto received, and beg to their Friends and the Public that their most 
assiduous attention will be paid to merit a continuance of it… 
 
One could expect a similar level of service here to that offered in 1752 by John 
Gibson, also in Newcastle, who announced that ‘the Tea Kettle will be always 
 
48 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
176 
 
boiling. Gentlemen and Ladies may try the Teas.’49  What is clear is that 
Gottenburgh Teas were effectively promoted as a brand, which is enlarged 
upon in my article in the History of Retailing and Consumption.50 
 
Earlier in this chapter, it is shown that John Nisbet supplied Bell and Rannie, the 
Edinburgh wine merchants, over a period of years. They, in turn, would have 
sold his smuggled wine to their customers. It is possible that he had a similar 
relationship with Stewart’s of Edinburgh, as Sir John Stewart of Allanbank 
junior, heir to the family wine importing and sales business, rented Gunsgreen 
House for five years in the 1780s, when Nisbet needed financial support.51 
 
Some contraband was sold direct by the smuggler to the consumer. When 
Charles Swanston, the Northfield smuggler, died in June 1782 he left several 
bills detailing who owed him money. Some of these were clearly directly buying 
goods for their own use, others were innkeepers, referred to above. The 
personal customers include the ‘Reverend Doctor Robert Bowmaker, Minister of 
the Gospel at Duns’, who owed £17 10s. The biggest debtor was James Carse, 
a carter in Dunse, who owed £46. He had owed a further £38, but had paid off 
three instalments of £8, £20 and £10.52  
 
The most remarkable piece of evidence for sales direct to the consumer is in 




49 Berry, ‘Polite Consumption’, p.386. 
50 Derek Janes, Fine Gottenburgh Teas: the import and distribution of smuggled tea in Scotland 
and the north of England, c.1750 – 1780, History of Retailing and Consumption, Volume 2, 
2016, issue 3, p. 229 
51 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  




Figure 5/7. Gunsgreen House, Eyemouth: the ‘tea chute’ 
 
This is the so-called tea chute, a large storage silo lined with re-cycled tea 
chests from Canton, with a capacity of around 500 lbs of tea – about 6 tea 
chests. It is carefully concealed in the building to be very difficult to find in the 
event of a rummage. Filled on the top floor through a carefully concealed 
opening, it had an outlet on the ground floor, in what was originally a cupboard. 
It was surely created to allow the Nisbets to dispense measured quantities of 
tea for sale to private individuals, presumably from gentry and professional 
families. The context within Gunsgreen House, was that there were at least two 
other concealed storage spaces – one adjacent to the top of the tea chute and 
the other behind a removable section of dado in a bedroom on the top floor. The 
original purpose for both spaces is unknown – although that which is next to the 
tea chute is big enough to accommodate several tea chests. 
 
5.5 The attraction of smuggled goods to the consumer: tea and claret 
 
It seems self-evident that smuggled goods were cheaper than those brought in 
honestly. This examination of the market for smuggled tea and claret reinforces 
that view. The two items concerned were among the most smuggled in 
Scotland. Tea forms part of that group of groceries which have been the subject 
of much research related to the growth of consumption from the late 
seventeenth century onwards and which are seen as having had a strong 
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influence on the desire for people to generate disposable income to purchase 
these new goods. Tea and alcohol are behaviour-influencing products, offering 
‘cheap energy and relaxation for consumers.’53 Tea and claret were in different 
categories, however. Tea was one of a number of ‘prohibited goods’, the import 
of which was restricted. The East India Company (EIC) had the monopoly on all 
trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and all tea had to be imported direct from 
the country of its native growth. The EIC had, therefore, a monopoly on the 
supply of tea. It was this monopoly, combined with very heavy taxation – 
peaking at 119 per cent – which drove up the price of legal tea and provided 
fertile ground for the expansion of smuggling. ‘Heavy duties being imposed 
upon almost all goods imported, our merchant importers smuggle as much and 
make entry of as little as they can…’54 
The act of buying smuggled goods did, of course, support criminality. One of the 
best-known accounts by a customer is that of Parson Woodforde, writing of the 
1770s: 
Andrews the smuggler brought me this night about 11 o'clock a bag of 
Hyson Tea 6 Pd weight. He frightened us a little by whistling under the 
parlour window just as we were going to bed. I gave him some Geneva 
and paid for the tea at 10/6 a Pd.  
Woodforde regularly bought smuggled gin, brandy and tea, not only from 
Richard Andrews, but also from Clerk Hewitt of Mattishall Burgh, and from the 
blacksmith at Honingham, Robert 'Moonshine' Buck. Not all of Woodforde's 
suppliers of brandy and gin were as happy to show their faces as those that he 
names in his diaries. On at least one occasion the parson describes how a 
knock took him to the door, and he discovered a couple of kegs waiting for 
bottling: by the time he peered out into the night, whoever delivered them had 
melted away.55 In Berwickshire, as has been mentioned above, the Minister of 
Duns, the Reverend Robert Bowmaker, was one of the smuggler Charles 
 
53 Carole Shammas, ‘Changes in English and Anglo-American Consumption from 1550–1800‘. 
in John Brewer and Roy Porter (eds), Consumption and the World of Goods (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p.185. 
54 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, p.477. 
55 Neil Holmes, The Lawless Coast (Dereham: The Larks Press, 2008), pp.75, 104. 
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Swanston’s main creditors, so Woodforde was not alone as a man of the cloth 
buying contraband.56 
Sidney Mintz attempts to deal with the ‘why?’ question in respect of the demand 
for tea. He quotes David MacPherson as writing in his The History of European 
Commerce with India in 1812: 
 
… we are so situated in our commercial and financial system, that tea 
brought from the eastern extremity of the world, and sugar brought from 
the West Indies and both loaded with the expense of freight and 
insurance… compose a drink cheaper than beer. 
 
He links the consumption of tea and sugar with ‘poor nutrition, a cold and rainy 
climate, the gradual development of new work patterns as urban centres grew 
and industry spread, the emulation of the consumption habits of the more 
powerful and privileged and of course the pleasing taste of sweetness.’ He then 
adds 
 
… I think that express efforts by certain groups to enlarge demand may 
also have played a part. If so this would probably be the first such 
campaign in world history. How intentions to spread the consumption of 
such an imported item as sugar could mesh with the readiness of people 
to experiment with edible novelties is among the features of this history 
that we do not yet wholly understand.57 
 
He seems to be suggesting that the sugar growers and importers were 
encouraging the consumption of tea, coffee and chocolate to increase the 
demand for sugar. If this were so, could it have led to these sugar growers 
encouraging tea smuggling, when it became clear how the high price of this 
commodity was a barrier to its consumption and, therefore, to the increased 
consumption of sugar? Certainly, Austen and Smith are of the view that ‘the 
consumption of sugar with tea and, to a lesser extent, with coffee, became one 
of a number of significant elements in a cultural pattern that had meaning 
because it both signified and constituted the respectability of the people who 
 
56 NRS, CC15/5/11. 
57 Sidney W. Mintz, ‘The Changing Roles of Food in the Study of Consumption‘, in J ohn Brewer 
and Roy Porter (eds),Consumption and the World of Goods, p.264. 
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participated in it.’58 They further suggest that the attachment of sugar to tea 
‘may have started … to encourage the use of tea as a medium for consuming 
sugar’. They are, however, less persuaded than Mintz about the deliberate 
promotion of sugar in tea ‘... the extent to which early-modern institutional 
marketing could actually create new consumption patterns… was quite limited.’ 
This is certainly an area worthy of further research. 
 
Bunker reinforces the view of the importance of tea as a key commodity, writing 
that tea ‘had become far more than a bland familiar drink… (it) had acquired a 
more exalted status, as a prize to be fought over by powerful and ambitious 
men’. He described tea as ‘one of a handful of commodities that served the 
wider purposes that crude oil and copper fulfil today.’59 Be that as it may, 
demand did increase as the retail price fell and the price fell, until 1784, largely 
as a result of the impact of the teas imported into Sweden and Denmark and 
smuggled into Britain. Tea was sold through licensed retailers–any person 
having more than 6 lbs of tea to sell had to have a permit. Despite the Excise 
being one of the most effective tax gathering operations in Europe, the permit 
system was worked round, allowing the public to purchase smuggled tea in 
shops on high streets, as illustrated by the newspaper advertisements such as 
that reproduced as Fig. 5/6, above.  
 
The tea dealer Charles Paton attached part of the blame for the success of tea 
smuggling to the East India Company itself, making the point that ‘such of the 
Common people of Scotland as can afford to drink tea prefer the Congo… (and) 
the East India Company have not been at sufficient pains to supply Scotland 
with this article...’60 What this implies is that demand for tea far exceeded the 
legal supply, with the East India Company only able to meet about half of the 
demand for tea, particularly at the price customers were prepared to pay. 
 
In an account book from the Homes of Billie, from the mid-1770s, there are 
numerous references to the purchase of tea, although the sources are not 
 
58 Ralph A. Austen and Woodruff D. Smith, ‘Private Tooth Decay as Public Economic Virtue: 
The Slave Sugar Triangle, Consumerism and European Industrialization’ Social Science History 
14.1 (1990), 95–115, p.106. 
59 Bunker, An Empire of the Edge, p.32. 
60 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
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indicated. The advertisement by the Edinburgh Tea Warehouse (ETW) in the 
Newcastle Chronicle in 1779 (Fig. 5/6 above), for Gottenburgh Teas, shows that 
they were selling Green Tea for between 6s and 8s per pound, as opposed to 
10s 6d to 15s paid by the Homes. The cheapest tea offered by the ETW was 
between 3s and 4s, and the cheapest Congou between 4s 6d and 5s, 
compared to the Home’s ‘Housekeeper’s tea’ at between 6s and 6s 6d. The 
most expensive tea sold at the Edinburgh Tea Warehouse was Finest Hyson at 
between 14s and 16s, which price is only matched once by the Homes in 
February 1776. The Edinburgh Tea Warehouse prices are comparable to those 
quoted by Paton.61 This shows, then, that – assuming the Homes were buying 
legal tea – they were paying considerably more than they would have paid for 
smuggled tea even from a retailer. If, as seems highly likely, John Nisbet at 
Gunsgreen House was selling direct to the public, then his prices would have 
been lower again, as there was no retailer to take their share. 
 
These figures offer only a tiny snapshot, but the three sources – Paton, Home 
and the Newcastle Chronicle – are all from the same ten-year period, and 
Paton’s prices are certainly closer to those of the Edinburgh Tea Warehouse, 
than to the prices paid by Home. It is safe, therefore, to deduce that buying 
smuggled tea would have saved the purchaser somewhere between 30 per 
cent and 50 per cent. The Homes spent just under £22 on tea over a three-year 
period, so could have saved between £7 and £11 10s by buying Gottenburgh 
Teas – and have acquired a product widely regarded as having been of superior 
quality. 
 
Scottish drinkers had long favoured claret – red wine from Bordeaux.62 French 
wine and brandy were taxed more heavily than wine from, for example, Spain, 
as the revenue was often required to fund wars with France. The smuggling of 
wine from Bordeaux was highly prevalent in the early years of the eighteenth 
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… in 1711, in order to prevent the outport officers being tricked by 
merchants passing French wines and brandy run from Scotland and 
other places under pretence of their being wines of other countries, the 
Board ordered the customs officers to peruse the despatches carefully to 
see that they were not counterfeit; view and taste the wines; and if the 
officers were in doubt, to take the advice of the most skilled in in the port 
or send samples to London that the Customs Commissioners might have 
the opinion of the Surveyor and Wine Taster…63 
 
There are references above to John Keith of Eyemouth moving French wine 
near Newcastle and to David Nisbet transferring Claret to London via his 
contacts in Leeds, just the sort of activity referred to in this paragraph. There 
are instances of sending wine for tasting from Dunbar. For example, The Board 
of Customs wrote to the collector at Dunbar on 14 May 1764: 
 
It appearing by a letter received from Mr Read that the Wine seized from 
on Board the Ship commanded by Mr Hog is Burgundy Wine, I am to 
desire you will send two bottles of the said wine (with your seal upon it) 
by the first safe conveyance to be tested by the Commissioners.64 
 
In 1744, the Resolution against smuggling by the Justices of the Peace of the 
Shire of Haddington identified claret – French wines – as one of the most 
iniquitous of drinks: 
 
… and at the same time, that a luxurious and expensive way of living has 
shamefully crept in upon all Ranks of People, who neglecting the good 
and wholesome Produce of our own Country, are got into the Habit of an 
immoderate Use of French Wines and Spirits in publick Houses and 
private Families, which Wines are in a great part clandestinely imported 
and smuggled through the Country in defraud of the Revenue, and even 
the importing of them is very often attended with the abominable 
Wickedness of Perjury.65 
 
Ludington cites figures of recorded exports of claret from Bordeaux to Leith – 
approximately 1,975 tuns per annum in the early 1740s, comparing them to 
recorded imports into Leith of approximately 36 tuns of all French wines. This 
suggests a substantial smuggling traffic into south-east Scotland.66 The 
 
63 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs System, p.32.  
64 NRS, CE56/2/3, 14 May 1764. 
65 ‘The Justices of the Peace and Other Heritors of the Shire of Haddington...’ Caledonian 
Mercury 7 May 1744. 
66 Ludington, The Politics of Wine, p.113.  
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Eyemouth merchant William Robertson, who died in 1738, had considerable 
quantities of claret recorded in his inventory.67  
 
Item Ten Hogsheads of Claret at twelve pound, One hundred and twenty   
pounds  
Item Four do. at fifteen pounds is sixty pounds  
Item one do.  twenty pounds 
 
Ludington refers to an increasing demand for what he calls luxury claret, 
following the Union and the developing custom of higher-class Scots taking 
houses in London – Robertson seemed to have been addressing this new 
market by stocking three different qualities of claret. One Eyemouth merchant, 
Alexander Kerr was described in his will as ‘late of Eymouth, then after of 
Bourdeaux and last of Montpelier Mercht.’.68 He had presumably moved to 
Bordeaux to represent Eyemouth interests in the main wine exporting port, in 
the same way that William Johnston of Ulster had done in 1716.69  
 
On 30 May 1767 there was a reference in the Dunbar Customs Letter Book to 
the 
  
… arrival of ship Pretty Nymph at Eymouth, Peter Dalgleish Master, 
laden with 38 hogsheads and 3 Tierces of Claret wine from Boulogne 
pretending to be bound for Bergen in Norway... 
(Pretty Nymph had been boarded by Captn. Fairfax of the Greyhound 
cutter about two leagues without the Isle of May) 
 
On 16 June 1767 it was reported that the Pretty Nymph of Eyemouth was ‘now 
at Dunbar’. The claret was to be moved to the King’s Warehouse. On 29 
February 1768 there was a further report: 
 
... you have exposed to sale in three lots for the Duties 38 hhds and one 
Tierce of Red French Wine which was purchased by Mr John Nisbet at 
one shilling above the upset price of each lot... 
 
This was the wine from the Pretty Nymph. Nisbet paid £555 10s 11d from which 
Peter Dalgleish was paid £32 by the Customs for the cost of transporting the 
 
67 NRS, CC15/5/9. 
68 Edinburgh, NRS, Scotland’s People, Wills and Testaments, Testament Dative and Inventory 
of the Debt of Alexander Kerr, 1770. 
69 Kay and Maclean, Knee Deep in Claret, p.140. 
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wine from Boulogne. The duty in 1763 was £67 per tun, which was the 
equivalent of 4 hogsheads. The duty on 38 hogsheads was, therefore, £636 
10s, so Nisbet was still saving money even if he was buying his own wine.70 A 
hogshead is 52.5 gallons and a tierce is 35 gallons, so Nisbet bought 2,030 
gallons – 10,150 reputed quarts–of claret at approximately 1s per quart. The 
capacity of an eighteenth-century British wine bottle was generally this ‘reputed 
quart’, or one-fifth of a gallon, much the same as today’s standard bottle.71 
Based on the price Nisbet paid, this came to 1s 1d per bottle, including the cost 
of the glass bottle. The wholesale price of Nisbet’s claret (‘fined down and ready 
to bottle’) advertised in the Newcastle Courant in 1755 was approximately 1s 
7¼d per bottle. In the same advertisement claret already bottled was advertised 
at between 2s and 2s 9d per bottle (Fig. 5/3). 
 
An advertisement from a Dublin Newspaper offered bottled claret at prices of 
between 1s 7d and 2s 5d per bottle (bottled) with a minimum order 262 
bottles.72 All these advertised prices are well above what Nisbet paid at the 
auction in Dunbar in 1767, of 1s per bottle. Allowing for bottling and some profit, 
Nisbet would still have been able to sell this claret at a lower price than those 
quoted. If, as seems likely, he was selling smuggled claret to Edinburgh wine 
merchants, then by the time it reached the end customer – the consumer – it 
may well have been at a similar price to ‘honest’ wine, and been presented as 
such, so any additional profit would have accrued to the retailer, which would 
have encouraged them to work with merchant-smugglers. The consumers who 
would have benefitted from cheaper smuggled wine were those who dealt 
directly with the smugglers, such as Parson Woodforde and the Reverend 
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5.6  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has laid out how contraband was imported and then distributed, 
from its arrival on British shores, to its acquisition by the final customer. There 
are gaps in the record, notably relating to the identities of the actual consumers, 
but – in the case of tea at least – it is safe to say that virtually everybody who 
bought tea in Scotland, bought smuggled tea. Nisbet’s relations with Bell and 
Rannie and, perhaps, with the Stewarts in Edinburgh suggest that wine 
merchants were also regular purchasers of contraband.  
 
The clearest evidence relates to tea and makes a strong case for a whole range 
of competitive advantages enjoyed by smugglers – hard to match in any other 
branch of the smuggling trade. The apparent failure of the East India Company 
to supply sufficient quantities of the right sort of tea at an acceptable price, left 
the door open for the merchant-smugglers and their suppliers, the continental 
East India Companies, particularly those of Denmark and Sweden, who were 
also known for the quality of their product. With tea, therefore, the merchant-
smuggler, the retailer and the customer all gained financially and in terms of 
quality and availability. With claret, some was supplied direct to customers, but 
most may well have been sold to urban wine merchants, who then integrated 
the smuggled claret into their regular stock and took the additional profit 
themselves. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that smuggling was indeed driven by a mixture of price and 
availability. The apparent shortages of supply of specific types of tea opened 
the door to the merchant-smuggler, whose success was further boosted by the 
very heavy tax levied. Claret was also heavily taxed and – during the frequent 
wars with France – not so easy to get hold of. The fact that there was an 
Eyemouth merchant in Bordeaux is very suggestive of an active local trade, 
largely designed to supply wine merchants with a competitively priced product.  
 
The overall picture is of a professionally organised trade, designed to fill gaps in 
the market and to maximise the profits of the dealers. The end customers, 
especially for tea, would have had little doubt as to the origin of their goods, as 
the use of the phrase ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ in the newspaper advertisements is 
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clearly code for ‘smuggled tea’ and everyone surely knew this, which indicates 
that smuggling could only exist on a large scale with the support of the 
community at all levels of society. The following chapter explores in detail the 
Importance of smuggling across the North Sea and the promotion of 





The international dimension: smuggling in the North Sea 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
Following extensive examination of the nature of smuggling, both in terms of 
how and why it worked, with a primary focus on the south-east coast of 
Scotland, this chapter looks further afield by proposing the existence of a 
distinctive ‘northern’ smuggling, with an emphasis on the creation of a specific 
market in discounted tea in the north of Britain. It will seek to analyse the scale 
of the smuggling of tea and will then follow the supply chain from source to 
customer, referring to John Nisbet as an example of a merchant-smuggler 
involved in this particular branch of trade. It will demonstrate that the principal 
sources of supply of contraband for Scotland and the north of England were 
directly across the North Sea, in Sweden, Denmark-Norway, and the 
Netherlands. This chapter will demonstrate that this is the key difference 
between the Scottish and northern English centres of smuggling and those in 
the south and west of England. Having identified the sources of contraband, the 
chapter will then look at its distribution and sale within northern Britain, making 
use of a range of sources, including contemporary advertising. 
 
The port of Eyemouth, and its community of ship owning merchants, had a 
regular coastal and overseas trade, primarily with Scandinavia and the Baltic. 
The growth of this trade, after the harbour improvements of 1748–1752, was 
discussed in more detail in chapter two. What is clear, however, is that it was 
the trade with Scandinavia and the Baltic which provided the opportunities for 
Eyemouth’s more ambitious merchants to broaden their business interests, 
especially as the Berwickshire hinterland continued to develop, providing an 
expanding customer base for both legitimate and illegitimate trade. After 
seeking to assess the impact of tea smuggling in Britain, it will then look in more 
detail at its importance to Scandinavia, reinforcing the view being developed 
there of the substantial reliance on smuggling tea to Britain for the economic 
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success of the East India Companies of both Denmark and Sweden.1 It will 
show the overlaps between the legitimate trade from Sweden and Denmark to 
Eyemouth and the illegitimate, building on, and challenging aspects of, Kent’s 
pioneering work in this field.2 One of the more speculative sections deals with 
the timber ports of southern Norway, where there are strong suggestions of a 
contraband trade, possibly in both directions, but little hard evidence at this 
time. In addition, it will identify and review the background and careers of some 
of the key individuals who had connections with John Nisbet and Eyemouth, 
particularly in Gothenburg, who supplied contraband goods, whilst maintaining a 
position and lifestyle in their adopted home appropriate to wholly legitimate 
merchants. It will further raise questions about the importance of the Jacobite 
sympathies of some of the key Scots in Gothenburg. 
 
Although Eyemouth was only a relatively small player in the smuggling 
business, it was not atypical. It can be seen, therefore, to be a microcosm of the 
trade as a whole, so that a detailed analysis of this one port offers a view of the 
whole northern smuggling world. My chapter in the New Coastal History offers a 
shorter view of tea smuggling in the North Sea, which has been considerably 
developed in the following pages. This resulted from a conference paper – one 
of several presented over the years – which were intended to float ideas and  
provoke discussion, relating to the idea of northern smuggling.3   
 
6.2 The scale of tea smuggling from Sweden and Denmark 
 
Of all the contraband goods smuggled across the North Sea in the eighteenth 
century, it was tea that made the greatest impact in Britain, both in terms of 
reduced prices for consumers and in arousing the antagonism of the authorities 
and legitimate tea merchants, particularly the large and influential East India 
interest. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider this trade in some detail. 
 
 
1 Mûller. ‘The Swedish East India trade’, pp.28–44. 
2 Kent, War and Trade   
3 Derek Janes, ‘…of which a contraband trade makes the basis of their profit’: Tea Smuggling in 
the North Sea, c.1750 – 1780, in David Worthington ed., The New Coastal History 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) pp 269 - 282 
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An account of the smuggling of tea, from Sweden and Denmark is given by 
Kent.4 He wrote that ‘the evidence for smuggling of tea from Scandinavia is 
extensive and incontrovertible’.5 That evidence came from what was said to 
parliamentary enquiries by ‘customs officers, by reformed or perhaps not quite 
so quiescent smugglers, and by other merchants’.6 The British consuls in 
Copenhagen and Gothenburg both reported on the trade, as did the consul in 
Bergen. Kent quotes figures of tea imports to Europe in 1750, showing that the 
English, the French and Dutch, and Swedes and Danes each brought in about 
one third of the amount shipped – despite there being seven English ships, 
eight French and Dutch and only four Swedish and Danish.7 The ships of the 
Swedish East India Company (SOIC) and Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) were 
consistently the biggest operating on the run from Canton to Europe, averaging 
just short of 1,000 metric tonnes.8 
 
In terms of the impact on the overall British tea market, it is necessary to 
consider the Swedish and Danish companies together, although it is almost 
exclusively ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ that are named in contemporary debates and 
advertisements. It is not clear why this was, although it may be to do with the 
sales methods of the two companies, in that Danish tea was sold, in the first 
instance, to Danish merchants, while the Swedish tea could be purchased 
directly by foreign merchants.  
 
Christan Koninckx, in his study of the first two charters of the SOIC, completed 
in 1977, wrote: ‘…much of the merchandise was re-exported. In this way the 
Swedish East India Company provided for the circulation of the products in 
Europe’.9 This a very delicate way of describing the situation, as what actually 
happened was that a high proportion of the tea imported from China to Sweden, 
and probably much the same proportion of tea brought to Denmark, was 
smuggled into Britain. Kent had already established the scale of this trade and 
his conclusions have been supported by the recent work of Leos Müller, among 
 
4 Kent, War and Trade, pp.112–129  
5 Kent, War and Trade, p.118  
6 Kent, War and Trade, p.118  
7 Kent, War and Trade, p.117.  
8 Koninckx, The First and Second Charters, p.430.  
9 Koninckx, The First and Second Charters, p.431.  
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others.10 Table 6/1 suggests that as much tea came into Britain from the 
Swedish and the Danish Companies as by the legitimate route of the 
Honourable East India Company. These figures are remarkably similar to those 
hazarded at the time and more recently worked out by W.A. Cole, without so 
clearly identifying the sources.11 Using average annual imports for seven seven-
year periods by the EIC, the SOIC and the DAC, then assuming that 10 per cent 
of the SOIC/DAC imports were consumed at home, leaving 90 per cent 
available for export to Britain, it indicates that over the periods in question, the 
likely combined imports from the SOIC and the DAC, indicated in column 3, 
were broadly equivalent to the legitimate imports of the EIC.  
 
 
1 2 3 
Period EIC S & D EICs 90% of col 2 
1734–1740 630 605 545 
1741–1748 901 1437 1293 
1749–1755 1393 1588 1429 
1756–1762 1475 1925 1733 
1763–1769 3063 1954 1759 
1770–1777 3097 2365 2129 
1778–1784 3433 3286 2957 
 
Table 6/1. Tea Imports from China 1734–1784, in tonnes 
 
Imports by the East India Company of London (EIC) compared to the Swedish and Danish 
companies combined (S & D EICs). The figures are the average annual imports for each period. 
Müller has identified that only about 10 per cent of tea imported by the SOIC was consumed in 
Sweden. It is not unreasonable to make a comparable assumption for the Danish Company.  
(Adapted from a table by Louis Dermigny, La Chine et L’Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au 
XVIIIe siècle, 1719–1833, tomes 1–2 (Paris, 1964), p.539, and reproduced in Leos Müller, 
‘Swedish East India Company and trade in tea 1731–1813’, lecture (Kyoto, 2004). 
NB: original table uses piculs, which I have converted to tonnes at 16.5 piculs per 1000 kg. 
 
Reinforcing this point, Müller, supporting Kent’s figures, also indicated that the 
two Scandinavian East India Companies imported between twenty-five and 
 
10 Kent, War and Trade; Mϋller, ‘The Swedish East India trade’.  
11 Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth Century Smuggling’.  
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thirty-five per cent of the tea brought from China to Europe in the peak years of 
the eighteenth century. He also emphasised the advantage enjoyed by the 
SOIC, in that, having been actively discouraged by the British from trading in 
India, it concentrated wholly on the trade in tea and China goods, meaning its 
round trips were much quicker than those of the other European companies.12 
 
In Müller’s later analysis of the re-exports of the SOIC’s goods, he records 51 
per cent going to the Netherlands, 11 per cent to France, 8 per cent to England, 
15 per cent to German harbours and 15 per cent to a variety of other outlets.13 
This supports the figures in the table above as the majority of these destinations 
can be linked with smuggling to Britain. 
 
Despite the absence of an alternative explanation for the disposal of the SOIC’s 
tea, Koninckx still doubted the extent of smuggling, although he does seem to 
have been in two minds: 
 
Whether the smuggling traffic was suitable as an outlet for the Swedish 
Company’s products is … difficult to discover …A legal export trade to 
Scotland, at all events, did fall within the scope of the Swedish Company. 
It is very much a question whether imports into Scotland would have 
been legal at all.14   
 
It is interesting to observe that Koninckx refers specifically to Scotland, not 
England or Britain. This is not explained. The case, referred to below 
concerning the Nisbets and Sibbald and Greig of Gothenburg serves to illustrate 
this apparent paradox stated by Koninckx – that it was legal to export tea from 
Sweden, but it was not legal to import it into Scotland – or, indeed, anywhere 
else on mainland Britain.15  
 
The sheer volume of tea smuggled into Britain from the SOIC and DAC had a 
significant effect on the domestic retail market. Kent makes a strong point about 
the impact on tea prices, for example: 
 
 
12 Mϋller, The Swedish East India trade, p.35  
13 Müller, ‘The Swedish East India Company: Strategies and functions of an interloper’, table 3. 
14 Koninckx, The First and Second Charters, p.282.  
15 NRS, CS229/NI/60. 
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But for smuggling, tea-drinking would hardly have become such a 
widespread habit as the price of legally imported tea was so high, and it 
was therefore ‘especially the damnified teas imported from Gottenburgh’ 
at a lower price which were said to have contributed to the spread of the 
tea drinking habit.16  
 
He added an extract from a letter from a London merchant, Blount, to his 
Correspondent in Gothenburg, during the War of the Austrian Succession, in 
1744: 
Sales of Tea will, I believe, be low as our ships cannot carry on the 
Smuggling Trade from Gothenburg as they used to do in time of Peace17 
 
Charles Paton, in his report to Henry Dundas, even suggested that the success 
of tea smuggling was responsible for ‘greatly facilitating the illicit trade in foreign 
spirits, which has been carried to a great height in Scotland’.18  
 
6.3 The distribution and sale of contraband tea in Scotland and the north 
of England 
 
There is no doubt that there was a substantial market in discounted, contraband 
tea. Jessica Hanser discusses the consumption of tea and China goods in the 
north-east of England in the eighteenth century.19 In my view, she 
underestimates the impact of smuggling. For example, when discussing the 
lower end of the market she notes that ‘these estimates do not take into 
consideration smuggled tea … consumers seeking to buy cheaper tea 
undoubtedly took advantage of the extensive system of smuggling.’ The 
evidence makes it clear that there was a single market for tea, operating quite 
openly. It seems unlikely that anybody, unless they went out of their way to be 
law abiding, would choose to buy legal tea, when the same, or even better-
quality tea was available at a discount. Paton is very clear that there was a 
distinctive Scottish preference for Congou tea: 
 
The Teas hitherto used in Scotland have Chiefly been the Congos & 
generally of the best kinds…The coarse Boheas or Brown Teas are very 
little used in Scotland. Any of this kind that the Smugglers bring in they 
generally send to the North and northwest of England. 
 
16 Kent, War and Trade, p.113.  
17 Kent, War and Trade, p.124, f.2. 
18 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 




Paton explained that, in his view, people in Scotland had developed this taste 
for the dearer Congou tea, at the lower price offered by smugglers, so 
effectively made it impossible for the EIC to compete. Aitchison added a further 
explanation of the success of smugglers: 
 
The Smuggler, from the credit he has abroad, and otherwise , gives 
credit to the retailer of 2,3,and 4 months which same inducement will 
make the retailer purchase from the Smuggler rather than at the public 
sale where he has money to pay ere he can receive his goods.20  
 
Having considered the scale of importation of tea from Sweden and Denmark, it 
is now necessary to develop the account given in chapter five of the distribution 
and sale of contraband tea. Both Charles Paton and John Aitchison, former tea 
dealers, described to Henry Dundas how the distribution of tea from smuggler to 
retailer operated. ‘I.C.’, probably Ilay Campbell, the Lord Advocate, the 
intermediary between Dundas and the two tea merchants, explained that 
 
Mr Paton being a Dealer in Glasgow is only acquainted with the trade on 
the west coast. He says that last year about 10,000 boxes of Congo 
containing 80 lbs average each were imported by the Smugglers upon 
the west coast, some small part of which was seized…He says that 
about 300 lbs wt of Congo is used in the City of Glasgow every day, not 
three pounds of which pays duty. 
 
The Smugglers bought this tea at Gottenburgh @ from 22 to 26 pence 
per pound. He considered the risk at sea six pence more, and the freight 
and other charges at about sixpence. There were people with whom he 
could Contract at these rates, so that the charge to him might be 
considered altogether at about 3/-, or from 2/10 to 3/2. 
 
The price which the Smuggler received from the dealer at Glasgow was 
from 4/3 to 5/- the Goods being delivered two miles without the town. The 
risk of bringing it from that place to Glasgow was considered as equal to 
3d per pound more, and the Dealer at Glasgow sold by retail at 6/ to 6/6 
per lb.21 
 
Paton pointed out that, in Edinburgh, the smugglers delivered the tea direct to 
retailers’ premises, charging an extra 3d or so per lb for bearing the risk. IC 
quoted Aitchison, the Edinburgh tea merchant, who he described as ‘one of the 
 
20 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
21 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
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most considerable dealers in Edinburgh in the article of smuggled teas’ as 
indicating a higher reward to the retailer and lower to the smuggler, but this was 
not consistent with a range of other accounts that IC had been given. Aitchison 
may be a less reliable correspondent than Paton as, for example, he claims that 
his trade in the north of England was supplied from teas purchased at the 
Custom House and Excise sales in Scotland, which seems highly unlikely.22 
 
As with all areas of smuggling, the detailed impact on the retail market is hard to 
assess. The work of Mui and Mui is important in this regard and their findings 
are supported by what seems a startling range of press advertisements. These 
serve to demonstrate the strength of the Gottenburgh ‘brand’ in terms of both 
quality and price. 
 
 
Figure 6/1. Caledonian Mercury, 9 January 1750 
 
This example shows how ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ had become a brand name, as 
early as 1750.23 The advertisers make it clear that what they are offering is 
genuine in that ‘The above Teas are all neat in their Packages, as imported 
from the Swedish East India House at Gottenburgh.’ An advertisment from 1755 
makes it clear that the tea on that occasion came from the Custom House at 
Leith and was, presumably, therefore, seized contraband. 24 This was one way 
of obtaining the necessary excise permit, which could then be used for all teas 
sold.25 
 
22 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
23 Janes, ‘Fine Gottenburgh Teas’, p229 
24  A Sale of Teas, Caledonian Mercury. Edinburgh (16 September 1755).  





Figure 6/2. Newcastle Courant, 30 June 1770 
 
This example from Newcastle advertises ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ quite openly as a 
superior product, while Thomas Bonner in Leeds is very blatant about both the 
quality and price of ‘Gottenburgh Teas’, in comparison with those imported by 
the English East India Company. 
 
 
Figure 6/3. Leeds Intelligencer, 27 June 1779 
 
.A search of the British Newspaper Archive for ‘Gottenburgh Teas’, with five 
different spellings of Gottenburgh, for all papers in all places between 1750 and 
1780 reveals advertisements only in Edinburgh (50), Newcastle (12) and Leeds 
(2).26 Even allowing for any issues with the use of the Newspaper Archive, this 
strongly supports the view, despite the letter from Blount quoted above, that the 
main public market for tea from Gothenburg was the north of England and 
Scotland. It is also clear that these teas were being sold quite openly, despite 
such products being clearly prohibited goods.27 
 
The Muis emphasise the existence of a particular Scottish market, with a 
preference for Congou – rather than the cheaper Bohea tea which was the entry 
level product in England. They also indicate the importance of Edinburgh, with 
 
26 http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/search/advanced, retrieved 2 March, 2015.  
27 Janes, ‘Fine Gottenburgh Teas’. 
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Aitchison of Edinburgh selling tea in Newcastle, Shields, Durham and Leeds.28 
This is further borne out by this advertisement from the Newcastle Courant, in 
which the Edinburgh Tea Company promotes Gothenburg teas in Newcastle 
and Durham.  
 
 
Figure  6/4. Newcastle Courant, 15 August 1778 
 
This and a series of related adverts prompted an exchange of correspondence 
in the Newcastle Courant between the Edinburgh Tea Company (ETC) and 
other locally based tea dealers, with the latter accusing the ETC of misleading 
the public, claiming that they had actually bought their tea in London, so the 
ETC’s assertion that they sold tea ‘greatly below the London Wholesale Prices’ 
was untrue. They concluded that ‘the fair Trader, like the regular bred 
Physician, scorns the Lure of Advertisements and Hand-bills,–whilst others 
imitate the Practice of the Empirick, and try “to take the Unwary in”.’ The use of 
the term ‘fair Trader’ is interesting in this context – were they perhaps seeking 
to flush out the smuggling business that lay behind the ETC’s ability to set low 
prices. William Ritchie, the Manager of the ETC responded to the ‘very 
 




extraordinary and scurrilous Attack made upon them’. Ritchie admitted having 
bought some very particular brands of tea in London but claimed that the ETC 
‘have within these twelve Months sent several thousand Pounds of such Teas 
as they sell in Newcastle to London; and the Gentlemen who sign the Letter 
have bought in Scotland…several particular Parcels of Teas for the Newcastle 
Market’. Ritchie observes the success of the ETC and concludes by observing 
that ‘in my Opinion, that Tea at 7s. sold by the Company, is equal to theirs at 
9s. But the kind Writers seem to be in Despair,–and I hope we shall bring them 
to Repentence’.29  
 
What this correspondence describes is the trade between Scotland and London 
referred to by the Muis, whereby in 1776, for example, 71,754 lbs of tea were 
sent by permit from England to Scotland, as opposed to 180,978 lbs from 
Scotland to England. This is again extraordinary, with what was clearly 
smuggled tea being shipped by permit to London, where it was sold in 
competition with the teas of the East India Company. It is also suggested that 
the vendors of smuggled tea would regularly buy some quantity of tea from 
London to mix with their contraband and create a situation which allowed their 
stocks to appear wholly lawful. The Muis explain this process in some detail.30 
They also quote contemporary figures suggesting that as much as 800,000 lbs 
of contraband tea was delivered to Edinburgh dealers each year and that at 
least as much as 80 per cent of all tea sold was smuggled. This represents 
about 10,000 cases of tea. The Muis’ key sources are those letters from 
Charles Paton, the tea merchant in Glasgow and John Aitchison from 
Edinburgh, both written in 1785 and supplied to Henry Dundas, who managed 
Scotland for the Government and was seeking to assess the impact of the 
Commutation Act of 1785 on the internal tea trade, quoted in section 6.3 
above.31  
 
Despite the detailed records kept by the Excise of all tea sold, a retailer had to 
have a permit for the purchase of more than 6 lbs, smugglers and their 
merchant associates were able to operate successfully and openly sell 
 
29 To the Editor...Newcastle Courant. Newcastle, 1 August 1778.  
30 Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade’, p.64.  
31 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
198 
 
contraband tea, particularly in the east of Scotland and the north-east of 
England. Having established the existence of this well managed market, it is 
now appropriate to look at the source of the famed ‘Gottenburgh Teas’, the term 
used to market the product. 
 
6.4   The Swedish East India Company and the Danish Asiatic Company 
 
Scandinavia, as the map below (Fig. 6/5), shows, dominated the regular 
overseas trade of Eyemouth and it equally dominated the smuggling trade. This 
was because of the presence of two successful – and single minded – East 
India companies in Sweden and Denmark. Before analysing the contributions of 
Sweden and Denmark (including Norway) to the smuggling trade, it is apposite 
to review these two companies. 
 
Established in 1731, the SOIC was one of the last of the East India Companies 
to be set up. Koninckx suggests that the reason for this was the nature of 
Sweden’s political structures and ambitions.32 Mûller explains the background to 
this: ‘By 1718 – 21, Sweden had lost its great power status and political interest 
shifted from military to commercial priorities; in a way the active economic policy 
of the 1720s and 1730s was a substitute for military expansion.’33 He further 
develops this thinking, explaining that  the shift of political power from the king 
to the riksdag and the royal council ‘gave the commercial elite much more 
political influence. After 1718, this social group could participate more actively in 
shaping Sweden’s economic policy than in the seventeenth century: 
consequently, the interests of different mercantile groups became an integral 
part of Sweden’s policy.’34 
 
Gothenburg, established in early seventeenth century as a major westward 
facing port, became the centre of this new approach, with the founding of the 
SOIC, one of whose moving spirits was the Scottish merchant Colin Campbell. 
After abortive attempts to develop trade with India, the SOIC concentrated 
 
32 Koninckx, The First and Second Charters, p.31 
33 Leos Mûller, Consuls, Corsairs and Commerce: The Swedish Consular Service & Long 
Distance Shipping, 1720 – 1815, (Uppsala, Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 2004), p. 19 
34 Mûller, Consuls, Corsairs and Commerce, p.40 
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entirely on the importation of tea and China goods from Canton, sailing directly 
there and back, paving the way for around fifty years of commercial success.35  
 
In his chapter on the Third Charter of the SOIC (1766 – 1786), Kjellberg shows 
clearly how tea dominated the homeward bound trade – almost 45m thalers in 
silver out of total imports valued at 54m. He further makes the point that, of the 
outward bound cargoes, totalling some 79m thalers, almost 75m thalers 
consisted of silver, with only 456k thalers of Swedish broadcloth. ‘The Swedish 
standard goods, such as iron, wood and tar are missing, although a condition 
for the charter was that the Company should further Swedish products.’36 
 
Kjellberg describes the slow decline of the SOIC during the period of the fourth 
and fifth charters. The management estimated that the Company had lost more 
than five sixths of its market in the 1790s due to the restrictions in England and 
Holland. The shareholders received no dividend during the period of the fourth 
charter (1786 – 1806).37 The fifth and final charter (1806 – 1813) saw the end of 
the Company, with no ships at all being sent to Canton. Instead tea was 
imported in American ships, which led to a short-lived re-export trade. The 
Company was dissolved in 1813, having settled its foreign debt and given the 
shareholders three years interest of 15%.38 
 
A further element in the success of the SOIC, and an explanation of the 
popularity of ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ in Britain was quality. According to the Muis 
 
Contemporaries reported that the Swedes ‘got the best tea’ by 
contracting in advance with the silver they brought to China: the credit of  
the Danes was ‘tolerably well established at Canton’ … Only the Dutch 
had a reputation for bringing to Europe ‘teas of the worst qualities’.39 
 
Feldbaek writes that between 1600 and 1843 there had been ‘at least twenty 
Danish trading companies’ of which eighteen were formed within a period of 
125 years from 1656 to 1782.40 Of these companies, the Danish Asiatic 
 
35 C. Gill, ‘The Affair of Porto Novo: an Incident in Anglo-Swedish Relations’, English Historical 
Review 73(286), 1958, 47-65 
36 Kjellberg, Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna, p.317 
37 Kjellberg, Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna, p.318-9 
38 Kjellberg, Svenska Ostindiska Compagnierna, p.319 
39 Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade’, p.48.  
40 Feldbaek, The Danish Trading Companies, p 204 
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Company (DAC) operated in different forms from 1616 until it ceased in 1843. It 
enjoyed a monopoly of trade with China and in Chinese goods throughout the 
period. The DAC was established by Copenhagen merchants, with the support 
of Dutch promoters and followed the form of the Dutch East India Company, 
although, as Feldbaek writes ‘the economic success, which the Danish 
company also tried to copy, was never vouchsafed to it.’41  
 
The first company, which established factories in India and what is now 
Indonesia was, according to Feldbaek, ‘an economic fiasco’.42 It was not wound 
up until 1650, although the royal colony of Tranquebar in India was retained, 
despite no Danish ships visiting for 29 years. The second company was 
established in 1670 and survived until 1729, when it was wound up, with both 
the charter and Tranquebar being handed back to the King, although Feldbaek 
thinks that this may have been a ruse to allow the creation of a debt free 
company, which is what happened when the DAC was founded in 1732.43 
 
Despite a small domestic market – even by the end of the eighteenth century 
90% of Chinese goods were being re-exported – Denmark benefited from being 
largely neutral in a century of warfare. ‘…it was only when their competitors’ 
trade was crippled in whole or part by war that the Copenhagen auctions 
produced satisfactory results.’44 The other change in the eighteenth century was 
that many of the goods imported from China were no longer luxuries but, in the 
case of tea for example, effectively necessities. This very much supports the 
view of Denmark-Norway joining Sweden as a source of contraband tea.  
 
Table 6/1 illustrates the significance of both the SOIC and the DAC as importers 
of tea into Europe and their reliance on smuggling into Britain. Both the Swedish 
and Danish Companies only began to fail when the duty on tea imports into 
Britain was slashed in 1784, at a stroke rendering tea smuggling uneconomic. 
This is reinforced by Mads Kirkebaek, who wrote that ‘the heavy British duties 
had made it a profitable business to smuggle tea… However, in 1784 the British 
 
41 Feldbaek, The Danish Trading Companies, p 206 
42 Feldbaek, The Danish Trading Companies, p 206 
43 Feldbaek, The Danish Trading Companies, p 208 
44 Feldbaek, The Danish Trading Companies, p 208 
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government …reduced (the duty) to 12 per cent. This took away the advantage 




Figure 6/5. Eyemouth and the North Sea. 
 
The numbers are the total number of recorded voyages between Eyemouth and each 
district between 1740 and 1790. This map clearly illustrates how well-placed Eyemouth 
is to trade with the principal northern smuggling centres. While not every voyage would 




45 M. Kirkebaek, ‘The voyage of the Dronningen af Danmark to China 1742’, in K.E. 
Broedsgaard and M. Kirkebaek (eds), China and Denmark: Relations since 1674 (Copenhagen: 
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2001), p.43.  
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6.5  Smuggling from Sweden and Denmark 
 
An analysis of the trading links of Eyemouth, illustrated in Fig. 6/5, provides an 
understanding of the way that the North Sea smuggling trade worked and how it 
followed the pattern of legitimate trade. The SOIC re-exported the bulk of its tea 
directly from Gothenburg, but the DAC’s smuggling outlets were more 
complicated. Whereas the SOIC sales were open to all, those of the DAC were 
restricted to Danish buyers only and, whilst the names of the buyers are known, 
there is little or no record of their disposal of the tea purchased. As explained 
below, some was smuggled direct from Danish territory, but Kent believed that 
more shipments went to England via Holland and the Austrian Netherlands. He 
notes that shares in the DAC were held in the Dutch and Flemish ports from 
where smuggling to Britain was carried out.46 
 
Bergen was a known outlet for DAC contraband, but the timber ports of south 
Norway were also used, as was Copenhagen itself, the Faroe Islands and, 
perhaps, Altona, the southernmost of the Danish-controlled ports, now a suburb 
of Hamburg.47 There is only a little hard evidence for any of this, but there is 
enough to draw tentative conclusions. 
 
Sweden had a legitimate trade with Britain, exporting iron, tar and timber. In the 
1750s, for example, Britain took over one half of Sweden’s bar iron exports, 
which, in turn, accounted for at least half the bar iron requirements of British 
industry.48 This trade meant that ships were regularly traversing the North Sea 
for legitimate reasons. In terms of Eyemouth, there were thirty-six recorded 
arrivals from Gothenburg, thirty of which carried timber and iron, two just iron, 
one timber only and another carried hemp and hemp tow in addition to timber 
and iron.49 Two had cargoes unrecorded. There was only one recorded export 
cargo – wheat, barley, oatmeal and malt in 1750. While it is always difficult to 
identify undetected smuggles, between 1782 and 1784 the Elizabeth also 
known as the Betsy and Peggie, John Lyon, master, brought timber and iron 
into Eyemouth on four occasions. John Lyon, however, was a notorious 
 
46 Kent, War and Trade, p.122.  
47  Kent, War and Trade, p.119.  
48  Kent, War and Trade, p.76.  
49 NRS, E504/10. 
203 
 
smuggler, referred to thus, by the Customs in connection with an otherwise 
unrecorded voyage from Gothenburg, in the same ship, in October/November 
1785: ‘getting hold of his vessel will be difficult as he is a most Compleat artfull 
Fellow for the Business. No capture will destroy smuggling on that Coast as 
much as securing this vessel.’50 These figures are only from the Eyemouth end. 
Grage, for example, analysing the Gӧteborgs tolagsräkenskäper notes three 
Eyemouth ships leaving Gothenburg in 1755, whereas no matching arrivals are 
recorded in the Collectors Quarterly Accounts.51 This suggest two patterns: the 
Eyemouth based ships didn’t necessarily sail to Eyemouth and that there is a 
substantial piece of work to be done in Gothenburg analysing the records and 
tying up recorded departures with recorded arrivals. John Nisbet’s dealings with 
Scott and Fraser and Sibbald and Greig further confirm the reality of smuggling 
direct from Gothenburg to Eyemouth.52 The key to this smuggling from 
Gothenburg lay partly in the merchant community in that city. 
 
 ‘The history of Gothenburg has been closely linked with that of England and 
Scotland since the town was founded in 1621’. So starts John R. Ashton’s 
survey of the British in Gothenburg, which then proceeds to demonstrate this 
with clarity and detail.53 One of the founding members of the town government 
of Gothenburg in 1621 was Thomas Stewart, a Scot who had been enrolled as 
a burgher of Nylӧse, the settlement that preceded Gothenburg. Other Scots 
came over to Sweden to join the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, the great 
protestant leader in the Thirty Years War. Unlike the Scots and other 
Europeans, the English were reluctant to be naturalized, which was a pre-
requisite for becoming a burgher and being permitted to trade. 
 
During the seventeenth century, trading connections built up with England, with 
London, Newcastle and, especially Hull. In the 1720s several Scots worked for 
the Ostend east India company, then, after it failed, moved to Gothenburg. 
Murdoch paints a picture of a vigorous and influential Scottish presence in the 
early modern period: ‘Scots also played an important role in the development of 
 
50 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 19 November 1785. 
51 Elsa-Britta Grage, ‘Scottish Merchants in Gothenburg, 1621–1850’, in T.S. Smout (ed.), 
Scotland and Europe, 1200–1850 (Edinburgh, 1986), pp.112–127; NRS, E504/10, 1755/1756. 
52 NRS, RS19/17/140–1; NRS, CS229/NI/60. 
53 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London.  
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Scandinavian cities and their infiltration into the institutional apparatus of 
Sweden in particular was breath-taking.’54 His pioneering work on the Scots 
development of networks in northern Europe prior to the mid-eighteenth century 
sets the scene for their involvement in the Swedish end of the smuggling 
trade.55 He has also worked to effectively destroy the myth of the connection 
between Jacobites and Freemasons in northern Europe, notably by 
demonstrating that both Hanoverians and Jacobites were active in 
Freemasonry.56 
 
An upsurge in Scots coming to the city followed the defeat of the Jacobite rising 
in 1746. The Swedes had agreed with the French to provide military support to 
the Jacobites in Scotland, but the ship involved was icebound in Gothenburg 
until too late to help. A few refugees came over, however, many of whom 
stayed on. It was this group, together with other Scots who had come both 
earlier and later, who formed the substantial and influential Scottish merchant 
community in the middle of the eighteenth century.57 They all appear to have 
enjoyed good reputations in Gothenburg, but as many of them were involved in 
the purchase of tea, it is highly likely that they participated in smuggling that tea 
into Britain. There is surely no other justification for the purchase of tea at the 
SOIC sales. The presence of these merchants in Gothenburg was crucial to the 
success of the merchant-smugglers of Eyemouth. Their knowledge and 
understanding of the ‘home’ market made them especially valuable contacts. It 
is important to bear in mind that, in all these cases, the smugglers, the 
importers of contraband, were merchants, dealing directly with fellow 
merchants, often Scottish or with Scottish roots. As George Johnston observed 
in the Sibbald and Greig case: ‘…this smuggling trade is carried on between the 
natives at home and the Houses abroad in the most regular and systematic 
manner, a trade the most lawfull could not be carried on more avowedly….’58 
  
 
54 Murdoch, ‘The Scots and Early Modern Scandinavia’, p.41.  
55 Murdoch, Network North.  
56 Steve Murdoch, ‘Des reseaux de conspirationdans le Nord? Une étude de la franc-
maconnerie jacobite et hanoverienne en Scandinavie et en Russie, 1688 – 1746’ Politica 
Hermetica,24 (Sorbonne, 2010) (English translation, pp. 21 and 27 
57 Behre, ‘Sweden and the Rising of 1745’, 148–171.  
58 NRS, CS229/NI/60. 
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A number of these merchants had known trading connections with Eyemouth. In 
May 1777, for example, there is a record of John Nisbet settling a debt of £372 
12s 6d owed to John Brown, merchant in Edinburgh, on behalf of Messrs Scott 
and Frazer of Gothenburg.59 This is a substantial sum and is highly likely to 
have been for tea. In the latest (1759) of the online sales catalogues of the 
SOIC, Scott and Company were regular buyers of tea.60 Both John Scott and 
John Frazer became burghers of Gothenburg and were also founder members 
in 1769 of the Bachelors’ Club, ‘where the members could meet for billiards, 
and pleasant undisturbed fellowship’.61 In 1759 John Scott was one of the 
signatories on behalf of the British Congregation who bound themselves to 
spend a bequest from Colin Campbell, one of the founders of the SOIC, 
towards the building of a church.62 John Scott was a subscriber, with a number 
of other Gothenburg Scots, to the publication in 1759 of the former SOIC 
supercargo William Chambers’ book ‘A Treatise of Civil Architecture’.63 Scott 
had been a leading Jacobite – originally a merchant in Montrose he was a 
soldier in Ogilvy’s Regiment and then Deputy Governor of Montrose, where he 
was imprisoned by the government in 1746, whence he escaped and fled to 
Gothenburg. 
 
Figure 6/6. Early members of the Bachelors’ Club, Gothenburg.  
 
Henry Greig’s name is prominent in the centre, with John Sibbald’s just underneath. 
The names of John Scott and John Fraser, other associates of John Nisbet, can also 
be made out. From the home page of the website of the Royal Bachelors Club 
http://www.rbc.se/rbc.asp  
 
59 NRS, RS19/17/140–1. 
60 University of Warwick, Sale Catalogues of the Swedish East India Company,  
61 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.67.  
62 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.60.  
63  Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.38.  
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John Sibbald, whose father was in partnership with Henry Greig, pursued 
Nisbet, and then his sequestrated estate, for the final payment on a 
consignment of tea. The legal challenges relating to this case provide some of 
the detail of Nisbet’s business affairs.64 Johnston describes Sibbald thus: 
 
The chief Partner of the House John Sibbald constantly resided at 
Kinghorn and it is believed was seldom if ever out of the country – his 
son, the Present Claimant, went to Gothenburgh and as Acting Partner of 
the House supplied such commissions as were sent from this country. 
He has returned some years since after having made a handsome 
fortune and purchased the estate of Abden in the neighbourhood of 
Kinghorn his native Place. 
 
The name of John Sibbald, probably the son, appears in the records of the 
British Factory at Gothenburg and he was also a founder member of the 
Bachelors’ Club.65 In 1771 the ship Sea Hero arrived in Eyemouth from 
Gothenburg with a cargo of timber and iron for Henderson and Renton and 
Robert Robertson. The master was William Sibbald and her home port was 
Kinghorn, surely part of the Sibbald family business.66  
 
Henry Greig, who was John Sibbald senior’s business partner may have been 
born in 1743 – certainly a child of this name was baptised at Lunan, with two 
merchants as witnesses, one from Montrose. Other sources give a birth date of 
1750 or 1740.67 He is reported as being active in Gothenburg by 1765, which 
makes an earlier date more likely. In 1771 he was actively involved in 
smuggling in the Forth, just off Kinghorn, Sibbald’s home port and, in a report to 
the Board of Customs on 13 May, a warrant was sought for his arrest.68 Later 
that same month Greig wrote to the Nisbets, for the first time that is known, 
almost certainly enclosing the 1771 sale catalogue of the SOIC (‘…the following 
letters, also inclosing a printed Note of the Teas to be sold by him.’) and 




64 NRS, CS229/N/1/60. 
65 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.67.  
66 NRS, E504/10, 8 August 1771. 
67 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.84; ‘Det gamla Goteborg’ from 
http://gamlagoteborg.se/2014/04/09/chalmers-ostindiska-opiumsmuggling-och-slojdskola/  
68 NRS, CE1/12, 13 May 1771. 
69 NRS, CS 229/NI/60. 
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In terms of Greig’s life in Gothenburg, he was a distinguished citizen. Like the 
others referred to above, he was a founder member of the Bachelors’ Club in 
1769. He was an active member of the British Factory, the organisation of 
British merchants and factors, from 1773, four times Treasurer of the British 
Poor Box and became a Burgher in 1780. He became involved in the 
governance of Gothenburg, especially as an auditor of public funds, he 
established a malthouse and brewery and is chiefly remembered as working 
with the Burgomaster to raise subscriptions to fund the bringing of piped water 
to the town in 1785. He suffered from the slump in trade in the 1790s and went 
bankrupt in 1794, dying in 1798.70 
 
Born in 1726, George Carnegie, another Jacobite, from a landowning family of 
Pitarrow in Kincardineshire, fought at Culloden in Charles Edward Stewart’s 
Lifeguards. Following the defeat, he escaped and fled to Gothenburg, where he 
found employment with a British house. In 1752 he was elected a member of 
the British Factory, becoming Treasurer of the British Poor Box in 1755 and 
1762 and giving generously to the English Church. He was close to two 
merchants originating from Hull – John Hall and William Williamson.71 By 1758 
he was in business on his own account and was enrolled as a burgher in 
Gothenburg. He was involved in the import and export business, exporting 
timber, iron bars and China goods, including tea. He seems always to have 
intended to have returned to Scotland, writing to his former captain in July 1759 
 
I have resided in this country ever since the Reduction of our Troop and 
find no cause to repent my changing the military for mercantile State of 
Life. I am now turning my thoughts homeward, tho’ I have not yet 
determined in what part of Scotland I shall take up my habitation!72 
 
George Carnegie ‘from the Lodge of St John in Gottenburg’ visited the masonic 
Lodge St Ebbe in Eyemouth on 12 February 1761.73 In that year he and his 
Trustees were pursuing a petition at the Admiralty Court regarding a master on 
one of his ships who had embezzled £150 paid for a cargo of timber at 
 
70 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.85. 
71 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p.123 . 
72 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.70. 
73 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.   
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Inveraray.74 His lawyer and trustee in this case was Robert Jamieson WS, who 
also acted for Robert Robertson of Eyemouth. Might this explain his visit? 
According to Ashton he returned to settle in Scotland in 1768 or 1769, so he 
may well have been paying a discreet visit to sort out his problem, before his 
pardon had come through and there were few more discreet places than 
Eyemouth that were near to Edinburgh, where Jamieson was based.75 
Jamieson was still acting for Carnegie in 1767 when he was in dispute with a 
merchant in Dundee.76 In 1767 he re-acquired the family home at Pitarrow in 
Kincardineshire and lived out his life in Scotland, where he died in 1799.77 His 
son, David, returned to Gothenburg where he joined John Hall’s business and 
eventually established his own firm, which still survives, even if in name only, as 
the Swedish Investment Bank, Carnegie.78 From this account of his career, two 
matters stand out – his unexplained visit to Eyemouth in 1761 and the reference 
to his dealings in tea. According to Ashton, some of his financial records 
survive, not least a Book of Charges. These may well throw some light on his 
dealings. Unfortunately, this book does not appear to be in the local archives 
and Ashton died in 2008. 
Of the other merchants, John Hall did supply cargoes to Eyemouth ships and 
buy tea, but it is not possible to make a closer connection at this stage. In terms 
of the bigger picture of ‘northern’ smuggling, however, it is surely not irrelevant 
that the Halls came from Hull and would have retained contacts in that port and 
its hinterland.79 
 
What is clear from this, is that Gothenburg, the source of the best quality 
contraband tea, was well placed geographically and in terms of connections 
with Scotland, with its cadre of Scottish and northern English merchants. The 
fact that several the Scots were also Jacobite exiles would certainly indicate 
that they would have been accustomed to working with discretion. It is also 
 
74 Edinburgh, NRS, Carnegie, G. and Trustees, Petition to the Admiralty Court. Edinburgh, 
1761, AC8/1036. 
75 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.70. 
76 Edinburgh, NRS,  Robert Garrie (Garry) v Robert Jamieson, Trustee for George Carnegie of 
Pitarrow, 1767, CS271/63597 and 63519.  
77 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.70.  
78 ‘Carnegie’, from http://www.carnegie.se/en/about-carnegie/history/, accessed 2015.  
79 Ashton, Lives and livelihoods in Little London, p.73. 
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likely that they would have been able to use old Jacobite colleagues in Scotland 
as trusted contacts. It is notable, however, that these merchants, these 
suppliers of contraband, were largely leading citizens of Gothenburg and their 
association with this trade evidently did no harm to their reputations. This surely 
serves to reinforce Müller’s assertion as to the importance of smuggling to the 
commercial success of the SOIC,80 itself perhaps a symbol of national 
resurgence after the collapse of Sweden’s military force early in the eighteenth 
century. The men contributing to the commercial success of the SOIC were 
then acting in Sweden’s national interest. 
 
Denmark included Norway during the period covered by this work. Unlike 
Sweden, whose exports of contraband all came from Gothenburg, Denmark-
Norway had a more complex series of outlets. The area with which Eyemouth 
has the strongest links was Norway and, although concrete evidence of 
smuggling from Norway is thin, circumstantial evidence is quite strong. The 
main import to Britain from Norway was timber, from the south coast and 
Bergen. Unlike Sweden, which, as far as Eyemouth was concerned, meant only 
Gothenburg, Norway had regular trade with Eyemouth on a long-term basis. 
There was a total of one hundred and thirty-nine recorded voyages to and from 
Norway between 1743 and 1785.81  
 
In smuggling circles, Bergen was best known as a false destination. Examples 
relating to Eyemouth include ‘the Ship Unity of Eymouth…from Rotterdam being 
arrived in the Harbour of Burntisland, pretending to have been forced up the 
Firth in distress, and to be bound for Bergen…’ (1756); the sloop Charles and 
Mary of Carron Water found at anchor off Lumsdean Bay ‘pretended designed 
to be carried to Bergen’ (1757); the ship Molly of Eyemouth loaded with spirits 
and other goods ‘pretending to be bound for Bergen’ (1760); ‘the ship Pretty 
Nymph … pretending to be bound for Bergen in Norway’ (1767).82 
 
Bergen was as far north as a ship with contraband would need to pretend to 
travel, to allow her to sail up the east coast, in order to run her cargo. The case 
 
80 Müller, ‘The Swedish East India Company’, pps. 6–8.  
81 NRS, E504/10. 
82 NRS, CE56/2/1–5.  
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of the Unity shows clearly how the pretence worked, whereby the master 
claimed that she was in distress, when, in fact, she was suspected of hovering 
at the mouth of the Firth of Forth. The Charles and Mary had the misfortune to 
be caught in the act, anchored just off one of the main ‘running’ beaches near 
Eyemouth. We know that the Molly was a smuggler – belonging to the Nisbet 
brothers – as two of the crew later became informers. The cargo of the Pretty 
Nymph was seized and sold – to John Nisbet.83 
 
There were, however, genuine links with Bergen. There were 19 recorded 
voyages between Eyemouth and Bergen – nine outwards and ten inwards to 
Eyemouth. The exports to Bergen were all grain – barley, oatmeal and malt. 
The imports varied. In the 1740s they were mostly Iberian or Mediterranean 
goods, presumably being re-exported from Bergen – Levant wines, prunes, 
almonds and cork, for example, lipra raisins and Levant wines and raisins, 
prunes and Italian brandy. One more unusual cargo included lemons. From 
about 1750 onwards, the recorded imports were timber and tar – just what 
would be expected.84 
 
Alexander Wallace, a Norwegian merchant of Scottish descent, was appointed 
British Consul at Bergen in 1744. He reported to the British government on 
smuggling from Bergen in 1757, describing how shipments of East India goods 
were sent from Copenhagen to Bergen, whence they were smuggled to 
Britain.85 Wallace would have known about this from personal experience, as he 
himself had at least two ships seized by the Customs, one of which, the George 
of Sunderland, was taken by Daniel Dow, the Commander of the King’s Boat at 
Eyemouth in June 1765.86 Alexander Wallace, merchant in Bergen, made a 
claim for the cargo and offered a composition, which was accepted by the 
Board of Customs.87  
 
In March 1762 Maria Margarethe of Bergen, with a declared cargo of timber, tar 
and nuts was wrecked on the approach to Eyemouth. Her master, the merchant 
 
83 NRS, CE56/2/1–5.  
84 NRS, E504/10. 
85 Kent, War and Trade, p.119.  
86 NRS, CE56/2/3, 18 June 1765. 
87 NRS, CE1/11, 31 October 1765. 
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who owned the cargo and one of the crew were all made members of the Lodge 
St Ebbe in Eyemouth and John Renton, the agent to the Homes of Billie, 
organised the salvage of the cargo.88 Despite this misfortune, the Board of 
Customs wrote to Dunbar concerning the ship, instructing the officials there to 
‘endeavour to procure evidence of the hovering of this ship and Running the 
quantity of spirits by these mentioned – not under fifty ankers’.89 
 
South Norway was the part of Scandinavia with which Eyemouth had the most 
frequent connections. For example, there were 117 shipping movements 
recorded between Eyemouth and southern Norway, compared to 22 for Bergen, 
Stavanger and Trondheim and 36 for Gothenburg.90 There is a sequence of 
small harbours along the south coast of Norway – Risor, Krogero, Dram, 
Christiansand and several others, as well as Christiania (Oslo).  
 
Port Ships Percentage 
Arendal 1 0.80 
Krogero 7 6.00 
Dram 9 8.00 
Christiania (Oslo) 15 13.00 
Risor  53 45.00 
Fredericksdal 3 2.54 
Christiansand 14 12.00 
Long Sound 1 0.80 
Frederickstad 4 3.42 
Moss 1 0.80 
Postground (Porssgrund) 1 0.80 
Mandel 8 6.84 
 
Table 6/2. Recorded ports of departure in south Norway for ships arriving in Eyemouth 
with timber, 1744–1785 
Source: Collector’s Quarterly Accounts, Dunbar91 
   
 
88 NRS, E504/10, 9 April 1762; Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.  
89 NRS, CE56/2/2, 4 March 1762. 
90 NRS, E504/10. 
91 NRS, E504/10.  
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Of these, Risor was far and away the most popular departure point, with 53 
ships – 45 per cent of the total. The next was Christiania with 15 (13 per cent). 
This contradicts Kent’s view, which was that ‘few shipments from southern 
Norway to Scotland can be traced’, that ‘Scotland received its timber from 
western Norway’ and that ‘the Scottish trade appears to have been practically 
exclusively a barter trade’. The first two points are addressed by the figures 
quoted above and the concept of a barter trade is undermined by the fact that 
there are no recorded exports from Eyemouth to southern Norway. Kent 
describes the barter trade process thus: ‘Fleets of small Scottish ships of a 
hundred or so tons brought mainly grain, some coal, a few textiles, sugar and 
tobacco in exchange for wood. Shipmasters would delay unloading their cargo 
until they had been assured of timber, which was sometimes carried to 
England.’92 79 out of the 117 voyages from southern Norway to Eyemouth were 
undertaken by Norwegian ships – 67 per cent of the total, which further 
contradicts Kent.  
 
One evidence of business process is contained in a statement of account 
between Michael Leon of Christiansand and Harry Knox and John Nisbet, dated 
7 March 1754 according to which Leon owed Knox and Nisbet £20 8s plus £1 
11s 9d interest ‘which he promises to pay in good wood’.93 It is intriguing that 
Leon owed Knox and Nisbet money. Were they smuggling goods to Norway? In 
an article about new exotic goods in Norway, Ragnhild Hutchison seeks to 
identify the scale of imports of tobacco, sugar and coffee by sampling local 
customs records, but she adds a caveat: ‘It should be emphasized that there is 
no reason to believe that what was noted in the customs records was all that 
arrived. Norway has the longest coastline in Europe, and there was no way 
customs officials could patrol it thoroughly for smuggling.’94  
 
In terms of concrete evidence for smuggling to Britain, this is hard to come by. 
In November 1776 a ship was reported arriving at Montrose laden with deals 
from Christiansand – and also bringing in tea.95 Thomson reported that ‘the 
legitimate timber trade with Norway had a long history of acting as a cover for 
 
92 Kent, ‘The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the eighteenth century’, 67.  
93 NRS, AC8/912. 
94 Ragnhild Hutchison, ‘Bites, Nibbles, Sips and Puffs’, 158.  
95 NRS, CE1/15, 12 November 1776. 
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smuggled wines and spirits’.96 In 1795 Mary Wollstonecraft visited Risor, on 
behalf of her then partner, Gilbert Imlay, in search of a cargo of silver which had 
been shipped on a vessel from that port and ‘disappeared’. 97 Wollstonecraft 
travelled by boat along the rocky south coast of Norway, and was unimpressed 
by Risor: 
 
…the character of the inhabitants is as uncultivated, if not as 
picturesquely wild, as their abode. Having no employment but traffic, of 
which a contraband trade makes the basis of their profit, the coarsest 
feelings of honesty are quickly blunted…Nothing genial, in fact, appears 
around this place or within this circle of its rocks...What, indeed, is to 
humanise these beings, who rest shut up, for they seldom even open 
their windows, smoking, drinking brandy and driving bargains…Nothing 
can be more disgusting than the rooms and men towards the evening: 
breath, teeth, clothes and furniture, all are spoilt.98  
 
The legal timber trade was important as well, supplying building materials for 
the new houses being built throughout the Scottish Borders. Hutchison makes 
clear the link between urban expansion and house building in Britain and the 
scale and nature of timber exports from Norway.99 She also links the increased 
disposable income generated in the timber growing areas of Norway, where the 
forests were often owned by individual farmers, rather than large scale 
landlords or the state, with a consequent demand for luxury goods.  
 
This situation is reinforced by Arnvid Lillehammer, writing of the later 
seventeenth century about the district of Ryfylke in south west Norway, near 
Stavanger. He describes a form of trade which sounds very similar. He makes 
the point that in this area the seventeenth century is still referred to as ‘the 
Scottish period’. It was characterised by direct trade between ports on the east 
coast of Scotland and farmers, who owned the forestry resources, using 
informal ports in local fjords. Two factors put an end to this trade – the 
depredation of the forests and the increasingly successful efforts of Stavanger 
to control it. The ultimate success of the authorities in Stavanger was a royal 
resolution in 1717 safeguarding the privileges of Stavanger and banning 
 
96 Thomson, The Scottish Timber Trade, p.38.   
97 L. Gordon and G. Molden, ‘The Treasure Seeker’, The Guardian (8 January 2005).  
98 Richard Holmes (ed.), Mary Wollstonecraft: A Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark. Penguin Classics (London, 1987), p.131.  
99 Ragnhild Hutchison, ‘The Norwegian and Baltic timber trade to Britain 1700–1835 and its 
interconnections.’ Scandinavian Journal of History, 37(5), (2012), 578–599.  
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Scottish ships from trading direct with the farmers in the fjords.100 The 
similarities with the timber trade in the later eighteenth century in south Norway 
are marked. 
 
There seems, therefore, to be a potential synergy, whereby timber and 
contraband were imported from south Norway into Eyemouth, with other 
contraband going back to Norway. It is also clear that timber was exported from 
south Norway in excess of the quotas permitted.101 The south Norway timber 
ports provided around 25 per cent of the crews of the DAC ships sailing to 
Canton, a further hint at the possibility of them being centres for the dispersal of 
contraband from the East.  
 
Copenhagen was the headquarters of the DAC, but the only evidence of 
smuggling directly to south-east Scotland from there, is contained in intelligence 
reports of ships loading with tea.  
 
A great Quantity of Tea and other Goods lately imported at Copenhagen 
from India will be sent to the British Dominions and the following vessels 
were loading on the 10th and 11th of October (1783) with those commodities: 
A large ship going to Ostend, where the Captain’s Brother (one Gibson) is 
preparing all the vessels calculated for the Smuggling trade to receive the 
Cargo which will probably be landed on the Coast of Scotland…102  
 
On the 12 October a ship commanded by George Gibson passed through the 
Sound bound for Ostend from Copenhagen with a cargo of tea.103 Then, a 
fortnight later there was another report of a ship loading a substantial cargo of 
tea ‘from the House of Mr Ryberg’.104 Erik Gǿbel describes Niels Ryberg as 
‘one of the important actors in this (smuggling)’105 A further series of reports 
were submitted in September and October 1785, one of a cargo of tea ‘to be 
taken to Scotland in a schooner’ then an account of a ‘Smack rigged Scotch 
 
100 Arnvid Lillehammer, The Scottish-Norwegian Timber Trade in the Stavanger Area in the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in T.C. Smout (ed) Scotland and Europe 1200 – 1850. 
John Donald (Edinburgh, 1986) pp97 - 111 
101 Kent, ‘The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the eighteenth century’, 66.  
102 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 3 November 1783. 
103 Sound Toll Registers. 
104 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 20 November 1783. 
105 Erik Gǿbel of the Danish National Archives, personal communication (26 January 2015). 
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sloop…all over black’.106 There is just one record of a ship coming to Eyemouth 
from Copenhagen, in 1754, with a declared cargo of timber.107 
 
From 1640 until 1864 Altona was one of the most important Danish controlled 
ports. It is now a suburb of Hamburg, which itself was a Free City within the 
Holy Roman Empire, on the River Elbe. In April 1774 the Board of Customs in 
Edinburgh wrote to the Collector in Dunbar that 
 
…an Information (had been) received…respecting the Contraband Trade 
carrying on from Hamburgh, Altona and the villages of New Mills and 
Blacknese situated in the Elbe to Great Britain, and that the same is 
committed by concealing wine and spirits in Small Casks and Flasks, 
Gold Silver and Thread Lace between the Ribs of the vessels, which are 
afterwards covered & nailed up with Boards…108 
 
The Collector’s Quarterly Accounts which record only declared voyages, show 
one ship coming in from Altona, the Harriot of Dunbar for William Nisbet, with a 
cargo of raisins, currants, soft soap and liquorice in November 1748. There was 
a spasmodic export trade to Hamburg, taking malt or grain for Robert 
Robertson, with five voyages in the early 1750s, another four in the early 1760s 
and a further five in 1777.109 There is little official evidence of return cargoes, 
but the Hope of Eyemouth, commanded by Thomas Hogg, carried grain to 
Hamburg for Robertson in March and May 1762 and then was taken by the 
customs in July of that year carrying a substantial cargo of French wine and 
brandy from Hamburg for John Nisbet. She had been found hovering in the 
mouth of the Forth, perhaps seeking to run on the south coast to supply 
Nisbet’s customers in Edinburgh.110  
 
Providence, which sailed to Hamburg in January 1752 was in the charge of 
John Aitken, a master associated with smuggling. Providence is almost certainly 
Robertson’s own ship, later re-named Peggy and linked to smuggling. She was 
stopped and spirits seized in December 1753, for example, and in September 
 
106 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 12 October 1785.  
107 NRS, E504/10, 6 July 1754. 
108 NRS, CE56/2/5, 21 April 1774. 
109 EH504/10, 7 November 1748, 23 March, 30 March, 10 April 1750, 16 January 1752, 18 April 
1754, 13 January, 3 March, 7 May 1762, 28 June 1763, 1 March, 12 March, 22 March, 14 June, 
21 June 1777. 
110 CE1/11, 8 February 1763. 
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1759 she was reported to be hovering in the Forth and had spirits seized (Table 
4/1). The Syren also went to Hamburg for Robertson, in January 1762, having 
attracted the attention of the authorities the previous December, when an 
Excise Officer was prevented from boarding her by two members of the crew of 
the King’s Boat.111 No suspicion is attached to the ships in 1777, other than that 
the master of Robertson’s own vessel Philadelphia was Ralph Gibson, a man 
later associated with smuggling.112 There is further evidence in the report of the 
informer Charles Coombs, on board David Nisbet’s ship Molly in 1759, in which 
he describes four successive voyages from the continent, including one from 
Hamburg with ‘each voyage returning to the coast of Scotland, where there 
were run out of the said Ship sundry Quantities of Brandy, Geneva, Tea, Wine, 
Tobacco, Vinegar and eleven pieces of Indian silk Handerchieffs’.113 
 
This is clearly indirect evidence, but – as well as being adjacent to Altona – 
Hamburg was a noted source of contraband. George Parish, a merchant from 
Leith who had settled in Hamburg in the early 1750s, took part in the smuggling 
trade and developed links with ports in France. His son, John, continued the 
trade and later was very helpful to the Americans in the lead up to, and during 
the War of Independence,114 in which role he had some connection with Henry 
Greig in Gothenburg.115 
 
6.6  The Low Countries 
 
The Low Countries – modern Netherlands, Belgium and just over the border 
into France – had long had trading links with Scotland and the east coast of 
England. They were also the home of two East India Companies – the Dutch, 
known as the VOC, and the Austrian, better known as the Ostend Company. 
While tea was imported by the VOC, it is generally thought to be the case that 
the bulk of tea smuggled from the Netherlands had its European origins in 
 
111 NRS, E504/10, 15 December 1761; 13 January 1762. 
112 NRS, E504/10. 
113 NRS, CE1/10, 26 August 1761. 
114 Schnurmann, ‘His Father’s Favored Son’. 
115 B.B. Oberg (ed.), ‘Letter to Benjamin Franklin from Parish & Thomson, 24 August 1781’, in 
The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1999.), vol. 
35. (letters in date order) 
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Gothenburg or Copenhagen.116 As referred to above, ‘Dutch tea is become a 
name for all that are bad in quality and unfit for use.’117 The Ostend Company 
was effectively suppressed by Britain in 1731, to the regret of consumers, 
‘underselling is the only natural method of engrossing a trade’, and some 
politicians, but to the joy of merchants, ‘I never heard that any man was wild 
enough to affirm that the trade carried on at Ostend was of no consequences 
whatever to us.’118 
 
Although there was a considerable smuggling traffic from the Netherlands to 
Scotland, the bulk of the trade from the Austrian Netherlands and Dunkirk was 
with the south of England: 
 
French and Flemish ports, notably Dunkirk and Ostend, were convenient 
harbours for the loading of wines, repacking of tobacco, or preparation of 
Continental goods for landing on the coasts of Kent or Sussex.119 
 
Rotterdam was a notorious centre for the supply of contraband. Dutch 
merchants were among the major buyers of tea at the sales in Gothenburg.120 It 
is known from details of his sequestration that John Nisbet purchased 
contraband, including tea, from Richard Pillans, a second generation English 
merchant in Rotterdam.121 There are records of ten ships coming to or linked to 
Eyemouth from Rotterdam, of which only five are recorded in the Collector’s 
Quarterly Accounts as arriving in Eyemouth with a cargo or, in one case, 
leaving.122 One of these five was actually stopped off St Abbs Head on her way 
in, in February 1769, when spirits in small casks were found ‘designed to be 
carried to Norway’ and seized. The other five ships are recorded as involved in 
smuggling – one in the Letter Books in 1756, two linked to Pillans, and two, 
from 1759 and 1760, in the Minutes of the Board of Customs.123 
  
 
116 Mϋller, ‘The Swedish East India trade’, p.38.  
117 Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade’, p.48.  
118 G. B. Hertz, ‘England and the Ostend Company’, The English Historical Review 22 (86) 
(1907), 255–279 (278).  
119 Hoon, The Organisation of the English Customs, p.169.  
120 Kent, War and Trade, p.120.  
121 NLS, BCL.D2650(85). 
122 NRS, E504/10. 
123 NRS, CE56/2/4, 9 February1769; NRS, CE56/2/1, 18 November 1757; NRS, CE56/2/2, 26 
June 1760; NLS, BCL.2650 (85). 
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The three towns of Campveere Middelburg and Flushing (Vlissingen) are all 
close together on what was then the island of Walcheren at the mouth of the 
Scheldt estuary. Campveere was the Scottish Staple, from 1541 until 1799. It 
acted as the legally agreed port for trade between Scotland and the United 
Provinces for an agreed range of ‘staple goods’. The Scottish side was 
administered by the Convention of Royal Burghs who appointed the 
Conservator. Davidson and Gray give an account of the full history of the staple, 
which describes its steady decline during its final 140 years.124 
 
…Scottish merchants were becoming more adventurous, and … the 
attractions offered by a Staple town were not enough to satisfy their more 
developed capacity for foreign trade. All this explains the lifelessness, 
which more and more marks everything to do with the Staple contract 
after the Restoration, and above all during the eighteenth century.125 
 
What happened was that early modern realism and practicality dictated that 
Rotterdam was the most effective port to use. Indeed, towards the end of the 
Staple, the Conservator was based there. Rotterdam had a Scottish population 
of around 800 in the late seventeenth century, while Campveere had as few as 
fifteen.126 Davidson and Gray refer to Rotterdam’s role as a ‘city of refuge for all 
who found it inconvenient to remain in Scotland’, but after the Revolution (1689) 
‘the greater part of the Scots population resident there must at this time have 
been engaged in trade pure and simple.’127 
 
Campveere continued in its formal role until 1799, when the arrangement was 
terminated by the Batavian Republic, the revolutionary regime then in power.128 
Towards the end it is possible that what had become Campveere’s 
disadvantage, its relative remoteness, may have made it attractive to 
smugglers, especially from Scotland. John Nisbet, for example, continued to 
trade with Campveere – one of the Molly’s voyages in 1759 recorded by the 
informer was from Campveere.129 In addition, the year before, Molly was 
recorded as arriving in Eyemouth in August 1758 with a cargo of flax for John 
 
124 J. Davidson and A. Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere: A Study in the Economic History of 
Scotland (London, 1909) pp 211 – 268. 
125 Davidson and Gray, The Scottish Staple, p.221 
126 Davidson and Gray, The Scottish Staple, pp. 242 - 243 
127 Davidson and Gray, The Scottish Staple, p.242 
128 Davidson and Gray, The Scottish Staple, p.265 - 266 
129 NRS, CE1/10, 26 August 1761. 
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Nisbet from Campveere.130 What made this voyage interesting was that Molly 
was carried into Dunkirk by a French Privateer in July 1758, having just left 
Campveere in the company three other Scottish ships.131 She obviously left 
Dunkirk quite promptly, presumably after payment of a ransom, perhaps of 
several hundred guineas.132 Does this suggest that Nisbet had insurance? It 
was certainly the case that ships’ masters had delegated authority to settle 
ransom demands and that insurance gave comfort in terms of meeting the 
amount required.133  
 
Vlissingen certainly became known as a base for smugglers, to the extent that 
the term ‘Flushing Cutter’ was taken to refer to smuggling vessels. For example, 
the reference in March 1780 to John Lillie of Duns reported as heading a gang 
of smugglers ‘when the Flushing Cutter were upon the coast.’ and another from 
December 1773: ‘a Flushing Cutter is soon expected on the Coast betwixt 
Berwick and Ross’.134 Kerr also refers to Flushing ‘Such men (local 
smugglers)… are much encouraged to persevere by regularly established 
agents of the Kentish and Flushing smugglers who allow credit for the smuggled 
goods…’135  
 
Middelburg was less used – it was accessed only by canals – but Robertson 
received a cargo of oats and old iron from there in June 1766 and in January 
1786: 
 
Mr James Kyd Commandr. of the Osnaburgh cutter signified that a Brigg 
belonging to Ely arrived there that Night from Midleburgh the Master of 
which informed him that on the 4th Instant when he sailed from thence, a 
Lugger came out with him, which he saw off St Abbs Head on Sunday 
evening last 8th Instant.136 
 
Aside from its role as a base for Privateers, there are only three references to 
Dunkirk in relation to shipping in Berwickshire. One is specific to Robert 
 
130 NRS, E504/10, 1 August 1758.  
131 ‘Captures, &c. by the French’, Scots Magazine, Edinburgh, (July 1758).      
132 ‘List of Ransoms made by the WHIM Privateer of Dunkirk’, Caledonian Mercury, Edinburgh 
(25 July 1781).  
133 A.B. Leonard, ‘Underwriting Marine Warfare: Insurance and Conflict in the Eighteenth 
Century’, International Journal of Maritime History 25.2 (2013), 173–185 (176).  
134 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 24 March 1780; NRS, CE56/2/5, 9 December 1773. 
135 Kerr, General View, p.7.  
136 NRS, CE56/2/5D, 13 January 1786. 
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Robertson, and quite tantalising. This is in the will of Job Buck, a shipmaster 
from Eyemouth who died in 1753. In the list of debts owing to Buck, there is 
this: 
…by Robert Robertson merchant in Eymouth Eighty pound Sterling 
Contained in a bill dated at Dunkirk in France the twenty seventh Day of 
August last and drawn by the defunct upon the said Robert Robertson 
payable four months after date.137 
 
There is no record of Buck as the master of any ship in or out of Eyemouth, but 
he did have a half share in the 90 ton ship Helen, which was rouped (auctioned) 
on 1 May 1753 at Eyemouth, after returning from Malaga on 12 March with a 
cargo of raisins and Spanish wine for Davidson, Grieve and Co., under the 
command of Thomas Davidson. There is nothing to link Robert Robertson to 
Dunkirk other than this one reference. It is possible that the Eighty Pounds was 
linked to a ransom – Robertson was the sort of man that someone like Buck 
may have gone to for assistance in the event of his ship being taken. On 24 
December 1787 ‘a small vessel laden with Spirits, Wines and Tobacco was that 
morning drove onshore bottom uppermost at Thorntonloch’ and in March 1788 
an application was made to the Board of Customs 
 
…on behalf of John Christian junr., Merchant in Dunkirk claimer of the 
Cargo of Spirits and Tobacco on board the Lively, James Simison 
master, lately wrecked at Thorntonloch.138 
 
In 1766 the Elizabeth of Eyemouth, Lawrence Fraser, from Dunkirk was 
stopped and found to have ‘broken bulk’, there were spirits in ankers, so was 
seized and taken into Dunbar, despite Fraser’s protestations that she was 
bound for Gothenburg, presumably a pretended destination, as Bergen was so 
often.139 The year before, Elizabeth under the regular smuggling master George 
Hay had been seized by Captain Boog’s cutter and taken into Leith, with a 





137 NRS, CC15/5/10.  
138 NRS, RH4/76, March 1788. 
139 NRS, CE56/2/3, 8 December 1766. 




There was a distinctive North Sea smuggling world. Consumers in Scotland and 
the north-east of England preferred to drink Congou, one of the better-quality 
teas, hard to get and expensive through legitimate channels. The East India 
companies of both Sweden and Denmark relied largely on smuggling into 
Britain for their commercial success. This was no accident. They developed 
ships that carried the optimum amount of tea in the most cost-efficient and 
speedy way and neither had any internal market to speak of. Both companies 
also had good financial reputations in Canton and were able to buy the best 
quality teas.  
 
In Sweden, there was a group of merchants of Scottish origin, some of whom 
had been active Jacobites in 1745/1746, who bought tea from the SOIC and 
sold it directly to merchant-smugglers at ‘home’ in Scotland. It is likely that 
merchants in Gothenburg with their origins in Hull would also have dealt with 
their former townsmen. The Humber estuary was the most plausible route for 
tea to reach Leeds from Sweden. In addition, Dutch merchants bought tea to 
sell through Amsterdam to other UK based tea smugglers. The Danes seem to 
have undertaken more direct selling of tea, from Copenhagen itself, through 
Bergen, the Faroe Islands and surely the group of isolated, ultra-specialised 
timber ports of southern Norway, with their traditions of law breaking, new 
demands for imported luxuries and connections with the DAC. 
 
The Netherlands had long been a trading partner of Scotland, through the 
Staple of Campveere on Walcheren and the port of Rotterdam. As with the tea 
imported by the Scandinavian East India Companies, the Netherlands supplied 
goods that were highly taxed in Britain and much in demand, such as gin and 
French wine and brandy, brought up to be re-distributed. The same was true of 
the German river port of Hamburg, which acted as an entrepôt between the 
European hinterland and the sea. Dunkirk, the southernmost of these ports, just 
over the border in France, supplied goods to the north and south of Britain. Its 
main role, however, was as the base for privateers in time of war. These 
threatened smugglers, as witness the seizure of the Nisbets’ Molly in 1758. The 
threat from Dunkirk could well have encouraged a shift in smuggling to the 




The apparent contrast with smuggling in the south of England, fed from France 
and Guernsey and with the west coast, fed from the Isle of Man, until 1765, is 
surely related to the distances involved and the weather that could be expected. 
In other words, relatively small boats could manage the smuggling trade in the 
English Channel and the Irish Sea, but in the North Sea, larger vessels were 
needed. This could be at least part of the explanation for the dominance of the 
trade by merchant-smugglers, who were already regularly bringing cargoes into 
Eyemouth from many of the same ports that supplied contraband. It is apparent 
that, from sometime around 1780, smuggling changed again. This is discussed 
in more detail in chapter seven, which will explore the reasons for this, which 










This final, almost valedictory, chapter covers a period of approximately 20 
years up to 1796, during which the nature of smuggling in the south-east of 
Scotland changed completely. Five case studies will be used to make the 
point, reinforcing the micro-history of smuggling around Eyemouth. 
 
The first, and most substantial, is that of John Nisbet, who was sequestrated 
(made bankrupt) by a fellow merchant in 1787. The very fact of his being a 
smuggler prompted a number of legal disputes around his sequestration, 
which allow for a more detailed analysis of his failure. Secondly, James 
Renton, the son of the Eyemouth lawyer John Renton, was a timber merchant 
and associate of initially of Robert Robertson, then of John Nisbet, John Lyon 
and John Lyell. James was bankrupted in 1788. Thirdly, John Lyon was a ship 
master and well known (to the authorities) as a full-time smuggler based in 
Berwick-upon-Tweed. Fourthly, John Lyell (later known as Lyall) originally of 
Greystonelees, near Burnmouth withdrew from the trade between 1785 and 
1788 and moved to London and Sussex, where he made a new life as a ship 
owner and merchant and fathered a dynasty of Victorian professional men. 
Finally, there is the Gibson family, of Fairnieside, also near Burnmouth, who 
married into a Folkestone smuggling family and can be seen to exemplify the 
new world of ‘professional’ smuggling. One additional figure, who was 
examined in some detail in Chapter 4, was Charles Swanston, the ringleader 
of the raid on the Customs Warehouse in 1780. He had died in 1782, so 
perhaps was also included in George Tod’s categorisation of ‘former dealers’.1 
 
 
1 George Tod, ‘Parish of Eyemouth’, in Sir John Sinclair (ed.), The Statistical Account of 




The reasons for these changes are complex and efforts will be made to tease 
them out and draw distinctions between personal issues and the changing 
political and economic climate. The timing of both Nisbet’s and Renton’s 
failures and Lyell’s move away is strongly suggestive of a connection with the 
end of large-scale tea smuggling following the Commutation Act of 1784. 
Nisbet was a special case, the last and most blatant, of the Eyemouth 
merchant-smugglers.  
 
The earliest local source which drew attention to these changes was the 
Reverend George Tod, Minister of Eyemouth, writing in the Statistical Account 
of Scotland in the early 1790s. 
 
For several years past, there has not been a single smuggler residing 
in this parish. The former dealers in that illicit trade are now all dead, or 
removed to distant parts. Not one of them died rich, and the far 
greatest part of them became bankrupt.2  
 
Three contemporary sources will be examined: Tod, quoted above, as well as 
Robert Kerr and Adam Smith.3  
 
7.2 The failure of John Nisbet 
 
When George Tod wrote of smugglers in Eyemouth that ‘the far greatest part 
of them became bankrupt’, he was surely referring to John Nisbet, the highest 
profile of the Eyemouth merchant-smugglers who was brought down by that 
pillar of the Church of Scotland, Robert Robertson, in 1787. It is possible to 
follow Nisbet’s failure from the early 1770s, when he was doing well, to his 
sequestration in 1787, his subsequent retirement to Tweedmouth, on the 
south side of Berwick-upon-Tweed, and his death in 1796. Following his 
death, his affairs remained confused, not being finally resolved until 1812, 
long after the period covered by this thesis. Nisbet clearly failed to address 
this dictum of Adam Smith’s: 
 
 
2 Tod, Parish of Eyemouth p.115 
3 Kerr, General View; Smith, The Wealth of Nations.  
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…the common returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits of 
stock, not only to make up for all the occasional losses, but to afford a 
surplus profit to the adventurers of the same nature with the profit of 
insurers.4 
 
so that when he did suffer losses, he was not able to recover. Much of 
Nisbet’s business career, including his network of associates, was dealt with 
in Chapters 3 and 4, but some of this will need to be reiterated in the context 
of his failure. Nisbet will dominate this chapter, partly because of the quantity 
of material available concerning his business failure, but also because he was 
the dominant figure in the smuggling business in Eyemouth.  
 
There are, as yet, no detailed studies of business failure in Scotland at this 
period. The key work on the subject in England is still Julian Hoppit.5 Despite 
the legal differences between the two jurisdictions, the reasons for failure are 
similar. When Hoppit looks at merchants, his prime focus is on those involved 
in the export trade, who needed to advance credit to attract customers. Nisbet 
was almost exclusively involved in imports – the usual position of the 
smuggler.6 Robertson had a much more even balance of recorded imports 
and exports (36 export voyages and 51 imports). Nisbet, therefore, relied 
heavily on credit being advanced to him. This made him particularly 
vulnerable to sequestration. Sequestration is a Scottish practice, defined as 
‘primarily a coercive procedure initiated by a creditor by which the assets of a 
debtor who fails or refuses to pay his debts are made available to his creditors 
towards the satisfaction of their debts.’7 The main work on this subject is still 
Burton from 1845.8 
 
Hoppit looks at access to credit and, as with Fair Trade, this was an essential 
requirement of smuggling. He quotes Rosenblatt’s study of credit in the 
tobacco trade ‘in fact, the ability to command commercial credit in time of 
 
4 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, p.213.  
5 Hoppitt, Risk and Failure. 
6 Joe Varley, ‘Smuggling in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries‘. On-Line Journal 
of Research on Irish Maritime History (2014), accessed 5.2.2014. 
7 Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation (Scottish Law Commission, 
1982), paragraph 2.8. 




duress was more important to success in eighteenth-century commerce than 
any technical or administrative skill the merchant might possess.’9 It was 
Nisbet’s failure to re-pay all his debts that provided the opening for his 
sequestration, either because of business decline or the inability to access 
other lines of credit or, in this case, because he was not given the opportunity 
to pay his creditors. 
 
Perhaps the most significant problem faced by a contemporary scholar 
looking at eighteenth-century smuggling as a business is to grasp what 
proportion of adventures succeeded and, in this case, what proportion of 
Nisbet’s total business was devoted to smuggling. While some effort has been 
devoted to specific aspects of smuggling in relation to overall trade there does 
not seem to have been any detailed analysis of smuggling as a local 
business.10 This is, of course, largely due to the absence of material – 
smugglers’ detailed accounts have not generally survived. Job’s partial 
records give a broad view, but he was more of a backer of smugglers, rather 
than an active smuggler himself.11 The informer aboard Nisbet’s ships in the 
late 1750s reported on four voyages in none of which the ship came into port 
and which would, otherwise, have remained unknown.12 The suggestion from 
the Pillans case is that there was an ongoing relationship between Nisbet and 
Pillans and also between the Robertsons and Pillans, which are also not 
reflected in the official records.13 There is, however, a reasonable amount of 
material relating to Nisbet’s career which will allow for certain assessments to 
be made. This section, therefore, will review the data that exists regarding 
Nisbet’s smuggling career and draw conclusions.  
 
The last recorded voyage of a ship for John Nisbet in the official records is 
that of the Betty which came from Rotterdam in June 1770 under the 
command of Peter Dalgleish, one of Nisbet’s favoured masters, with a 
declared cargo of clover seed for John and David Nisbet. It seems to be the 
 
9 Hoppitt, Risk and Failure, p.101. 
10 Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth Century Smuggling’; idem, ‘The Arithmetic of Eighteenth 
Century Smuggling:  Rejoinder’; Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade’. 
11 Wilcox, ‘Maritime Business in Eighteenth Century Cornwall’. 
12 NRS, CE1/10, 26 August 1761. 
13 NLS, BCL.D2650 (85). 
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case, that the last officially recorded voyages for the Nisbets were all from 
Rotterdam in 1769 and 1770, mostly with declared cargoes of seeds.14 It is 
clear, however, that the Nisbets were still active later in the 1770s and, indeed 
almost certainly into the 1780s. Their relationship with Greig and Sibbald of 
Gothenburg, for example, dates from as late as 1771,15 while in 1773 their 
servants were caught bringing contraband away from the shore at 
Gunsgreen.16 The dispute between George Johnston for the creditors and 
Robert Robertson and Son relates to Nisbet’s transactions with Richard 
Pillans of Rotterdam in 1774. According to Johnston, in another case following 
the sequestration, in early 1775 ‘… Mr Nisbet’s affairs became much 
embarrassed and he himself falling into a very bad state of health, became 
little able to give attention to business of any kind.’17 Contraband was found in 
a building at Gunsgreen in 178218 and there is paperwork suggesting the 




Nisbet’s dealings with Pillans offer a clear exposition of how smuggling 
worked at this level and offer an indication of what may have started his 
decline. The two sources for this matter are Johnston’s petition of 179220 and 
an account of the case used in Bell to illustrate the principle of a Pactum 
Illicitum:  
 
Richard Pillans, a native of Holland, and merchant in Rotterdam, had 
been engaged in furnishing goods to John Nisbet merchant in 
Eymouth, which he knew were to be smuggled into this country; and it 
appears from his letters, that he had pointed out to Nisbet different 
methods of conducting this business, as well as solicited employment 
in that line. 
 
 
14 NRS, E504/10, 15 February 1769; 1 June 1770.  
15 NRS, CS229/NI/60.  
16 NRS, CE56/2/5, 24 June 1773. 
17 NLS, ESTC T213586. 
18 NRS, CE56/2/5B, 26 August 1782. 
19 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
20 NLS, BCL.D2650 (85). 
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In one of his letters, for example, Pillans had advised Nisbet that ‘our India 
sales are now over, and on the other side you have the quotations of the 
present shipping prices for your government; if you wanted to make another 
trial this winter, here is one of our schoots on sale...’.21  
 
It is interesting, therefore, to note Nisbet’s incoming voyages from Rotterdam 
in 1769 and 1770 referred to above. It is also known from the paid informers 
on the Molly that Nisbet was bringing in contraband from Rotterdam and 
Campveere as early as 1759.22 The dispute in the Pillans case concerned a 
ship called the Hawk, James Balfour, master, which Nisbet sent to Rotterdam 
in June 1774. A ship of this name, George Malcolme, master, was reported 
sailing from Kirkcaldy to Gothenburg to load tea and spirits in July 177123 and 
running tea from Gothenburg at Redheugh, north of Eyemouth, in November 
1772.24  
 
The Hawk, it transpired, required extensive repairs, the cost of which were 
borne by Pillans. Nisbet regarded such jobs as ‘ready-money work’ which he 
wished to be instantly discharged. The account below, therefore, relates only 
in part to the repairs and related costs. The total of 14,453.9 florins converted 
to approximately £1,285 at an average exchange rate of 11.25 florins to the 
pound sterling, as deduced from the creditor column. The repairs and related 
costs were subsequently assessed as amounting to around £199. The 
remaining £1,086, therefore, was presumably paid for contraband. The 
shortfall in Nisbet’s payments indicated below was approximately £656. He 
had, however, paid £630, comfortably more than the cost of the repairs. It 
must be assumed that Nisbet made further payments after this statement was 




21 Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session, pp.349–355. 
22 NRS, CE1/10, 26 August 1761. 
23 NRS, CE56/2/4, 28 July 1771. 




Figure 7/1. The state of Nisbet’s account with Pillans, 23 September 177425 
 
Johnston made the point that Nisbet’s payments should have been applied 
first to the repairs and that Pillans made no specific request for payment for 
‘various articles sent to Nisbet, such as tea, wine and brandy’. This is 
significant as the whole court case revolved round a Pactum Illicitum, which 
Burton refers to as ‘a smuggling transaction, or money lost at play &c,’ which 
‘cannot be held to be a just and necessary cause.’26 As Lord Swinton said in 
his Opinion to the Court of Session: 
 
A foreign merchant knowing the smuggling laws of this country, who 
has been accessory to a smuggling adventure, cannot pursue for 
implement of the smuggling contract; were such an action to be 
sustained, he would derive advantage from those very laws which he 
had violated.27 
 
The Court did, however, allow that part of the overall account relating purely to 
the repairs of the ship and related costs to stand. Nisbet’s creditors were 
unhappy about this and objected on two grounds – that laid out above, that 
Nisbet had paid for the repairs, and that the repairs were de facto part of the 
 
25 NLS, BCL.D2650(85) 
26 Burton, The Law of Bankruptcy 
27 Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session, pp.349–355 
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Pactum Illicitum. Unfortunately for them, the original decision stood and £198 
19s 5d was allowed out of the original claim of £413 17s.28 
 
During the hearing about this specific matter, letters were read into the court 
record to illustrate the nature of the relationship between Pillans and Nisbet. 
These throw light on the initial cause of Nisbet’s decline. 
 
In my last I acknowledged the receipt of your favour by the Royal Code, 
and have dispatched the cargo, as per invoice on the other side, of 
2996ft. to your debite, and hope it will meet better luck. I expect it on 
board this day, and as the wind is fair, may be with you ere this comes 
to hand.29  
 
It was the cargo sent by the Royal Code, which was taken, that eventually led 
to the claim against Nisbet. It amounted to approximately £266 sterling, and 
by 1778 the debt, with interest, amounted to £413. It was then that Nisbet 
granted a heritable bond over the lands of Gunsgreen, which was taken in the 
name of Alexander Robertson, acting as Pillans’ ‘friend and correspondent’. 
Alexander, the son of Robert Robertson, then purchased this debt in 1782 for 
£400, although it was by this time worth £600. Robertson and his father then 
used this debt to seek to have Nisbet sequestrated, although they failed in this 
for procedural reasons.30 
 
This rather complex sequence of events highlights several interesting factors. 
Firstly, Nisbet had had a reasonably long-term relationship with Pillans, buying 
tea, wine and brandy and smuggling it into Britain. Pillans gave active help, 
offering to provide a ship – the schoot referred to – and arranging for Nisbet’s 
ship to be repaired and the master and crew looked after. This has all the 
hallmarks of ‘normal’ trade, down to the line of credit and payments made 
through reputable banking houses. What it also shows is that Nisbet lost a 
cargo when the Royal Code was taken and possibly earlier, if one notes the 
phrase ‘hope it will meet better luck’ in Pillans’s letter. This seems to have 
been the beginning of the end of this phase of Nisbet’s career, particularly as 
 
28 NLS, BCL.D2650(85). 
29 Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session, p.350. 
30 Bell, Cases Decided in the Court of Session, p.350. 
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these episodes coincided with his reported ill-health.31 It also, perhaps, 
suggests that Nisbet lacked the access to the further lines of credit or funding 
that he had had earlier. 
 
Alexander Dow 
The Nisbet brothers had a complicated relationship with Alexander Dow, who 
was John Nisbet’s clerk in the early 1750s, then went, following a cruise on a 
privateer off the south coast of England, to India. He became a colonel in the 
Bengal Regiments of the East India Company, learned Persian and produced 
a three volume History of Hindostan, published in 1768/1772. He also 
produced a volume of stories and two plays, put on by David Garrick in 
London. He was friends with David Hume, James MacPherson and Caleb 
Whitefoord and had his portrait painted by Joshua Reynolds. He died in 1779 
at the age of 43 leaving his entire property – now some £14,000 to £18,000 –
to David Nisbet, in a will produced in 1757 aboard the privateer.32 
 
Two of the more considerable debts that featured in Nisbet’s sequestration 
are linked to Dow, and Nisbet’s ‘expectation’ of his inheritance from Dow 
allowed him to postpone the final sale of his property for well over a year. 
Dow’s career can be reconstructed from a variety of sources, but the story of 
his relationship with the Nisbets is outlined in papers regarding two post-
sequestration court cases, one relating to an advance to one of Dow’s 
relatives, the other to Nisbet’s attempts to delay the execution of the process 
of sequestration.33 They serve to illustrate how Nisbet’s affairs deteriorated 
through the 1770s. 
 
Bell and Rannie 
The story of Nisbet’s dealings with the Leith wine merchants Bell and Rannie 
is very complex, but quite revealing. The source is George Johnston’s 
response to Bell and Rannie’s petition to be recognised as creditors and is 
 
31 NLS ESTC T213586. 
32 NA, Prob. 11/1091. 
33 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
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dealt with in chapter three above.34 The case revolved around Alexander 
Dow’s cousin, Duncan Carmichael, who was a grocer in the Nether Bow in 
central Edinburgh.35 In the late 1760s, Dow advanced his cousin £100 
sterling, then in 1768 Nisbet, without further reference to Dow, gave 
Carmichael a letter, addressed to Bell and Rannie, authorising them to supply 
Carmichael with ‘one of our butts of Port’ which makes it clear that Nisbet did 
supply them with wine. Interestingly, there is no record of Nisbet importing any 
wine from Portugal in the years before this transaction. In February 1768, 
however, he bought 38 hogsheads and three tierces of claret at the customs 
auction in Dunbar, wine which may well have been his own in the first place, 
having been seized from a ship captained by Peter Dalgleish, one of his 
regular masters, in July 1767.  
 
What happened subsequently was that Bell and Rannie advanced Carmichael 
more goods on credit, despite Carmichael having been imprisoned for debt at 
one point. The situation became increasingly complex with Carmichael 
pursuing several financial manoeuvres, presumably to try and keep afloat. Bell 
and Rannie pursued Nisbet, who wrote to them in January 1773: 
 
Your favour of the 20th instant, advise the Lords have determined 
against you in the affair you had with Carmichael’s bond, in which I 
have no concern. I expect Colonel Dow in three weeks when you may 
depend I will do the utmost in my power for your interest 
 
The Interlocutor granting a stay of execution on the sale of Nisbet’s property, 
in rehearsing some of the background, indicates that in 1771 Dow had lent 
Nisbet £1,500, secured by a heritable bond and that this bond was reinforced 
by a Bond of Corroboration in 1777.36 What this suggests is that even at a 
time when we are told he was ‘a man in considerable trade’ he still relied on a 
substantial loan to keep him going, which he showed no intention of ever 
paying back. This loan also turned out to be what eventually brought about his 
downfall.
 
34 NLS ESTC T213586. 
35 Williamson, Directory for the City of Edinburgh. 
36 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
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John Sibbald and Henry Greig 
Nisbet’s relationship with the Gothenburg merchants Sibbald and Greig, later 
Henry Greig alone, falls into two parts. The earlier period, starting in 1771, is 
detailed in Chapter 7 above. The dealings with Greig in the 1780s are more 
difficult to untangle. The whole of Nisbet’s relationship with Greig and Sibbald 
appears to be described by George Johnston in his 1790 submission to the 
Court of Session.37 This is reinforced by the earlier submission by Henry 
Greig, a sworn expression of the ‘State of Debt due by Mr John Nisbet of 
Gunsgreen to Mr Henry Greig’.38 What complicates matters is the existence of 
the original documentation relating to this debt, including the bill of exchange, 
preserved elsewhere in the National Records of Scotland.39 
 
This documentation indicates that Nisbet was still buying tea from Greig as 
late as 1783, which suggests that Nisbet’s failure could be linked to the effects 
of the Commutation Act. There are some indications, however, that matters 
were not as simple as they first appeared. One is the description of Nisbet’s 
poor health in 1775 by Johnston.40 The other is that Nisbet’s brother, and 
business partner, David had died in early 1784, probably in March. Nisbet 
was, therefore, isolated and open, as described below, to the Robertsons’ 
machinations and possibly vulnerable to some form of exploitation executed 
by, or through, Gavin Young, described as a London merchant.41 Equally, 
Johnston may have exaggerated his comments on Nisbet’s health – Nisbet 




37 NRS, CS229/NI/60. 
38 Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/N/1/59/3, State of the Debt Due by Mr John Nisbet to Mr Hy Greig, 
1788. 
39 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
40 NLS, ESTC T213586. 
41 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
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The transcript of the Bill written into the papers for the court reads thus, with 
the date shown as 1784:42 
 
 
L259.16/ Sterling Gottenburg ye 6 Decemr. 1784 
   
Four months after date pay this my first of Exch. 
to Mr Gavin Young or order in London Two 
Hundred & fifty nine pounds Sixteen shillings 
Stg value in our place same as per advice from  
 
To Mr John Nisbet ] Henry Greig 
Of Gunsgreen  ] Accepts John Nisbet 
Eymouth  ] at Messers Kinloch & Hog 
     London 
 
 
The problem is that the actual Bill, preserved in the archive, has the year 
removed – it looks as though it could well have been cut off – as can be seen 
in the picture below (Fig. 7/2).  
 
 
Figure 7/2. Nisbet’s bill to Gavin Young, 6 December 178343 
 
There then follows the payment pattern described in the sworn ‘State of Debt’, 
starting on 6 April 1784, probably less than a month after the death of David 
Nisbet – and exactly four months after 6 December 1783, as promised in the 
 
42 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
43 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
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Bill: surely confirming 1783 as a more likely date for the Bill, if it were genuine. 
A further point of interest is that two of the payments, those of 26 November 
1784 and 24 March 1785 were made in Berwick to John Lyon, whose career 
is discussed below. If this Bill really relates to a consignment of tea delivered 
in late 1783, it indicates that Nisbet must have taken delivery of around 32 
cases of tea: Paton’s prices suggest about £8 for an 80 lb box.44 In addition, 
this document indicates that Nisbet was in a position to make regular 
payments, totalling £259 13s between April 1784 and January 1787. The ship 
that seems the most likely means of importing this tea was the Betsy & Peggy, 
which was recorded as arriving in Eyemouth from Gothenburg in late October 
1783, skippered by John Lyon for James Renton,45 evidence of a potential 
further connection with Renton and Lyon. 
 
It is hard to understand Nisbet’s financial position, as when he was issued 
with a Protest in April 1784, four months after the date of issue of the Bill, a 
standard period, his bankers, Kinloch and Hog of London explained that the 
Bill could not be paid ‘for want of funds’.46 The assumption must be that he 
was successfully selling the tea and receiving payments on an irregular basis, 
or that he was relying on someone else, perhaps James Renton, to provide 
the funds, presumably in cash.  
 
The process of the sequestration 
On 10 July 1787 
 
John Nisbet having become insolvent, a petition was preferred … at the 
instance of Robert Robertson and Sons, merchants in Eyemouth, his 
creditors in a bill … praying for a sequestration of his estate… But this 
petition was refused, ‘in respect the same is not presented within the 
time limited by the act of Parliament, after the last step of diligence’. 47 
 
The Robertsons were clearly not men to take no for an answer and on 19 July 
they ‘having found that Mr Nisbet was also debtor to Alexander Dow, brazier 
 
44 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
45 NRS E504/10, 24 October 1783. 
46 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
47 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
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in Hertford’ presented a new petition on which sequestration was awarded on 
14 August 1787, in these terms: 
 
John Nisbet not having appeared within the time specified in the 
citation … to show cause why further procedure should not be had in 
the petition, neither having paid the debt mentioned therein (Lord Alva) 
Sequestrates the whole real and personal estate belonging to the said 
John Nisbet…48 
 
This decision set in train a sequence of events which led eventually to the sale 
of Gunsgreen House. Nisbet, however, did not give in without a considerable 
struggle. His position had been weakened by the death of David in 1784 and 
William ten years earlier. If he was still involved in tea smuggling as 
suggested by the bill to Henry Greig, the impact of the Commutation Act 
would have been very serious.49 John was also 75 years old by this time. 
  
Nisbet sought to exploit his age by submitting a petition to the Lord Ordinary 
‘in which, though he admitted that he had once been a merchant, yet he said 
he had given over business for some years and contended that therefore he 
did not fall under the description of the statute.’ The finding, on 18 September 
1787, was ‘… as his debts had been contracted in the course of trade, it was 
of no consequence though, after his affairs had fallen into confusion, he 
should have given over business.’50 The legislation was unclear on this point, 
in fact and it was not laid down whether a lapse of time would render the 
application inept. A decision made as late as 1830 was that it referred to 
people who ‘are or have been traders’.51 
 
The advertised meeting of creditors went ahead, therefore, on 15 October 
1787. At this meeting George Johnston, an Edinburgh lawyer, was appointed 
to act as the trustee for the creditors. He was then instructed to advertise a 
public roup (auction) of the sale of ‘the lands and estate of Gunsgreen, 
together with the houses upon it’ in Edinburgh on 6 February 1788, with an 
 
48 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
49 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
50 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
51 Burton, The Law of Bankruptcy, pp. 275 - 6 
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upset (reserve) price of £3,000. In what seems to have been normal practice, 
Nisbet could remain in possession of the farm until Whitsunday 1788. Nisbet 
then tried a second delaying tactic – he ‘avoided his examination under the 
statute upon pretence of sickness’, so Johnston had to apply for a new date to 
be set. There is a detailed account of this examination in the Petition of 1788. 
As it represents Nisbet’s own account of his affairs, it is valuable to include 
this lengthy quotation: 
 
Mr Nisbet, being accordingly examined, declared, ´That the lands of 
Gunsgreen, belonging to him, have been in his own natural possession 
since his purchase, and that he cannot, on that account, exhibit an 
exact rental thereof (original italics); but, in his opinion, that land, with 
the farm-houses thereto belonging, including the house and yard 
presently possessed by himself, may be let in tack for £100 Sterling of 
yearly rent. Declares, That the rent of the large house, lately possessed 
by John Stewart, Esq; younger of Allanbank, with the small garden at 
the end of it, was, when in his possession, £35 Sterling yearly, and that 
he possessed the same for five years at that rent, and removed from it 
at Whitsunday last… Declares, That he has one share in the East 
Lothian and Merse Whale-fishing Company in himself and another 
share to which he succeeded by the decease of his said brother David 
Nisbet. Declares, That he is of opinion that these two shares would at 
present sell at par, or £50 Sterling each; and that he is confirmed 
executor of his brother in the share which belonged to him... he goes 
on to say, that half of Colonel Dow’s succession should belong to him 
in right of his brother; and declares, that he had from Colonel Dow a 
promissory note, for L.400 Sterling, which the declarant indorsed to 
Messrs Robert Robertson and Son, in security of a debt, originally due 
to Mr Pillans of Rotterdam, and now in the persons of the said Robert 
Robertson and Son; but that he cannot at present say, whether that 
L.400 promissory note makes part of the debt given in against the 
representatives of Colonel Dow or not, but that the same will appear 
from the state.52 
 
Following this, Johnston called a meeting of the Trustees to confirm the earlier 
decision to advertise the sale of Nisbet’s property. This was held on 25 
January 1788 and attended only by the representative of Alexander Dow of 
Hertford – the creditor with the largest claim. The sale was fixed for 6 
February, but the day before Nisbet gave in a petition on which an interlocutor 
(a judgement given before a suit is concluded) was granted. Johnston argued 
against the interlocutor, citing the appropriate statute, which he believed made 
 
52 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
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it clear that it was for the creditors to decide how to proceed. After a series of 
withdrawn advertisements, Gunsgreen House was finally sold in March 1789 
– to Alexander Robertson.  
 
Below is a summary of the acknowledged debts, but closer examination 
reveals several queries on both sides of the argument.  
 
 
Figure 7/3. Summary of Nisbet’s debts, 178853 
 
Of these debts, the three largest are all, to a greater or lesser extent, dubious. 
They have all been referred to in the previous section and now they can be 
considered in relation to the sequestration. 
 
Mr Dow 
The original sum of £1,500 was borrowed from Colonel Alexander Dow in 
1771. The ‘owner’ of the debt, however, was Alexander Dow of Hertford, a 
brazier. He was the son of Colonel Dow’s last surviving uncle – and the only 
one who outlived him, William Dow. As William had outlived him, he would 
have had a strong argument to be the Colonel’s heir in the absence of a will. 
The discovery of the will, however, or a ‘paper purporting to be a will’ as it was 
described should have placed William in a different position.54 The will was 
perfectly clear 
 
… all and singular such Salary, wages, Prize Money Sum and Sums 
…Do give grant and bequeath unto my beloved friend David Nisbet of 
Eymouth in North Britain merchant and to his assigns for ever and I do 
 
53 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
54 NA, C/12/658/19 
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nominate him the said David Nisbet Sole Executor of this my last will 
and Testament…55 
 
Dow of Hertford’s will, dated July 1802, refers to the bond: ‘…whereas I am 
entitled to or otherwise interested in a certain sum of money arising due or 
payable under and by virtue of an Heritable Bond upon an Estate in Scotland 
of the late Colonel Dow…’56 
 
It is indicated in the Interlocutor that Nisbet was not content to accept Dow’s 
right to the heritable bond, although his challenge seems to have been 
unsuccessful. Johnston said 
 
The petitioner has no occasion to enter into the objections which Mr 
Nisbet stated to the claim of Alexander Dow, upon his bond for L.1500. 
It is sufficient to mention, that protestation was sufficient to pass in a 
process of reduction brought for setting it aside.57 
 
The position was that, as the £1,500 was secured on a heritable bond, it 
counted as property and therefore, it passed directly to Dow’s nearest relative 
and was excluded from the will.58 
 
A further peculiarity of Dow’s affairs is that an annuity to a Mrs Isabella 
Touffner, née Mountfort was to be taken out of Nisbet’s resources. Mrs 
Touffner is referred to in the will of Dow of Hertford as ‘a woman who formerly 
cohabited with the said Colonel Dow’.59 It is clear from this will that Mrs 
Touffner’s annuity was due to be paid from Colonel Dow’s effects, in particular 
from the proceeds of the heritable bond. She certainly made her case by filing 
a bill in the Court of Chancery 
 
against these trustees and all others concerned, praying that she may 
be paid the amount of her demand, as a just and lawful creditor on the 
estate, in preference to those who may be entitled to the free residue, 
after payment of debts.60 
 
55 NA, Prob 11/1091/280 
56 NA Prob 11/1377/272. 
57 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
58 NRS, Register of Sasines, 17/143. 
59 NA, Prob 11/1377/272. 
60 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
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The whole business of the resolution of Dow’s will was complex and difficult to 
follow. In terms of Nisbet’s sequestration, however, ‘I very much doubt, 
whether Mr John Nisbet’s interest in Colonel Dow’s effects, could at this time, 
with propriety, be brought to market’,61 was Johnston’s dismissal of its 
relevance to the sequestration. 
 
Messrs Robertson and Sons 
This was the Pillans debt, described above. It was challenged in the Court of 
Session and substantially reduced. It caused Nisbet a great deal of bitterness 
and the tone of his comments in his will lead one to suspect a strong element 
of personal feeling in the whole affair. This debt and, in particular, the way it 
was managed and exploited by the Robertsons, is one of the pieces of 
evidence supporting the view that the Robertsons set out to deliberately 
destroy Nisbet. There was certainly no financial imperative and they had no 
personal stake in the matter having chosen to purchase the debt from Pillans 
in 1782. The fact that they did so ‘at an undervalue’ further roused Nisbet’s 
suspicion of their motivation.62 
 
Messrs Bell and Rannie 
This debt, arising from the activities of Duncan Carmichael, was of dubious 
validity, as suggested by the legal challenges to it by George Johnston on 
behalf of the other creditors. Certainly, there seems no evidence that could 
persuade a court of law that Nisbet owed much more than £100 if that. Nisbet 
was acting on behalf of Dow and neither he nor Dow could have foreseen the 
trail of debt that Carmichael would build up and the response to it of Bell and 
Rannie. 
 
The smaller creditors 
Wightman was presumably William Wightman, the doctor in Eyemouth. Could 
this debt have represented charges in connection with Nisbet’s reported 
sickness? Henderson was probably James Henderson and Edgar was 
Andrew Edgar, both fellow merchants and these are to be regarded as normal 
 
61 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor. 
62 NA, Prob 11/1276/239. 
241 
 
trading debts. George Andrew, Writer in Edinburgh, is listed in a later 
document as representing ‘Mr Henry Greig, late Merchant in Gothenburgh’.63 
The figure of £60, however, bears no relation to any of the related documents. 
One creditor, not yet listed, was David Paterson, an Edinburgh Insurance 
Broker, who presented a Protest in May 1788, seeking to be recognised as a 
creditor. This was accepted. This was in respect of an advance of £100 cash 
in return for a promissory note signed by John Nisbet on 13 August 1787, the 
day before his sequestration took effect, plus a further sum of £698 2s 5d in 
respect of advances to James Renton which had been underwritten by Nisbet 
and Sir John Stewart of Allanbank.64 This is dealt with in more detail in the 
section below concerning James Renton. 
 
 
Figure 7/4. Nisbet’s Promissory Note for £100 to Paterson65 
 
Although the date of the sequestration was 1787 and legal disputes carried on 
until 1792, 1789 has been chosen as a cut-off date, as this was when Nisbet 
lost Gunsgreen House and had to move to Tweedmouth, now a suburb of 
Berwick-upon-Tweed on the south side of the river. It is not yet known where 
he lived in Tweedmouth. The resolution of his affairs dragged on to 1812 and 
illustrates some of the complexities of his affairs, even though only a relatively 
small sum was involved. 
 
 
63 Edinburgh, NRS CS228/N2/30, Minutes of a Meeting of the Creditors of John Nisbet, 
Edinburgh, 1805. 
64 Edinburgh, NRS CS229/G/6/2(1–3), Claim for Mr Paterson on the Estate of Mr Nisbet of 
Gunsgreen, 1790. 
65 NRS, CS229/G/6/2 (1–3). 
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Nisbet’s will is a valuable source of information.66 First written in 1793 and 
revised until early 1796, much of it betrays Nisbet’s thought processes at this 
difficult time. He starts by describing himself as ‘John Nisbet of Gunsgreen 
Esq., presently residing at Tweedmouth’. The word ‘presently’ seems, in the 
context, quite threatening. Nisbet named three executors – John Constable, 
attorney at law in Berwick, George Johnston, Writer to the Signet and John 
Nisbet, farmer of Ancroft. Nisbet of Ancroft is presumably a relation, although 
there is no other evidence for this. Nisbet and Constable both refused to 
serve, leaving George Johnston as the sole executor. This was to prove 
significant over the coming number of years, particularly as he was also the 
factor for the creditors. Johnston was an Edinburgh lawyer, a WS – Writer to 
the Signet. At the creditors’ meeting on 15 October 1787 he was appointed as 
the factor (agent) for the creditors and it was he who handled all the legal 
disputes that provide so rich a source of information on Nisbet’s affairs. He 
was also, as mentioned above, the only one of Nisbet’s nominated executors 
who agreed to serve. It was this dual role that caused much of the subsequent 
difficulty. 
 
In November 1787 and July 1788, Nisbet conveyed his interest in Colonel 
Dow’s estate to Johnston, to enable him to recover the money. Nisbet died on 
25 March 1796 and four weeks later a final decree of the Court of Chancery 
was obtained, dividing Dow’s fortune among the several parties concerned 
and identifying for the first time the actual amount of Nisbet’s share, which 
Johnston recovered, save for his portion of a fund set aside to provide Mrs 
Touffner’s annuity.67 Mrs Touffner, incidentally, was reported to be still alive in 
1812. As Johnston was both executor and trustee, on Nisbet’s death and the 
receipt of the funds from India, he began to settle Nisbet’s affairs, paying his 
funeral expenses and current debts, then resolving debts unpaid from the 
sequestration and several legacies and donations made in the will. He formed 
the impression that there would be enough to settle all outstanding matters, so 
he terminated the sequestration. What seems to have happened, however, is 
that Johnston had made no payments at all to any of the creditors claiming 
 
66 NA, Prob 11/1276/239. 
67 NA, C.12/658/19. 
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under the sequestration. He carried on making payments to those in most 
need, notably Nisbet’s housekeeper, Janet Ferguson. This continued until 
1799 when Johnston’s own affairs ‘went into confusion and he found it 
necessary to execute trust deed in favour of certain trustees for behoof of his 
creditors’. The whole matter was most confusing as Johnston had insufficient 
assets to pay his own debts and those relating to Nisbet’s sequestration and 
will. The Trustee, therefore decided it would be prudent to re-activate Nisbet’s 
sequestration to allow the whole matter to be resolved. Johnston having died, 
a new Trustee for Nisbet’s creditors was appointed at a meeting in July 
1805.68  
 
As part of the process of dealing with Johnston’s ‘confusion’ and death, there 
were two meetings of creditors in 1805 and 1812, the minutes of which 
survive. The first meeting took place on 24 July 1805 in the Royal Exchange 
Coffee House in Edinburgh. It was attended by George Andrew WS, 
representing Henry Greig; John Paterson, on behalf of his father David; John 
Gibson WS on behalf of the heirs of the late Andrew Gillie – the first mention 
of Mr Gillie; Charles Bremner WS for Sir John Stuart of Allanbank, presumably 
in relation to the jointly guaranteed advance from David Paterson, and also for 
the representatives of the late Alexander Dow of Hertford, his daughters Mary 
and Elizabeth; Walter Cook WS, agent for William Dick on behalf of his 
children who were Nisbet’s residuary legatees, the descendants of William 
Nisbet, and for Mr Robertson of Prenderguest; and Robert Strachan WS 
agent for the trustees of the late George Johnston, who had died in 1801. The 
purpose of the meeting was to elect a new Trustee to act for the creditors in 
place of the late George Johnston. After some debate, Mr William Molle WS 
was elected by the majority of creditors in value. What the creditors failed to 
address was that Johnston was not only their Trustee, but also the sole 
executor for Nisbet’s will.69 
 
 
68 Edinburgh, NRS, CS177–867, Act Appointing William Molle WS Curator Bonis on the 
Sequestrated Estate of John Nisbet, 1812. 
69 NRS, CS228/N2/30. 
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It took a further seven years to address this outstanding issue, at the meeting 
held on 22 May 1812. In addition, there had been a dispute with William Dick 
concerning Mrs Touffner’s annuity, which also held up the final resolution of 
Nisbet’s affairs. This meeting was attended by fewer parties, William Molle as 
Trustee for the Creditors; James Bremner WS for the representatives of 
Alexander Dow of Hertford; John Orr WS for Mr Thomson, in right of Alison 
Ferguson, Janet Ferguson’s niece, ‘a legatee in Mr Nisbet’s trust deed and 
settlement’ and Mr Strachan WS for ‘Miss Jean (sic) Ferguson, Berwick, an 
annuitant per Mr Nisbet’s settlement’ and also for the representatives of 
George Johnston. 
 
Mr Molle explained the complexities of the matter, that 
 
… there were legatees and annuitants under Mr Nisbet’s settlement, to 
a considerable amount, whose claims were preferable to those entitled 
to the reversion of Mr Nisbet’s funds; but as by the death of Mr 
Johnston … there was now no person authorised to carry the testator’s 
intentions into effect. It therefore occurred to him to be advisable for the 
postponed creditors, legatees and annuitants, to apply to the Court of 
Session to have a curator bonis appointed, for carrying the purposes of 
the Trust into effect… 
 
This was agreed by the meeting, a petition submitted and Molle was so 
appointed on 20 June 1812, finally producing a resolution of Nisbet’s affairs, 
sixteen years after his death and twenty-five years after his sequestration.70 
 
While Nisbet did owe around £4,000 by 1787, he was not without some 
expectations and, indeed, had been actively paying off his debt to Henry 
Greig. What really brought him down was the action of one creditor – Robert 
Robertson and Sons. McAloon, talking of the system of credit in Scotland 
says, of bills of exchange: 
 
it required a fairly disciplined society, aware of the necessity for 
goodwill between creditor and debtor, to make their continued use 
effective. If such qualities had been missing, the whole system might 
have periodically collapsed in an avalanche of lawsuits.71 
 
70 NRS, CS177–867. 
71 McAloon, ‘A Minor Scottish Merchant in General Trade’, 24. 
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The main beneficiary of Nisbet’s sequestration was clearly Robert Robertson’s 
son, Alexander. He was able to buy Gunsgreen House cheaply and set up 
home in the smartest house in Eyemouth.  
 
There are perhaps three indicators of the personal nature of the 
sequestration. The first sign that something unusual was happening was that 
Robert Robertson and Sons, having failed to have Nisbet sequestrated with 
the debt that they had purchased from their erstwhile business partner 
Richard Pillans, returned to the Court of Session just nine days later, having 
become aware of the heritable bond that had been assigned to Alexander 
Dow of Hertford. 72 
 
It has been shown above how Nisbet successfully resisted the sale of 
Gunsgreen House in February 1788. A letter written from Edinburgh by 
George Home of Branxton, who inherited Paxton in 1809, to his cousin, 
Patrick Home MP of Billie, whose young brother Thomas had been indentured 
to John Nisbet in 1750 reveals more about Nisbet’s feelings. The letter 
discussed a range of family and local business, before George added a note 
at the foot: 
 
I had the Inclosed from John Nisbet, after thanking him in your name 
for his good intentions towards you. I told him I was convinced you 
would not Interfeer with the purchase in any respect – I can not say I 
perfectly understand the purport of the Letter – The poor man I believe 
would do any thing rather than it should fall into Mr Robertson’s hands 
– and he will be mad if he pays £3000 for it, which is the upset price.73 
 
The letter is dated 3 February 1788, just three days before the original 
scheduled date for the sale of Gunsgreen House, to which it clearly refers. 
Unfortunately the ‘Inclosed’ is missing. 
 
The third piece of evidence is John Nisbet’s will, which contains two versions 
of the following instruction. The earlier one indicated that Nisbet would 
undertake it himself. It was revised in early 1796: 
 
72 Johnston, Petition against an Interlocutor.  
73 Paxton House. 
246 
 
I hereby grant full power and authority to follow furth and prosecute a 
process of Reduction of the sale of the Lands and Estate of Gunsgreen 
… and houses in Eymouth ... purchased by Alexander Robertson of 
Prenderguest from the trustee on my said sequestrated Estate and of 
damages against him for having purchased up a Debt against me at an 
undervalue and for having taken the advantage of me at an advanced 
period of my life by which much expence has been incurred and for 
making the aforesaid purchase and to take such other steps as redress 
of the injuries I have sustained by reason of his proceedings which 
process I intend to institute against the said Alexander Robertson.74 
 
Reduction in this sense means the annulment or setting aside of an action by 
legal process – in other words, overturning the sale of the house.75 It is clear 
from this that Nisbet believed that the Robertsons had sought his downfall and 
it appears that he was right in this belief. What is harder to deduce is why? It 
can certainly be guessed at – Nisbet’s house would have been an affront to 
the Robertsons, the doyens of the local merchant community. They had a 
house on the waterfront in Eyemouth, overlooked by Nisbet’s ‘palace’. Nisbet 
represented new money and he was a notorious smuggler. The Robertsons 
were not innocent of smuggling, but it appears to have been only a side-line, 
not their main business. Nisbet’s bitterness at his downfall, and the role of the 
Robertsons in it comes through all too clearly. 
 
The purpose of sequestration was to ensure a fair outcome to creditors when 
a trader was unable to pay his debts. In Nisbet’s case, this was patently not 
the outcome of the sequestration process. The neediest debtor, Alexander 
Dow of Hertford, died before the position was resolved. The Robertsons were 
the one party who achieved what seems to have been their objective – the 
purchase of Gunsgreen House at a cheap price. The fact that they bought it 
demonstrates that they were not interested in any financial settlement; they 
would have had no need of the relatively small sum they were owed. They 
had bought the debt from Pillans in the first place, so they had, perhaps, 
always intended to make use of it in the way that they did. 
 
 
74 NA, Prob 11/1276/239. 
75 Robinson (ed.), The Concise Scots Dictionary. 
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Nisbet laboured under several disadvantages, particularly, perhaps, that his 
key business was smuggling. This may have led to his exclusion from polite 
society and, perhaps, the local masonic lodge and even made his cash flow 
less reliable. This was reinforced by the fact that he was mostly involved in 
imports, so inevitably relied on credit. He had two large loans in his career: 
£1,500 each from his brother David and from Colonel Alexander Dow. David’s 
death in 1784, when John was at a vulnerable point in his life and Dow’s early 
demise in 1779 left him vulnerable, with two debts related to Dow being 
significant factors in his failure. Even though some sort of deal seems to have 
been done with Dow’s representatives, whereby half his wealth should have 
been left to David, this proved to be so controversial to Dow’s family and 
connections that Nisbet was unable to access any of it.76 This was 
exacerbated by the transfer of the right to the £1,500 heritable bond to Dow’s 
cousin, Alexander of Hertford.  
 
The documentation offers an unusual enough picture of the ‘road to 
bankruptcy’ of a merchant but a very rare breakdown of the business affairs of 
a smuggler, or merchant-smuggler. It is this body of paperwork which lends 
John Nisbet such significance in the study of the business of smuggling. 
 
7.3 James Renton 
 
James Renton was born in 1749, son of the Eyemouth lawyer John Renton 
and older brother of David Renton, also a lawyer in Eyemouth. He was the 
cousin of John Gibson of Fairnieside, who acted as an agent for Henderson 
and Renton throughout the 1770s and whose later smuggling career is dealt 
with below. Renton was married to Margaret Home, Robert Robertson’s first 
wife’s niece – his relationship with Robertson is described in chapter three. He 
appears to have been involved in trading from the age of eighteen, the first 
reference being to a cargo brought in on the ship Dunbar of Dunbar in March 
1767. Part of the cargo was managed by James Grey, who had been John 
Nisbet’s clerk in 1760.77 Renton joined the Lodge St Ebbe in December 
 
76 NA C12/658/19. 
77 NRS, E504/10, 30 March 1767. 
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1768.78 There is little concrete evidence for Renton being involved in 
smuggling early in his career, although much that is circumstantial; for 
example, he used one of Nisbet’s more active smuggling masters, Peter 
Dalgleish in 1770, for voyages from Riga and Memel,79 shortly after Dalgleish 
on the Ann & Peggy of Eyemouth had shot at the King’s Boat during a 
prolonged chase which ended with a substantial seizure of spirits.80 There is 
also a possibility that the importation of timber from southern Norway was 
effectively a ‘cover’ for the smuggling of contraband from the Danish Asiatic 
Company. Kent quotes several sources which encourage this belief, and this 
is also discussed in Chapter 6.81 
 
At the end of his career Renton had a relationship with John Nisbet. In 1786, 
for example, Nisbet and Sir John Stewart of Allanbank, tenant of Gunsgreen 
House, stood surety for Renton when he borrowed £500 from David Paterson, 
an Edinburgh insurance broker.82 This loan provoked a dispute in 1796 
between the Assignees of James Renton and the Trustee of John Nisbet – an 
interesting coming together of the representatives of bankrupts in England 
and Scotland.83 The evidence led in this case confirmed that Renton and 
Nisbet had had a business relationship: 
 
There were separately a variety of mercantile transactions between 
John Nisbet and James Renton which as final winding up, left a 
balance of £74.10.4 due to Mr Renton. The Right to which debt having 
vested in the respondents as Assignees under the Commission of 
Bankruptcy they made claim upon the sequestrated estate to the effect 
of recovering the amount…  
 
The dates of the ‘mercantile transactions’ are unclear. The Trustee for 
Nisbet’s estate had seemingly argued that the account was prescribed. The 
Assignees responded that that ‘Merchants Books and Letters in re mercatoria 
… do not prescribe for twenty years, which has not yet elapsed, that if 
 
78 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.  
79 NRS, E504/10, 14 July and 18 September 1770. 
80 NRS, CE56/2/4, 19 April 1770. 
81 Kent, War and Trade. 
82 NRS, CS229/G/6/2(1–3). 
83 Edinburgh, NRS, CS229/12/4/27, David Hume, Answers for the Assignees of James 
Renton Late Merchant in Berwick Now Deceased to the Objections Stated to Their Interest in 
the Sequestration of the Estate of John Nisbet, 1796. 
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undergoing any shorter prescription it has been kept alive by the Citation 
given in 1792 at the instance of the Assignees…’ 
 
The complexities of the dealings over the loan from David Paterson are too 
great to enter into here; the key element is that it illustrates the apparently 
close relationship between Nisbet and Renton. It seems likely that, if he was 
not involved earlier, Renton had turned to smuggling as his business began to 
fail, perhaps with the advice and support of John Nisbet, in accordance with 
Smith’s dictum that ‘the presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as 
upon all other occasions, and to entice so many adventurers into those 
hazardous trades.’84 The key evidence for this change of direction is in the 
shipping records.85 An analysis of these shows that Renton dominated the 
local timber trade – between 1775 and 1784 for example, he was involved in 
28 out of 33 timber importing voyages into Eyemouth and then stopped 
abruptly after August 1784. This is, according to the report from the Customs 
quoted below, about the time he moved to Berwick-upon-Tweed. The 
Eyemouth timber trade itself continued in much the same scale without him. 
One indication of something happening was that, after having used a wide 
variety of ships from different places, suddenly Renton used the Elizabeth 
(also known as the Betsy and Peggie) of Berwick-upon-Tweed under her 
master John Lyon, to bring in timber and iron from Gothenburg four times in 
1782–1784. As mentioned below, Lyon was a notorious smuggler. There is 
other evidence that Renton did more than import timber with Lyon: 
 
Gentlemen, 
Having considered your Report of the 2nd Instant on the petition of 
James Renton Merchant at Berwick, praying the delivery of two kegs of 
oil under stop out of the Betsey and Peggie John Lyon Master from 
Oporto for not being reported by the Master. We direct you to return the 
same as a Seizure for Condemnation.86 
 
What can be deduced from this? It is known that Renton’s business failed in 
1788. Could it be that he was in financial difficulties some years earlier? 
 
84 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, p.213. 
85 NRS, E504/10, 1775–1786. 
86 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 6 September 1785. 
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Robert Robertson, with whom he had family and business connections, was 
getting old, he died in 1788, and so had he turned to John Nisbet who, 
although also semi-retired, perhaps still had contacts in the smuggling trade 
and was able to set Renton up with Lyon? It is clear from the evidence cited 
earlier that Renton did work with Nisbet, in a way not revealed in the 
Collector’s Quarterly Accounts. There is also a coincidence of timing between 
Nisbet’s bill of exchange with Henry Greig in December 1783 and Lyon’s 
arrival from Gothenburg for James Renton in late October that year. 
 
 
Figure 7/5. Notice of James Renton’s bankruptcy sale, from the Newcastle Courant, 
27 December 1788 
 
The advertisement describes Renton as a wine merchant, and he had 
obviously spent money on improving his premises. The timing of his failure is 
surely not unconnected with the phasing out of tea smuggling following the 
Commutation Act of 1784, given that he was trading with Norway and 
Gothenburg when his timber business was at its height. He had a ship arriving 
from Gothenburg virtually every year, either when he was in partnership with 
John Henderson,87 or when he was trading on his own account. In 1776 two 
ships bringing in his cargoes from Memel had been stopped and had 
contraband seized, so the temptation to take advantage of connections in 
Gothenburg would have been hard to resist. One other factor may have been 
the impact on the timber trade of the ending of the American War of 
Independence. 
 
87 NRS, GD267/27/81. 
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Date Ship Master 
(agent) 
Comments 
20.5.1771 Lively (Eyemouth) G. Young 
(JG) 
Recorded in Gothenburgh 
8.8.1771 Sea Hero (Kinghorn) W. 
Sibbald 
(JG) 
Linked to J. Sibbald of 
G’burgh 
4.6.1773 Nancy (London) J. Fowler 
(JG) 
 
17.5.1774 Peggie (Kincardine) R. Hodge 
(JG) 
 
18.5.1776 Venus (Leith) T. Philp 
(JG) 
 
29.4.1777 Mary (Ely) J. Duncan   
Two years of records missing 
13.6.1780 Elizabeth (E’mouth) J. Peart  
14.9.1781 Elizabeth (E’mouth) J. Peart  
24.4.1782 Elizabeth (BuT) J. Lyon Same ship as Betsy & 
Peggie 
2.6.1783 Betsy & Peggie (BuT) J. Lyon  
24.10.1783 Betsy & Peggie (BuT) J. Lyon  
12.7.1784 Betsy & Peggie (BuT) J. Lyon  
  
Table 7/1. Voyages from Gothenburg for Henderson and Renton or James Renton. 
Voyages where John Gibson acted as agent identified (JG).88 
 
His engagement with Lyon, as mentioned above, was surely a desperate last 
move, designed to try and keep his business afloat. Renton had links with 
John Nisbet, John Lyell and John Gibson, the three other protagonists in this 
chapter. John Lyon also had a relationship with Nisbet and Henry Greig, 
handling two of Nisbet’s payments to Greig in late 1784 and early 1785.89 
 
7.4  John Lyon 
 
Little is known of John Lyon’s life, but he could perhaps be seen as a 
transitional figure between the merchant-smuggler represented by Nisbet and, 
to an extent, by Renton, and the later professional smugglers linked to 
Gibson. The reason for suggesting this is that the description of Lyon’s ship, 
the Elizabeth or Betsy & Peggie as ‘barely 60 tons, and rigged like a smack, 
square sterned and (with) a very long top mast’90 indicates a more specialised 
smuggling vessel, one that sounds as if it was based on the Berwick smack – 
 
88 NRS, E504/10, 1771–1784. 
89 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
90 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 18 July 1785. 
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the fast coastal sailing vessels which were operated on the route from 
Berwick-upon-Tweed to London.91 
 
As indicated in Table 7/1 above, Lyon undertook voyages from Gothenburg on 
behalf of James Renton four times between 1782 and 1784. In addition, Lyon 
was reported in July 1785 as 
 
a very little man humpbacked; this vessel sailed from the 17th May with 
grain for London and was off Dover the 18th of June on her passage to 
Oporto to load a cargo of wine for Berwick.92  
 
This is clearly the voyage when Lyon imported the oil for Renton that was 
subsequently seized by the Customs.93 As mentioned in chapter six, in the 
autumn of 1785 it was written by the Customs that ‘getting hold of his vessel 
will be difficult as he is a most Compleat artfull Fellow for the Business. No 
capture will destroy smuggling on that Coast as much as securing this 
vessel.’94 
 
In the 1780s, therefore, he was clearly seen as a significant figure in the 
smuggling business in south-east Scotland. He also had some sort of 
relationship of trust with either Henry Greig direct, or through his apparent 
London contact, Gavin Young or his Edinburgh lawyer George Andrew. This 
relates to Nisbet’s transaction with Greig and the associated Bill of Exchange, 
which Nisbet paid off in instalments. Two of these were received by John Lyon 
in Berwick-upon-Tweed, to a total of £79 18s.  
 
 
91 Barrow, ‘Corn,Carriers and Coastal Shipping’, p.16. 
92 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 18 July 1785. 
93 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 6 September 1785. 




Figure 7/6. Reverse of Bill of Exchange showing John Lyon’s  
signature for payments by John Nisbet95 
 
7.5 John Lyell 
 
John Lyell falls into George Tod’s category of those smugglers who ‘removed 
to distant parts’, re-locating his home to Findon in Sussex, where he made a 
new life for himself, and his business to London. He distanced himself so 
much from his past that when his grandson’s biography was published in 
1913, the author, while associating the family home at Greystonelees with 
stories of smuggling, was quick to disassociate smuggling from the Lyells: 
‘there is nothing to connect them (the stories of smuggling) with George Lyall. 
He died in 1801, not rich, but a man of standing and repute…’96 There is a 
Lyall Terrace in Burnmouth, the community nearest to Greystonelees. 
 
The evidence from the official records is clear, however, that the Lyell family 
(the spelling was modified) was deeply involved in smuggling. This account, 
from late August 1780, links them to the raid on the King’s Warehouse in 
Eyemouth:  
 
95 NRS, CS229/Y/1/17. 
96 Mortimer Durand, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Alfred Comyn Lyell (Edinburgh 
London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1913), pps 1 -3. 
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It also appearing by the Declaration of the Tidesmen that five Ankers of 
Spirits were likewise seized by them among the corns of George Lyell 
Tennant in Graystonlies in presence of him and Christopher his son, 
the Smuggling Cutter at that time lying off shore in their sight – when 
the son Christopher at that time threatened the officers with getting 
twenty or thirty of the Smugglers to land and take back the goods again 
out of the Warehouse and in fact a boat from the Smuggler having 
soon after landed and convened with the Lyels, the Crew fired 
immediately after the Officers , and the Warehouse was also broke 
open that night But neither Lyell nor his son being examined, the same 
is also to be done. And you are to report the Result of the whole for our 
further consideration.97 
 
In mid-July 1785, a further report specifically linked John Lyell to the 
smuggling business and, further, indicated that Greystonelees was known to 
the authorities as a centre of the trade. 
 
Having received Information that Frauds to the prejudice of the 
Revenue have been committed from on board the Sloop John of which 
John Lyal was several years master and is now the reputed owner, 
which vessel is at present commanded by one Whitehead and has for 
the above time generally cleared from Newcastle for Hamburgh, 
Norway and Sweden under the command of one of them, and delivered 
a Cargo of Lumber at Newcastle having previously discharged her 
Contraband Goods at or near a place called Graystonelees near 
Eymouth (near which place lives George, the father of the 
abovementioned John Lyal.) and very likely will be there in a very short 
time as she cleared from Newcastle 21st June for Christiana, 
nominally…98 
 
There are several notices in the Newcastle Courant of the ship John with Lyell 
named as master clearing for the ports as described. An example of these is 
shown below. Other notices place a comma between John, the name of the 
ship and Lyall, the master, as with the other ships shown.  
 
97 NRS, CE56/2/5B (31 August 1780). 




Figure  7/7. Notice of ships ‘cleared for over sea from Shields’, from the Newcastle 
Courant, 17 June 1780, showing the John Lyall bound for Hamburg 
 
The significance of Greystonelees was reinforced in the same report as 
above, which also linked the Lyells with John Lyon: 
 
… also that the Sloop Elizabeth … commanded by one Lyon… but as 
this vessel belongs to the same Fraternity… there is no doubt but a 
good part of the cargo will be attempted to be landed at or near 
Greystonelees, probably in August.99 
 
The sources for Lyell’s career are relatively slight, but Durand does review the 
early history of his subject’s antecedents. George Lyell was at Greystonelees 
in the 1750s and by 1761 was able to buy a piece of land in Castlegate in 
Berwick-upon-Tweed, where he built a house. John was the eldest son, born 
at Greystonelees in September 1752. Durand says that John was given a 
good education and then moved to Newcastle, where he married Jane 
Comyn, the daughter of a ‘broken’ former Jacobite, who was ‘out’ in 1745. 
Their first son, George, was born in Newcastle in 1779.100 This evidence is 
supported by the shipping records from the Newcastle Courant and the 
reports in the customs records, quoted above. He was still in Newcastle in 
1785, but in 1788 his fifth son was born in Stepney. There is no clear 
explanation for his move to London, but it certainly gave him the opportunity to 
reinvent himself, which he did as a ship owner and proprietor of a house at 
Findon in Sussex. Indeed, he even chartered a ship, the Herculean, to the 
East India Company in 1800 and 1802, ironic given his earlier career.101 
 
When he died in 1805, he owned a house in Findon, an Estate and Farm in 
Virginia, the house that his father had built in Berwick, two ships wholly 
owned, a share in another, a sloop and a three-hundred-pound investment in 
 
99 NRS, CE56/2/5C, 18 July 1785. 
100 Mortimer Durand, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Alfred Comyn Lyell,  pps 3 - 4. 




the local turnpike road in Sussex. Although straying a little from the theme, the 
careers of his sons illustrate his progress. The first son George, born in 
Newcastle, inherited his father’s business, twice served as Conservative MP 
for the City of London and was a director of the East India Company, 
chairman in 1830. The fifth son, William, was Dean of Canterbury from 1845 
to 1857 and is buried in a marble tomb in the cathedral there.102 
 
John’s will refers to his father’s will as ‘now in the possession of Mr David 
Renton, Writer in Eyemouth’. This was the same David Renton who was 
engaged by the Board of Customs to collect the precognitions (witness 
statements) in relation to the raid on the King’s Warehouse in Eyemouth and 
the related incident at Greystonelees, at which George Lyell combined with 
the smugglers to see off the customs men who were searching his haystacks. 
A further layer of complexity is that David Renton later lived at 
Greystonelees.103 The naming of John’s brother, Christopher’s, children 
clearly reinforces this connection with the Renton family. A son was 
christened David Renton Lyell and a daughter Isobel Renton Lyell. David and 
Isobel Renton were siblings to James. Christopher, of course, was mentioned 
in the account of the incident at Greystonelees.104 
 
7.6 The Gibsons of Fairnieside 
 
Writing in 1809, Robert Kerr gave an assessment of the state of smuggling at 
that time: 
 
Formerly by various evasions of the revenue laws, a considerable 
contraband trade, in wine, foreign spirits, tea and tobacco, was carried 
on at Eyemouth. But this illicit traffic, by the amendment and better 
execution of the revenue laws, is now happily abolished. Even a petty 
smuggling trade, mostly in Hollands gin, and chiefly confined to fishers, 
and other low people, now very much curtailed, or at least seems to 
have changed its place of action to the English side of the borders. 
Such men… are much encouraged to persevere by regularly 
 
102 Clive Dewey, The Passing of Barchester (London: The Hambledon Press, 1991). 
103 London, NA Prob 11/1435, Last Will and Testament, John Lyall, 1805.NRS Scotland’s 
People, SC60/41/12 Inventory of the Personal Possessions of David Renton of 
Graystonelees, 1849 
104 Tom Lyall Two Brothers. 
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established agents of the Kentish and Flushing smugglers who allow 
credit for the smuggled goods…105 
 
The Gibsons can be seen to represent this ‘new’ smuggling, which replaced 
the business of the merchant-smugglers. It can be no coincidence; Kerr is 
clear about this: that it took over at about the time that tea smuggling was 
effectively stopped by the 1784 Commutation Act and that it concentrated on 
alcohol. The Gibsons lived at Fairnieside, a farm on the coast close to 
Burnmouth, and to Greystonelees. John Gibson, who had acted as a shipping 
agent in the 1770s and was a Messenger (court official) and auctioneer, was 
the head of the family. He was also related to James Renton – he was his 
cousin. Gibson named one of his daughters Jean Renton. 
 
In a letter to his cousin, Patrick Home of Wedderburn, David Home, from the 
branch of that family dispossessed after the 1715 rising, wrote of an 
encounter with John Gibson in about 1793.106 Gibson had ‘professed much 
Friendship’ for David Home and provided him with some seed and some help 
with his farming. He also gave him a gallon or so of spirits. ‘All this while 
inveighing against Smuggling, but I soon discovered him to be one of the most 
treacherous of all the contraband Tribe’. Gibson presented Home with an 
account for over twenty pounds. Home had a lot of trouble with Gibson, and 
his son, whom he described as a ‘Republican Puppy’.  
 
In 1801, a Folkestone smuggler, John Dangerfield, the eighteen-year-old 
master of a smuggling lugger, was observed with his crew landing a cargo of 
spirits at Burnmouth. In 1806 ‘a Friend to the Publick’ wrote to Lt Robert 
Nicholls of the Eyemouth Sea Fencibles linking the Gibsons to Dangerfield.  
 
…10th July Dangerfield’s cutter landed her Cargo near Eyemouth… I 
am informed she landed 7 or 800 ankors at these places… 600 
anchors where landed at Burnmouth, Mr Gibson of Funeside had 3 
men assisting in carrying the anchors on Shore. There must have been 
a great quantity landed at Burnmouth for there was no less than 6 
Carts whent through this place… Ten Days the Smugglers either from 
 
105 Kerr, General View, p.7.  




Furnside or Burnmouth for I saw all six with my own eyes, Mr Wlm 
Frazor and his son at Hallow Down and John Dangerfield and severall 
other agents who stay at Furny Side at times…107  
 
In October 1806, David Home – no friend of the Gibsons, as indicated above 
– also wrote a letter complaining about the Dangerfields, describing how 
Dangerfield was at ‘Berwick to meet his ships with fresh Cargoes from 
Flushing and continues to remain there and smuggle unmolested.’108 
 
The relationship between the Gibsons and the Dangerfields was cemented in 
1811 by the marriage of John Gibson’s daughter Isabella to John Dangerfield. 
In the record of their wedding, Dangerfield is described as ‘of this parish’ and 
a brewer. It seems, therefore, that he had a respectable business, while also 
acting as an agent for smugglers from Flushing, having earlier actively 
smuggled from Folkestone. These facts, and those above, bear out Kerr’s 
assertions regarding the changes to the smuggling trade, and its move south 
of the Border. Incidentally, the future of the couple bore similarities to that of 
their former near neighbours, the Lyells. They settled in Edinburgh, where 
John became a fish curer in quite a substantial way of business and their son, 
John, went to University and became a Church of Scotland Minister. The New 
Statistical Account, prepared in the 1830s describes Fairneyside as 
 
a good property extending along the sea coast, with an ancient 
mansion and farmhouse… the former occupied by farming tenants and 
the latter by farm servants. Here, also smuggling concealments have 
lately been discovered indicating a two-fold traffic carried on by a 
former tenant, the history of which is sufficiently recent to be pretty well 




What can we learn from these five case studies? One is, yet again, the 
apparent normality of smuggling, emphasised by Adam Smith, who merely 
 
107 Jim Tibbett, The Dangerfield Family of Folkestone (Victoria, Australia/Norfolk, England: 
2010), p.10. 
108 Tibbett, The Dangerfield Family of Folkestone, p.11.  
109 Tibbett, The Dangerfield Family of Folkestone, p.12.  
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described it as ‘the most hazardous of all trades’.110 The whole twenty-five-
year process of the sequestration and settlement of Nisbet’s affairs was 
carried through following the normal legal processes. The only indications that 
Nisbet was anything other than a legitimate merchant were the legal 
challenges to two of the debts on the basis that they were incurred for 
unlawful purposes. The tone of the George/Patrick Home letter bears out this 
view: that Nisbet was not seen as a criminal or gangster, but as a sympathetic 
character in a difficult position. 
 
What we see in Nisbet’s failure is the collapse of the financial viability of a 
man on the verge of retirement, almost certainly brought about deliberately by 
the Robertsons, possibly exacerbated by the impact of the Commutation Act 
of 1784. The loss of his house seems to have caused him a great deal of 
upset and the fact that the Robertsons purchased it for a bargain price caused 
him particular anguish. Due to the complexity of his dealings and his 
smuggling activities we are given a very detailed picture of the failure of the 
business of a merchant in a small port in Scotland, despite the absence of any 
of Nisbet’s own records. 
 
James Renton operated what seems to have been a successful timber 
business, often involving partners and associates. In later life he moved to 
Berwick-upon-Tweed, perhaps as Eyemouth harbour became increasingly 
unsuitable for larger ships. He was described in the advertisement for his 
bankruptcy sale as a wine merchant. What is apparent, however, is that in the 
early 1780s he moved into serious smuggling in association with one of the 
most notorious smuggling skippers in the area, John Lyon and, almost 
certainly, with John Nisbet. The timing of his failure,1788, does seem to 
suggest a connection with the Commutation Act – his regular trade with 
Gothenburg, must be strongly suggestive of tea smuggling. 
 
John Lyon was seen by the authorities as a leading smuggler and had 
relationships with Nisbet, Renton and the Lyells. His role in handling Nisbet’s 
 
110 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, p.213. 
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payments to Gavin Anderson, acting for Henry Greig is of particular interest. 
The lack of more information about his career is tantalising. 
 
John Lyell, who had moved away from home and set up as a ship owner in 
Newcastle was also clearly involved in smuggling, in association with his 
father, brother and John Lyon, at the very least, as late as 1785. His son 
George was born in London in 1788, so, as with Renton and John Nisbet, the 
timing of this change of direction coincided with the implementation of the 
Commutation Act. Lyell, of course, made a sensible decision to re-locate, and 
was able to reinvent himself to the extent that he was seen as being the 
respectable father of a family of successful children, educated at the best 
schools and universities. 
 
The Gibsons and their associates the Dangerfields represent the new world of 
professional smuggling, with a system of agents connected with the fast, 
purpose-built smuggling craft from Folkestone and Flushing. Paton had 
implied that tea smuggling was the gateway to smuggling wine and spirits.111 
The implication of the change is that smuggling tea was undertaken by 
merchant-smugglers ‘in the most regular and systematic manner a trade the 
most lawfull could not be carried on more avowedly’112 while the new 
smuggling, largely confined to gin, was the business of ‘fishers and other low 
people’113 supported by a network of agents, as the Guernsey smugglers were 
in Cornwall.114 Effectively smuggling changed from an activity run by the 
middling sort, supplying goods such as tea and claret to fellow middle class 
citizens to a much more working class occupation, with ‘fishers and other low 
folk’ supplied via agents and dealing in gin, presumably supplying a market 
mainly consisting of local working people. 
 
Is it fair, then, to see John Nisbet, supported by his brother David, as the last 
of the serious merchant-smugglers of south-east Scotland, with his John 
Adam house, his ships and his ‘esquire’? James Renton, son of a lawyer, 
 
111 NRS, GD51/3/194/1–2. 
112 CS 229/NI/60. 
113 Kerr, General View, p.7. 
114 Jamieson (ed.), A People of the Sea, p.211.  
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seems only to have moved into regular smuggling late in his career, while the 
Lyells of Greystonelees were probably not to be seen as merchant-smugglers, 
more as one of those farming families with land on the coast, referred to in 
Chapter 4. In many ways, the Nisbets were unique, particularly with regard to 
their pretension in building Gunsgreen House and it may well be the case that 
this hubris helped to bring about their downfall, provoking the Robertsons to 
have them sequestrated. 
 
The Commutation Act of 1784 seems to have brought about a change in the 
culture and methodology of smuggling in the area in the second half of the 
1780s. There clearly was such a change, reported at the time by both George 
Tod and Robert Kerr and the loss of the market in contraband tea seems to 
have been the most likely explanation. By looking in detail at these five 
smugglers, it can be seen how this change impacted on the fortunes of these 
individuals, the most successful of whom was the one who moved furthest 
away, from both his home and his previous reputation. 
 
What these case studies have shown is the way that smuggling was managed 
in south-east Scotland in the years leading up to 1784. It demonstrates clearly 
the close relationship that John Nisbet had with Henry Greig of Gothenburg. It 
is this relationship that inspired the development of this thesis and the 







This thesis has clearly demonstrated several key propositions relating to 
smuggling in the eighteenth century in south-east Scotland. It is clear that 
smuggling in Scotland accompanied economic development and post-union 
‘enlightenment’ agricultural improvement schemes and was not a ‘throw-back’ 
to something earlier. John Nisbet could only conduct his activities in 
Eyemouth because it acquired a harbour big enough to accommodate his 
ships and had road and trade networks that were sufficient for him to transport 
goods safely and efficiently inland, together with access to credit facilities to 
make those deals attractive.  
 
Chapters one and two explain the background to the development of the port 
of Eyemouth and its hinterland and demonstrate how smuggling was able to 
grow on the back of an expanding international trade in grain and timber, and 
closer ties across the North Sea with Norway, Sweden and Denmark, as well 
as with the Netherlands. As chapter three demonstrates, these activities led to 
the growth of a group of substantial merchants, whose activities ranged 
across legitimate and illegal trade, with John Nisbet standing out as the most 
blatant of the smugglers, the builder of an imposing Georgian house on the 
basis of almost entirely ill-gotten gains. The Minister of Ayton, writing in the 
1830s, reported that ‘It was in allusion to this mansion-house [Gunsgreen] that 
a member once observed in the Senate [House of Commons], that smuggling 
was carried on to such an alarming extent on the east coast of Scotland that 
one man had been enabled, from its gains, to erect a splendid palace.’115 
 
If smuggling was organised as a business so was revenue enforcement in this 
part of the country, as chapter four makes clear. While the processes of ‘state-
formation’ had created a revenue service that had branches in every port, the 
primary purpose of the service was to extract tax from the smugglers, not to 
bring an end to smuggling itself. Consequently, Scottish smuggling lacks 
stories of violent confrontation between smugglers and the authorities, 
 
115 George Tough, ‘Parish of Ayton’, Statistical Account of Scotland (1834–1845). 
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because smuggling was conducted like legitimate commerce and the 
authorities sought to enforce tax payments in a similarly business-like manner, 
within the limited resources at their disposal. John Nisbet’s career provides a 
particularly concentrated example, because he was a man who did little else, 
and invested his profits ostentatiously, but he operated in the guise of a 
prudent merchant, rather than as a ‘desperate’ smuggler. 
 
The distribution of contraband is detailed in chapter five. Some of the 
customers were innkeepers and merchants, while others were probably the 
end consumers. Aside from the evidence relating to Nisbet, there is also the 
will of Charles Swanston, a local smuggler, showing that he was owed money 
by innkeepers, a carrier and a church minister. The Nisbet brothers made use 
of a local carrier and there is evidence that they supplied wine merchants in 
Edinburgh and Newcastle, as well as using contacts in Leeds to move goods 
to London.  
 
The improvement of local agriculture, as well as supporting the development 
of Eyemouth harbour, provided landowners and farmers in the hinterland with 
increased disposable income to purchase luxury goods and also ensured the 
availability of transport, with increasing numbers of carts and wagons required 
to move grain to the port. As with the development of the port itself, the 
societal changes brought about by agricultural improvement during the 
Scottish Enlightenment, industrial development around Newcastle and the 
increasingly prosperous – and numerous – landowning and professional 
classes in Edinburgh provided the impetus for the growth of smuggling. The 
apparent existence of a market in Scotland for high quality tea, not capable of 
being satisfied by the East India Company, together with a residual fondness 
for claret, when French wines were heavily taxed, further supported the 
contraband business. 
 
John Nisbet’s case opens the door to understanding a distinctively ‘Northern’ 
system of smuggling, which was substantial in scale, dependent on 
international trading companies, and which imposed significant distortions on 
the patterns of the supply and consumption of tea in Britain, explained in 
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chapter six. This thesis demonstrates that ‘Gottenburgh’ teas were a 
distinctive brand, which dominated tea consumption in Scotland and northern 
England. Such teas were sold openly, at prices that the legitimate trade from 
the EIC could not match, and on credit terms that made them even more 
attractive. This trade was of such high volume and profitability that it formed 
the primary business of the Swedish and Danish East India Companies. As 
soon as the tariffs on tea were lowered, their profit-margins disappeared and 
both companies failed in short order.  
 
John Nisbet was merely one cog in this mechanism of supply that stretched 
from China, via Sweden and Denmark, back to Norway and Holland, and then 
across the North Sea to the Scottish east coast. Its particularly Scottish 
orientation may have reflected the presence of Jacobite exiles and other 
Scots among the merchant community of Gothenburg, as well as Scots’ 
preference for Congou over Bohea teas. Chapter seven shows how Nisbet 
rose and fell alongside the fortunes of the tea trade and the profitability of the 
two Scandinavian East India Companies. His immediate downfall was 
provoked by local rivalries, and the Robertsons’ desire to acquire his most 
prized possession, Gunsgreen House. However, the concurrent 
disappearance of other participants in the ‘Northern’ smuggling trade shows 
how Nisbet’s fate also depended on the fiscal rules of this broader geo-
political, geo-economic system. 
 
The stereotypical image of the villainous smuggler, initially prompted by the 
reporting of the Hawkhurst Gang, has been kept alive by the enthusiastic 
reporting of local historians. What this micro-historical study has clearly shown 
is that many smugglers were indistinguishable from local merchants, other 
than that they dealt in contraband. Perhaps the stereotype should rather be 
the bespectacled clerk with a clipboard overseeing the transfer of his master’s 
goods into small boats.  
 
Across the North Sea, merchants were buying from merchants and 
distributing goods to retailers or customers in this country, with a great 
enterprise – the SOIC – heavily dependent on smuggling and a market for 
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goods, whose branding, ‘Gottenburgh Teas’, indicated their true nature, 
growing in Scotland and the north of England. The true significance of this is 
that smuggling – and tea smuggling in particular – was all pervasive. It was 
widely believed that hardly any ‘legal tea’ was consumed north of the Trent, so 
virtually the whole population of that area was complicit.  
 
What effect did it have? Tea smuggling certainly boosted tea consumption in 
Britain and, thereby the consumption of sugar from the West Indies and the 
trade in slaves to produce it. It provided Sweden with a heritage of a great 
trading company, exemplified by the headquarters building of the SOIC, now 
the City Museum in Gothenburg, and a reconstructed Swedish East Indiaman, 
which has even visited Guangzhou (Canton) in recent years. Many Swedish 
homes have collections of Chinese ceramics from the eighteenth century. The 
East India Company was left, at one point, with a vast surplus of unsold tea in 
London, which it was permitted to export to the American Colonies, where 
Boston merchants – who did well out of tea smuggling themselves – 
encouraged the dumping of the tea in Boston Harbour, thereby providing one 
of the sparks of the American War of Independence.  
 
This study of one small port and its smuggling business draws attention to the 
effect of this early wave of globalisation, with Swedes, including Scottish 
exiles, buying South American silver from Spain to take to China to exchange 
for good quality tea, which was brought back to Europe. Much of it was then 
smuggled into Britain, where it helped to create a wider market for tea, grow 
the market for sugar and support the growth of pottery and other decorative 
art manufactures.  
 
What this thesis demonstrates is the existence of a distinctive form of 
smuggling operating in the North Sea, which helped to create a substantial 
market for tea in northern Britain and formed the basis of the economic 
success of two important Scandinavian trading companies. The business of 
smuggling, in terms of the suppliers, the smugglers and their customers 
followed the pattern of eighteenth-century trade, with a group of merchant-
smugglers dominating the business. These merchant-smugglers owned their 
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own ships, had access to credit, bank accounts – in London as well as 
Edinburgh – and, in the case of John Nisbet in particular, owned a magnificent 
house which completely dominated the town and harbour of Eyemouth, just as 
he dominated the smuggling trade.  
 
Mϋller, Mackillop and Kent have written about aspects of northern smuggling,  
Murdoch and Zickermann have written extensively about the Scottish 
communities in Gothenburg and northern Germany and the Muis and Cole 
have looked in detail at tea smuggling. This in-depth examination of the port of 
Eyemouth and its merchant-smugglers produces a much more detailed 
analysis of that phenomenon.116 Mackillop has looked at the distribution of tea 
to individual customers, which has not been possible for this study, but the 
strength of this work is the combination of new sources, relating to Eyemouth, 
with an informed re-examination of earlier work. In addition, the increasing 
availability of online sources, such as the British Newspaper Archive, 
Scotland’s People and the Sound Toll Records, for example, has allowed for 
the development of both a wider and deeper picture of the sale of tea, 
including the development of ‘Gottenburgh Teas’ as, in contemporary terms, a 
brand and of the understanding of the trade and merchant community of 
Eyemouth, never previously examined in such detail.117 
 
There are, inevitably, unanswered questions. How typical was Eyemouth? Its 
geographical advantages are highlighted in chapter two, but these apply to 
other ports. It does seem that the port was redeveloped by the ‘County’ to 
provide an outlet for grain from the improved farms of the Merse, the rich 
agricultural district of Berwickshire. Can it be said that agricultural 
improvement paved the way for Eyemouth to become a centre for smuggling? 
Why are respectable merchants in Newcastle and Leeds dealing with at least 
one smuggler in south-east Scotland? How important was the Jacobite 
connection between Scotland and Gothenburg?  
 
116 Mϋller, ‘The Swedish East India Trade’; idem, ‘The Swedish East India Company’; 
Mackillop, ‘A North Europe World of Tea’; Kent, ‘War and Trade in the Northern Seas’; 
Murdoch, ‘Network North’; Mui and Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784’; 
Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth Century Smuggling’; idem, ‘The Arithmetic of Eighteenth Century 
Smuggling: Rejoinder’. 
117 Janes, ‘Fine Gottenburgh Teas’. 
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The research associated with this thesis reveals a series of issues that can be 
pursued in future studies. These include the history of the port of Eyemouth 
itself and the coastal grain trade, the relationship between Eyemouth and 
Newcastle, the role of the ports of south Norway in smuggling, including a 
clearer view of Danish tea imports into Britain, and the life and career of 
Alexander Dow, Nisbet’s one-time clerk who rose to become a minor literary 
figure in London.  
 
What may be most important, however, is to highlight the importance of 
smuggling as an arm of trade in eighteenth-century Britain, first identified by 
Ramsay in 1952.118 Whenever the history of the trade of a port is being 
examined, smuggling should be treated as an integral part of that study.
 
118 Ramsay, ‘The Smuggler’s Trade’. 
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Appendix 1. Eyemouth Merchants c.1740–1790 
 
The purpose of this table is to identify merchants active in Eyemouth in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, to indicate the scale of their activity – 
through the number of recorded voyages and the level of detected smuggling 
activity associated with them. It then shows their association with the main 
networking opportunities discussed in chapter 3.5.1–4. It also notes if they pay 
Window Tax, a further indicator of wealth. What is clear that involvement in 
smuggling was no bar to participation in any of the bodies concerned, except 
for John Nisbet’s exclusion from the Masonic Lodge. Perhaps the scale of his 
smuggling activity was simply too extensive to be acceptable. 
 
Name Active  Voyages Smugs Mason WT  Kirk  EL&M Notes 
John 
Aitken 













1749–1768 58  X X   Many voyages as 





1770–1782 34 1 X  X  Cousin of James 















1744–1770 13 6 X X  X  
William 
Grieve 
1786–1787 7  X X    
James 
Henderson 
1764–1775 41 1 X X   Mostly with 
James Renton; 

















1765–1768 7      Agent for Thomas 
French 
John Keith 1727–1747 17 1 X X   d.1771;10 
voyages pre-
1742 




Name Active  Voyages Smugs Mason WT  Kirk  EL&M Notes 
1740s and 1750s; 
based in Dunbar 
James 
Martin 
1747–1761 68 3 X   X d. 1761; brother-








X X      
David 
Nisbet 








































1770  1  X X   Partner to P. 
Grieve 
27    23 18 4 5  
 
Key: WT = Window Taxpayer; EL&M = shareholder in East Lothian and Merse Whale Fishing 
Company; Smugs = reported smuggles. The sources for this table are the Minutes of Lodge 
St Ebba,1 the records of Eyemouth Kirk Session,2 Customs Records3 Berwickshire tax 
records4 and the wills of some of the people involved. 
 
1 Minutes of Lodge St Ebbe.  
2 Eyemouth Kirk Session. 
3 Minutes of the Board of Customs; Dunbar Customs Letter Books. 
4 Window Tax Records, Berwickshire. 
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Appendix 2. Glossary of smuggling and associated terms 
 
Term Meaning Comments 
Anker Small, portable barrel, ideal 
for carrying by hand or 
slung over a horse. 
Described in the OED as 
containing 10 ‘old wine gallons’ 
or 8 imperial gallons. 
Appraised value The value of seized goods 
as appraised by local 
officials. 
‘the appraisement of the Goods 
is invested in Trusty and 
Experienced Officers.’ 
Breaking Bulk Transferring wine, spirits 
etc. from Hogsheads to 
Ankers. 
Treated as evidence of intention 
to smuggle. 
Composition A price agreed between the 
owner of seized goods and 
the authorities to allow them 
to be reclaimed. 
Had to be agreed by the Solicitor 
to the Customs, generally when 
evidence to support a successful 
prosecution was deemed 
inadequate. 
Condemnation The forfeiture of seized 
goods following 
prosecution. 
After this the goods were 
generally auctioned, with the 
‘appraised value’ being the 
equivalent of the reserve price. 
Contraband Illegal or prohibited traffic. Often used as shorthand for 
contraband goods. 
Cutter Fast sailing boat. Term generally used for customs 
boats. 
Deforce The use, or threat, of 
violence sufficient to 
prevent an officer of the law 
from doing his duties. 
 
Fair Trade Legitimate trade – with all 
taxes and dues paid – the 
opposite of contraband. 
The OED has it that it was also 
used in the eighteenth century as 
a ‘euphemistic synonym’ for 
smuggling, although it has no 
source for this term. 
False Destination Shown on ship’s papers – 
usually ports such as 
Bergen. 
To allow ships to cruise up the 
coast seeking to run goods 
justifying their presence and 
explaining away their cargo of 
contraband. 
Free Trade The OED definition is ‘open 
and unrestricted trade’ but 
is often used as a synonym 
for smuggling. 
In fact, the earliest OED 
references to Free Trade 
meaning smuggling are in two 
novels by Sir Walter Scott – Guy 
Mannering (1815) and 
Redgauntlet (1824). 
Headport The main port in a customs 







Term Meaning Comments 
Hogshead Large barrel used for 
transport. 
Described in the OED as 
containing 63 ‘old wine gallons’ 
or 52½ imperial gallons. 
Hovering Limits The distance offshore – 
three miles – within which a 
ship loitering could be 
assumed to be involved in 
smuggling. 
The OED defines hovering as ‘to 
wait near at hand’. 
Lugger Specialised sailing boat. Term generally used for 
smuggling vessels. 
Outport A smaller subsidiary port in 
a customs district. 
Sometimes referred to as a 
creek. Eyemouth in Dunbar 
district. 
Prohibited Goods Goods such as tea whose 
import by merchants was 
forbidden. 
The import of tea was subject to 
a monopoly of the Honourable 
East India Company. 
Rummage Search of ships, premises 
etc. by the authorities. 
 
Run Landing contraband, 
generally away from a port 
or harbour. 
 
Seize Technical term used for the 
formal confiscation of 
contraband. 
Goods were liable to seizure 
upon suspicion of fraud or 
running. Common causes of 
seizure were hovering, running, 
false oath by masters and failure 
to declare the whole cargo. 
Following seizure, the goods 
were generally either 
discharged, subject to a 
composition, or condemned 
following prosecution. 
Smuggle (noun) An incident of smuggling.  
Tierce Literally one third – a unit of 
measure the equivalent of 
one third of a pipe of wine. 
The OED defines this as 42 ‘old 
wine gallons’. 
 
Note: the sources are the OED and E.E. Hoon The Organisation of the English 
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